It's been ten years
2000 - 2011: Bashar al-Assad (Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party) [1]
2000 def: Unopposed
2007 def: Unopposed
2011 - 2012: Najah al-Attar (Nonpartisan) [2]
2012 - 2016: Mohammad Farouk Tayfour (Islamic Renaissance Party) [3]
2012 def: Qadri Jamil (Syrian Popular Front), Riad al-Turk (Syrian Democratic People’s Party), Ammar Bakdash (Syrian Communist Party), Bashar al-Yazigi (Syrian Social Nationalist Party)
2016 - 2017: George Sabra (Syrian Salvation Party) [4]
2016 def: Mohammad Farouk Tayfour (Islamic Renaissance Party)
2017: George Sabra (Syrian Democratic Party) [5]
2017 - 2018: Ahmad Jarba (Syrian Democratic Party) [6]
2018 - 2020: Hadi al-Bahra (Syrian Democratic Party) [7]
2020 - 0000: Mohammad Farouk Tayfour (Islamic Renaissance Party) [8]
2020 def: Hadi al-Bahra (Syrian Democratic Party), Bushra Massouh (Syrian Progressive League)
[1] - As the intervention in Libya was going on, with Qadhafi receiving little support from the international community, even from America’s rivals such as Russia, China, and Iran, Bashar al-Assad, who himself was facing a growing protest movement in his own country, began to weigh his options. Though his government had maintained good relations with Russia, China, and Iran, he believed that he could not rest on the laurels on that support, and that if a civil war were to break out in Syria as it did in Libya, then he, like Qadhafi, may not have much support from those three countries if the West were to set their sights on him. Further, the prospect of spending the rest of his life living comfortably in the United Arab Emirates did appeal to him. Assad would spend much of the spring of 2011 contemplating whether or not to step down. Despite the crakcdowns, the protest movement was only expanding and becoming more and more violent. Unlike his late elder brother Bassel, Bashar was not groomed to be leader until much later, and he felt as if he could not be able to handle a country in a state of civil war, especially if the most powerful countries in the world were against him.
As such, on July 1st, 2011, Bashar al-Assad announced on television his intention to resign from office. It took three and a half months, but the millions of people out in the streets was enough to make Assad another domino to fall in the event that was the Arab Spring. Assad would not regret his decision when, a few months later, he saw on television the gruesome death of Qadhafi in his villa in Dubai.
[2] - Assad’s Vice President, Najah al-Attar, was not a major figure in Syrian politics up and until Assad’s resignation. But with Assad gone, she found herself made the most powerful person in Syria, and she, like Assad, knew the way the winds were blowing. If Assad felt that a violent crackdown would be too risky and a civil war unwinnable, then this would be the case for the hitherto unknown al-Attar as well. In contrast to what some of the more extreme members of the Syrian government were advocating for, she would relent and announce democratic elections within 365 days. The military would withdraw from the streets, and the revolution had succeeded.
al-Attar would be remembered, much like Mohammed Tantawi in Egypt, as a transition figure between autocracy and democracy, the pre- and post-Arab Spring era. On the surface, she was laying low, and was unwilling to make any major decisions which would harm Syria’s newborn democracy, yet unbeknownst to most people was that, throughout her period in office, she would spend that time in conjunction with many other remnants of Assad’s government to destroy any evidence of the crimes of Assad along with their own crimes, so as to avoid or at least make easier any criminal trial which may occur following the 2012 Election. Evidence of Syria’s dealings with Israel under Hafez and Bashar were also destroyed, and within the last week of her tenure in office, she would leave Syria for Moscow, following a pattern of many former Ba’ath Party officials who would flee to either Lebanon, Iran, Russia, China, numerous countries in Europe, and others. Many suspected something was going on with al-Attar trying to maintain a low profile even as she was the President of Syria. Even when the Supreme Court of Syria decided to ban the Ba’ath Party, she didn’t speak up at all. This sort of silence was seen as odd, and led to many people taking it as evidence that there was something going on behind the scenes.
