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WI: Sikh Empire conquers Sindh

SinghSong

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Prior to being invaded and annexed by the British East India Company under the command of General Charles James Napier, the province of Sindh was ruled over by the Talpurs, whose dynasty had been established in 1783 by Mir Fateh Ali Khan Talpur, who declared himself the first Rais, or ruler of Sindh, after defeating the Kalhoras at the Battle of Halani. Prior to this, the Talpurs had served the previous Kalhora Dynasty (who'd been installed as the administrators and rulers of the Mughal imperial province, the 'Subah of Thatta' by Emperor Aurangzeb), dominating the Kalhora military, until 1775, when the Kalhora ruler had ordered the assassination of the chief of the Talpur clan, Mir Bahram Khan, leading to a revolt among the Talpurs against the Kalhora crown. Early Talpur rule was termed the 'First Chauyari', or "rule of four friends" - Mir Fateh, along with his brothers Mir Ghulam, Mir Karam, and Mir Murad. And ultimately, four separate branches of the Dynasty were established. The Talpur capital was declared to be Hyderabad, which had served as the capital of the overthrown Kalhoras. After his success, Fateh Ali Khan ruled the Shahdadani branch from Hyderabad, while his nephew established another branch of the dynasty, the Sohrabani, in Khairpur. Another relative, Mir Thara Khan, established the Mankani branch in southeast Sindh, around the area around Mirpur Khas - a city which was founded by his son Ali Murad Talpur. And a fourth branch, the Shahwani Talpurs of Tando Muhammad Khan, was also formed, though it became subordinate to the Shahdadani branch after the death of its founding ruler in 1813.

At their height, the Talpur brothers extended their rule over neighboring regions such as Balochistan, Kutch, and Sabzalkot (roughly corresponding with the present-day Rahim Yar Khan District of Pakistan), covering an area of over 100,000 square kilometers, with a population of approximately 4 million. They administered their realm by assigning jagirs to control individual land grants. During their rule, Syed Ahmad Barelvi (a Wahhabist Jihadi, who intended to establish a strong Islamic state on the north-west frontier in the Peshawar valley, as a strategic base for the future invasion of India, accompanied by an army of around 8,000 Mujahideen) tried to garner the Talpurs' support for his campaign against Maharajah Ranjit Singh, having sent an ultimatum to the ruler of the Sikh Empire demanding that he "either become a Muslim, pay Jizyah or fight and remember that in case of war, Yaghistan supports the Indians". With the rulers of Tonk, Gwalior and Rampur having been the primary supporters and funders of his newly declared Islamic Caliphate though, with the full consent of the British (who deemed it to be simply aiding an enemy of a nation they would soon be at war with), Barelvi was perceived to be a British agent, and these requests were turned down by the majority of the Talpurs- with the sole exception of 'Ali Murad, the younger half-brother of the then ruler of the Sohrabani branch Mir Rustam 'Ali Khan, who also supplied financial support to Syed Ahmad's 'Islamic Caliphate of Mardān', in the hopes of furthering his own ambitions, to weaken the Sikhs enough to make the conquest of the region of Multan (which had originally been part of the Kalhora Dynasty, and the Mughal Province of Thatta) possible.

In this short-term, original goal, 'Ali Murad failed- Syed Ahmad's efforts to reconcile between established power hierarchies, in pushing through aggressive and violent policies to enforce Sharia law (including efforts to collect the Islamic tithe of 10% of crop yields, the mandatory immediate marriage of all unwed girls above the age of 9, and flogging of any who who didn't pray) created strong opposition against him incited local revolts against him by the Pashtuns, forcing him and his Mujahideen to flee Peshawar for the hills, hoping to migrate and try his luck in Kashmir instead; Syed Ahmad was killed when an expeditionary force led by the first-born son of Maharajah Ranjit Singh's first wife, future Maharajah Sher Singh (having been entrusted with the task upon his recent appointment as Governor of Kashmir, a post which he'd hold until 1834) stormed his Mujahideen's final refuge at Balakot Maidan in the mountainous valley of Mansehra district on the 6th May 1831, and the early Indian Wahhabi movement fell with him. And the devastation of the Sohrabani Talpurs' diplomatic relations with the neighbouring Sikh Empire caused by their support of Syed Ahmad Barelvi's campaign, along with the Sikh Empire's rumored preparations for a retaliatory invasion to conquer the region of Chandūka (corresponding with the present-day Larkana Division) from them in restitution, were massive factors in 'Ali Murad's decision to follow the same strategy to escape the wrath of the Sikhs that the rulers of Tonk, Gwalior and Rampur had- signing a treaty with the British in 1832, in which he secured recognition as the independent ruler of Khairpur in exchange for surrendering control of foreign relations to the British in 1838, as well as use of Sindh's roads and the Indus River. But this did enable 'Ali Murad to oust his elder brother, and secure his ascension to become ruler of the Sohrabani Talpurs unopposed.

And the divisions among the Talpurs, such as 'Ali Murad's subsequent request to the British to seize Karachi from the Shahdadani Talpur dynasty in Hyderabad on his behalf in 1839, would allow the British to eventually conquer Sindh in relatively short order IOTL. Even prior to the signing of 'Ali Murad's treat with the British, after ascending to become the ruler of the Mankani Talpur dynasty in Mirpur Khas in 1829, Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur, who later became known by the moniker "Lion of Sindh" had established friendly relations with the Sikh emperor Maharajah Ranjit Singh, seeking to form an alliance against the British. This alliance, though, was stymied partially by an invasion of Upper Sindh conducted by the deposed Shah Shuja Durrani in 1832 (again, with the financial support of the British), which the Talpurs united against to defeat, and ultimately failed to endure beyond Maharajah Ranjit Singh's death IOTL. Instead Sindh was annexed to British India under the East India Company following the conquest of Sindh by Charles James Napier and defeat of Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur on 24 March 1843 at the Battle of Dubbo (during which, some local Sindhi jagirs are reported to have taken bribes from British forces, and aimed their guns towards Talpur Baloch forces). After this defeat, Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur and his remaining men retreated into the rural areas, where they continued a enduring counter-insurgency (inspiring Napier's invention of the term 'counter-insurgency) against the British invaders, with the 'Lion of Sindh' surviving until the 24th August 1874.

Following the British victory, and consequent annexation of the Sindh, troubles quickly arose. The authorities in England were not pleased with the annexation of the Sindh, which wasn't nearly as prosperous as Napier had claimed it would be after capture, and popular sentiment at the time was that the territory should be restored to the Talpur Amirs. However, the British East India Company ultimately decided that, since the process of returning the Sindh to its original owners would be difficult, and the forced resignation of Ellenborough and Napier would cause further criticism from England (with the government back in England having already written to Napier and Ellenborough, condemning the annexation and their actions), the ownership of the Sindh would remain with the British, who divided it into districts and integrated it as part of the Bombay Presidency. 'Ali Murad, who had helped the British in 1845-7 during the Turki campaign, was then accused by the British of plotting against them in 1851–2, and so was stripped of his lands in upper Sindh by the British East India Company.

So then, that's most of the relevant backstory in the region, and how things played out IOTL. But what if the Sindh region had fallen into the hands of the Sikhs instead? Let's say that the Sikh Empire's rumored campaign to enact retribution against, and extort restitution from, Khairpur and the Sohrabani Talpurs for their support of Syed Ahmad's Islamic Caliphate, commences before 'Ali Murad manages to secure a treaty with the British for their protection ITTL; seizing Chandūka (Larkana Division, corresponding with the Sohrabani's territorial extent west of the Indus, and thus free for the taking under the Treaty of Amritsar) at the very least. And/or that the alliance between The Sikh Empire and the Mankani Talpurs then subsequently endures and strengthens rather than weakening and being largely abandoned after Maharajah Ranjit Singh's death, with Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur requesting that the Sikhs seize Karachi from the Shahdadani Talpurs on his behalf instead ITTL in the manner that Mir Ali Murid Talpur requested it of the British IOTL, and the entirety of Sindh (west of the Indus river at least) subsequently falling into the hands of the Sikh Empire. How long could they hold onto it- perhaps even indefinitely? And how much stronger would the Sikh Empire's position be ITTL, with the entirety of Sindh either brought into their possession or brought under their influence via their alliance with the Mankani Talpurs and the 'Lion of Sindh', standing together in unwavering opposition to the British until at least the mid 1870's?
 
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Interesting WI. I think a key question is what a Sikh or Sikh-dominated regime does with seaports like Karachi, do they allow the EIC to trade and so on. One can imagine both a scenario where they manage to build a strong and stable enough polity that it gets treated on the same level as Persia/Iran in the later stages of colonialism, but conversely it might be seen as all the more threatening to the EIC as a military rival and be targeted as a result.

Also, does Kalat get drawn into this Sikh-dominated entity as well?
 
Reading this thread's title, I thought this was going to be about a Sikh-majority Sindh!

I do wonder if the Sikh Empire conquering Sindh would really affect the reasons it really collapsed. In many ways the Sikh Empire was Ranjit Singh's one-man show (and when he died it immediately had succession disputes), and though there are ways to avoid the succession disputes after his death, I'm not sure if Sindh would change that except maybe through some extended butterflies. In the short term, or if we assume that the succession disputes don't occur, it makes the Sikh Empire considerably wealthier and I imagine Ranjit Singh would invite trade to Karachi because that was one of his aims in taking the region. Potentially he'd try to use the port to play the French and British off of one another. The way such a strategy would work long term I'm not really sure, but it has the potential to both backfire or succeed.
 
