Erin's Erfurt III Experience

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The thing about the Weimar Republic is that there was simply too much going on.

There really, really was. In 13 years they had nine parliamentary elections, two presidential elections, two national referendums, thirteen Chancellors, twenty-one federal cabinets... we're used to steady pace of modern politics, but the Weimar Republic was completely chaotic. Everything happened at a breakneck speed. The Nazis went from a marginal force nobody really thought about to establishing total dictatorial control in three and a half years. The reorientations and internal struggles within the parties were happening year to year, conference to conference. It's a shock that anyone got anything done.

 

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The SPD-led grand coalition was quickly beset by internal conflicts, particularly between the DVP and SPD. They faced troubles on the domestic front, such as strikes in the Ruhr and the brutal police response to KPD-led May Day protests in Berlin which resulted in the deaths of 33 civilians. On the foreign affairs front, tensions were high with both Poland and Russia. The government did achieve some successes, particularly the Young Plan and the establishment of social programs including a national unemployment insurance scheme and the expansion of pension coverage. However, the Wall Street crash and resulting collapse of American capital flow into Germany abruptly ended the steady economic growth and began the onset of the Great Depression.

At the beginning of 1930, the SPD sought to increase government contributions to unemployment benefits as more and more people found themselves out of work. The cabinet struggled to agree on how it should be done, and the SPD parliamentary faction refused to accept a compromise put forth by Chancellor Müller and Centre leader Heinrich Brüning. Desperate, Müller attempted to get around this by requesting that President Hindenburg exercise his powers under Article 48 of the Constitution. Article 48 allowed the President to exercise extraordinary powers if he believed an emergency situation called for it, such as issuing emergency decrees bypassing normal constitutional procedure. In this case, Müller requested that he promulgate the government's proposed legislation without approval from the Reichstag. Hindenburg refused. Seeing no alternative, Müller resigned as Chancellor. Hindenburg appointed Brüning as his replacement and asked him to put together a government.

This event, and what ensued afterwards, was an extremely important turning point for the republic. The Brüning government was not formed on the basis of a parliamentary majority, but at the personal commission of Hindenburg. This kind of presidential government had been discussed as a theoretical for a number of years, particulary among conservative circles who favoured it as a way to undermine the power of the Reichstag.

The concept went as follows: the President has sole power to appoint the Chancellor, and thus control over the composition of government. Article 48 also allows him to bypass the Reichstag and govern via emergency decree. While the Reichstag has the ability to topple governments via motions of no confidence and to veto decrees made under Article 48, the President also has the power to dissolve the Reichstag. If exercised in tandom, the President could appoint a government of his preference, utilise Article 48 to enforce policy and, if challenged by the Reichstag, dissolve it and call fresh elections. Whether Hindenburg deliberately allowed the Müller government to fail in order to replace it with a presidential government or whether he simply believed it was the best solution for the moment remains a matter of debate. Nonetheless, the appointment of Brüning as Chancellor dramatically changed the power dynamic within the Weimar political system.

Brüning's key focus as Chancellor was to get the economic situation under control, which he planned to accomplish by enforcing a harsh austerity programme - freezing wage increases, slashing benefits, and raising taxes. This was as popular as you would expect it to be. Brüning's cabinet was not so much a coalition as a series of personal appointments, and comprised ministers from the Centre, DVP, DDP, BVP, and Wirtschaftspartei. It was well short of a parliamentary majority. Brüning's budget proposals were firmly rejected by the Reichstag, opposed by the SPD, KPD, DNVP, and Nazi Party. In response, Brüning requested that President Hindenburg enforce them via Article 48 instead, to which he agreed. The Reichstag then vetoed his decree on 18 July. Later that day, at Brüning's request, Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag and schedule new elections for 14 September.

The 1929-30 period saw a lot of movement within and between parties, particularly on the bourgeois-conservative side of politics. The DNVP suffered a series of moderate splits: first the Christian-Social People's Service (CSVD) in late 1929, who aimed to become a Protestant equivalent to the Catholic Centre. They were followed by the wing around Kuno von Westarp in July 1930, who formed the Conservative People's Party (KVP); further defections took place in August. Meanwhile, the death of long-time DVP leader Gustav Stressemann in 1929 sent the party into a tailspin and sapped much of their popularity and profile. They attempted to form a common platform with likeminded bourgeois parties, but the Wirtschaftspartei and new KVP both declined. The DDP took a significant lurch to the right after merging with the paramilitary branch of the völkisch Young German Order, which led to an exodus of its progressive members. It subsequently rebranded as the German State Party (DStP).

On the administrative front, the pace of change to district borders picked up from 1929 onwards. Compared to 1929, they were changes in the Lower Rhineland, Westphalia, and Bavaria. The small, rural state of Waldeck was also abolished, merging into Hesse-Nassau. In Westphalia, Bielefeld grew its borders, and there was a general reorganisation of the area south of the Ruhr - Dortmund absorbed the remainder of Hörde, becoming a truly monstrous city, while Bochum, Witten, and Hagen were both expanded and their rural districts abolished, with the new Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis covering the area to the south and west. A similar reorganisation took place across the border: the cities of Elberfeld and Barmen were merged into Elberfeld-Barmen (later renamed Wuppertal), and Duisburg and Hamborn into Duisburg-Hamborn (later just Duisburg). Essen was greatly expanded to absorb most of its former rural district. Similarly, Krefeld, Neuss, and Remscheid were expanded and their rural districts abolished or reorganised; Remscheid's merged with Solingen's. Cologne-Land also merged with Mettmann. Münchengladbach to the west was reorganised and renamed Gladbach-Rheydt, while Viersen became an independent city. Finally, the cities of Sterkrade and Osterfeld became part of Oberhausen. In Bavaria, Würzburg city was greatly expanded, Nuremberg grew a little in the northwest, the Bamberg-Land districts were unified into one, the district of Stadtamhof surrounding Regensburg was absorbed into Regensburg-Land, Augsburg-Land absorsed Zusmarshausen district, the district of Berneck in Upper Franconia was divided between its neighbours, and Bad Reichenhall was separated from Berchtesgaden district.

The months leading up to the election were troubled and featured a marked increase in violence compared to past campaigns, especially between the Communists and Nazis. By this time, the latter were acknowledged as a significant political force and were expected to make substantial gains. Nazi rallies attracted thousands and appearances by Hitler were particularly well-attended. They capitalised on discontent over the economy, running a novel campaign emphasising national identity and workers' interests in opposition to both the socialist left and bourgeois right. The SPD focused their energy on fighting back against the bourgeois government and the Nazis.