But these were just feelings, and feelings are not evidence in even the most basic definition of the word. And so, al-Attar’s presidency ended without much of a focus on her as there was a focus on her successor, and to this day she still lives in Moscow, forgotten even in her own country, which was just as she wanted it.
[3] - Tayfour’s ascension to power was seen as part of a larger phenomenon of Islamists taking advantage of the Arab Spring protests to cement power for themselves. Be it Morsi in Egypt, or Ennhada attaining a plurality of seats in the Tunisian Assembly elections, Tayfour’s victory, while not ideal, was nevertheless seen as unsurprising to most observers. Only Libya was this trend bucked, with the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned party placing a distant second place from the more moderate National Forces Alliance. Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia would decide to expand ties with Turkey and Qatar, two countries which supported the Arab Revolutions the most and would be aligned with the Brotherhood. Tayfour, like Morsi, would win in the second round seeing as how their opponent would be one affiliated with the previous regime (in Jamil’s case, the alignment of many former Ba’athist figures with his campaign - though in reality, they may have just been afraid of a Brotherhood-aligned party taking control - led to many believing that voting for Tayfour would truly preserve the revolution).
Tayfour’s election would be coupled with the IRP gaining a majority of seats in the Syrian Parliament, and as such, he would be given a mandate with which to implement the Brotherhood’s agenda upon Syria. Unlike Morsi, who still had to face up against a powerful army, and Ghannouchi, who still did not have an ally in the executive or even a majority in parliament, Tayfour did not face any of those problems and thus could go to work easily. Within the first few weeks of taking office, he would successfully push through a ban on alcohol, and would go on to implement a trade agreement with Turkey and would cause controversy by inviting Hamas’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, to meet with him in Damascus. Come 2013, with the calling of new elections in Lebanon, he would endorse the party known as the Islamic Group, the Brotherhood in Lebanon, which caused it to rise in the polls at the expense of the relatively moderate Sunni Future Movement and would eventually lead to a cementing of the Hezbollah-FPM alliance when election day came. While many in the Middle East were concerned regarding Tayfour, to the outside world he was seen as “not our problem”, someone who, even if he really wanted to, could not expand Syria’s influence any more than possible.
That was until the summer of 2013, when Egypt exploded into protests against the Morsi government, which was becoming increasingly more authoritarian. The army, seeing it as their chance to retake power, would side with the protestors and eventually would take the initiative to overthrow Morsi once it was clear that he wasn’t going to resign. Morsi, on the other hand, understanding that the army was in on this from day one, knew that if he was going to go down he may as well ensure that the army will not enter power so smoothly. He, along with various other government officials and their families, guarded by a sizable number of defectors from both the army and the police loyal to the civilian government chose to remain in the Presidential Palace on August 11th, and after a brief gun battle which ended in victory for the putchists, they entered the palace and began to open fire on Morsi and others that chose to remain. Morsi was dead, but that was his plan. With such a violent seizure of power, it was made certain that the new military government would face a variety of problems from day one.
Saad al-Katani, the head of the Brotherhood-aligned Freedom and Justice Party, managed to flee to Damascus and declared an Egyptian Government-in-Exile from there, which was immediately recognized by Syria, Turkey, Qatar, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya. Sectarian differences aside, the fact that the new Egyptian Government was backed by the Gulf States led to Iran deciding to recognize al-Katani as well, and across the Muslim World, be it in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Somalia, Morocco, and others, demonstrations were held in favor of al-Katani and against the Egyptian military government. Defectors from the military and the police coupled with existing pro-Brotherhood militias had led to Egypt being placed on the brink, and a massacre of anti-military protestors in Rabiaa was the spark which led to the beginning of the Egyptian Civil War.