Reading this thread's title, I thought this was going to be about a Sikh-majority Sindh!
Technically, if one considers 'Nanakpanthi' Hindus to be Sikhs (as the Sarkar-e-Khalsa doubtless would), then one could make the case that Sindh came fairly close to that IOTL, and that it wouldn't actually be too hard, especially after a few decades or so under Sikh rule, to blur the boundaries further and consolidate their collective self-identification as 'Sikhs' rather than 'Hindus'. Sindhi Hindus were predominantly Nanakpanthis, and they dominated Sindh's economy and trade pre-partition, as well as comprising over 27% of Sindh's population prior to partition IOTL. And many of the Sindhi Balochs, who ethnically comprise around 40% of Sindh's present-day population, and emigrated there (and to Punjab, where the Derajat region owes its existence as an historical area to the Baloch immigration in the fifteenth century, when the Langah sovereign of Multan, Sultan Husain, called in Baloch mercenaries to hold his trans-Indus possessions, and assigned these territories to Haji Khan in jagir; his sons, Ghazi Khan, Ismail Khan and Fateh Khan, founded the three Deras or 'settlements' which were named after them, with the conquest of the Derajat region completed by then-Prince Nau Nihal Singh completing IOTL, as the last significant territorial acquisition of the Sikh Empire) in waves throughout the little Ice Age as climate refugees when Balochistan's already harsh winters (below -20C) intensified to make the region nigh-uninhabitable during the winter months, were still classified (by the British, in their censuses after they took power) as 'Tribal' rather than Muslim, only converting to Islam over time later on. The legacy of Syed Ahmed Barelvi's jihad can still be seen in the fact that 1.25% of the present-day population of Baluchistan still belong to the Ahl-i Hadith movement which follows his teachings, with c.65% of Balochis following the later Deobandi movement which claimed succession from it. Find some way to convert more than half of those Sindhi Balochs to Sikhism instead of to Islam as IOTL, and you're basically there (even without increased migration to and colonization of Sindh from Punjab, in a manner vaguely comparable to the British Canal Colonies)- hey presto, Sikh-majority Sindh.

I do wonder if the Sikh Empire conquering Sindh would really affect the reasons it really collapsed. In many ways the Sikh Empire was Ranjit Singh's one-man show (and when he died it immediately had succession disputes), and though there are ways to avoid the succession disputes after his death, I'm not sure if Sindh would change that except maybe through some extended butterflies. In the short term, or if we assume that the succession disputes don't occur, it makes the Sikh Empire considerably wealthier and I imagine Ranjit Singh would invite trade to Karachi because that was one of his aims in taking the region. Potentially he'd try to use the port to play the French and British off of one another. The way such a strategy would work long term I'm not really sure, but it has the potential to both backfire or succeed.

Depends on how it was conquered, by whom, and what the full repercussions were. IOTL, the Derajat region owes its existence as an historical area to the Little Ice Age Baloch migrations, when the Langah sovereign of Multan, Sultan Husain, called in Baloch mercenaries to hold his trans-Indus possessions (as the Kalhora would later call in the Talpurs to bolster them militarily), and assigned these territories in jagir to their leader Haji Khan; his sons, Ghazi Khan, Ismail Khan and Fateh Khan, founded the three Deras or 'settlements' which were named after them. And the conquest of the Derajat, nominally begun when tribute was imposed upon the chief of Mankera in 1821 by Maharajah Ranjit Singh, was completed by an army led by then Kanwar (Prince) Nau Nihal Singh in 1835 (at the tender age of 14), before he accompanied his father to the borders of Sindh to confront the Talpurian amirs in 1836 (and being awarded with the highest medal of valor, the Kaukab-i-Iqbal-i-Punjab, Order of the Propitious Star of the Punjab, by Maharaja Ranjit Singh for his deeds in 1837).

IMHO, Nau Nihal Singh represents perhaps the most promising candidate to lead a successful enduring Sikh Empire after his grandfather Maharajah Ranjit Singh's death; and while he's still far too young to be truly involved from the very beginning, before Khairpur's treaty with the British in 1832 (at which point, he was still 11yrs old) it isn't a massive stretch to imagine that trip he makes in 1836, accompanying his father Kharak Singh to the border with Sindh to merely confront the Talpurian Amirs IOTL, instead involving the military campaign to fully conquer Sindh (and/or unify it under the Mankani Talpurs) ITTL. In which instance, and in the event that Nau Nihal Singh acquits himself as well in said campaign as he had in Derajat and did in commanding the Sikh army which proceeded to Peshawar to assist Colonel Wade's contingent on its march from Punjab to Kabul across the Khyber Pass IOTL, it'd have only served to further boost his popularity and prestige relative to IOTL (where he was already dubbed "Yuvraj Kunwar Sa", or 'Respected Young Prince', and extremely popular with the royal court and general public), and this could conceivably shift the balance of power to render any attempts to have him assassinated politically untenable for the Dogras.
 
I suppose the big question is whether this larger Sikh empire can withstand the inevitable confrontation with the EIC that's going to come after the death of Ranjit Singh.

It won't necessarily happen exactly on schedule, since it was so dependent upon court politics, but I don't think that changing the rulers of Lahore will by itself prevent a war. With Sindh denied them, the EIC will be hungry to remove what seems like the last great threat to their rule within the subcontinent.

Now, the 1st Anglo-Sikh War was... not a triumph of British arms. While I don't subscribe to the view that the Sikh commanders were trying to throw the war, it's certainly not hard to imagine that any serious change in leadership will see the Sikhs perform better. Enough to beat the British?

It depends. The EIC were always more vulnerable on paper than in practice; even when taking the body blows of 1857 the British were able to assemble their forces with remarkable speed. But if there was ever a foe who had the discipline, numbers and resources to blunt the British, it was the Sikhs.

Moving on- let's throw a butterfly net, and say that after a draw in this hypothetical war both sides declare victory. The Sikhs blunt the imperial incursion, the British say they've secured their north-west border.

What happens in the alt-1857 (remember, butterfly net!) without the redoubtable Sikh regiments?
 
Technically, if one considers 'Nanakpanthi' Hindus to be Sikhs (as the Sarkar-e-Khalsa doubtless would),
That is a good question. The Singh Sabhas and the Akali movement is what drew the line of Sikhism to exclude Nanakpanthi Hindus; with the Sikh Empire some of the grievances behind it wouldn't exist, but on the other hand there were noted differences between the Sikh clergy and the imperial administration. It's a topic that would take decades of tensions to even come up, and the way the line between Sikhism and Hinduism would be drawn is one very much dependent on the way the Sikh Empire would go decades after the POD. I'm not really sure how it would go - I wonder if you'd see the line get drawn by Hindus trying to prevent Sikh influence, instead of by Sikhs trying to prevent Hindu influence. But I am going on a tangent here.

Depends on how it was conquered, by whom, and what the full repercussions were. IOTL, the Derajat region owes its existence as an historical area to the Little Ice Age Baloch migrations, when the Langah sovereign of Multan, Sultan Husain, called in Baloch mercenaries to hold his trans-Indus possessions (as the Kalhora would later call in the Talpurs to bolster them militarily), and assigned these territories in jagir to their leader Haji Khan; his sons, Ghazi Khan, Ismail Khan and Fateh Khan, founded the three Deras or 'settlements' which were named after them. And the conquest of the Derajat, nominally begun when tribute was imposed upon the chief of Mankera in 1821 by Maharajah Ranjit Singh, was completed by an army led by then Kanwar (Prince) Nau Nihal Singh in 1835 (at the tender age of 14), before he accompanied his father to the borders of Sindh to confront the Talpurian amirs in 1836 (and being awarded with the highest medal of valor, the Kaukab-i-Iqbal-i-Punjab, Order of the Propitious Star of the Punjab, by Maharaja Ranjit Singh for his deeds in 1837).

IMHO, Nau Nihal Singh represents perhaps the most promising candidate to lead a successful enduring Sikh Empire after his grandfather Maharajah Ranjit Singh's death; and while he's still far too young to be truly involved from the very beginning, before Khairpur's treaty with the British in 1832 (at which point, he was still 11yrs old) it isn't a massive stretch to imagine that trip he makes in 1836, accompanying his father Kharak Singh to the border with Sindh to merely confront the Talpurian Amirs IOTL, instead involving the military campaign to fully conquer Sindh (and/or unify it under the Mankani Talpurs) ITTL. In which instance, and in the event that Nau Nihal Singh acquits himself as well in said campaign as he had in Derajat and did in commanding the Sikh army which proceeded to Peshawar to assist Colonel Wade's contingent on its march from Punjab to Kabul across the Khyber Pass IOTL, it'd have only served to further boost his popularity and prestige relative to IOTL (where he was already dubbed "Yuvraj Kunwar Sa", or 'Respected Young Prince', and extremely popular with the royal court and general public), and this could conceivably shift the balance of power to render any attempts to have him assassinated politically untenable for the Dogras.

That does make sense and I do think you're right that a successful military campaign would significantly boost his popularity. Though if Nau Nihal Singh was already being feted as the yuvraj, that is a good sign for his changes. However, even then I could see Gulab Singh arrange an accident for Nau Nihal Singh, and the collapse going off as in OTL, with the main butterfly being Gulab Singh snatching a larger imperial treasury. My solution to that would just be Gulab Singh dying in battle, since a Punjabi conquest of Sindh would dramatically change patterns of military conquest. I suspect Punjab would eventually be drawn into a confrontation with the Britishers, but under a strong leader like Nau Nihal Singh was, it might have prevailed. And if they prevail long enough, I guess you could see the Sikh Empire survive.

But that's a lot of ifs.
 
Interesting WI. I think a key question is what a Sikh or Sikh-dominated regime does with seaports like Karachi, do they allow the EIC to trade and so on. One can imagine both a scenario where they manage to build a strong and stable enough polity that it gets treated on the same level as Persia/Iran in the later stages of colonialism, but conversely it might be seen as all the more threatening to the EIC as a military rival and be targeted as a result.

Also, does Kalat get drawn into this Sikh-dominated entity as well?
Kalat (and the other Khanates of Baluchistan which wound up becoming princely states later on IOTL) getting drawn into an alliance is certainly a possibility, and the would almost inevitably have fallen into the Sikh Empire's sphere of influence as soon as the region of Chandūka (and control over the Bolan Pass) fell under Sikh control. Though it's also worth mentioning that, at this time, with the Little Ice Age still ongoing, the region itself was at its least fertile and prosperous. Could've helped with providing military support, and a readily available net inflow of cheap labor (which would;ve been highly useful if this Sikh-dominated entity did want to modernize); any attempt by the Sikhs to push into and conquer Baluchistan's kingdoms militarily would've been highly counter-productive, though.

