Nanwe's Maps and Graphics Thread

[vjw]

Unfortunately, I can't seem to find a decent map of the Commie era municipalities of Zagreb, so they're not included.

Well, i found some map of the municipalities from a 80s guidebook that someone put up for sale. There is a difficulty with the north, but in my opinion it's insignificant

 

[Nanwe]

It's now time for the 'Muslims' (here understood as Islam-practicing Serbo-Croat speakers), which after the 1991 census would also be referred to as 'Bosniaks', although they were also present in the Sandjak region of south-western Serbia and north-eastern Montenegro.

In 1981, they represented 8.92% of Yugoslavia's population, the third-largest group behind both Serbs (36.3%) and Croats (19.8%)

​

There's an interesting pattern repeating in all maps that the municipality of Jesenice in Slovenia has a higher-than-expected share of non-Slovenes of all stripes, wonder if there may have been military installations given it was in the border.

 

[Thande]

merged the Split municipalities [/CENTER]

*chef's kiss*

Liking the Yugoslavia maps, it's something that always fascinated me in hindsight after living through its breakup constantly being on the news throughout the 90s.

 

[Nanwe]

*chef's kiss*

Liking the Yugoslavia maps, it's something that always fascinated me in hindsight after living through its breakup constantly being on the news throughout the 90s.

Thanks! Yeah, although I was alive for most of it, I can't remember them but I have been pretty drawn to these types of complicated, multi-ethnic/religious entities (I guess it's not too surprising given I'm a Spaniard living in Belgium) so they're so interesting to map. And hopefully, I do get to make some mock election maps and some infoboxes after this is over, as I have a pretty clear idea of what I wanna do.

I think the next map will be the one showing the share of the population that self-identified as 'Yugoslavs', who, as no one will be surprised to hear, were younger, more urban and urbane than the average Yugoslav citizen. They were also likelier to come from the areas with weaker identities (aka Vojvodina and Bosnia).

 

[Nanwe]

Oh and thanks @vjw ! I will see how to integrate it into the map

 

[Nanwe]

Next Up: Slovenes! Unlike the Serbo-Croat speakers, Slovenes had a single "ethnic homeland", and it shows. Even though they were 7.82% of Yugoslavia's population in 1981, they were all concentrated in Slovenia, as they never made up over 0.55% of the population in any other republic or autonomous province.

Within Slovenia itself, they made up 88-98% of the population in nearly all municipalities, with the exception of the municipalities around Trieste (Koper, Piran and Izola) where Italians were still a significant minority. Same goes for Hungarians in the municipality of Lendava.

 

[Nanwe]

And because, other than Yugoslavas, these other maps are easy to do, here's a second one for today - Albanians. Needless to say, in a country whose name literally included the term 'Slav', Albanians always stood out and apart. They made up 7.72% of the population in 1981, but featured insanely high demographic growth rates. Not too surprising as Kosovo and the Albanian-majority areas of Macedonia were the poorest parts of Yugoslavia by far.

In any case, Albanians represented 7.72% of the federation's population, but were heavily concentrated in Kosovo (77.42%), western Macedonia (19.76% of the republic's population) and in eastern Montenegro (6.46% of the total population). There were significant populations in municipalities in Serbia proper neighboring Kosovo.

 

[Ares96]

They made up 7.72% of the population in 1981, but featured insanely high demographic growth rates.

Which is famously how the ethnic conflicts started - the local Serbs in Kosovo feared they were going to be pushed out by Albanian population growth, and Milošević decided to legitimise their concerns by going to speak with them and then eventually getting the local government replaced with his own loyalists. Which energised both the Croats and the Croatian Serbs, who started pushing for their own autonomous republic/boundary revisions to include Herzegovina in Croatia, and then it was off to the races (by which I mean ethnic cleansing).

 

[Nanwe]

Which is famously how the ethnic conflicts started - the local Serbs in Kosovo feared they were going to be pushed out by Albanian population growth, and Milošević decided to legitimise their concerns by going to speak with them and then eventually getting the local government replaced with his own loyalists. Which energised both the Croats and the Croatian Serbs, who started pushing for their own autonomous republic/boundary revisions to include Herzegovina in Croatia, and then it was off to the races (by which I mean ethnic cleansing).