In the West, they had already picked a side, and that was al-Sisi and the military government in Egypt. The new Romney administration had created a new State Department staffed by those with the belief that Obama’s support of the Arab Revolutions was a big mistake, as it hurt Israeli and Saudi interests in the region, and was seen as a boon for Islamic militants who were using the less authoritarian governments to more openly promote their ideology with some measure of success. The EU concurred with this, and as such both the US and EU would recognize al-Sisi and would provide aid for them. As for al-Qaeda, though they neither had love for the Brotherhood or Sisi, they saw the new situation in Egypt and concurring with their interests and as such began to launch successful military offensives in the Sinai Peninsula, which just further legitimized Sisi in the eyes of the West as he was beginning to be seen as necessary for stability in Egypt. By the year’s end, the Muslim Brotherhood would be declared a terrorist organization in the United States, citing attacks on Christians, their militancy against an internationally recognized government, ties with Hamas, and ostensible ties with al-Qaeda. This declaration would harm the Muslim community within the United States and would lead to a noticeable trend of Arabs and Turks who had ties with the Muslim Brotherhood being forced to return back to their home countries as a result.
But Syria and the Tayfour Government maintained firm in their support of al-Katani regardless of what the West supported. It led to a detrimental impact for Syria’s foreign relations and ensured the capital would leave Syria as it was being given the reputation of a terror-sponsoring extremist state, but for Tayfour to just go back on supporting al-Katani would harm him immensely among his base at home.
But Egypt would not be the only failed state in the Middle East. Right next door in Iraq, another war was beginning. Starting from the American withdrawal in 2011, the Sunni insurgency, consisting of everyone from al-Qaeda to Ba’athist loyalists and those inbetween, had been growing without stop. Allegations that these insurgents were funded by the Gulf States were not entirely baseless, and the corruption and general incompetence of the al-Maliki government did not do anything to slow down the advance of the Sunni insurgents. By 2014, much of Sunni-majority Iraq was already in control of the insurgents, and the time for their coronation was at hand. In the summer, offensives launched by the Sunni insurgents led to the collapse of Iraqi Army positions in Mosul, Tikrit, Fallujah, and other cities in Iraq’s West. Within a few months, the insurgents already began to set their sights on Baghdad and on the Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. Perhaps one of the biggest events to occur throughout the insurgency would be the assassination of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a man of such high stature in the Shia world that his assassination led to outrage and anger. Shia-dominated militias in support of the government began to sprung up, and Iran would announce that they would intervene in Iraq as a response. Many Shias from Yemen, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and yes, Syria as well, decided that they would want to fight in Iraq, if not for avenging Sistani, then at least for protecting the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf.
However, with victory so close in their sights for them, the various differences between the two main factions of the insurgents - Ba’athist and Jihadist, ad-Douri and al-Baghdadi - began to become more visible as neither wanted the other to succeed. Sporadic episodes of gunbattles between the two factions began to become more and more common and would end up halting any further advance of the insurgents. This would prove to be a boon for the Iraqi government and its allies. Further, with NATO announcing that they would provide air support for the Iraqi government, it seemed as if the insurgency would soon collapse much much sooner than expected. The government of Iraqi Kurdistan choosing to declare independence and open up itself for the US to station their airforce there would just make it all the more easier for the US to bomb the insurgents. In Damascus, these events would trouble Tayfour and his government, fearing that a radicalized Shia populace would engage in revenge attacks against the Sunni populace as the insurgents began to lose territory and would cause a movement of refugees into Syria. Further, Tayfour sympathized with the Sunni insurgents, and didn’t wish to see them fall. And so, a very risky decision was made on part of the Syrian government to support the insurgents, if not for their ultimate victory, than at least for their preservation.