What would they do with seaports such as Karachi? France is the most commonly mentioned counterweight and alternative trading partner which gets brought up, but it's worth mentioning that the European nation which the British themselves, and all other European observers, most frequently deemed to be the closest analogue to the Sikh Empire, especially later on, was Germany- with analogies drawn between the Sikh Confederacy and German Confederation, between the Ahluwalia Misl and Prussia, and between the structure of the Sikh Empire at its maximum extent IOTL and that of the North German Confederation, prior to the inception of the German Empire. Of course, it'd still be decades away from being a possibility, but I'd say that trade links and diplomatic ties being formed between the Sikh and German Empires would represent the ultimate nightmare scenario for the British.

And another thing worth mentioning, in favor of Nau Nihal Singh being the best candidate for succession to usher in a long-lived, stable and modernized Sikh Empire, if you're looking for someone to 'do a Meiji'- the interior decor of his personal mansion in Lahore (which was repurposed under the British to become Victoria Girl's High School, and remains so to this day, with Nau Nihal Singh having been the only male ever to have resided there) has been examined and found to be indicative of clear East Asian influences; Japanese, most of all. With a seaport like Karachi, even if he himself didn't 'kick off a Meiji', one could easily imagine Maharajah Nau Nihal Singh or his firstborn son Jawahar Singh (who was stillborn IOTL in May 1841, due to his pregnant mother having been poisoned by the Dogras) looking to the example of Emperor Meiji (just over a decade Jawahar Singh's junior), and making efforts to emulate its rapid industrialization and modernization; and one could also easily imagine TTL's Sikh and Japanese Empires forging close diplomatic ties and trade links.
 
That is a good question. The Singh Sabhas and the Akali movement is what drew the line of Sikhism to exclude Nanakpanthi Hindus; with the Sikh Empire some of the grievances behind it wouldn't exist, but on the other hand there were noted differences between the Sikh clergy and the imperial administration. It's a topic that would take decades of tensions to even come up, and the way the line between Sikhism and Hinduism would be drawn is one very much dependent on the way the Sikh Empire would go decades after the POD. I'm not really sure how it would go - I wonder if you'd see the line get drawn by Hindus trying to prevent Sikh influence, instead of by Sikhs trying to prevent Hindu influence. But I am going on a tangent here.
Most likely outcome there, IMHO, is the line getting drawn in both of those ways, on respective sides of the border. In British-held India, it'd be drawn both by Hindus and by the BEIC to prevent Sikh influence, to a markedly greater degree than it was IOTL (though this could well backfire for the BEIC to a degree, if such a crackdown were to generate a backlash); in an enduring, strong and independent Sikh Empire though, it'd be drawn by the Sikhs- though rather than being drawn to try and prevent Hindu influence, it'd be most likely to increase their own influence over the populace, and consolidate their fledgling national identity. IOTL, today, there are estimated to be around 120-150M 'Nanakpanthi' Hindus; mostly in India, though with a few million still left in Pakistan. If the Sikh imperial administration's definition of 'Sikhs' includes Nanakpanthis, whilst this could generate tensions with the Sikh clergy (which were purportedly in need of modernization and oversight to mitigate corruption at the time- perhaps it'd be best to tackle the issue head-on ASAP?), it'd be a fairly easy ticket to boost the Sikh population, and increase national unity. Though it could well also result in TTL's equivalents to the Singh Sabhas and Akali movements, only seeking to drawing the line to exclude Nanakpanthi Hindus a few decades down the line, after things reach the point when they comprise a smaller share of the population than the Sikhs do- with the potential for TTL's equivalent movements, if they did still follow the path of religious exclusionism, to take on a markedly uglier, more oppressive and authoritarian tone...

That does make sense and I do think you're right that a successful military campaign would significantly boost his popularity. Though if Nau Nihal Singh was already being feted as the yuvraj, that is a good sign for his changes. However, even then I could see Gulab Singh arrange an accident for Nau Nihal Singh, and the collapse going off as in OTL, with the main butterfly being Gulab Singh snatching a larger imperial treasury. My solution to that would just be Gulab Singh dying in battle, since a Punjabi conquest of Sindh would dramatically change patterns of military conquest. I suspect Punjab would eventually be drawn into a confrontation with the Britishers, but under a strong leader like Nau Nihal Singh was, it might have prevailed. And if they prevail long enough, I guess you could see the Sikh Empire survive.

But that's a lot of ifs.
Indeed, there are plenty of ifs involved. A confrontation could, and almost certainly would, still come with the British; though where said confrontation comes could be pretty important, with the expansion southward opening up newer, likelier potential flashpoints for conflict. 'Ali Murad, even in the event of Khairpur in its entirety coming under occupation by Ranjit Singh's forces, would be most likely to flee and take refuge with the British as the deposed Shah Shuja Durrani of Afghanistan had, after all. And with the Company most likely to back and support him all the way, even more so if Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur secures dominance over the other remaining branches of the Talpurs and over Sindh, backed and supported by the Sikhs. The place where you'd be most likely to see the Sikhs and British coming into conflict ITTL would be over Sindh itself- but the most likely manner in which such a conflict would play out would be as an effective proxy war, with the potential for both the Sikhs and British to actively avoid directly confronting and engaging one another's armies (or, indeed, for neither of them to field their own armies in said conflict at all). And even if the British did 'win' such a conflict, nominally 'restoring' Mir Ali Murad to the throne of a rump-remnant Sindh east of the Indus, Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur kept his counter-insurgency against the British going for over 30yrs IOTL with little to no assistance. Imagine how much more potent he'd be with the continued support and funding of the Sikhs; and how much more of the British East India Company's military assets and resources would be kept pre-occupied with trying to pacify Eastern Sindh, rendering them unable to be brought to bear against the Sikhs themselves instead before the alt-1857 Rebellion/Great Mutiny kicks off?
 
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Most likely outcome there, IMHO, is the line getting drawn in both of those ways, on respective sides of the border. In British-held India, it'd be drawn both by Hindus and by the BEIC to prevent Sikh influence, to a markedly greater degree than it was IOTL (though this could well backfire for the BEIC to a degree, if such a crackdown were to generate a backlash); in an enduring, strong and independent Sikh Empire though, it'd be drawn by the Sikhs- though rather than being drawn to try and prevent Hindu influence, it'd be most likely to increase their own influence over the populace, and consolidate their fledgling national identity. IOTL, today, there are estimated to be around 120-150M 'Nanakpanthi' Hindus; mostly in India, though with a few million still left in Pakistan. If the Sikh imperial administration's definition of 'Sikhs' includes Nanakpanthis, whilst this could generate tensions with the Sikh clergy (which were purportedly in need of modernization and oversight to mitigate corruption at the time- perhaps it'd be best to tackle the issue head-on ASAP?), it'd be a fairly easy ticket to boost the Sikh population, and increase national unity. Though it could well also result in TTL's equivalents to the Singh Sabhas and Akali movements, only seeking to drawing the line to exclude Nanakpanthi Hindus a few decades down the line, after things reach the point when they comprise a smaller share of the population than the Sikhs do- with the potential for TTL's equivalent movements, if they did still follow the path of religious exclusionism, to take on a markedly uglier, more oppressive and authoritarian tone...
Well on the British side the Maharaja of Patiala was a Sikh ruler of a princely state, so my suspicion is that even on the British side there’ll be a royal-led religious reform movement of Sikhism with influence going both ways.

In general, I just really doubt Nanakpanthi Hindus would genuinely be considered Sikhs - at best they’d be considered masses to be inducted. Guru Nanak’s views by itself are similar to Bhakti Hinduism, and thus it is only natural that some Hindus would revere him. And that is the most important attribute of Nanakpanthi Hinduism. There are other aspects of Sikh influence, like both men and women covering their heads going into temples, some use of Gurmukhi, etc., but the vast majority of the defining attributes of Sikhism are simply not there. They worship God through idols, they don’t follow any of the five Ks; they just follow rituals tangential to Sikhism. I could see a way in which Nanakpanthi Hindus are considered simultaneously Hindu and Sikh, but if lines are drawn firmly they would almost certainly be considered Hindus with some Sikh rituals. I could, however, see the line drawn so that the Udasi are considered Sikh rather than Hindu, same goes for various other borderline sects - and even that would be met with a lot of dispute by figures like the Sikh clergy. Likewise I could see an attempt to turn the Nanakpanthi into more orthodox Sikhs in an attempt to include them - but that would effectively be a requirement of conversion, and that would likely cause a Hindu counterreaction.
And even if the British did 'win' such a conflict, nominally 'restoring' Mir Ali Murad to the throne of a rump-remnant Sindh east of the Indus, Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur kept his counter-insurgency against the British going for over 30yrs IOTL with little to no assistance. Imagine how much more potent he'd be with the continued support and funding of the Sikhs; and how much more of the British East India Company's military assets and resources would be kept pre-occupied with trying to pacify Eastern Sindh, rendering them unable to be brought to bear against the Sikhs themselves instead before the alt-1857 Rebellion/Great Mutiny kicks off?
Yes, definitely. It would weaken the Britishers quite a bit, while at the same time the Punjabis would reap the benefits of the access to the full Indus trade. If the Indian Mutiny does hit, that makes it a lot more likely to succeed, and while the Britishers would be likely to make attempts to take over the neo-Mughal and neo-Maratha empires and all, this does make it a lot less likely the British would be able to take over Punjab in the long run as that would take time - why, the Sikh Empire might even be able to take over the cis-Sutlej states.
 
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Well on the British side the Maharaja of Patiala was a Sikh ruler of a princely state, so my suspicion is that even on the British side there’ll be a royal-led religious reform movement of Sikhism with influence going both ways.