The result was alarming. The exact movement between parties is difficult to estimate due to an increase in turnout - over five million more votes were registered compared to 1928 - but the biggest loser was the DNVP, who lost half their vote share and tumbled to fifth place with just 7%. The DVP, WP, and DStP recorded a decline and all finished around 4%. The SPD also suffered a blow, slipping by five percentage points, but they remained clear of their dismal 1920 and May 1924 results and lost only ten seats overall. This was especially encouraging given that the KPD experienced a surge in support to 13%, rising from 54 to 77 seats.

The biggest story of the election was, of course, the Nazi Party. They soared to second place on a swing of over fifteen percentage points and claimed 107 seats with 18.3% of the vote. This was above even the most generous predictions. Their geography correlated closely with that of the DNVP - particularly East Prussia, Brandenburg, and Silesia - but their support was more dispersed and they performed better in the west than the old nationalist parties. They also broke through in agrarian strongholds such as rural Hesse, Thuringia, and eastern Hanover. They also made inroads in areas the right had never previously breached, seeing success in towns across the country and, interestingly, the southwest of Saxony. In perhaps the greatest indication that they were not simply DNVP 2.0, their region of greatest dominance was Oldenburg. They also notably did not pick up the DNVP vote in rural Protestant areas of Franconia. The DNVP, for their part, were reduced to just their heartland of Farther Pomerania and East Prussia - they were almost erased elsewhere. Overall, East Prussia flipped to the Nazis and the DNVP took just 25% of the vote in Pomerania, barely coming out on top in a tight three-way race with the SPD and Nazis.

The SPD's losses were quite uniform. The only exception were their strongholds of the eastern Ruhr and in Berlin, where they faced a strong swing to the KPD. They were also able to expand modestly into former DNVP territory such as parts of Brandenburg, Silesia, Pomerania, and the districts around Nuremberg. The Communists bolstered their margins in Merseberg and Düsseldorf East, and secured a plurality in Berlin thanks to strong performances in the city centre, eastern boroughs, and Neukölln. In the Ruhr they also won Duisburg-Hamborn and Hagen from the SPD. The collapse in DNVP support in Thuringia saw them claim Erfurt and its surrounding district.

The Centre again continued its slow decline, particularly in the Rhineland and Baden. The BVP's performance was a mixed bag, strengthening in rural heartland while slipping in more marginal areas. It was also unable to capitalise on the collapse of the DNVP in Bavaria - that honour went to the agrarians, specifically the CNBL, which had been renamed to the Deutsche Landvolk (DLV). They swooped in and claimed almost all of the rural Protestant territory the DNVP had previously dominated. This more than compensated for the losses they suffered to the Nazis in other parts of the country, and they almost doubled their overall result to 3% and 19 seats. The DBP and DHP both suffered substantial losses while the WBWB recorded a marginal decline. Among the bourgeois parties, the DVP failed to win a district for the first time, notably losing their stronghold of Königsberg city to the Nazis. The DStP also fell short of a plurality for the second election running. The new CSVD, however, saw some success, replacing the DNVP in both the district and city of Siegen in southern Westphalia and winning Grafschaft Bentheim in the Emsland.

The events of 1929-30 were incredibly damaging to Weimar democracy. It was the beginning of the end for the republic. The parliamentary system was effectively abolished and the Reichstag, thoroughly divided between KPD, SPD, bourgeois, and Nazi, had no chance of asserting itself against the new presidential government. The relationship between the executive and legislature had become coercive, with the latter risking harsh punishment for acting out. The Weimar coalition was shattered as the Centre under Brüning became Hindenburg's go-to when forming policy, and the SPD became ever more isolated. The 1930 election result worsened the situation drastically. From this moment on, the Nazis were the defining political force in Germany. The other parties watched them carefully, and their actions and goals dictated the behaviour of the republicans, bourgeois, and communists alike.

The SPD in particular were paralysed by fear and indecision by their emergence. After the 1930 election they made the highly controversial decision to prop up the Brüning government in confidence motions and veto votes, believing this was the lesser of two evils compared to the risk of Nazi ascendancy in a snap election. In doing so they were burdened with responsibility for enabling the government's brutal anti-worker policies while still being completely excluded from power and the legislative process. It goes without saying that this was massively alienating for their base and deeply unpopular in the party itself. The leadership, though conflicted, insisted that there was simply no alternative.

 

[Ares96]

Steglitz having a normal one, I see.

 

[Erinthecute]

Brüning's approach to tackling the depression achieved two things: making him deeply, deeply unpopular, and failing to help to spiraling economy. The economic and political situation continued to deteriorate throughout 1931. Hindenburg and the cabinet governed almost exclusively by decree and the SPD continued its policy of propping them up in the Reichstag. During this time, Brüning approached the Nazis in hopes of securing more support in the Reichstag, but they insisted upon being included in government, which both Brüning and Hindenburg would not accept. Thus, they remained excluded from power.

State elections throughout the year showed a clear trend: a massive decline for the moderate parties, particularly on the right, and a dramatic increase in support for the Nazis and, to a much lesser degree, the Communists. In May, the Nazis stormed to victory in Oldenburg with 37% of the vote, followed by the SPD on 21%, the Centre on 17%, KPD on 7%, while the DNVP, DVP, and DDP won just 3-5% each. In the SPD stronghold of Hamburg, the September election proved a three-way race between the SPD (28%), Nazis (26%), and Communists (22%). The Nazis' popularity grew with alarming speed: a particularly tough blow came in November when they won decisively in the left-leaning state of Hesse. Each of these results produced an unworkable parliament, leaving the outgoing governments in caretaker mode until literally the end of the republic. The entire German political, legal, and administrative system was breaking down - not all at once, but steadily and surely. By now, it was only a matter of time.

As it turned out, the first federal electoral challenge post-1930 was not caused by the dissolution of the Reichstag, as due to the SPD's efforts it survived not only 1931 but well into 1932. Instead, it came from the scheduled expiration of Hindenburg's seven-year term. It was no secret that Hitler sought the presidency, and given the fragmented political system and developments of the last few years, Hindenburg's re-election was far from guaranteed. Brüning made efforts to corral the Reichstag into amending the constitution to extend his term, but the DNVP and Nazis refused to supply the two-thirds majority required. The parties thus began preparing for would undoubtedly be a brutal campaign.

Hindenburg had never planned to seek a second term. At this point he was 84, which is known in the biz as "old as shit", and wasn't as sharp as he used to be. But Brüning and his allies were of the belief that he was the only viable candidate to keep Hitler out. Hindenburg obviously knew well in advance that there would be a push for him to run again, but nonetheless he took some convincing. At the beginning of February an appeal was published extolling his virtues and calling for his re-election, which was signed by numerous figures from the moderate right. After this, Hindenburg acquiesced and agreed to stand again.