2014 would see a decline in fortunes for the Tayfour government. The Muslim Brotherhood insurgents in Egypt that they were funding were losing to al-Qaeda, more specifically their branch in Egypt, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House, that is, al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock). War has a tendency to radicalize people and radicalize it did for much of the insurgents who began to become disillusioned with the idea of “Islamic democracy” when all of the major democratic powers were supporting Sisi. Further, the military successes of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Shabaab in Somalia and other Salafi Jihadist groups led to them believing that Salafi-Jihadism would be the path forward for military success. And so, even as Syria continued funding the Brotherhood insurgents they would indirectly fund Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in the process as defections began to grow. And eventually, when ABM blew up the Sphinx and other ancient landmarks in October of 2014 and was making threats to blow up the pyramids it became clear that they were becoming too big of a problem for Sisi to handle alone, and so, much like in Iraq, NATO opened up a front in Egypt as well in support of Sisi, and they viewed both the Brotherhood and ABM as one and the same, which probably was good for ABM in the long run since they were going to be attacked anyways but every bomb dropped on the Brotherhood meant a bomb not dropped on them and another hundreds of people radicalized. But it also meant that the numerous countries in support of al-Katani - Turkey, Qatar, Syria, Libya, and others - had to tone down their support for him lest they be caught in opposition to NATO (however, the various disagreements that Turkey had with NATO be it in Egypt, Iraqi Kurdistan, or Nargono-Karabakh would eventually induce Turkey to leave the organization in 2015).
But Tayfour was al-Katani’s personal friend so he still remained the Brotherhood’s biggest supporter even when NATO was opposed to it, and this meant that on December 14th, when a US jet blew up a den which was thought to only contain Brotherhood fighters, they accidentally killed seventeen members of Syria’s intelligence. This led to a deterioration of US-Syria relations and would eventually lead to the US placing sanctions on Syria for their support of the Brotherhood.
The next couple of years would be hard for Syria. Tayfour’s ideological grievances began to take precedence over what would actually help Syrians. Attacks on Alawites and other religious minorities would eventually led to calls for the separations of the Alawite-majority provinces and Latakia and Tartus from the rest of Syria (Bashar al-Assad was the biggest supporter of these sentiments). The 2015 Armenia-Azerbaijan War, which ended in an Azeri victory and the following expulsion of Armenians from Nargono-Karabakh would lead to members of the Armenian diaspora choosing to return to Armenia, and this was seen in Syria the most, with upwards of 75% of Syria’s Armenian population choosing to leave a country with a faltering economy in return for what was, essentially, their homeland, and in doing so harming the local economies of the areas which they resided in.
By 2016, every opposition group ranging from communists to Ba’athists to liberal democrats chose to unite in opposition to Tayfour. They chose Georges Sabra, a Christian who was once a member of the Syrian Communist Party and a prominent opposition figure during Assad’s time, to lead the opposition against Tayfour. Faced with international isolation and a collapsing economy, Tayfour would lose in a landslide as Sabra managed to avoid a second round and become the first Christian President of Syria.
[4] - Sabra would take the initiative to try and reopen Syria to the world, more specifically, to the West. al-Katani and the rest of the Egyptian exile government would be forced to move to Doha, Qatar, and the Syrian Air Force would embark on a few air raids on ISI (Islamic State of Iraq) camps near the Syrian-Iraqi border, which signalled a change in priorities for Syria. A few months after Sabra’s election victory, Barack Obama would win in 2016 as the first President to win a non-consecutive term after Cleveland, and Obama, looking for an easy foreign policy victory after an election dominated by it, would meet with President Sabra on February 15th, 2017, and just a few days later would announce the lifting of sanctions on Syria, which led to a rebounding of the Syrian economy.