Yeah, I have been reading quite a bit into the period (there's a particularly good book I'm reading atm about the anti-bureaucratic or yoghurt revolutions in Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina) and indeed. The general vibe I'm getting is that when control over the province switched from Serbs to Albanians from the mid-60s/early 70s, there was a mix of grievance politics on both sides that pushed Serbs to feel (wrongly or rightly, and I suppose that'd be down to local circumstances) discriminated against (I guess going from ruling minority to regular minority sucks) which led to emigration and a feeling of powerlessness combined with indeed the high growth rates.

Personally, I also find the odd role of Slovenian nationalism fascinating, as it seemed like Slovenian and Serbia nationalisms were twin engines of radicalisation, feeding one another and then empowering all other nationalisms everywhere.

 

[Nanwe]

The Macedonians represented 5.97% of the country's population, most of them living in the SR Macedonia (where they made up 67.01% of the population), with minimal presence elsewhere. They were especially concentrated in eastern and southern Macedonia

 

[Nanwe]

Next up, the self-described Yugoslavs, who represented 5.76% of the population in 1981, although with significant variations from 8.8% in Croatia to 0.19% in Kosovo. In general self-described Yugoslavs were more urban and more often found in ethnically-mixed areas in Croatia, Vojvodina and Croatia, as well as in coastal Montenegro. Interestingly, they also represented a higher share of the population in Istria, an area where Croatian national identity is weaker even to this day (as many Istrians identify as Istrian, not Croatian).

The share of the population that identified as Yugoslav in Slovenia, and particularly Macedonia and Kosovo was negligible.

 

[Alex Richards]

Was there a significant Yugoslav naval base at Kotor, or is this literally 'Austria-Hungary classified these people as Yugoslavs rather than Montenegrins and it left a legacy'.

EDIT: Wait, aren't those two strong areas in Serbia the bits gained from Bulgaria after WWI?

 

[Nanwe]

Was there a significant Yugoslav naval base at Kotor, or is this literally 'Austria-Hungary classified these people as Yugoslavs rather than Montenegrins and it left a legacy'.

EDIT: Wait, aren't those two strong areas in Serbia the bits gained from Bulgaria after WWI?

There was a naval base there but the major Navy base was in Split. The other naval bases don’t show that level of identification with a Yugoslav identity.

And indeed, they are, I believe, “Other” majority areas, which as you say and if memory serves me right, remain Bulgarian majority.

 

[Nanwe]

Very rough and dirty map of the cities that sent representatives to the provincial delegations of the Burgundian Netherlands' States-General.

It is not very representative as while a series of cities tended to always send delegates (including the so-called Four Members of Flanders), whereas on occasions where the matters discussed and voted greatly impacted a province, then more cities went.

In any case, voting was done by province, and with each provincial delegation (formed by representatives of all three orders, but usually only the members of the Third State showed up), the assistance of more or fewer cities would not impact an outcome too much.

In a very medieval quirk, Limburg never sent a member of the Third Estate because the duchy was too poor whereas Luxembourg never did because the Duchy's burghers considered that their proud territory should not be grouped with anyone and should retain its own Estates, together with those for the Netherlands (the pays de par-delà, "the lands of over-there") and the joint Estates for the Duchy and the County of Burgundy (the pays de par-deçà, "the lands of over here")

 

[Nanwe]

As a quirky aspect, the County of Flanders' Third Estate was not only represented by burghers, whether by the cities themselves or the delegates from the Brugse Vrije (the 'Franc of Bruges' or the 'Liberty of Bruges'), a large swathe of territory around Bruges with prosperous farmers and villages which, previously jurisdictionally dependent on the great commercial town, had been granted its independence by the Duke Philippe the Good (the 'Great Duke of the West' as he liked to style himself) and a seat among the Four Members of Flanders (1).

Besides that area, the various castellanies (kasselrijen) of the County also sent delegates. Including the castellanies of Veurne, of Kortrijk, of Oudenaarde, of Sint-Winoksbergen, of Broekburg, of Belle, and of Ieper, as well as the ambachts ('métiers', offices?) of Veurne, Assenede and Hulst (officially the 'Vier Ambachten'), the Waasland (around the town of Sint-Niklaas), the Lordship of Wastene, the land of Dendermonde, as well as the Oudburg of Ghent (the lands and town around the city).

The French-speaking parts of Flanders, the 'Waals Vlaanderen' or 'Flandre wallon', sent separate delegations from the rest of the county, as these areas had a sort of special governing arrangement, fairly separate from the rest of the County. The leading cities, which were the only ones to send delegates, were Lille, Douai and Orchies. All very proto-Belgian.