The Centre, DVP, BVP, and DStP all quickly endorsed him, but the DNVP and nationalist groups like the Young German Order refused to come aboard. With the right split, Brüning knew that Hindenburg would need support from all remaining republican forces to ensure victory. The Social Democrats were keenly aware that this included them, and in the lead-up to the election they announced that they would not stand a candidate and instead endorse Hindenburg. They pointed out that he had stayed loyal to the constitution during his term and stated that, in the current situation, their number one priority was the preservation of the democratic order and the defeat of fascism, whatever the cost. This was, as with everything the SPD had done since 1930, highly controversial within the party. Nonetheless they committed themselves to the task with surprising energy. The newly-formed Iron Front, a confederation comprising the SPD, its paramilitary wing the Reichsbanner, and the bulk of the trade union movement, was deployed to unite and rally the party. They proved a formiddable force, capable of mobilising millions of workers and activists to campaign and demonstrate during the election.

While the moderate parties united around Hindenburg with relative confidence, the nationalist right did not do the same for Hitler. The DNVP and Stahlhelm refused to subordinate themselves to him and instead put forward their own candidate, Theodor Duesterberg. He was positioned as a more moderate conservative who would appeal to industrialists and agrarians, in contrast to the demogogue Hitler. For perspective, Duesterberg was the chairman of the Stahlhelm and in the previous decade had been considered a radical within the already-extreme group, successfully pushing for the expulsion and banning of all Jewish members. In response to his candidacy, the Nazis did some digging and exposed that Duesterberg himself was of partial Jewish ancestry. Duesterberg was unaware of the fact and had a nervous breakdown, attempting to resign from the Stahlhelm, but his allies convinced him to carry on his campaign.

Let's step back a moment and consider the position that the country has now found itself in. Seven years ago, Paul von Hindenburg was the candidate of the anti-democratic, monarchist, völkisch right. He was opposed by a vibrant and powerful republican coalition, whom he only bested thanks to his unparalleled personal appeal. By 1932, having now de facto abolished parliamentary democracy and begun running the government on his own whim, he was considered the candidate of democracy and backed primarily by those who had fought tooth and nail against him in 1925. The nationalist right was split between two candidates, both leaders of violent extremist movements, whose campaign strategies revolved around trying to be more antisemitic than one another. The only other candidate was Ernst Thälmann, a committed Stalinist. All of these candidates were staunchly and vocally opposed to the republic.

Bleak would be putting it lightly. The first round of the election took place on 13 March.

Hindenburg fell just short of an absolute majority, enough to ensure he would win in the runoff, Thälmann or no Thälmann. Hitler placed a distant second with 30%; Duesterberg was a flop, winning just 7% of the vote. Thälmann recorded a respectable 13%. The geography of Hindenburg's result was stark compared to 1925, looking a lot more like Marx's performance than his own. Centre and BVP support saw him dominate Catholic regions, while the SPD delivered him their strongholds. Hitler won much traditional nationalist and agrarian territory, putting on particularly strong performances in northern Hanover and Oldenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, rural Hesse, and also Protestant parts of Franconia where the Nazis had failed to break through in the 1930 Reichstag election. He won overall pluralities in Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein, as well as Chemnitz-Zwickau, which actually proved one of his strongest regions. Duesterberg won two pluralities overall, both in rural Farther Pomerania. Thälmann took three, all KPD heartland: Solingen in the Ruhr, the Saalkreis in Merseberg, and Zella-Mehlis in Thuringia. He failed to overcome the united republican push in Berlin, even in strongholds such as Wedding. A fun historical tidbit: to this day a remnant of this election remains standing in the city of Weimar, in the form of a very faded sign reading "Wählt Thälmann" painted onto the side of a house.

Turnout was 86%, higher than the 1930 election and much higher than in the first round of the 1925 presidential election. In fact, with 18.65 million votes, Hindenburg beat his 1925 runoff performance by four million votes. Hitler won 11.34 million, five million more than the Nazis had garnered in 1930.

 

[Erinthecute]

Duesterberg withdrew after the first round, leaving the runoff to shape up as a Hindenburg v Hitler contest. Thälmann predictably refused to drop out, but his campaign had lost most of its energy. The most interesting developments in the time between rounds came from the camp who had backed Duesterberg - the DNVP and Stahlhelm refused to endorse anyone, with the latter calling for its members to abstain. Most industrialists and groups likewise remained neutral, though a few, including Fritz Thyssen and the Reichslandbund, announced their support for Hitler.

The second round took place on 10 April. Hindenburg issued a decree banning campaign activity over Easter, restricting it to the final week before the vote.

As expected, Hindenburg won by a wide margin, taking 53% of the vote. However, Hitler clearly gained more from Duesterberg's withdrawal. Compared to the first round, Hindenburg gained 700,000 votes while Hitler gained 2.08 million. Thälmann suffered a sharp loss of almost 1.3 million votes, a full quarter of his initial support. Looking at the map, Hitler was able to consolidate his performance in the areas where he broke thorugh during the first round. These include agrarian regions like eastern Hanover, where he secured an overall plurality, and Pomerania, but also industrial regions like Thuringia and Merseberg, which he won thanks to Thälmann's strong presence. He also managed to win one borough in Berlin, Steglitz. Demographically, women voted strongly for Hindenburg while Hitler and Thälmann were backed primarily by men.

 

[Erinthecute]

Though the republican and bourgeois camp celebrated the presidential election result, Hindenburg himself was unsettled. As a staunch conservative he resented having to rely on Catholic and socialist voters. His ire was directed primarily at Brüning, who had been the mastermind of the campaign and his key cheerleader. However, his dissatisfaction with Brüning and his policies had been growing for some time. A particularly disruptive episode came just a few days after the presidential runoff, when defence minister Wilhelm Groener issued a ban on the Sturmabteilung (SA), the paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party. The SA were responsible for an enormous amount of violence by this time, particularly in clashes with the KPD and its paramilitary, which frequently ended with deaths. However, the German military leadership opposed a ban on the SA since they saw them as a potential ally and source of recruits.

Enter Kurt von Schleicher, chief of the defence ministry's office and one of Hindenburg's closest allies. He was a military man through and through, and a staunch reactionary; he had helped pioneer the concept of the presidential government. Schleicher was outraged by Groener's decision and worked to force him out. He resigned in mid-May. This was just one of several episodes in early 1932 that damaged Hindenburg's confidence in Brüning and his cabinet, whom he increasingly viewed as incompetent and unreliable. Throughout the early months of 1932 he constantly insisted he was on the verge of a breakthrough in regard to canceling Germany's obligation to pay reparations, but it never came.