But things would not go so smoothly for Sabra. A few months later, Lebanon was to hold elections, and the Brotherhood-aligned Islamic Group, now no longer having the patronage and support of the Syrian government, would lose all of its seats on election day to the Future Movement. Using the new strength that it had now possessed, the Future Movement would block any formation of an FPM-Hezbollah government, clearly looking to instead form their own government in conjunction with other anti-Hezbollah parties and independents. The FPM-Hezbollah government would criticize this as harming the stability and economy of Lebanon, yet the Future Movement persisted in their deadlock. Among those within the Syrian Salvation Party who were once Ba’athists, they openly voiced their support for the Lebanese government and urged Sabra to do the same, warning that a Second Lebanese Civil War, definitely not in Syria’s interests, was possible if the deadlock continued. Sabra chose not to, and further would criticize those within his party who nevertheless chose to interfere in Lebanese affairs by picking a side. That faction was disappointed in Sabra’s stance, and would choose to leave the Syrian Salvation Party and instead form the Syrian Progressive Party, which, after forming an electoral alliance with the SSNP and the Syrian Communist Party would form the Syrian Progressive League. Sabra, realizing that the SSP was never meant to be more than a temporary coalition against Tayfour, made the decision to dissolve the party.
[5] - Of course, that would not end Sabra’s problems. While he would no longer have to deal with an intransigent faction in his own party, seeing as how Syria was a democracy he’d have to deal with them regardless. With the Future Movement (many suggesting at the behest of the US, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even Israel) still continuing their deadlock and refusing to form any government which didn’t end with them on top, the situation in Lebanon began to get more volatile as government workers weren’t receiving salaries, no budget was being passed, and as polarization was increasing as a result of this political crisis violence was increasing between partisans of the Future Movement and of Hezbollah. Further, as the Civil War in Iraq was beginning to come to a close and an insurgency beginning to take its place, many Sunnis from Iraq’s west began to migrate to Syria in the thousands, a situation which Syria was not prepared for. What’s more, the Iraqi government was urging Syria to block the refugee flow claiming that there were al-Qaeda and Saddamist fighters in their looking to evade being captured and tried. It was too much for the aging man to handle - and so he resigned.
[6] - Ahmad Jarba was seen by Western observers as Syria’s beautiful and attractive progressive who would legalize gay marriage and recognize Israel and reform Islam etc. etc. he was shot two months into his term by an Iraqi refugee who was going to shoot Sabra for siding with the Iraqi government but after he resigned decided to settle for his number two instead.
[7] - It would’ve been an understatement to say that the national mood of the Syrian Republic was down. The initial optimism of the revolution had passed, and since then it has been a constant barrage of one thing coming after the other. Sanctions, a civil war next door, religious violence, and then an assassination have all done to create a pessimistic, mournful mood amongst the Syrian populace.
al-Bahra, for his part, tried to change that. Instead of falling into anti-Iraqi xenophobia, which experienced an upsurge after Jarba’s assassination, he decided to take the initiative to grant immediate citizenship to all Iraqi refugees residing within Syria. As Lebanon was beginning to collapse, al-Bahra would openly threaten to cut off all economic ties with Lebanon unless the parties were willing to make a deal. Lebanon only bordered Syria and Israel, and they definitely weren’t going to saddle up with Israel (despite what a few Phalangists would want), and as such their only partner was Syria, and if Syria were to end all ties with Lebanon, then that might just be the spark to induce a collapse of Lebanon’s economy, and then government, and then into civil war. As such, the Future Movement chose to end their nearly year-long deadlock and accept a continuation of the Hezbollah-FPM government, which meant that at the eleventh hour, civil war was averted. The years of 2018 and 2019 would begin to see a growing economy, and the brief period of national malaise had ended.
Abroad, he faced other challenges. The scaling back of America’s troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan led to increasing violence in the two countries as the Taliban made moves to take control of them, and as they were doing so they were engaging in a genocidal campaign against the Shia population in both countries. Iran, very much not pleased to see this take place, decided to take action. They were already in Iraq and were still facing off a deadly insurgency so a military intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan was out of the question, yet what Iran did instead was incite the Shias living within those two countries, along with Shias in the Middle East, to go to Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight a war against those wishing to destroy their religion. Syria was included among these countries, and Iran will try to incite young men of Syria’s Shia minority to fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan. al-Bahra, seeing that a radicalized and more militant Shia populace within Syria could potentially become a problem, would try to curb any travel into Afghanistan and Pakistan by banning all travel to those two countries and by openly criticizing Iran on the topic, leading to a downsize in Syria - Iran relations.