In general, I just really doubt Nanakpanthi Hindus would genuinely be considered Sikhs - at best they’d be considered masses to be inducted. Guru Nanak’s views by itself are similar to Bhakti Hinduism, and thus it is only natural that some Hindus would revere him. And that is the most important attribute of Nanakpanthi Hinduism. There are other aspects of Sikh influence, like both men and women covering their heads going into temples, some use of Gurmukhi, etc., but the vast majority of the defining attributes of Sikhism are simply not there. They worship God through idols, they don’t follow any of the five Ks; they just follow rituals tangential to Sikhism. I could see a way in which Nanakpanthi Hindus are considered simultaneously Hindu and Sikh, but if lines are drawn firmly they would almost certainly be considered Hindus with some Sikh rituals. I could, however, see the line drawn so that the Udasi are considered Sikh rather than Hindu, same goes for various other borderline sects - and even that would be met with a lot of dispute by figures like the Sikh clergy. Likewise I could see an attempt to turn the Nanakpanthi into more orthodox Sikhs in an attempt to include them - but that would effectively be a requirement of conversion, and that would likely cause a Hindu counterreaction.

Probably would be religious reform movements on both sides, with influence going both ways; but tensions and hostilities between military powers back in the 1800s were fairly effective barriers to inhibit cross-cultural exchanges. And one might say that "they worship God through idols, they don’t follow any of the five Ks; they just follow rituals tangential to Sikhism"; but the Sanatan (tl: 'Eternal') Sikh denomination heavily identified with the Brahmanical social structure and caste system, and it was the most prominent Sikh faction in the 1800's, during the height of the Sikh Empire IOTL. The Sanatan gained social prominence following heavy persecution of the Khalsa by the Mughals, wherein the Khalsa was forced to relinquish institutional control over the Gurdwaras and vacate the Punjab plains in the 1700s, and it was they comprised the overwhelming majority of the mahants (hereditary managers/custodians who controlled and held the door keys), who guided the operations of Sikh gurdwaras in the pre-British 18th- and colonial-era 19th-century Punjab, empowered by the support and patronage of many of the most influential Sikh Imperial elites, and later, by the colonial British empire)- after heavy Mughal persecution had forced the Khalsa to relinquish control of the Gurdwaras and vacate the Punjab plains in the 1700s. These mahants also often belonged to Udasi, Nirmala, or other Brahmanical-influenced ascetic heterodox sects, or were non-Sikh altogether. And whilst the Khalsa/Reformist Sikh factions set about engaging in guerilla campaigns against the Mughals and the hill-rajas of the Sivalik Hills allied to them, and later fought the Afghans and established themselves as local leaders, with their jathas solidifying into the Sikh misls of the Dal Khalsa, which established the Sikh Empire and brought them to political power, the Brahmanical/Vedantic Sikh Mahants instead wrote exegeses and solidified their control over the Gurdwaras, consolidating their religious institutional power.

Sanatan Sikhism espouses spiritual sympathy and leniency towards the worship of idols and images, rural traditions and to respecting Hindu scriptures. And it was they who were the primary participants and molders among the rural masses of the Sikh Empire's population; and in contrast to Nirankari and Tat Khalsa Sikhs, Sanatan Sikhs did (and still so) actually consider images and idols of the ten Sikh gurus, as well as others, to be an inclusive practice, and a wholly acceptable means of devotional worship. Known as the 'Sahajdhari', these Sanatan Sikh mahants- who generally claimed direct descent from the Sikh Gurus, holy men (Babas, Bhais, Sants) and/or intellectuals in Sikhism called gianis and dhadhis- actively practiced the worship of images and idols, and provided ritual services and led functions for Sikh aristocrats and elites during Sikh Imperial rule, under the patronage of Sikh elites and aristocracy. And with the positions of mahants having also been hereditary at this time, they also actively encouraged the perpetuation of a caste system, with themselves at the top. Their views have been dismissed by the vast majority of Sikh scholars, and labeled and shunned as "Hindu saboteurs", having engaged in the Hinduization of Sikh customs and the institution of idolatrous practices. But it was only with the rise of the Singh Sabha movement, after the creation of the SGPC and the Nankana Sahib massacre, that the idols were removed from sites like the Golden Temples, and that laws were passed to abolish hereditary mahant priesthoods, with control over the Gurdwaras subsequently mostly passing from the Sanatan Sikh denomination to reformer Sikhs, and the orthodox Sikh stance shifting to wholesale rejection of idolatry.

In an ATL though, one where the Sikh Empire endured, how differently might this play out? IOTL, this underlying struggle between the Sikh Empire's political and religious elite was arguably the primary factor behind the factional intrigues which ultimately caused the downfall of the Sikh Empire- the political elite, comprised of the Misldar clans, and under the leadership of the Sukerchakia dynasty, were overwhelmingly aligned with the Khalsa reformist factions, and sought to entrench what we see today as the defining attributes of Sikhism- aiming to create a more meritocratic, egalitarian and secular system of governance. Maharajah Kharak Singh, for instance, whilst much-lambasted as an incompetent, weak-willed and simple-minded imbecile, was depicted as such by the Dogra faction and European observers (most of them, without having ever met him) partly on account of his "mild and humane disposition", and the degree to which he was "loved by his dependants"; as a multi-lingual patron of the fine arts, astrology and of handicrafts like Phulkari knitting, which he'd been taught by his mother Datar Kaur aka 'Mai Nakain', who'd took an active interest in the affairs of the State and personally taken over her firstborn son's training for 18 months during his expedition to Multan (herself personally managing the logistics of the Sikh army during that expedition, and teaching him in the administration and handling of important strategic and governing duties, at which he excelled, as well as instilling in him the values of humanitarianism and diplomacy).

Kharak Singh was also deemed to be too heavily and easily influenced, giving females in particular far too much respect and agency for the traditionalists' liking; accused of having been 'dandified' by his mother's training, depleted of the degree of male dominance needed to be a strong enough ruler, with the most problematic influences upon him deemed to be his Queen Consort Chand Kaur (who even prior to her husband's and her only son's deaths, often purportedly chose to forgo wearing a veil in favor of a turban, attended military parades in lieu of her husband, and was purported to have stated "Why should I not do as Queen Victoria does in England?"), and by his tutor and personal advisor Chet Singh Bajwa (who'd been assigned the post by Datar Kaur before she passed away, and was also an uncle of Chand Kaur), who purportedly had "such an ascendancy over him as to render him a puppet". Both belonged to the Sandhu Jat clan which governed the Kainhaiya Misl, with Jat clans also governing 8 of the 12 misls, comprising the majority of the Sikh Empire's political elite, and it was said of them at the time that "their spirit of freedom and equality refused to submit to Brahmanical Hinduism and in its turn drew the censure of the privileged Brahmins... The upper caste Hindu's denigration of the Jat did not in the least lower the Jat in his own eyes nor elevate the Brahmin or the Kshatriya in the Jat's estimation. On the contrary, he assumed a somewhat condescending attitude towards the Brahmin, whom he considered little more than a soothsayer or a beggar, or the Kshatriya, who disdained earning an honest living and was proud of being a mercenary".

Chet Singh had the support of commander-in-chief General Ventura, who had long held ill feelings towards Dhian Singh, along with the other officers of the ‘French Brigade’, General Avitable and General Court, who all sided with him and supported his vision for the future of the Sikh Empire and of Sikhism itself, which would have been more closely aligned with the core French values of Liberté, égalité, fraternité. According to the testimony of the Wisconsinite Alexander Gardner (who sided with the Dogra brothers), on the day of Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh's return to Lahore from Peshawar, where he'd been stationed with the Khalsa Army in connection with the implementation of the Tripartite Treaty to restore Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul (having sent a message requesting that his father's coronation be delayed until his arrival in Lahore a few months later, only for Dhian Singh to fast-track the coronation to take place a week before Nau Nihal's scheduled arrival, in light of Sher Singh's approaches to the British to try and obtain their support to his claim to the throne; which the Governor-General only rebuffed, after some delay, immediately after the coronation took place), "euphoric Chet Singh was rash enough to warn Dhian Singh in open Durbar that day: ‘See what will become of you in the next twenty four hours’. Dhian Singh smiled and said, ‘Your humble servant Sir, we will see’.” And it may also be worth a mention that, whilst the Dogras alleged that Kharak Singh was largely absent from the court, and confined himself in his own private quarters most of the time on account of being so heavily addicted to opium that he twice a day deprived himself of his senses and spent his whole time in a state of stupefaction, a tale which European visitors to the Sikh Imperial Durbar were all too willing to believe and recount, Kharak Singh rarely, if ever, spent his time in his private quarters alone- or with any of his wives for that matter, Chand Kaur included. There were two adjoining beds in his room; one belonging to himself, and one belonging to Chet Singh Bajwa.

And there are question marks about the precise nature of the increasingly "close" relationship between Kharak Singh and Chet Singh Bajwa- the precise term in Punjabi which was used by contemporaries, to describe their relationship, can also be translated as 'intimate'. Which, if true, would provide added explanation for Chand Kaur's falling out with her uncle, and her and Nau Nihal Singh's complicity in Chet Singh's assassination- beyond the rumors spread by the Dogras that Chet Singh was a traitor and was in the pay of the British, and the forged documents which they'd had presented to Chand Kaur and the newly arrived Nau Nihal Singh, alleging that Chet Singh had agreed to place Punjab under British protection, and that when they let him take over, he would pay six annas out of every rupee (3/8th) of revenue to the British, with the promise that he would disband the Khalsa army, and remove all the current Sardars from their commands (effectively, reproducing documents which offered the same terms to the British which Sher Singh's grandmother, Sada Kaur, had actually offered to the British as chief of the Kanhaiya Misl back in 1820- seeking to break away from the Empire which she'd played a critical role in helping her son-in-law to create, after he'd spurned her daughter and grandson to informally confirm his favorite wife's firstborn son as his heir instead, only for the British to refuse, since they couldn't contemplate admitting a princely state with a female head of state).