Brüning's approach to the depression also became increasingly desperate. In a particularly boggling move, he began working on a new programme in which he essentially gave up on economic recovery and instead proposed regressing Germany to an agrarian economy by resettling unemployed workers from cities to the countryside. To do this, he planned to end subsidies to agricultural estates in the east of the country, most of which were deeply indebted and completely reliant on government support for survival. Ending subsidies would both free up a huge amount of public money for the national budget and precipitate the financial collapse of the estates, allowing the government to acquire the land for settlement.

This was utterly unthinkable for the conservatives. In both a symbolic and material sense, the estates represented the power, influence and heritage of the noble and landed classes who ruled in the Empire. To deliberately allow them to fail was a direct attack on the rights and privileges of the rightful ruling class and all the values conservatives and monarchists held most dear. Not to mention that many of them had interests directly tied up in these estates. It's really difficult to overstate how offensive this idea was to almost every person and group that Hindenburg had ever sought to align himself with. As far as they were concerned, the government had basically gone communist overnight. This is all without mentioning that the president himself lived on an estate at Neudeck which was reliant on subsidies to stay afloat. On 29 May, Hindenburg announced that he would no longer sign any decrees at Brüning's request, essentially issuing a one-man motion of no confidence in his cabinet. Brüning resigned the next day.

In his place, Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen, outspoken leader of the Centre's right-wing and one of the party's staunchest arch-conservatives. Over the previous year he had become increasingly critical of Brüning's reliance on the SPD and advocated closer cooperation with the Nazis. The fall of the Brüning cabinet ultimately ended the involvement of the Centre with the presidential government, and Papen resigned his membership shortly after becoming Chancellor when the party announced plans to expel him. Papen's appointment had been recommended by Schleicher, who by this point guided many of the president's decisions; he was quickly appointed defence minister. The new cabinet was deeply conservative, comprising non-party and DNVP ministers. It was dubbed the "Cabinet of the Barons" as seven of its twelve members were from noble families.

Finally free from the influence of the liberal and bourgeois parties, Papen planned a wide-reaching constitutional reform which would formally abolish parliamentary democracy, solidifying the president as the supreme authority and reducing the Reichstag's influence even further by introducing a non-elected upper house. He proposed the establishment of a "President of Prussia" which would be merged with the office of Reich President - in a manner very similar to the Empire, in which the Hohenzollern monarch was simultaneously King of Prussia and German Emperor. It should come as little surprise that the final phase of his plan entailed the restoration of the monarchy.

The problem was that reforming the constitution still required a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag, something the government had absolutely no hope of achieving with only the DNVP on side. Papen and Schleicher turned to Hitler and the Nazis, who agreed to support the cabinet under two conditions: first, the ban on the SA should be lifted, which they were happy to do. Secondly, a new Reichstag election should be called. Since the DNVP and Nazis still commanded a relatively small minority in the current Reichstag, and the SPD were already preparing a motion of no confidence which was almost certain to pass, they readily agreed to this as well.

The election was scheduled for 31 July, allowing plenty of time for the newly re-legalised SA to unleash an unprecedented campaign of violence and intimidation against their opponents. In just one month, 99 people were killed and over a thousand injured, particularly during clashes with the KPD and its paramilitary. A particularly dark incident occurred on 17 July, when a brawl between SA and KPD demonstrators escalated into a shootout, resulting in the deaths of two SA men and a brutal response from the police, who opened fire on surrounding apartment windows where they believed the Communists had stationed sharpshooters. In the process they killed sixteen civilians and no Communists.

This incident ultimately precipitated one of the most dramatic events in Weimar political history, which is saying a lot. Back in April, a state election had taken place in Prussia, delivering a clear plurality for the Nazis. As with elections in other states, the Landtag was hopelessly divided between Communists, the SPD and republicans, and the Nazis. The outgoing Weimar coalition cabinet led by SPD veteran Otto Braun thus remained in office as caretaker. The results of this election were of particular interest and concern for Papen, who wanted to ensure that control of the largest and most powerful state did not remain in the hands of the Social Democrats. In particular, Braun and his cabinet controlled the state's 90,000-strong police force, which could theoretically be mobilised against the government and the SA. After unsuccessfully trying to compel a coalition between the Nazis, Centre, and DNVP during June, Papen resorted to the nuclear option on 20 July.

Papen requested that President Hindenburg exercise his powers under Article 48 to suspend the Prussian state government on the basis that, after the massacre on 17 July which took place in Altona, a satellite suburb of Hamburg in Prussia, "public safety and order in Prussia could no longer be guaranteed". Hindenburg then appointed Papen himself as Reich Commissioner for Prussia, allowing him to exercise full control over the state. A state of emergency was declared; the decree was to be enforced by the military.

The Social Democrats had seen a coup against the Prussian government coming for months, and Braun and his ministers reacted immediately and negatively. They announced that they would challenge the constitutionality of the decree and refused to step down. When Papen asked state interior minister Carl Severing in person for his resignation, he responded: "I will yield only to violence." Ultimately, however, they did nothing. Severing declined to deploy the police to resist the Reichswehr as they moved into Berlin. The SPD and Iron Front even refused to call for civil resistance or a general strike. A purge of government and administration ensued as the chiefs of police and members of the republican parties were suspended from their positions and replaced by conservatives aligned with the Reich government.

In a sign of how bad things had become, this entire situation had already been planned for by both sides ahead of time - the decree suspending the Prussian government was drafted on the 14th, three days before the events in Altona provided Papen his justification for doing it. On the 16th, the SPD leadership had privately decided not to resist a coup d'etat in Prussia, fearing it would spark a civil war. Appealing to the legal system proved utterly pointless; the Constitutional Court rejected the SPD's request for an injunction against the government's suspension, and in October formally upheld the legality of Papen and Hindenburg's actions.

The coup betrayed Papen's true intentions, namely replacing the democratic republic with an authoritarian state, but by this point things were too advanced for anyone to be particularly outraged. Most frustration within the SPD was directed at the leadership for their refusal to resist.

A final event worth discussing in the lead-up to the election is the Lausanne Conference, which took place from mid-June to early July to discuss German war reparations. In the context of the depression, US President Herbert Hoover had issued a moratorium on reparations payments a year earlier. The German government now hoped to cancel them altogether. Papen, however, was not a very adept negotiator and ultimately only came away with an informal understanding that reparations would come to an end afterwards - and only on the condition that a final payment of three billion marks was made. While this was still basically the end of reparations, it was widely expected that the government would be able to cancel payments outright, and Papen was slammed by all corners for his failure.

