1919 German federal election with 1918 electoral reform
Erinthecute
Well-known member
- Location
- Australia
- Pronouns
- she/her
In Andreas Schulz's book How would the 1919 National Assembly elections have turned out if absolute majority voting had been retained?, he models the results of the 1919 election using the Reichstag electoral system as reformed in August 1918. The Imperial Reichstag was elected via single-member constituencies using the two-round system, with the top two candidates proceeding to a runoff. The electoral boundaries were first drawn up in the 1860s-70s and had remained almost completely unchanged since. The constituencies, which had never really been particularly equal in terms of population to begin with, became absurdly malapportioned in the following decades. By 1912, the smallest constituencies comprised around 60,000 residents while the largest, Teltow-Beeskow-Storkow-Charlottenburg south of Berlin, had over 1.3 million. A similar pattern was found across the country; in general, more urbanised areas were underrepresented compared to rural areas. This had a particular impact on the SPD, the party of the urban working class. As such, despite taking the largest share of votes in every election since 1890, it wasn't until 1912 when they finally won a plurality of seats in the Reichstag.
Reform to the electoral system had been discussed for many years, but disagreements over what should be done and opposition from the conservatives and Centre prevented action. By the time the Great War began, the critical importance of the government securing passage of its budgets allowed the Social Democrats and left-liberals, who were in a strong position after the 1912 election, to force a deal in exchange for their support. At the beginning of 1917 a draft reform bill was published. The fundamentals of the electoral system were to remain; most seats would still be elected via the two-round system, and the constituency boundaries were left almost untouched. However, in constituencies with over 300,000 residents, additional seats were to be added, elected via proportional representation using the largest remainder method. Large cities were also unified into single constituencies with multiple members. Berlin, previously comprising six constituencies which massively underrepresented the populous working-class suburbs, was to comprise a ten-member constituency. Meanwhile, the Teltow-Beeskow-Storkow-Charlottenburg constituency would have seven seats. A similar pattern followed across the country; a total of twenty-six multi-member constituencies were specified. The bill also provided for additional seats to be added automatically as constituencies grew beyond 300,000 people, and for every additional 200,000 residents.
This was not a radical change to the system - indeed, the vast majority of seats remained the exact same as they had been previously. Only affording additional seats to cities with over 300,000 residents, while most other constituencies contained half as many or fewer, still left urban areas severely underrepresented. Likewise, the use of proportional representation actually aided the non-socialist parties by giving them a chance to win seats in previously impregnable Social-Democratic strongholds. Nonetheless, the greater weight given to urban areas was a win for the SPD, and the mere fact that they had secured the reform was a significant concession from the liberal-conservative establishment. Proportional representation also gave them the security of guaranteed representation, whereas previously they were often frustrated by the runoff system which allowed the anti-socialist parties to unite behind an opposing candidate to deny them seats. The electoral reform bill was passed in August 1918 with strong support; it was opposed by the Conservatives, Poles, and USPD.
Of course, this system was never used. Only a few months later, the November Revolution saw the dissolution of the Empire and proclamation of a new republic. The provisional Council of People's Deputies legislated a new electoral system under which the entire parliament was to be elected via party-list proportional representation. The use of "pure PR" is often cited as a weakness of the Weimar Republic, leading to weak governments and instability, which contributed to its downfall. Andreas Schulz explores what would have happened if the reformed Imperial electoral system had been used for the 1919 election. Would the SPD have won an outright majority? Would a more stable government have been possible?
It's not easy to translate the results to a series of single-member constituencies, and there is a high degree of uncertainty about how things would have turned out. Factors such as individual candidate choices and joint nominations are impossible to account for. Likewise, predicting the results of runoffs proved extremely difficult. Schulz relies as much as possible on the actual results data, assuming for simplicity that the strongest and second-strongest party in each constituency sends a candidate to the runoff. He then projects the outcome based on the relative strength of the parties, leanings of the electorate, and history of the constituency. Due to the inherent uncertainty of the task, however, he puts forward two models for the election. Model A ssumes a high degree of success for the socialist parties in runoffs, with Social Democrats managing to win support from much of the left-liberal electorate as well as minority voters, and the SPD and USPD support one another. Model B is just the opposite: the socialist parties are marginalised, left-liberals are more likely to support nationalist and Centre candidates, or stay home. In practice, this means that whenever the outcome is at all in doubt, Model A predicts a victory for the more left-leaning candidate and Model B predicts a victory for the more right-leaning candidate. Lack of granularity in the data also means some multi-member constituencies have divergent results in the two models, following a similar logic.