(1) Both privileges were greatly resented by the burghers of Bruges, who, whenever they got the upper hand on the dukes, got them to revoke the Franc's membership in the Four Members of Flanders.

 

[Nanwe]

The last point and interesting one - the members of the provincial delegations were not representatives. They were, in the strictest of senses, delegates. They were given written instructions by the provincial Estates and/or their cities (as the reasons for holding the States-General were made known in the summons by the Dukes) and were not at liberty to deviate from them.

Indeed, it was common to pause sessions in case major negotiations were needed, as delegates would need to travel back to receive new instructions and then return to continue negotiating. This practice was also carried out in the Dutch Staten-Generaal of the Dutch Republican era. The practice was - and is - known as 'ruggespraak' (consultation). They were said to operate subject to "last en ruggespraak" (order and consultation) from their cities or provincial Estates.

I see a lot of potential for some sort of TL where the birthplace of modern constitutionalism is in the Low Countries, particularly in the Duchy of Brabant, with its extensively developed constitutional law (the so-called Brabantian constitutions), which each new Duke had to swear to uphold upon their Joyous Entry. The key documents are the 1312 Charter of Kortenberg and the 1477 Great Privilege.

I could go on talking about the governance of the city of Brussels and its surrounding lands (the Cuve/Kuip), which was governed in a typically intricate manner by a combination of the lignanes of the city (the six urban patrician families that governed the city alone until the 'Urban Revolution' of 1421) and the so-called 9 Nations of Brussels (Our Lady, Saint Giles, Saint Lawrence, Saint John, Saint Christopher, Saint James, Saint Peter and Saint Nicholas) which grouped together the 49 recognised guilds of the city.

Each of the two groups elected one of the city's two mayors and half-and-half of each magistracy in the city (treasurers, echevins, councillors, tax receivers, accountants of the city, secretaries, etc.). Okay, so I did talk about it after all.

 

[Nanwe]

Some of the reasons for the Yugoslav maps here,basically an idea that is already taking shape (lengthy parties overview, something writing as to the developments of events from the mid-80s on, etc.). Ideally with some wikiboxes etc.

Anyway, the electoral map for the 1990 Yugoslav federal election, in which, to accelerate the constitutional amendment process, it was decided to introduce direct elections to the 220 seats of the Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia without modifying the allocation of seats (30 for each republic regardless of population, and 20 for each autonomous provinces regardless of population).

And then, based off the numbers of the 1981 census, the map for the 1992 federal election, taking place after the modification of the Constitution. The idea is that, given the hesitancy and/or opposition of the Slovenes (TTL and OTL) concerning any re-federalisation and introduction of majoritarian mechanisms in the republic, the allocation of the 250 sears is population-based but after allocating 44 seats (6 per each republic regardless of population, and 4 for each AP regardless of pop.), on top of which the rest were distributed based on population. As a result, the smaller republics (Slovenia, Macedonia, and especially Montenegro) would be overrepresented.

 

[Nanwe]

So this started out as a little idea heavily inspired by Belgium and my readings lately into Ancient Regime institutions and laws, but it got a bit out of hand:

Political Parties in the Dual Monarchy (1886)

Following the Charter Revolution of 1851, when the Commons and the Estates rose against King Henry X, forcing him to acquiesce to the restoration of traditional rights and liberties and introduce great institutional novelties like self-summoning estates and the Permanent Delegation of the 30 (1), tasked with overseeing the work of royal and governmental officials, a sort of comptroller office.

The Revolution introduced - restored according to its defenders - a complicated institutional set up across the kingdoms, while introducing a major novelty, a new body, the Joint Estates of the Realm. The French and English (and Welsh) electors each choose the same amount of commons' delegates, split between burgh seats and rural seats, while the Irish elect half of what the other two do. Then the nobility and the Church elect their own delegates, with the weight of their representation significantly reduced compared to the pre-1851 situation.

Since the Revolution, and particularly since the ascension to the throne of Edward VI, the former revolutionaries have split, as they by now the constitutional set up is secure and the old ideological and provincial differences have returned to the forefront of politics.

In addition to the traditional differences between the moderates and the liberals (themselves increasingly split between traditional or ‘doctrinary’ liberals and progressive ones) who have dominated politics since the Revolution, one has to add the traditionalists (the old Court Party) as well as the new political forces, the Irish trialists and the first workers’ organisations.