The result was unquestionably a victory for the Nazis. They fell just short of beating the SPD's 1919 result of 38%. The SPD suffered only a small swing against them and lost ten seats; all things considered, it was still not an awful result, though they obviously lost their position as the most popular party for the first time since 1887. The KPD recorded only a small swing to 14%. The Centre and BVP saw slight gains while the DNVP slid further to 5.9%. Most of the Nazis' gains apparently came from the smaller bourgeois and agrarian parties - the DDP, DStP, WP, and CSVD all collapsed into near-irrelevance with 1% of votes or less. The DLV in particular was annihilated, losing 90% of its votes.

This sharp decline in the more niche interest parties greatly simplified the geography of the election, with only six parties winning any pluralities. The Nazis found themselves dominant across almost all Protestant territory. Their strongest results came in rural areas like the periphery of East Prussia, northern Hanover, plus old DNVP stomping ground like rural Hesse and Lower Franconia. They destroyed SPD and KPD dominance in their traditional strongholds, and even in Berlin where they achieved a major breakthrough, narrowly winning the city overall in a very close three-way race. The SPD secured just forty pluralities in total, comprising a smattering of industrial cities and a few other provinces. Both Hamburg and Lübeck fell to the Nazis. The KPD held onto Saalkreis, but otherwise only claimed boroughs in the centre and east of Berlin and cities along the Ruhr. On the Rhineland side of the border they were overrun by the Nazis and only won Solingen, but on the Westphalian side they strengthened their vote share and claimed Dortmund for the first time.

The Centre and BVP managed to reverse their declining vote share thanks to a better showing in their heartland, though support in Baden and Upper Silesia continued to slip. The DBP were the only agrarian party who managed to keep hold of any provinces: they took just one, Landau in Lower Bavaria. Even in Württemberg, where the the WBWB had always held strong, they were overcome by the Nazis and only claimed 7%.

Comparing the Nazis' result to Hitler's performance in the second round of the presidential election a few months earlier, they only gained 327,000 votes for a total of 13.75 million. This clearly went against the trend of the previous couple of years which had seen precipitous growth in their popularity. Indeed, the general response to the result was surprise that the Nazis hadn't performed better; even Goebbels expressed disappointment. Looking more closely, with the minor bourgeois, agrarian, and conservative parties all but sucked clean and the four remaining major parties holding firm, it seemed that the Nazis may have hit their electoral ceiling. And given that the new Reichstag was short of a majority even for the Nazis and DNVP combined, that was a troubling development for them.

 

[Makemakean]

Truly stunning, beautiful, excellent work!

 

[Ares96]

I can only agree. One thing I will say is I think Düsseldorf, Solingen and Wuppertal are all quite a bit too small, but that's such a minor thing I almost feel bad for pointing it out.

 

[Erinthecute]

I can only agree. One thing I will say is I think Düsseldorf, Solingen and Wuppertal are all quite a bit too small, but that's such a minor thing I almost feel bad for pointing it out.

I noticed that, particularly for Düsseldorf, but the shapefiles I'm working with use these borders all the way up to at least 1933, even though I'm sure there were changes. I might look into it and change them if I can find a satisfactory solution.

 

[Erinthecute]

Alright! Looks like a lot of city borders in Düsseldorf province were wrong (sometimes severely, such as Essen, Elberfeld, and Düsseldorf itself) but I was able to fix them and account for changes over time, particularly the 1929 reform. I've gone back through and changed all the maps.

 

[Erinthecute]

Immediately after the July election, the Nazis reneged on their promise and withdrew support for Papen's government. Schleicher attempted to entice them back by offering to bring them into cabinet, but Hitler would accept nothing less than being appointed Chancellor, which Hindenburg among others would not accept. Against the wishes of the government, the Nazis began negotiations with the Centre for a coalition, conducted primarily by the labour-oriented wings of both parties who had an easier time finding common ground. These ended without success; in any case, the Nazi leadership did not truly intend to form a coalition and approached the Centre primarily as a way of pressuring Papen, Schleicher and Hindenburg.

The impasse had not been resolved by the time the new Reichstag convened on 30 August. Its first order of business was electing its presiding officer. The SPD put forward Paul Löbe, who had served in this role for almost the entire republic; the Nazis proposed Hermann Göring. The Centre supported Göring and he was elected on the first ballot. Both the SPD and KPD were denied any positions on the presidium - the three vice presidential spots went to the Centre, DNVP, and BVP.

The Reichstag met on 12 September for its first regular session. With little else on the agenda, the KPD requested motions to veto presidential decrees which had been issued the previous week, as well as a motion of no confidence in the government. Nobody objected and the motions were tabled. Göring then suspended the session for a half-hour to consult with Hitler, who instructed the party to support the no-confidence motion. Papen, meanwhile, had caught wind and urgently sent an aide to retrieve an order - already drafted and signed by Hindenburg - dissolving the Reichstag.

When the sitting recommenced, Papen entered the chamber with a red folder under his arm. Everyone in the room was quite aware of what was happening. However, Göring declared that the motion of no confidence would be voted upon as the immediate order of business. Papen protested and demanded he be given the floor, evidently planning to read the declaration of dissolution which would end the session and prevent the Reichstag from toppling the government. Despite the rules of procedure stating that the Chancellor could request the floor at any time, Göring ignored Papen, pretending not to notice his protests and literally looking the other way while the vote on the confidence motion proceeded. Papen threw the folder containing the dissolution order on Göring's desk and left the chamber. The motion of no confidence passed 513 votes to 42, supported by all parties except the DNVP and DVP.

However, since Göring had technically received the order before the motion was passed, it still had legal effect and the Reichstag was dissolved and the no-confidence motion nullified. The formal grounds for dissolution were "the risk that the Reichstag will demand that the emergency decree of 4 September be rescinded." The incident remained heavily damaging for Papen, who quickly took to radio to explain his platform and vision for the country. He proposed that an "impartial national leadership" dominated by professionals should take the place of democracy, with the influence of the general public limited to electing the president. He stated that Prussia should be administered alongside the Reich by the federal government. There was little mention of plans for economic recovery or reduction in unemployment.

In contrast to the previous election, the November campaign proceeded relatively without drama. There was still violence, of course, but not to the same degree as in June and July. Perhaps hoping to win over Nazi voters, the Communists put greater focus on nationalism in their propaganda and doubled down on targeting the Social Democrats, deriding them as "social fascists".

The main lesson of the result was that the Nazis had, seemingly, hit their peak in July. They fell to 33% and, combined with a decline in voter turnout, lost over two million votes and 34 seats. While they remained clearly the largest party, it was a pretty significant blow. The main winners of the election were the Communists and DNVP who both recorded swings of about 2.5%. The SPD continued to slip, losing another twelve seats, which left them just 21 seats ahead of the KPD. The DVP also made a slight recovery to 11 seats and a bit under 2% of the vote. Compared to the last election, the minor bourgoies and agrarian parties remained steady, and some even made small gains, including the CSVD, DBP, and DHP.