The religious elite, on the other hand, were effectively 'led' by the Prime Ministers/Wazirs of the Sikh Empire, the Dogras; who themselves identified as Nanakpanthi Hindu Rajputs, and provided the greatest patronage of all to the Sanatan Mahants of Sikhism's most prominent Gurdwaras and holy sites- most of it directly from the taxpayers' purse, and supported by ever-increasing religiously discriminatory taxation against the Muslims, in their own personal fiefdom of Kashmir most of all. And it was they who were responsible for the imposition of several of the more problematic and controversial Sikh Imperial edicts, imposed upon the general populace in keeping with their own beliefs. Prominent examples of these include the universally imposed bans on cow slaughter and the Islamic call to prayer, which caused the greatest counter-reaction and incited civil unrest among the majority Muslim population, and the Dogra administrations' increasingly severe and institutional imposition of veth-begar (caste-based forced labour analogous to serfdom, from which only Brahmins/Pujani such as the Mahants and Rajputs such as themselves were exempted) upon the populace, under the premise of 'facilitating the supply of materials to the imperial army'. After the stroke which deprived Maharajah Ranjit Singh of his ability to speak, reducing him to communication via sign language, in Jan 1839, Kharak Singh was deprived of any further access to his father on his deathbed by Dhian Singh Dogra (as his younger brother Sher Singh was), forced to bribe the attendants to gain entry and repeatedly dispatched away from Lahore on missions and campaigns far more often than required.

In the meantime, Wazir Dhian Singh had taken full advantage by pretending to understand all the gestures and directives of the Maharaja, and effectively seizing power exclusively for himself, increasingly brazenly issuing his own edicts in Ranjit Singh's name. First and foremost among these had been reversing of the awarding of Kashmir to Kharak Singh, which had been the last edict issued by the lips of Maharajah Ranjit Singh himself, as a check on the ambitions of Gulab Singh Dogra- with Dhian Singh immediately declaring that the Mahajarah had indicated to him through signs that Kharak Singh was unfit to govern Kashmir, and that his elder brother Gulab Singh Dogra should be Raja of Kashmir in perpetuity. The penultimate major example involved Dhian Singh Dogra summoning the toshikanaea (director of the Royal Treasury) Beli Ram, 2 days prior to Ranjit Singh's death, and asserting that the Maharaja had indicated through signs to him that the Koh-i-Noor diamond be given away, with all proceeds going to the Brahmins in charity. Beli Ram publicly refused, in the Sikh royal court; saying that the priceless gem should be retained for the Maharaja’s descendants, and pointing out that Dhian Singh had already given away twenty-one lakhs of rupees from the royal treasury to the Brahmins in the past few months alone (roughly 7% of the entire Sikh Empire's annual revenues, at a time when the Sikh Empire's revenue accounted for just under 1% of global GDP)- for which show of defiance, immediately after the assassination of Chet Singh Bajwa, he was sent for, and after having 2 iron shackles placed upon each of his legs, sent to prison, only escaping execution on account of Dhian Singh Dogra acknowledging Beli Ram's status as a Brahmin, exempting him from harsher punishment. And immediately upon Maharajah Ranjit Singh's death, 2 days later, Dhian Singh summoned Prince Kharak Singh to the deceased king's bedside; placing his hand in Maharaja’s hand, and then in his own hand, before returning to the court to announce publicly that the Maharaja had named Kharak Singh as his successor, and himself as Kharak Singh's Prime Minister.

That's how much money he was sending the way of the Brahmins, and the priest class which perpetuated the Hindu caste system in the Sikh Empire; that's where the Dogras' power base came from, even more than any of their later dealings with the British. Without that massive inflow of cash and patronage though, which was continued under British colonial rule, there's a good chance that things could change in this regard a lot sooner, as sought by the Mahajarahs and their allies; fast-tracking the modernization and 'de-Hinduization' of Sikhism relative to OTL. This could, and almost certainly would, lead to increased tensions from its Hindu community; but it'd also have the potential to greatly diminish tensions with, and increase the integration of, its Muslim communities. And thanks largely to the repeated Muslim invasions and forced conversions in the Punjab region, it was Muslims who were the majority, even if it was the Hindus, dominating the higher castes/upper classes of society, did still dominate the economy.
 
That does make sense and I do think you're right that a successful military campaign would significantly boost his popularity. Though if Nau Nihal Singh was already being feted as the yuvraj, that is a good sign for his changes. However, even then I could see Gulab Singh arrange an accident for Nau Nihal Singh, and the collapse going off as in OTL, with the main butterfly being Gulab Singh snatching a larger imperial treasury. My solution to that would just be Gulab Singh dying in battle, since a Punjabi conquest of Sindh would dramatically change patterns of military conquest. I suspect Punjab would eventually be drawn into a confrontation with the Britishers, but under a strong leader like Nau Nihal Singh was, it might have prevailed. And if they prevail long enough, I guess you could see the Sikh Empire survive.

But that's a lot of ifs.

Also, going back to this; there's no doubt about it, Sikh Imperial history in those times was was certainly very 'Game of Thrones'. But while there are indeed a whole lot of ifs, there are plenty of PODs, delicate enough IOTL to be butterflied the other way, which could have brought it all tumbling down for the Dogras.

For instance, ITTL, with Sindh as a newly acquired part of the Sikh Empire, how many fewer Sikh troops would still be available, and close enough to be brought to bear, to suppress the Poonch Revolt in 1837- wherein the Muslim tribes of Tanolis, Karrals, Dhunds, Satis and Sudhans rose up in revolt in Hazara and Poonch, against the extortionate taxation imposed by the Dogras which was causing widespread famines there, and against their brutal treatment as veth-bagar forced laborers in the salt mines there under the Dogras' jagirship? The Poonch Revolt was led by Shams Khan, Chief of the Sudhan tribe and former confidential follower of Dhian Singh Dogra, and with the betrayal of Shams Khan Sudhan against the regime taken personally, Gulab Singh was given the task of crushing the rebellion; doing so by narrowly defeating the insurgents in Hazara and Murree hills, before electing to minimize the personal risk to himself by staying at Kahuta for some time and promoting disunion among the insurgents, then dispatching his forces to crush the insurgents. With Shams Khan Sudhan and his nephew betrayed by bribed traitors in their camp, their heads were cut off during their sleep, whilst their lieutenants were captured, flayed alive and put to death with cruelty, with contemporary British commentators stating that many of the captured rebels had their hands and feet chopped off, and that the local population suffered immensely. ITTL, could the Poonch Revolt succeed the first time around, rather than only succeeding the second time around IOTL, over a century later, when the then-Maharaja Hari Singh Dogra's efforts to suppress the revolt in the same manner as his predecessor, with disproportinate, indiscriminate brutality and violence, backfired and empowered the rebel movement, resulting in the region successfully breaking away to form Azad Kashmir? Especially seeing as how the campaign into Sindh, led by Kharak Singh and Nau Nihal Singh, would've been ongoing at the same time, removing all of the reinforcements and supplies being routed to Sindh instead from the equation? If not in securing and maintaining the independence of the princely state of Poonch, then at the very least in defeating and killing Gulab Singh Dogra in those close-fought battles, and diminishing the Dogras' grasp in power?

And with yet another military campaign of conquest for Ranjit Singh to lead the Dal Khalsa in embarking upon personally, especially if he himself suffers injury in the process, how much earlier might he potentially pass away ITTL, with his health having been ailing for many years? On August 18, 1835, he'd already been struck by a stroke of paralysis, which had affected his left leg and his face, and from which he'd never recovered completely. And it was only in October 1838, just a few months prior to the crippling stroke which rendered him mute and enabled Wazir Dhian Singh Dogra to establish an unassailable stranglehold on power by issuing edicts in his name, that he'd agreed to sign the treaty with the British viceroy Lord Auckland, to restore Shah Shuja to the Afghan throne in Kabul in accordance with the Simla declaration, facilitating the passage of the British "Grand Army of the Indus", which was assembled in a grand review at Ferozepore together with the Dal Khalsa, to enter Afghanistan from the southern Bolan Pass, while Ranjit Singh’s troops went through the Khyber Pass and took part in the victory parade in Kabul. How much likelier would it be for the stroke which he suffered in January 1839 to be fatal ITTL, or for him to suffer a fatal stroke earlier? And how much less of a stranglehold on power would Wazir Dhian Singh have been able to secure for himself, without those six months when he was able to position himself as the sole voice of the Maharajah? How much more secure would the line of succession, and balance of power, have been if the last edict which Maharajah Ranjit Singh had ever had the chance to issue directly himself IOTL had truly been his last- removing Gulab Singh Dogra from power in Kashmir, and proclaiming it to be the territorial endowment of the heir to the throne from that point forth (in a manner akin to the Principality of Wales' status after the Statute of Rhuddlan in 1284)?

Would the British be able to secure an agreement from his successor to allow their army free passage to Afghanistan, and secure the Sikh support, which be even more critical ITTL, when both the Bolan and Khyber Passes would only be accessible via traversing Sikh Imperial territory, and the Sikhs would be able to cut off the expeditionary force's train of supplies to and from British India at any time? Or for that matter, without Sindh in their own possession for them to be able to invade Afghanistan through it, would the British even bother attempting to restore Shah Shuja to power ITTL, and engaging in the 1st Anglo-Afghan War, if the Russian-allied Persians still failed in the siege of Herat as they did IOTL, or would they deem it not worth the risk or effort? There's a whole lot of "ifs". But a whole bunch of those other "ifs" get a whole lot likelier, to the extent of becoming perhaps the most plausible potential outcomes, due to the POD.
 
Apologies if I missed anything - you've written quite a bit.