Following the hotly-contested 1885 election, when the Liberals under Walthère Frère-Orban were resoundingly defeated by the Moderates, as a result of the rejection by the voters of the anti-clerical policies of his cabinet, including the breaking of relations with Rome, the cutting of all funding for Catholic priests and the secularisation of all schools. In their stead, the Moderates came to power.

Government

Moderate Party - After 10 years out of power, the Moderates, led by Gathorne Hardy, have returned to power. In their agenda there is a push against the anticlericalism of the Frère-Orban years as well as some proposals to expand the franchise in the country seats (2).

In 1884, following the passing of the new liberal education laws, everyone expected a reaction, but no one - not even Moderates - expected the strength and resonance of the public backlash. Organised by parish priests and their flocks, and endorsed and funded by the Church, unprecedented marches on London and Paris were organised, hundreds of letters and petitions were addressed to the Estates, the Regent and the King calling on them to reject the legislation. The bishops in both France and England also spoke out in harsh tone condemning the move in spite of the government’s attempts to convince the Holy See to force them not to speak out.

This strong reaction has raised the stakes for the Moderates now in power, and it has greatly increased the internal battle between the parliamentary party - more moderate - and the leagues, clubs and circles that exist at the ground level and have close ties to the local gentry, agrarian leagues and the Church, which are far more clerical in outlook.

As a result, the Hardy cabinet is preparing legislation on the topic but is also quite divided. The majority of the parliamentary party, and roughly half the cabinet, led by Finance Minister H. H. Molyneux-Herbert (and supported by the Home Minister, Camille de Meaux) favour the repeal of the liberal laws and a return to the status quo ante. Meanwhile, the Catholic associative world from which the party draws its supporters, a large minority of the parliamentary party, led by Hardy, favour a more radical repeal.

In these radical moderates’ view, the goal of the new bill is to entrench Catholicism in schools and allowing towns and villages to ban the opening of non-parochial schools by funding them and introducing religious requirements in teacher training curricula.

Little thought has been given to the disproportionate impact on Reformists and other dissenters, which may still come to bite them, not to mention the stir in high society, where the extremism of both Moderates and Liberals is raising the stakes in the country’s politics. Rumours of imposition of schooling languages will no doubt increase opposition in southern France where the attachment to their langues d’oc is as strong as ever.

Unfortunately for them, the Moderates also face other issues now in power, inherited from the previous government. The economic situation in the country is not good, and budgetary restraints have been imposed, together with higher taxes. This already hurt the liberals and contributed to their downfall, and it is likely to also hurt the Moderates, particularly if the crisis starts to more directly affect the agricultural sector. As a result, agricultural relief and higher tariffs are being explored to protect the sector - and one of the party’s key constituencies.

Parliamentary Opposition

Liberal Party - the Liberals are in a rout. Their anticlericalism, overdone during the 1875-85 decade, has backfired. Their defence of provincial autonomy, free trade and the power of the Estates and parliaments is not enough of an ideological glue anymore, and anticlericalism, while unifying, is not exactly a vote-winner in either northern France or southern England. With the death of Henry X and the current reign of the boy king Edward, fears of attempted royal authoritarianism are not credible, and therefore they don’t unite the party either. Indeed, the great question for the party is the extension of suffrage.

The orthodox liberals led by Frère-Orban are opposed to any expansion (unless it is politically beneficial) and they struggle against the progressive liberals, led by Henri Brisson. The friction between the leaders and their factions has only increased as recriminations have gone up. Neither man is known as a compromiser, and the creation by the progressives of a separate organisation at the local and provincial level, and the establishment of a common platform, the ‘Liverpool Programme’, outlining nationalisations, welfare measures for workers and farmers, will only deepen the divide with the orthodox liberals, the strongest defenders of laissez faire economics.

Lastly, there is the geographical divide. The Liberals are strongest in the cities all around, and particularly in the industrial centres of northern England, where there is a strong bourgeois element, but they are also markedly strong in the areas of Reformed majority in Auvergne, Dauphiné and south-western France, as well as in Wales and parts of north-western England. Here they can count on the support of rural voters and local potentates who support the liberals’ secular agenda to combat the Catholic clericalism of the moderates.

This divide strongly feeds into the intra-party conflict, as the urban bourgeois element in towns like Manchester or Liverpool fear the enfranchisement of the working classes (or indeed the radical lower middle classes) whereas the rural liberals are aware that broader enfranchisement could benefit them, or at least not menace their elections thanks to their position as local notables.

