though one wonders how politically feasible that would be on the French side.
In the 30's ? no issues whatsoever. French-right or French-left governments had absolutely no ideological issues with buying shitload of american aircrafts and tanks and everything else.
This explain by the utterly catastrophic state of the armement industry in the 30's. What's worse, Pierre Cot and Le Front Populaire added utter chaos and madness to the industry, trying to improve it.
The SNCA (Société Nationales de Construction d'Avions) were byzantine and Kafka at the same time.
Recently I did some research on Potez, and laughed my arse off in despair. After 1936, there were
two Potez. There was a "public Potez" led by... Henry Potez himself, and a "private Potez" led by Jacques Chirac father, Abel François Chirac. This was absolute madness. The aircraft industry was gutted and dismembred, then the limbs and bits were glued together into geography-driven, Frankenstein-look-alike industries, the SNCAs.
What is really interesting is that the massive buyouts started in 1938 with the Curtiss H-75s, the NA-16 trainers, and the pair of bombers (Martin 167F and DB-7). As for the tanks, there was a very serious project to build a big plant in Savannah.
Fighting in France stops at the Spanish border, near the mediterranean coast, on august 8, 1940. The decision to keeps fighting, the turning point, happens nearly two months earlier, on June 13. During those seven weeks, two orders are applied a) scorched Earth policy near the battlefront, when the German invade and b) any useful idustry that can be moved, is send to North Africa.
Makes no mistake, the initial goal in moving the industry is to produce weapons in North Africa. And it miserably fails, per lack of basic industry there (foundries). So the real answer is Arsenal America, until 1944 and the end of the war.