Probably would be religious reform movements on both sides, with influence going both ways; but tensions and hostilities between military powers back in the 1800s were fairly effective barriers to inhibit cross-cultural exchanges. And one might say that "they worship God through idols, they don’t follow any of the five Ks; they just follow rituals tangential to Sikhism"; but the Sanatan (tl: 'Eternal') Sikh denomination heavily identified with the Brahmanical social structure and caste system, and it was the most prominent Sikh faction in the 1800's, during the height of the Sikh Empire IOTL. The Sanatan gained social prominence following heavy persecution of the Khalsa by the Mughals, wherein the Khalsa was forced to relinquish institutional control over the Gurdwaras and vacate the Punjab plains in the 1700s, and it was they comprised the overwhelming majority of the mahants (hereditary managers/custodians who controlled and held the door keys), who guided the operations of Sikh gurdwaras in the pre-British 18th- and colonial-era 19th-century Punjab, empowered by the support and patronage of many of the most influential Sikh Imperial elites, and later, by the colonial British empire)- after heavy Mughal persecution had forced the Khalsa to relinquish control of the Gurdwaras and vacate the Punjab plains in the 1700s. These mahants also often belonged to Udasi, Nirmala, or other Brahmanical-influenced ascetic heterodox sects, or were non-Sikh altogether. And whilst the Khalsa/Reformist Sikh factions set about engaging in guerilla campaigns against the Mughals and the hill-rajas of the Sivalik Hills allied to them, and later fought the Afghans and established themselves as local leaders, with their jathas solidifying into the Sikh misls of the Dal Khalsa, which established the Sikh Empire and brought them to political power, the Brahmanical/Vedantic Sikh Mahants instead wrote exegeses and solidified their control over the Gurdwaras, consolidating their religious institutional power.

Sanatan Sikhism espouses spiritual sympathy and leniency towards the worship of idols and images, rural traditions and to respecting Hindu scriptures. And it was they who were the primary participants and molders among the rural masses of the Sikh Empire's population; and in contrast to Nirankari and Tat Khalsa Sikhs, Sanatan Sikhs did (and still so) actually consider images and idols of the ten Sikh gurus, as well as others, to be an inclusive practice, and a wholly acceptable means of devotional worship. Known as the 'Sahajdhari', these Sanatan Sikh mahants- who generally claimed direct descent from the Sikh Gurus, holy men (Babas, Bhais, Sants) and/or intellectuals in Sikhism called gianis and dhadhis- actively practiced the worship of images and idols, and provided ritual services and led functions for Sikh aristocrats and elites during Sikh Imperial rule, under the patronage of Sikh elites and aristocracy. And with the positions of mahants having also been hereditary at this time, they also actively encouraged the perpetuation of a caste system, with themselves at the top. Their views have been dismissed by the vast majority of Sikh scholars, and labeled and shunned as "Hindu saboteurs", having engaged in the Hinduization of Sikh customs and the institution of idolatrous practices. But it was only with the rise of the Singh Sabha movement, after the creation of the SGPC and the Nankana Sahib massacre, that the idols were removed from sites like the Golden Temples, and that laws were passed to abolish hereditary mahant priesthoods, with control over the Gurdwaras subsequently mostly passing from the Sanatan Sikh denomination to reformer Sikhs, and the orthodox Sikh stance shifting to wholesale rejection of idolatry.

You're being a bit anachronistic here; the Sanatan Sikhs were only really organized as a "sect" as such in the 1870s, during the mass proliferation of religious movements across all of Punjab in that era. Before that point, they only really existed as a tendency within Sikhism. Indeed, even that name, Sanatan, is a byproduct of the 20th century when it came to be used to refer to traditional Hinduism. It is within that context that it must be viewed, a tendency within the faith rather than a true movement. Sanatan Sikhs are also not the same thing as Sajahdari Sikhs; those are two different but overlapping things. And I suspect if the viewpoints later organized as the "Sanatan" Sikhs become dominant, there will simply be no line whatsoever between Hinduism and Sikhism; sure, there will plenty of division within it, but they will be overlapping. There will also be a great deal of people who identify simultaneously as Hindu and Sikh

This extends to a wider point: the late nineteenth century Punjabi religious movements shaped not only the line between Hinduism and Sikhism, but the nature of Sikh internal divisions. It codified and organized them. The Sikh Empire surviving would change all of that; it would not only change which group is dominant within Sikhism, but also the nature of those groups themselves (and obviously Nirankari Sikhism only emerged in the late nineteenth century). And if something like the late nineteenth century religious confrontation does occur, well, that would change all of that.

In an ATL though, one where the Sikh Empire endured, how differently might this play out? IOTL, this underlying struggle between the Sikh Empire's political and religious elite was arguably the primary factor behind the factional intrigues which ultimately caused the downfall of the Sikh Empire- the political elite, comprised of the Misldar clans, and under the leadership of the Sukerchakia dynasty, were overwhelmingly aligned with the Khalsa reformist factions, and sought to entrench what we see today as the defining attributes of Sikhism- aiming to create a more meritocratic, egalitarian and secular system of governance. Maharajah Kharak Singh, for instance, whilst much-lambasted as an incompetent, weak-willed and simple-minded imbecile, was depicted as such by the Dogra faction and European observers (most of them, without having ever met him) partly on account of his "mild and humane disposition", and the degree to which he was "loved by his dependants"; as a multi-lingual patron of the fine arts, astrology and of handicrafts like Phulkari knitting, which he'd been taught by his mother Datar Kaur aka 'Mai Nakain', who'd took an active interest in the affairs of the State and personally taken over her firstborn son's training for 18 months during his expedition to Multan (herself personally managing the logistics of the Sikh army during that expedition, and teaching him in the administration and handling of important strategic and governing duties, at which he excelled, as well as instilling in him the values of humanitarianism and diplomacy).

Kharak Singh was also deemed to be too heavily and easily influenced, giving females in particular far too much respect and agency for the traditionalists' liking; accused of having been 'dandified' by his mother's training, depleted of the degree of male dominance needed to be a strong enough ruler, with the most problematic influences upon him deemed to be his Queen Consort Chand Kaur (who even prior to her husband's and her only son's deaths, often purportedly chose to forgo wearing a veil in favor of a turban, attended military parades in lieu of her husband, and was purported to have stated "Why should I not do as Queen Victoria does in England?"), and by his tutor and personal advisor Chet Singh Bajwa (who'd been assigned the post by Datar Kaur before she passed away, and was also an uncle of Chand Kaur), who purportedly had "such an ascendancy over him as to render him a puppet". Both belonged to the Sandhu Jat clan which governed the Kainhaiya Misl, with Jat clans also governing 8 of the 12 misls, comprising the majority of the Sikh Empire's political elite, and it was said of them at the time that "their spirit of freedom and equality refused to submit to Brahmanical Hinduism and in its turn drew the censure of the privileged Brahmins... The upper caste Hindu's denigration of the Jat did not in the least lower the Jat in his own eyes nor elevate the Brahmin or the Kshatriya in the Jat's estimation. On the contrary, he assumed a somewhat condescending attitude towards the Brahmin, whom he considered little more than a soothsayer or a beggar, or the Kshatriya, who disdained earning an honest living and was proud of being a mercenary".

Chet Singh had the support of commander-in-chief General Ventura, who had long held ill feelings towards Dhian Singh, along with the other officers of the ‘French Brigade’, General Avitable and General Court, who all sided with him and supported his vision for the future of the Sikh Empire and of Sikhism itself, which would have been more closely aligned with the core French values of Liberté, égalité, fraternité. According to the testimony of the Wisconsinite Alexander Gardner (who sided with the Dogra brothers), on the day of Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh's return to Lahore from Peshawar, where he'd been stationed with the Khalsa Army in connection with the implementation of the Tripartite Treaty to restore Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul (having sent a message requesting that his father's coronation be delayed until his arrival in Lahore a few months later, only for Dhian Singh to fast-track the coronation to take place a week before Nau Nihal's scheduled arrival, in light of Sher Singh's approaches to the British to try and obtain their support to his claim to the throne; which the Governor-General only rebuffed, after some delay, immediately after the coronation took place), "euphoric Chet Singh was rash enough to warn Dhian Singh in open Durbar that day: ‘See what will become of you in the next twenty four hours’. Dhian Singh smiled and said, ‘Your humble servant Sir, we will see’.” And it may also be worth a mention that, whilst the Dogras alleged that Kharak Singh was largely absent from the court, and confined himself in his own private quarters most of the time on account of being so heavily addicted to opium that he twice a day deprived himself of his senses and spent his whole time in a state of stupefaction, a tale which European visitors to the Sikh Imperial Durbar were all too willing to believe and recount, Kharak Singh rarely, if ever, spent his time in his private quarters alone- or with any of his wives for that matter, Chand Kaur included. There were two adjoining beds in his room; one belonging to himself, and one belonging to Chet Singh Bajwa.

And there are question marks about the precise nature of the increasingly "close" relationship between Kharak Singh and Chet Singh Bajwa- the precise term in Punjabi which was used by contemporaries, to describe their relationship, can also be translated as 'intimate'. Which, if true, would provide added explanation for Chand Kaur's falling out with her uncle, and her and Nau Nihal Singh's complicity in Chet Singh's assassination- beyond the rumors spread by the Dogras that Chet Singh was a traitor and was in the pay of the British, and the forged documents which they'd had presented to Chand Kaur and the newly arrived Nau Nihal Singh, alleging that Chet Singh had agreed to place Punjab under British protection, and that when they let him take over, he would pay six annas out of every rupee (3/8th) of revenue to the British, with the promise that he would disband the Khalsa army, and remove all the current Sardars from their commands (effectively, reproducing documents which offered the same terms to the British which Sher Singh's grandmother, Sada Kaur, had actually offered to the British as chief of the Kanhaiya Misl back in 1820- seeking to break away from the Empire which she'd played a critical role in helping her son-in-law to create, after he'd spurned her daughter and grandson to informally confirm his favorite wife's firstborn son as his heir instead, only for the British to refuse, since they couldn't contemplate admitting a princely state with a female head of state).