Reform to the electoral system had been discussed for many years, but disagreements over what should be done and opposition from the conservatives and Centre prevented action. By the time the Great War began, the critical importance of the government securing passage of its budgets allowed the Social Democrats and left-liberals, who were in a strong position after the 1912 election, to force a deal in exchange for their support. At the beginning of 1917 a draft reform bill was published. The fundamentals of the electoral system were to remain; most seats would still be elected via the two-round system, and the constituency boundaries were left almost untouched. However, in constituencies with over 300,000 residents, additional seats were to be added, elected via proportional representation using the largest remainder method. Large cities were also unified into single constituencies with multiple members. Berlin, previously comprising six constituencies which massively underrepresented the populous working-class suburbs, was to comprise a ten-member constituency. Meanwhile, the Teltow-Beeskow-Storkow-Charlottenburg constituency would have seven seats. A similar pattern followed across the country; a total of twenty-six multi-member constituencies were specified. The bill also provided for additional seats to be added automatically as constituencies grew beyond 300,000 people, and for every additional 200,000 residents.
This was not a radical change to the system - indeed, the vast majority of seats remained the exact same as they had been previously. Only affording additional seats to cities with over 300,000 residents, while most other constituencies contained half as many or fewer, still left urban areas severely underrepresented. Likewise, the use of proportional representation actually aided the non-socialist parties by giving them a chance to win seats in previously impregnable Social-Democratic strongholds. Nonetheless, the greater weight given to urban areas was a win for the SPD, and the mere fact that they had secured the reform was a significant concession from the liberal-conservative establishment. Proportional representation also gave them the security of guaranteed representation, whereas previously they were often frustrated by the runoff system which allowed the anti-socialist parties to unite behind an opposing candidate to deny them seats. The electoral reform bill was passed in August 1918 with strong support; it was opposed by the Conservatives, Poles, and USPD.
Of course, this system was never used. Only a few months later, the November Revolution saw the dissolution of the Empire and proclamation of a new republic. The provisional Council of People's Deputies legislated a new electoral system under which the entire parliament was to be elected via party-list proportional representation. The use of "pure PR" is often cited as a weakness of the Weimar Republic, leading to weak governments and instability, which contributed to its downfall. Andreas Schulz explores what would have happened if the reformed Imperial electoral system had been used for the 1919 election. Would the SPD have won an outright majority? Would a more stable government have been possible?
It's not easy to translate the results to a series of single-member constituencies, and there is a high degree of uncertainty about how things would have turned out. Factors such as individual candidate choices and joint nominations are impossible to account for. Likewise, predicting the results of runoffs proved extremely difficult. Schulz relies as much as possible on the actual results data, assuming for simplicity that the strongest and second-strongest party in each constituency sends a candidate to the runoff. He then projects the outcome based on the relative strength of the parties, leanings of the electorate, and history of the constituency. Due to the inherent uncertainty of the task, however, he puts forward two models for the election. Model A ssumes a high degree of success for the socialist parties in runoffs, with Social Democrats managing to win support from much of the left-liberal electorate as well as minority voters, and the SPD and USPD support one another. Model B is just the opposite: the socialist parties are marginalised, left-liberals are more likely to support nationalist and Centre candidates, or stay home. In practice, this means that whenever the outcome is at all in doubt, Model A predicts a victory for the more left-leaning candidate and Model B predicts a victory for the more right-leaning candidate. Lack of granularity in the data also means some multi-member constituencies have divergent results in the two models, following a similar logic.