Regardless, in response to the Hardy cabinet’s new school law bill, the two fractions of the Liberal Party are united in launching a large campaign to oppose it. Gathering the signatures and voices of all the major cities’ mayors (London, Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Birmingham, Liverpool, Dublin, etc.), university deans and key intellectuals to petition the Regent to refuse to endorse the law and declaring that, if that fails, they will go to the Parliament (3) of Paris to ensure that the law is not published.

This legalistic and top-down approach that the liberals have contrasts to the grassroots organisation of the moderate and showcases the problems affecting the party and the risks to its long-term viability as a political entity if suffrage is extended and the liberals don’t adopt measures to attract a growing electorate - further feeding into the party’s ideological divide.

Irish Trialists - The Irish trialists are not a proper party - even by the lax standards of ‘party’ in late 19th century party politics - but rather a collection of Irish notables and Gaelic-speaking local and county officials, driven by a single unifying demand - the recognition of Ireland as an equal kingdom to England and France in the Dual Monarchy (the ‘Triune Monarchy’ as they call it), with equal participation in political affairs (unlike its current subordinate position to England) and equal representation to the other two kingdoms in the Joint Estates.

A growing movement in the Emerald Island, the trialists have gathered a great deal of support across the island’s religious divide based on their platform of equal representation and equal rights for the kingdom and its institutions, to put the island’s Commons and Lords on equal footing with its English equivalent.

The trialists have gathered support from across Ireland, but they are particularly strong in the more politically-aware Leinster province, where the Charter Revolution was more felt, and therefore where resentment at the lack of changes in the island is most strongly felt. Their advocacy for the use of Gaelic means that they are growing more support in the western half of the island, which resents the dominance of the English- or French-speaking elites in eastern Ireland.

Politically-speaking, their members could easily be either moderates or liberals (and indeed they are roughly evenly split), but their common pledge to fight for equal representation has meant that they tend to leverage their support to either major party, although their success so far as been limited. To showcase the broad support in the island for the trialist cause across the sectarian divide, there is a broad consensus that the movement needs to be led by two leaders, one Reformist (Parnell) and one Catholic (Gavan Duffy).

Anti-Revolutionary Party - The anti-revolutionaries are, in case it wasn’t clear from their name, the last legacy of the hardcore supporters of the pre-revolutionary legal settlement, with centralised royal government, two languages and restrained parliaments and estates. They represent a small faction, acting as ultra-moderates outdoing even the more extreme members of the Moderate Party.

Their platform is simple enough, they desire a return to the old system: legal and linguistic centralisation, noble ascendancy, closely relation between throne and altar and royal authoritarianism (taxation without consultation, appointment of urban and provincial officials, and the re-introduction of the lettres de cachet and bills of attainder).

Regardless, after over 30 years of constitutional rule, the traditionalists are starting to make their peace with the system, particularly at the provincial level. These new anti-revolutionaries, who prefer to be referred to as ‘conservatives’, continue to espouse legally centralist views and an enshrined privileged role for the nobility and, especially, the Catholic Church in society. They are also strongly protectionistic. This has enabled them to survive as a political force in an otherwise hostile atmosphere.

Most of their members are elected (4) in the ‘noble’ seats to the Joint Estates, primarily from the extremely Catholic and conservative areas of Brittany and areas of intense sectarian tensions, like northern Provence.

Extra-parliamentary Opposition

Outside the Joint Estates, and for that matter nearly-all provincial estates, there is a brewing movement of the industrial working classes. In the large cities, in northern England and parts of northern France, industrial workers have formed socialist trade unions, mutual relief associations and all sorts of clubs (mutual support, education, sports, etc.), creating the first steps towards a working class organised subculture.

These organised workers and their associations are slowly beginning to interact with the broader political world, until now dominated by the aristocracy, the gentry and the urban bourgeoisie (whether patrician or burgher). This has been happening either by cooptation into the most progressive elements of the liberal camp or through the creation of Catholic workers’ associations, supported by the Church, and attempts to have “Catholic worker” independents run in urban elections, where the franchise requirements are lower (or non-existent in some cases).

However, there is growing dissatisfaction with the traditional parties, and inspired by the Burgundian and German models, union leaders and workers have began to create the first socialist parties to run for office at the local and provincial levels. These parties remain divergent in terms of their inspiration (philoclerical, anti-clerical, socialist, luddite, social Christian, liberal far-left, republican, etc.) and as such there not a single electoral force. And that is before entering into the sectarian divide or for that matter the tricky issue of trialism.