This is quite interesting; it does sound, from what you're saying, that a Maharaja Kharak Singh would strengthen the Tat Khalsa impulse within Sikhism. But at the same time, he would alienate a large portion of the administration, which was disproportionately Brahmin because of their education and all. Even if Gulab and Dhian Singh die, that'll still be the case. What you can say, I think, is that such opposition would be weaker without people so closely tied to the centre of the Sikh Empire and all. But at the same time, it wouldn't just be smooth sailing, and Kharak Singh would need to do something to alleviate these sorts of tensions, presumably in this case by crushing any sort of rebellion that would pop up.

Also, going back to this; there's no doubt about it, Sikh Imperial history in those times was was certainly very 'Game of Thrones'. But while there are indeed a whole lot of ifs, there are plenty of PODs, delicate enough IOTL to be butterflied the other way, which could have brought it all tumbling down for the Dogras.

Again, I suspect Dhian and Gulab Singh were less a cause of the Sikh Empire's collapse and more a symptom of it. You'd still have a great deal of scheming and all after Ranjit Singh's death, considering the extent to which it was tied to him.

Also, the fall of Dhian and Gulab Singh would have some very large consequences beyond them just falling. There were a great number of regiments within the Sikh Empire under their command, and the great general Zorawar Singh was, while not a member of the Dogra ethnic group, was strongly tied to Gulab Singh. What would occur to them if Dhian and Gulab Singh fell? Well, if their fall were to occur close to the death of Ranjit Singh, as you argue, that would result in a great number of military regiments having no commander during the imperial succession. This is not a recipe for calm and orderly transition of power, and instead it would cause a great deal of chaos and scheming as factions try to attract these regiments to their cause. It would make a lot more sense to instead have Dhian and Gulab Singh die at least somewhat earlier than that, so Ranjit Singh can deal with the problem of Gulab Singh's regiments himself.

Also, even without the Dogra family, the begar system of corvee labour will still be around, because that is simply part of the rotten nature of feudalism. I suspect you'll still have something like the Poonch rebellion break out even if it's a Sikh clan in charge of the area (and not to make too much of a point on it, but the brutal bloodletting that took place in Poonch, Mirpur, and indeed the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-8 was due to the inhuman, barbaric, horrors of the Partition of India that was destroying Punjab at the same time, not old feudal issues). So I suspect the rest of the scenario you laid out would still occur.

How much more secure would the line of succession, and balance of power, have been if the last edict which Maharajah Ranjit Singh had ever had the chance to issue directly himself IOTL had truly been his last- removing Gulab Singh Dogra from power in Kashmir, and proclaiming it to be the territorial endowment of the heir to the throne from that point forth (in a manner akin to the Principality of Wales' status after the Statute of Rhuddlan in 1284)?

I don't think it would be. Ranjit Singh declared Kharak Singh to be the Tikka Kanvar Yuvraj, or crown prince, and it simply resulted in him being assassinated. There being Kashmir attached to such a declaration wouldn't change these sorts of dynamics. Also, Kharak Singh did have Jammu as his endowment, and while at the time Jammu was a tiny backwater town rather than the small city it became due to Gulab Singh and his successors, this is in the broadstrokes more or less what you are saying - and it didn't change anything. Also, Srinagar is a bit tough to get to from Lahore due to terrain and all that, to the extent that the creation of a road from Srinagar to Rawalpindi (just a road) by the Britishers and the princely state decades later was considered a stupendous engineering achievement; if the heir is busy administering Kashmir, it makes it tough for him to go to Punjab and claim the throne.

It, rather, would make far more sense to make Multan or some other more accessible area a territorial endowment of the successor to the throne. And even then, it might not be enough; what is needed a lot more is a firm-willed successor who is able to fend off threats, maintain loyalty, and then establish a firm administration. And admittedly that does become likelier with Dhian and Gulab Singh gone and Gulab Singh's regiments fully integrated without them
 
Apologies if I missed anything - you've written quite a bit.

Sorry about that- might have gotten a bit carried away there.

You're being a bit anachronistic here; the Sanatan Sikhs were only really organized as a "sect" as such in the 1870s, during the mass proliferation of religious movements across all of Punjab in that era. Before that point, they only really existed as a tendency within Sikhism. Indeed, even that name, Sanatan, is a byproduct of the 20th century when it came to be used to refer to traditional Hinduism. It is within that context that it must be viewed, a tendency within the faith rather than a true movement. Sanatan Sikhs are also not the same thing as Sajahdari Sikhs; those are two different but overlapping things. And I suspect if the viewpoints later organized as the "Sanatan" Sikhs become dominant, there will simply be no line whatsoever between Hinduism and Sikhism; sure, there will plenty of division within it, but they will be overlapping. There will also be a great deal of people who identify simultaneously as Hindu and Sikh

This extends to a wider point: the late nineteenth century Punjabi religious movements shaped not only the line between Hinduism and Sikhism, but the nature of Sikh internal divisions. It codified and organized them. The Sikh Empire surviving would change all of that; it would not only change which group is dominant within Sikhism, but also the nature of those groups themselves (and obviously Nirankari Sikhism only emerged in the late nineteenth century). And if something like the late nineteenth century religious confrontation does occur, well, that would change all of that.

Indeed. So ironically, there's a decent chance that there'd be markedly less of a distinction between Sikhism and Hinduism in an enduring Sikh Empire. Though regarding the rise of Nirankari Sikhism, whilst it only really began its rise to prominence in the late nineteenth century, and was technically only founded in 1851 IOTL, its founder Baba Dyal Singh had been preaching and gaining followers in Rawalpindi since the age of 18, back in 1801, with Maharajah Ranjit Singh said to have appreciated his teachings and approved of his mission; the growing idol worship, obeisance to living gurus and influence of Brahmanic ritual which the Nirankaris proclaimed to have crept into the Sikh panth, were all trends which had been observed during the Sikh Empire's heyday and subsequent decline. In an enduring Sikh Empire, the Nirankaris could well either take the lead in TTL's equivalent of the late 19th-early 20th century confrontation agitating for religious reform, or be subsumed into whichever group does. And there's also the possibility that the Sikh Raj may well end up having to lead the way itself; most feasibly via the establishment of its own equivalent to Meiji Japan's Department of Divinities, implementing a form of 'State Sikhism' in a manner akin to 'State Shinto', with a state policy analogous to early Meiji-era Japan's shinbutsu bunri, but to 'separate Hinduism from Sikhism' rather than "separate Buddhism from Shinto"- which would, IMHO, be far more critical to an enduring Sikh Empire's ability to function and modernize than it was IOTL's Japan. However, this would also almost certainly come at the cost of sparking or empowering a popular anti-Hindu movement, comparable to the Haibutsu kishaku during the Meiji Restoration. Unlike the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Sikh Empire and the Sikh Confederacy which preceded it had never implemented any policy comparable to the danka system, so there wouldn't have been nearly so much pent-up popular anger to be released against the Punjab's Hindus as there was against Japan's Buddhists IOTL; but the same political and economic motivations would exist in the Sikh Empire as those which did in Japan, potentially to an even greater extent, and realistically would be likely to involve similar levels of violence and bloodshed.

This is quite interesting; it does sound, from what you're saying, that a Maharaja Kharak Singh would strengthen the Tat Khalsa impulse within Sikhism. But at the same time, he would alienate a large portion of the administration, which was disproportionately Brahmin because of their education and all. Even if Gulab and Dhian Singh die, that'll still be the case. What you can say, I think, is that such opposition would be weaker without people so closely tied to the centre of the Sikh Empire and all. But at the same time, it wouldn't just be smooth sailing, and Kharak Singh would need to do something to alleviate these sorts of tensions, presumably in this case by crushing any sort of rebellion that would pop up.

Again, I suspect Dhian and Gulab Singh were less a cause of the Sikh Empire's collapse and more a symptom of it. You'd still have a great deal of scheming and all after Ranjit Singh's death, considering the extent to which it was tied to him.

Definitely wouldn't be smooth sailing- the Sikh Empire was a lot messier, bigger, more multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-cultural than Japan. But while a large portion of its administration, especially in its financial and administrative posts, was disproportionately Brahmin due to educational and socioeconomic advantages, especially in its early days, this was gradually being diminished over time. Things would need to be done to alleviate these sorts of tensions; but in keeping his mother's personal tutelage on the arts of administration, strategy and governance, and the close advice of his tutor Chet Singh Bajwa,Kharak Singh would be less likely to simply crush any sort of rebellion that might pop up via the application of military force, and more likely to apply concessions and preventative measures to tackle their causes, along with pre-emptive measures to try and avert them. Which, of course, is the sort of progressive approach you'd need to establish a functional modern state, and to increase wealth and prosperity rather than diminishing it.

In a ATL where Chet Singh Bajwa and his faction, supported heavily by the 'French Brigade' of the Fauj-i-Khas led by Jean-Baptiste Ventura (who was born as Rubino, but who'd had to change his name in Constantinople to hide his Jewish origins, and who'd been obligated to leave the Duchy of Modena in 1817 in the first place after his revolutionary ideology and Napoleonic sympathies became known to the local authorities there, following a dispute between him and a member of the reactionary Ducal police), wins out over Dhian Singh Dogra and his faction (which he would have done IOTL if he hadn't been arrogant and foolhardy enough to directly inform Dhian Singh of his plans to have him and his brothers eliminated 24hrs in advance, to his face), and where Maharajah Kharak Singh remains in power for an extended period of time, it could well be plausible for either the Napoleonic Code, or a hybridized civil code with extremely strong Napoleonic influences (most likely akin to the system of law on the UK Channel Islands, but mixing Napoleonic civil law with Punjabi rather than Norman customary law) to be adopted by the Sikh Empire relatively early on in his administration, probably starting some time in the 1840's or 50's ITTL. Which would present a significant departure from OTL, where no nation in Asia save for European colonies instituted a civil code prior to Japan, as late as 1896-98, and give rise to all sorts of butterflies.