The Nazis' losses were felt strongly all across the country, but most sharply in the north and east, which can be attributed to the resurgence in DNVP support. They managed to hold strong in Schleswig, rural Hesse, and the rural parts of Middle Franconia.

The SPD and KPD recovered a substantial amount of territory from the Nazis, mainly in industrial and urban areas. The SPD's main triumphs were in Hamburg and Lübeck, as well as Dresden-Land. They also clawed back an overall plurality in Leipzig province. However, gains were most pronounced for the Communists. They surged on the Rhineland side of the Ruhr, flipping Remscheid, Duisburg-Hamborn, Düsseldorf, Rhein-Wupper-Kreis, and Mettmann, and the constituency overall. They strengthened their vote substantially in the Westphalian Ruhr and in Berlin. They also improved markedly in Württemberg and took Stuttgart and its surrounds, Nürtingen, and Göppingen.

The Centre and BVP recorded a slight decline. Geographically the only noteworthy features were a modest surge for the Centre in Upper Silesia and a general weakening for the BVP in old Bavaria. The latter probably owes to the minor recovery of the DBP, who managed to regain a second district in Lower Bavaria. The WBWB also won back three in Württemberg, though their vote share only recovered a little - from 7% to 8.2%.

The result was seen as an indication that Hitler's appeal was waning, either because voters were losing faith in his promises or losing patience after the politicking of past months. Likewise, the first signs of economic recovery provided hope that the forces of political radicalism might be starting to retreat overall. The Nazis faced internal strife between Hitler and the wing around Gregor Strasser, both because of the poor showing and because donors were beginning to turn their back on the party and they found themselves short on money.

 

[Time Enough]

@Erinthecute this has been a fascinating series and made me learn more about the Weimar Republic and how it could have very much avoided being controlled by the Nazi’s though it doesn’t seem to indicate a particularly stable democracy (like there’s a moment in the Mid 20s where it seems like it could have happened but this has shown that it was still horribly chaotic even then).

 

[Erinthecute]

@Erinthecute this has been a fascinating series and made me learn more about the Weimar Republic and how it could have very much avoided being controlled by the Nazi’s though it doesn’t seem to indicate a particularly stable democracy (like there’s a moment in the Mid 20s where it seems like it could have happened but this has shown that it was still horribly chaotic even then).

Thank you!! It's definitely a thought-provoking topic. The republic had deep fundamental flaws and massive challenges, but I don't know if it was destined to fall. It was constantly under attack from all sides for its entire lifespan, and honestly, ten or thirteen years is a pretty good performance in those circumstances. But it was such a pivotal moment in history and we can't help wondering whether things could have turned out differently. Even if the republic hadn't survived, in the 1930-32 period we see alternative models for authoritarianism and dictatorship in Germany gaining serious traction, and it raises the question: could the Nazis have been stopped if the republic was actually destroyed faster by someone else? Could the unspeakable atrocities that followed Hitler's rise to power then have been avoided? It's a morbid question.

 

[Time Enough]

It was constantly under attack from all sides for its entire lifespan, and honestly, ten or thirteen years is a pretty good performance in those circumstances.

True very true, I do ponder if it was possible if things were different if the Republic could have survived as a Democracy, though I could see it becoming a bit like France in a way, with numerous Republics being declared and Gaullist figures emerging.

Even if the republic hadn't survived, in the 1930-32 period we see alternative models for authoritarianism and dictatorship in Germany gaining serious traction, and it raises the question: could the Nazis have been stopped if the republic was actually destroyed faster by someone else? Could the unspeakable atrocities that followed Hitler's rise to power then have been avoided? It's a morbid question.

I have pondered that myself, I do always find Schleicher’s proposal of bringing the Strasserite section of the Nazi’s into a ‘Black Front’ coalition to be the most fascinating because it would have been horrible but probably more in line with the kind of horror seen in Italy at the time.

In general Schleicher seems like the kind of figure who was very close to forming a Military Dictatorship but got outmanoeuvred by people even worse than him.

 

[Erinthecute]

Despite the Nazis' decline, the new Reichstag did not help Papen's case. There was a broad expectation that the events of September would simply repeat, leading to yet another election. Papen suggested that the Reichstag could be dissolved, a state of emergency declared and the election postponed for at least six months, giving the Reich government a free hand. They would use this time to draft a constitutional reform and formalise it via a rubber-stamp referendum. This would be a clear breach of the constitution. Hindenburg initially supported the idea, but Schleicher was opposed, fearing that it could trigger a civil war. His ally Eugen Ott drafted a war game to simulate the scenario and concluded that, if the left and Nazis rose up in insurrection, the Reichswehr was unlikely to be able to put them down and the situation would deteriorate into an extended civil conflict, risking a breakdown in the supply of basic goods and possible Polish intervention. His findings were presented at a cabinet meeting on 2 December, which proved decisive in swaying Hindenburg to Schleicher's side. Papen had already resigned in mid-November in anticipation of forming a new cabinet, but Hindenburg instead appointed Schleicher Chancellor the next day.

Schleicher's strategy was to put pressure on the Nazis by exacerbating the conflict between Hitler and Strasser. He publicly proposed to build a Querfront (roughly "diagonal front") combining nationalistic and labour-oriented groups, with the Strasserite Nazis chief among them. He proposed that conservative elements of the SPD, socialist trade unions, and the Catholic labour movement could be won over to form a parliamentary majority. This was not a completely baseless concept - some Social Democrats had advocated rapprochement with the Nazis, such as the Hofgeismar Circle of the Young Socialists in the 20s. Similar sentiments could also be found among the unions. However, Schleicher was never seriously committed to this. He pursued it with the intention of pressuring Hitler into supporting his government or else risk a split in his party. To this end, he met with Gregor Strasser on 4 December and offered to restore the Prussian government and make him Minister-President in exchange for his participation in the Querfront.

Ultimately, Schleicher failed on both counts. Hitler outmaneuvered and isolated Strasser within the party, rendering the danger of a split negligible. The Querfront concept did garner some popularity, mostly among the trade unions and the Centre, but it was limited to the media sphere. His attempt to associate himself with socialism made him unpopular among the nationalist right, and his track record as a reactionary and his role in the Prussian coup made him unpopular on the left. To make matters worse, Papen began scheming immediately after his dismissal, hoping to topple Schleicher and regain his power. By the end of December, the new Chancellor's position was becoming precarious. Most of this politicking was happening behind the scenes, however, and the press generally interpreted the flailing situation of the Nazi Party as evidence that the republic was saved. On New Years 1933, the Frankfurter Zeitung boldly declared: "The immense nationalist attack on the state has been repulsed."