Nevertheless, the first congress of various forces is set to take place in 1887, as more and more leaders are becoming aware of the need to coordinate efforts. The outcome of the 1887 Workers’ Congress is very unclear, with a multitude of players.

Separately, “trouble" is stirring in southern France. Long proud of their history and aggrieved by the imposition of French over their langues d’oc, even if the practice has ceased, a regionalist movement, of conservative and rural nature, is appearing in Languedoc, Aquitaine, Provence or the Dauphiné. So far its impact is heavily limited to provincial estates, but it is growing. These worries local liberals, as these provinces tend to represent their best strongholds, with southern French liberals starting to mimic the style of these regionalists.

—————

1. Inspired by the Principality of Liege’s Tribunal of the 22.
2. Also very Belgian in inspiration. The two main Belgian parties in the 19th century, the liberals and the Catholics, both believed broadly in wealth-based voting (indeed, it was enshrined in the Constitution) but liked to play with municipal tax rates to expand or restrict the franchise in the towns or in the countryside to benefit themselves. By the late 1890s, the Catholics were bigger believers in universal suffrage as they believed - rightly - that the Flemish countryside would vote for them. The liberals were more reluctant, knowing that their strength arose from the French-speaking urban middle and upper classes (in the late 19th century, this meant nearly-all urban middle and upper classes), but deeply divided between doctrinary liberals (opposed to universal suffrage) led by Frère-Orban and progressive liberals (favourable to universal suffrage and labour-liberal cooperation) led by Paul Janson.
3. The Parlement de Paris, owing to its prestige and its composition has remained the key judicial organ in the monarchy, with its jurisdiction now extending to cover England and Wales as well as Ireland.
4. The ‘noble’ seats to the Estates are elected by the nobility in a given province, although many of them are de facto attributed to the highest noble(s) of the province, with the remaining seat(s) allocated through an actual vote.
   A similar system is used for the ‘ecclesiastical’ seats, which are allocated to specific ecclesiastical provinces, where some seats are elected by the members of abbeys, and others are elected by the bishops. In this cases, again, there is a certain tendency to vote respecting the hierarchical nature of the Church. Some have suggested introducing ecclesiastical seats to represent the Reformed churches, but nothing has come out of it - yet.

In relation to this, I found a quote from the OTL Frère-Orban that I don't want to lose in case I end up developing this idea further so I'm putting it here as a reminder:

"À propos de suffrage universel, j’ai demandé si on voulait constituer en arbitre des destinées du pays, en maîtres souverains des administrations communales les manouvriers et les valets de ferme… C’est la majorité dites-vous. Sans doute! Mais nous, nous n’admettons pas cette majorité. Vous voulez en deux actes arriver au suffrage universel. Quant à nous, ni en un, ni en deux, ni en trois, ni en cinq actes, nous ne voulons y arriver. Est-ce clair?"

Which roughly translates to "On the topic of universal suffrage, I have wondered if we wish to turn the farm workers and farmhands into the arbiters of our country's destiny, the sovereign masters of the local authorities ... They are the majority, you argue. Indeed! But for us, we don't accept such a majority. You wish to attain universal suffrage in 2 steps. For us, however, neither one, nor two, nor three, not five. We don't want to take any steps to get there. Is that clear enough?"

Elitism.

 

[Nanwe]

So I went ahead and bought a book on the Lebanese election of 1968 - but I don't know if it's worth mapping - there were essentially no real political parties, with most MPs being independents with no party ties, although many coalesced around informal blocs. Plus, electoral endorsements rarely stayed the same from one constituency to another.

Anyone would be interested?

 

[Lavidor]

So I went ahead and bought a book on the Lebanese election of 1968 - but I don't know if it's worth mapping - there were essentially no real political parties, with most MPs being independents with no party ties, although many coalesced around informal blocs. Plus, electoral endorsements rarely stayed the same from one constituency to another.

Anyone would be interested?

Lebanese politics are very interesting to me, though usually incomprehensible.

Most of the elections would be nearly impossible to map, it's shifting allegiances all the way down. But for 1968 you could make a post-facto division on the basis of the 1970 presidential election - mark Sarkis supporters as Constitutional Bloc and Frangieh supporters as National Bloc + Junblatt.

What book is it anyway?