And while there would be an issue of young men going to fight, another issue sprung up about young men who went to fight coming home. Those would be the Syrians who went out to fight alongside Ansar Bait ul-Maqdis during the highpoint of the Egyptian Civil War. By the late 2010s Egypt had stabilized at a very high cost. Thousands were dead, the economy was in the dumps, and nobody, neither in Egypt or abroad, had any fate in Sisi except that they believed that he was perhaps the only man standing between them and Taliban-style rule. As for ABM, they were forced out of the cities and into the deserts, where occasionally an IED goes off when a NATO military vehicle goes over it killing around 20 - 50 soldiers. Their leader, the “Egyptian Zarqawi”, Yunus Hunnar (actually Palestinian) was killed in 2018 and overall wasn’t in that good of a shape as it once was. A lot of the Syrians who went to Egypt and managed to both survive and make it out of being embroiled in the insurgency, mostly widows but some men as well, would be kept in an internment facility run by NATO called Camp Memphis, and, remembering how the Syrian government at one point was at odds with the West, would petition the Syrian government to pressure the West to free them. However, though they had sympathy from some members of the Islamic Renaissance Party, and as stories of women being abused did lead to a moral outcry within Syria, al-Bahra did not feel it wise to ask the West to hand them over, as one, the Syrian Democratic Party was united in their support for greater ties with the West, two, there was a fear that if they were to return that they will influence others with Salafi-Jihadi ideology, as had happened after the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, and three, though the stories of abuse did displease them there wasn’t really much sympathy from members of the Syrian government regarding the prisoners. Nevertheless, the Islamic Renaissance Party would use these stories of abuse to attack the al-Bahra and his government, accusing him of being a slave of the West and someone indifferent to Muslim suffering. It would be these issues that the IRP would run on in the 2020 Elections.
[8] - Tayfour’s political comeback would be a sight to behold. When he lost 2016 in a landslide, people assumed that he was done, finished. Yet he managed to carve out a loyal support group among the partisans of the IRP. For one, seeing as how the rest of the opposition banded against him it led to an image created of him that he was a man so dangerous to liberals in Syria that they were willing to align with Ba’athists, the very same people they were against just five years ago, just to get rid of him. Further, the foreign policies of Sabra, Jarba, and al-Bahra, which ended up benefitting the West in Egypt and Iran in Iraq, led to conspiracy theories that an international conspiracy was afoot, consisting of the Americans, Shias, and liberals within Syria, to dispose of Tayfour. Tayfour neither promoted nor rejected these claims, which helped him continue his political career and have him still be seen as a serious politician, and not just some sore loser crank. Tayfour would spend the years of 2016 - 2020 always on the media to give his own comments on political affairs critical of the new Syrian government, which ensured that he’d remain in the news even when he had very little power to do anything. By 2020, he was still immensely popular among the IRP base that any opposition to him was swept aside, and even those uneasy about making him the nominee did not wish to risk angering the IRP’s base, and as such, he was placed as the party’s nominee for that year’s election.
However not everyone in Syria was a member of the IRP and as such Tayfour would constantly trail in the polls against al-Bahra in the first round. The loss of Ba’athist support meant that a second round was inevitable, however there was practically no way for Tayfour to gain any Ba’athist voters of a large enough number to win, which meant that at first, al-Bahra’s victory was assured. The first round happened without a hitch, as it seemed to be a forgone conclusion that al-Bahra and Tayfour would make it to the second round, and it was only in the second round that any real drama would occur.