Papen met with Hitler on 4 January. Schleicher's allies caught wind and snapped photos of the meeting, which were published as front-page news the next day. Alarmed, Schleicher met with Hugenberg in hopes of securing the DNVP's support, but he refused - he was already on board with Papen. He spent the next few weeks scrambling to find a solution, but his allies were turning against him, particularly the military. Interestingly, he missed a crucial opportunity on 20 January which could have saved him. Leading Nazi Wilhelm Frick suggested to the agenda committee that the Reichstag take an extended recess until spring, which would have given the government much-needed breathing room. However, Schleicher had instructed his chief of staff that the recess should be kept as short as possible in the mistaken belief that the Nazis would not risk a potentially disastrous election by toppling him. He realised too late that this was not the case and that Papen and Hitler were about to move against him. Thus, the Reichstag was scheduled to reconvene on 31 January, and Schleicher's government would almost certainly be voted out. In a desperate and ironic final move, on 28 January he requested that Hindenburg dissolve the Reichstag and postpone the election indefinitely. His request was declined. He subsequently resigned and recommended that Hitler be appointed his successor.

Papen was ecstatic to have won the power struggle. After a second meeting with Hitler on 22 January, he became convinced he could co-opt his popularity while pulling the strings behind the scenes, just as Schleicher had done to him. Hitler was appointed Chancellor on 30 January. His cabinet comprised two ministers from the Nazi Party (Wilhelm Frick as interior minister and Hermann Göring without portfolio) with the remainder being DNVP and non-partisan ministers. Papen became Vice-Chancellor, and Hugenberg was appointed minister for economics and agriculture. They believed that they would be able to control Hitler and dispose of him when he was no longer useful. Indeed, given the circumstances, many derided Hitler's new position as little more than symbolic. Liberal publications insisted that a dictatorship in Germany was impossible, both because of institutional barriers and because the masses would never accept it.

Events moved with blinding speed. Hitler's first move was to dissolve the Reichstag and call a new election for 5 March, in just five weeks' time. The government quickly built on the restrictions on civil liberties which had been implemented by the previous presidential governments, targeting the KPD and SPD. On 17 February, Hermann Göring, who had been appointed acting interior minister of Prussia, ordered the state police to use firearms without hesitation.

On the evening of 27 February, a fire was reported at the Reichstag building in the heart of Berlin. Despite the efforts of firefighters, the building was gutted. The Nazis immediately accused the Communist Party of orchestrating it as the first step in an imminent revolution. Marinus van der Lubbe, a young Dutch communist, was later indicted as the culprit and executed in January 1934. Significant debate remains concerning the circumstances of the fire, but there is great consensus among historians that Van der Lubbe was likely responsible, but was acting alone.

Regardless, Hitler was more than happy to seize on the event and accelerate his plans. The next day, Hindenburg issued a decree at his request which indefinitely suspended habeas corpus, freedom of the press and expression, freedom of association and assembly, and privacy of correspondence. The efforts of the government and police were directed chiefly at the Communist Party and "those who co-operate with the Communists and who support or encourage their criminal aims," which in practice meant anyone considered a potential threat or enemy to the government. Estimates suggest that around 10,000 arrests were made in the fortnight following the Reichstag fire decree. This included KPD chairman Ernst Thälmann, who spent the remainder of his life in solitary confinement and, later, Buchenwald concentration camp, where he was executed on Hitler's order in 1944. The dam had broken; the dictatorship was here. An exodus of Communists and Social Democrats ensued, first from Berlin and other cities where the Nazis held power, and then across the borders into neighbouring countries.

It was in this atmosphere that the election was held less than a week later. The KPD had been shattered and had little to no remaining organisational presence. The Nazis allowed them to remain on the ballot to prevent the SPD from benefitting in their absence. The Social Democrats were also severely hampered, with demonstrations and events harshly cracked down upon. The SA, SS, and Stahlhelm were declared auxiliary police, giving them free roam to attack and intimidate as they pleased. To give the greatest possible clarity: the March 1933 election was not free or fair, and the results should not be interpreted as a genuine expression of the will of the electorate.

In spite of this, the Nazis still failed to win a majority, taking just 43.9% of votes. This came even as turnout increased drastically to 89%. The parties of the left only suffered marginal losses considering the brutal repression they suffered - the SPD lost only a single seat, and the KPD about a fifth of its support. The Centre and BVP likewise remained steady, while the minor bourgeois and agrarian parties again experienced a decline. Rather, the result was characterised primarily by a surge in votes for the Nazis. Nonetheless they were forced to rely on the DNVP, in alliance with Papen and the Stahlhelm as the Kampffront Schwarz-Weiß-Rot, who won 8% and provided the numbers for Hitler's majority.

The Nazis claimed the vast majority of districts. The SPD was reduced to a handful of heartland towns, notably Burg in Magdeburg, Rüstringen in Oldenburg (comprising the working-class suburbs of Wilhelmshaven), and Heilbronn in Württemberg. The KPD clung on to Wedding, Friedrichshain, and Neukölln. Much of the Catholic heartland remained in the Centre column albeit by a reduced margin - they only won pluralities in the Köln-Aachen and Koblenz-Trier constituencies. The BVP was overcome outside of the Upper Palatinate and Lower Franconia.

Still sticking to their quasi-legal strategy, the Nazis' intention in calling the election was to win a majority to transfer total power into Hitler's hands via an Enabling Act, which would allow the Chancellor to pass laws without the involvement of the Reichstag. They were not satisfied by the arithmetic they had been left with, however. The passage of the Enabling Act required two-thirds support, meaning even the Nazis and DNVP together lacked the numbers to pass it. Hitler negotiated with Centre chairman Ludwig Kaas and secured his support in exchange for guaranteeing the party's continued existence and the preservation of rights and protections for Catholics. The party itself was split on the issue, with former Chancellor Brüning advocating against the Act. Kaas's argument ultimately prevailed, however, and his opponents agreed to vote with him to maintain party discipline.

The Nazis pulled out all the stops to ensure the Enabling Act would pass when the Reichstag met on 23 March. They annulled the election of the 81 Communist deputies, many of whom had already been arrested, reducing the overall size of parliament to 566 members. This artificially bolstered their numbers and reduced the quorum necessary to pass the Act. For the same purpose, Göring declared that any deputy who was absent "without excuse" would be counted as present. A number of SPD deputies were also arrested. Finally, numerous SA men were stationed both inside and outside the chamber to physically intimidate the members of the Reichstag into voting for the Act. SPD chairman Otto Wels was the only deputy to speak against it: "No Enabling Act can give you the power to destroy ideas which are eternal and indestructible ... You can take our lives and our freedom, but you cannot take our honour. We are defenseless but not honourless."