And it did. Leaked documents, which were leaked by hackers who were purportedly on the payroll of the Qatari government, would reveal that al-Bahra was willing to engage in negotiations with Israel in his second term, in which Israel would give back the Golan in exchange for Syrian recognition of the state. Needless to say, it caused a political firestorm within Syria, as indeed in any Arab democratic country openly floating the idea of recognizing Israel was akin to committing political suicide. During the Egyptian War a new front was opened in the Gaza Strip as ABM would spillover there and attack both Israel and Hamas, and Israel, seeing an opening to permanently cripple Hamas (though not get rid of - that’d be too much work, even with US air support), would lead to the Second Gaza War in 2015, which was far more deadly than the First Gaza War from 2008 - 2009 and in turn would lead to a general reaction from the Arab World against Israel. Upto now, the war didn’t impact Syrian politics because literally everyone was against Israel and nobody could claim that the other did without looking like a nutter. The images of dead Palestinian civilians were seared into the conciousness of Syria’s populace and those images would be spread by Tayfour’s campaign in a successful attempt to link al-Bahra would those crimes. On Twitter the hashtag #البحرة_صهيوني (al-Bahra is a Zionist) would be spread by Tayfour’s supporters. al-Bahra would find it difficult to deflect from these accusations, and would lose narrowly, 52-48, to Tayfour in the second round.
One cannot fault Tayfour and his supporters for not exactly being humble in victory. After all, he had just came back from a landslide defeat to a victory, a rare feat in any country’s politics. Yet he would not exactly face an easy time in power. No doubt he will resume Syria’s intervention in Lebanese affairs and resume aid to Iraqi Sunni insurgents. With Egypt essentially being a done deal (the only force fighting against Sisi is the ABM, and nobody would want to openly support them), Tayfour would look to reconciliation with the Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with whom he differed upon on the matter of Egypt, but would find common ground on the matter of Iran. Following Pakistan’s collapse in 2013 both Saudi Arabia and Iran would get their hands on Pakistan’s nukes just a few years later, leading to a volatile arms race with no clear end. And now, with Iran’s intervention in Iraq beginning to resemble America’s intervention in the 2000s, Saudi Arabia and its allies found an opportunity to bleed Iran and possibly force the government to collapse by providing more aid to the insurgents. The extra oil money being put in the economy certainly didn’t hurt.
At home, the issue of Alawite separatism, which had become an issue in Tayfour’s first term but had dissipated to some extent during 2016 - 2020, had rebounded as Syria’s Alawites were convinced that religious violence against them would increase with Tayfour’s victory. However, it would be wrong to state that just because Tayfour won, he was given complete control of Syria’s affairs. Parliamentary elections showed that though the IRP had managed to become the largest party it still wasn’t as large as in 2012. As such, some members of the IRP who were expecting the institution of Islamic Law within Syria because of democracy would be dissappointed, and as that becomes more clear to them later on they may be forced to embrace ideologies such as Salafi-Jihadism which rejects democracy altogether.
Bashar al-Assad could not believe that the Syrian people would vote Tayfour in again. After all that had happened in his first term, why would they wish to risk a repeat? Perhaps he had overestimated the Syrian people when he chose to step down. Perhaps he should’ve tried to fight on. The tensions between NATO and Russia, China, and Iran, have increased ever since he had left. There is no doubt now, doubts which he held in 2011, that had he chosen to stay on that he would have received the support of those three states and could probably have won. Had he stayed on Syria would remain independent and truly free, if not free in the democratic sense then at least free in the sense that Syria would not be chained to either the West (as the SDP would want it) or Qatar (as the IRP would want it). It would become a beacon of resistance against the global order. These were, of course, thoughts only Assad had but questions of what would’ve happened had there been no Arab Spring and had Assad stayed on remain common among Syrians. The general consensus is that he was doomed from the moment the first protests began so perhaps it would be easier to imagine a scenario where Assad faces no protests after all. There would’ve been no sanctions, Syria’s Armenian population wouldn’t have gone, Syria wouldn’t have been as much of a political flashpoint as it was. Nobody really denies that the average Syrian would’ve probably been better off had there been no Arab Spring and all that remains is a debate over whether one would want to live in a poor democracy or a prosperous autocracy.
How would Syria look like if Assad was still President? The world may never know.