444 deputies voted in favour of the Act. Only the 94 SPD deputies present voted against. One Centre member and one DVP member were absent; both had been cleared by Göring ahead of time. Overall, 83% of those present supported the Act. As a percentage of the whole membership as elected on 5 March, however, the two-thirds hurdle was only narrowly cleared with 68.6% in favour. The Enabling Act was signed into law by President Hindenburg the same day.

Thus ended the last glimmer of Weimar democracy. The totalitarian regime rapidly imposed itself. The guarantees made to Ludwig Kaas never materialised, and newspapers, trade unions, and numerous other organisations were coerced into disbanding themselves. Jews who had not already fled the country were forced out of positions of prominence, their property confiscated, and risked violence or worse if they didn't keep their heads down. All political parties except the Nazi Party were formally banned in July. Papen and Hugenberg were both severely marginalised after just a few weeks in cabinet. Hugenberg resigned in June 1933, and Papen was eventually forced out after publicly criticising the Nazis in June 1934. Later that month, Schleicher was murdered during the Night of the Long Knives. The final vestige of the republic was snuffed out in August when President Paul von Hindenburg died. Adolf Hitler declared that the powers of President and Chancellor would be merged into his new office of "Führer and Chancellor".

The regime which had vanquished the Weimar republic was itself vanquished in May 1945 after Germany's defeat by the Allies in the Second World War. From the rubble, a ruined land grappling with horrors and atrocities previously unimaginable, rose a new generation of democrats committed to building a new republic, stronger and more tenacious than the last, with a new constitution expressly designed to ensure that what had happened could never happen again. The fingerprints of the Weimar experience can be found all over the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, etched deeply with scars and trauma that can never truly heal. Its first two clauses lay out the most essential, fundamental lesson that they took from the 1918-1945 period:

(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.

(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.

 

[Airesien]

Just wanted to say how great this map series was, really informative and a great view into some of the most interesting elections in world history.

 

[Erinthecute]

Just wanted to say how great this map series was, really informative and a great view into some of the most interesting elections in world history.

Thank you so much!!

 

[Ares96]

rip weimar republic u r wiv da angles now

 

[iainbhx]

I keep on meaning to do a Weimar timeline with a better electoral system which means more stability, but I find it very time-consuming. It's still on the list as a long term project.

 

[Erinthecute]

Thanks to my lovely girlfriend @Kanan I recently acquired a fantastic book titled How would the 1919 National Assembly elections have turned out if absolute majority voting had been retained? by Andreas Schulz (if you're interested, be aware it is in German). In it he models the scenario in question using data from the 1919 election. Included is a series of tables tallying the votes in each pre-1918 electoral constituency. It's not perfect, but it's a lot more granular than anything else I've been able to get my hands on, so of course I decided to map it.

The 1919 election was a strange one. The situation was really volatile, even by Weimar standards. The revolution had taken place just a few months earlier, the war was over but a peace had yet to be settled, and the government did not have effective control over substantial swathes of its territory due to foreign occupation, workers' uprisings, or insurgency. Less dramatically, but important to this story, the party system had undergone a complete shakeup during the past couple years and was still yet to sort itself out. The USPD was full of high-profile SPD dissidents and hammering them from the left, the liberal centre had tried and failed to reunify and in the process splintered again into the new DDP and DVP, the Fatherland Party had been founded and dissolved, and then combined with the old conservatives into the DNVP. The strength and influence of all of these forces had yet to be tested at the ballot box, especially in current circumstances. There was no way of telling what might happen.

The election to the National Assembly was called by the SPD, and it's important to contextualise why they did this and what they were hoping to achieve. By 1918, the SPD had not been a revolutionary workers' party for years, nor did they consider themselves one. Party orthodoxy, particularly among the leadership, was that their formiddable strength would, in time, allow them to achieve power within the system and peacefully reform it along the lines of a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. When they were brought into the cabinet of Max von Baden in October, they felt that this was their moment: the Emperor was willingly handing them the reins and giving them the chance to pursue reform. When the November Revolution began knocking with the mutiny in Kiel, it was the last thing they wanted. With their own power more tied to the Imperial constitution than ever, they were not at all interested in a social revolution. Above all, they wanted to avoid "Russian conditions": the breakdown of state authority, the ascendancy of radical revolutionaries, and a descent into chaos and terror. Their chief goal was to keep the state intact.

All their actions during the revolutionary period were aimed at achieving this. When Friedrich Ebert urged the Emperor to abdicate on 8 November, his goal was not to transform the state but to ease the unrest caused by Wilhelm's unpopularity. When Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the end of the monarchy before a huge crowd on 9 November, he aimed not to advance the revolution but to stifle it by preempting the proclamation of a socialist republic by Karl Liebknecht. The crucial following days were characterised by a race between the SPD and revolutionary factions to win over the working masses. This race was decisively won by the Social Democrats, who outmaneuvered their opponents by calling for the election of workers' councils where they, as the established party of the workers and trade unions, won huge majorities and prevented further radicalisation. They then formed a coalition government with the USPD to prevent them from usurping power by declaring a government of their own.

Calling for elections to a constituent assembly was a strategic move with the same intention. The USPD did not want national elections - rather, most members called for power to be transferred to the workers' or other revolutionary councils, and the immediate restructuring of the economy. The SPD insisted that such matters should be left to the new national parliament. Of course, they planned to consolidate their own power by winning the election decisively and marginalising both the USPD and Spartacists to their left and conservatives to their right. Indeed, the coalition between the two socialist parties was only short-lived; the USPD quit in protest after realising they had been reduced almost to irrelevance.

The National Assembly didn't go as planned, however. In January, rather than winning a clear majority, the SPD won just 38% of the vote. Even the two socialist parties combined were short of a majority. The Social Democrats were forced to ally with the parties of moderate liberalism, the Centre Party and the new left-liberal German Democratic Party, who shared their desire for parliamentary liberal democracy but little else. Potentially crucial to this outcome was the SPD's decision to use a system of party-list proportional representation for the National Assembly. This was a major change from the Imperial Reichstag, which was elected using a two-round system in absurdly malapportioned single-member constituencies whose borders hadn't been updated since the 1870s. Or had they? As it turns out, a substantial reform to the electoral system was passed in August 1918. Andreas Schulz's book explores in great detail exactly how the 1919 election may have turned out if the reformed majority system had been used. And, as you may have seen coming, I mapped out that scenario too. Stay tuned.