Also, the fall of Dhian and Gulab Singh would have some very large consequences beyond them just falling. There were a great number of regiments within the Sikh Empire under their command, and the great general Zorawar Singh was, while not a member of the Dogra ethnic group, was strongly tied to Gulab Singh. What would occur to them if Dhian and Gulab Singh fell? Well, if their fall were to occur close to the death of Ranjit Singh, as you argue, that would result in a great number of military regiments having no commander during the imperial succession. This is not a recipe for calm and orderly transition of power, and instead it would cause a great deal of chaos and scheming as factions try to attract these regiments to their cause. It would make a lot more sense to instead have Dhian and Gulab Singh die at least somewhat earlier than that, so Ranjit Singh can deal with the problem of Gulab Singh's regiments himself.

Also, even without the Dogra family, the begar system of corvee labour will still be around, because that is simply part of the rotten nature of feudalism. I suspect you'll still have something like the Poonch rebellion break out even if it's a Sikh clan in charge of the area (and not to make too much of a point on it, but the brutal bloodletting that took place in Poonch, Mirpur, and indeed the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-8 was due to the inhuman, barbaric, horrors of the Partition of India that was destroying Punjab at the same time, not old feudal issues). So I suspect the rest of the scenario you laid out would still occur.

Trouble is, though, that this would beg the question of how, and why, they'd die earlier than that ITTL, with the POD in 1831-32. It could be done of course, with an earlier POD; but the Poonch Revolt presents perhaps the best chance of that happening, short of outright assassination (which, without future knowledge, seems unlikely prior to the court intrigues which took place in the months before and after Maharajah Ranjit Singh's death). I suppose one could have the Poonch Revolt take place earlier- as Raja of Jammu, and governor over the Kashmir region, Gulab Singh Dogra had been imposing ruinous taxes on Kashmiri Muslims for over a decade prior, causing a famine in 1832, so tensions could have conceivably reached boiling point and kicked off the Poonch Revolt back then. But would the butterflies from the POD have had enough time to flutter that far, that fast? IDK if it could be made plausible enough...
 
Though regarding the rise of Nirankari Sikhism, whilst it only really began its rise to prominence in the late nineteenth century, and was technically only founded in 1851 IOTL, its founder Baba Dyal Singh had been preaching and gaining followers in Rawalpindi since the age of 18, back in 1801, with Maharajah Ranjit Singh said to have appreciated his teachings and approved of his mission; the growing idol worship, obeisance to living gurus and influence of Brahmanic ritual which the Nirankaris proclaimed to have crept into the Sikh panth, were all trends which had been observed during the Sikh Empire's heyday and subsequent decline. In an enduring Sikh Empire, the Nirankaris could well either take the lead in TTL's equivalent of the late 19th-early 20th century confrontation agitating for religious reform, or be subsumed into whichever group does.
That’s very interesting indeed. A Nirankari Sikhism taking the lead would likely be very different from its OTL nature. It would likely continue to follow the Five Ks and all (dropping that is really what has made it so hated by many Keshdari Sikhs) while still attempting to harken back to Guru Nanak and all. It would still be closer to Hinduism, specifically Bhakti Hinduism with its traditions of non-idolatry, than OTL Sikhism, while still being distinct and all. And it would also possibly merge or overlap with the attitudes that turned into the Tat Khalsa on the basis of common attitudes towards idolatry and all.

And there's also the possibility that the Sikh Raj may well end up having to lead the way itself; most feasibly via the establishment of its own equivalent to Meiji Japan's Department of Divinities, implementing a form of 'State Sikhism' in a manner akin to 'State Shinto', with a state policy analogous to early Meiji-era Japan's shinbutsu bunri, but to 'separate Hinduism from Sikhism' rather than "separate Buddhism from Shinto"- which would, IMHO, be far more critical to an enduring Sikh Empire's ability to function and modernize than it was IOTL's Japan.

I doubt you’ll get any sort of Shinto-style department of divinities. The main reason being that Sikhism is a religion led by the Akal Takht, a body which was often at odds with the imperial administration. The formation of a religious department like that would likely be viewed as an usurpation of power by secular authority. The Sikh state might very well lead the way, but it would need to obtain the assent and cooperation of the Akal Takht. And separating Sikhism from Hinduism likely also means giving the Akal Takht further power; it cannot under any circumstance be alienated.

In a ATL where Chet Singh Bajwa and his faction, supported heavily by the 'French Brigade' of the Fauj-i-Khas led by Jean-Baptiste Ventura (who was born as Rubino, but who'd had to change his name in Constantinople to hide his Jewish origins, and who'd been obligated to leave the Duchy of Modena in 1817 in the first place after his revolutionary ideology and Napoleonic sympathies became known to the local authorities there, following a dispute between him and a member of the reactionary Ducal police), wins out over Dhian Singh Dogra and his faction (which he would have done IOTL if he hadn't been arrogant and foolhardy enough to directly inform Dhian Singh of his plans to have him and his brothers eliminated 24hrs in advance, to his face), and where Maharajah Kharak Singh remains in power for an extended period of time, it could well be plausible for either the Napoleonic Code, or a hybridized civil code with extremely strong Napoleonic influences (most likely akin to the system of law on the UK Channel Islands, but mixing Napoleonic civil law with Punjabi rather than Norman customary law) to be adopted by the Sikh Empire relatively early on in his administration, probably starting some time in the 1840's or 50's ITTL. Which would present a significant departure from OTL, where no nation in Asia save for European colonies instituted a civil code prior to Japan, as late as 1896-98, and give rise to all sorts of butterflies.

I think you’re getting a bit ahead of yourself here. Kharak Singh may very well centralize the state and all, but the ratification of a civil code would take considerably longer than that. It would first require, in addition to a weakening of the jagirdars, the centralization of all the subsidiary states in Himachal Pradesh, Jammu, and of course Sindh. Due to the extremely mountainous nature of Himachal and Jammu, that’s going to be quite tough even if the subsidiary states are abolished; indeed, you’d require the construction of roads and especially railways to truly tie them to Lahore. Then there would be the need for an administrative service strongly tied to the centre, which is again very tough to do and not a simple process. It would take many decades before the Sikh imperial authority is even close to being able to promulgate a civil code, and when that time comes there will be a lot of dispute among Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims over its content even if it does not touch personal law. It would take until the 1870s, if not later, for the Sikh Empire to promulgate a civil code.

Trouble is, though, that this would beg the question of how, and why, they'd die earlier than that ITTL, with the POD in 1831-32. It could be done of course, with an earlier POD; but the Poonch Revolt presents perhaps the best chance of that happening, short of outright assassination (which, without future knowledge, seems unlikely prior to the court intrigues which took place in the months before and after Maharajah Ranjit Singh's death). I suppose one could have the Poonch Revolt take place earlier- as Raja of Jammu, and governor over the Kashmir region, Gulab Singh Dogra had been imposing ruinous taxes on Kashmiri Muslims for over a decade prior, causing a famine in 1832, so tensions could have conceivably reached boiling point and kicked off the Poonch Revolt back then. But would the butterflies from the POD have had enough time to flutter that far, that fast? IDK if it could be made plausible enough...
I would just handwave it as simply Gulab Singh getting himself accidentally killed in battle some-time, potentially even in Sindh, and Dhian Singh’s position in the imperial court weakening without his brother being a notable. This might not be the most satisfying explanation, but it would deal with all the possible issues of Gulab and Dhian Singh falling from power too close to the succession.
 
Is the Sikh Empire in control of all of Sindh, or just Sindh west of the Indus here?
First is possible, via proxy at the very least; the latter scenario's the more plausible though, and something which the British could well pressure them into accepting by threatening hostilities. And there are other possibilities as well. In the Treaty of Amritsar between it and the British East India Company, as stipulated in 1809, they'd agreed to a mutual ban on warfare, in which the Sikh Empire forfeited its claim to the Cis-Sutlej States and agreed to halt any expansion east of the Sutlej river, and the British were not to interfere north of the Sutlej nor in the Sikh Empire's existing territory to the south of the Sutlej. That "existing territory south of the Sutlej" at the time of the treaty technically should have included Bahawalpur, which had become a vassal of the Sikh Empire under Maharaja Ranjit Singh; but the British interfered there, signing a treaty in 1833 to make it a dependency of the British Empire, with Bahawalpur's ruling Abbasi family ceasing to pay tribute to the Sikhs and declaring independence in 1836.

This was deemed to be tolerable though, by both parties, since it had followed the signing of another treaty between them in the previous year (immediately after the POD, and still potentially subject to change) regulating traffic on the Indus, whereby this dividing line was extended further southwards to include the Panjnad and Satnad (i.e, the Indus River south of Mithankot), effectively permitting the Sikh Empire complete freedom of action west of not only the Sutlej, but of all of the rivers it subsequently drained into as well. Which would enable the Sikh Empire to seize control over Sindh west of the Indus without risking any violation of the Treaty of Amritsar, and thereby still keep affairs between themselves and the British relatively civil and peaceful.

The potential interpretations of this treaty, though, gets a bit more complicated and blurry once you get down into Sindh as far as Sukkur though, since the Nara River existed, albeit only intermittently prior to the construction of the Nara Canal- as a distributary of the Indus River, which had historically been the mouth of the Hakra River, and through which the Sutlej had historically drained into the sea via Sir Creek (the present-day international boundary between India and Pakistan). And the Nara River was the only reason why Mirpur Khas existed in the first place- the city which the Mankani branch of the Talpur dynasty had founded to serve as its capital, from which Maharajah Ranjit Singh's ally ruled over the wider region.

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So the Treaty could be cited by the Sikhs to assert their right to complete freedom of action west of the Nara River as well; but this would be incredibly unlikely to wash with the British. Or alternatively, ITTL, the treaty Maharajah Ranjit Singh signed with the British regulating traffic on the Indus may well never be signed at all, which would also have the added butterfly effect of keeping Bahawalpur as a vassal of the Sikh Empire instead of being allowed to become a princely state of the British instead, and denying the British control over any states or areas with direct access to the Indus, placing it all exclusively under the Sikhs' control. Ultimately, it'd depend upon how badly the Sikhs and the British respectively wanted control over Sindh, and over trade via the Indus, and how much they were willing to risk over it.

Acting to seize direct control over all of Sindh, including those territories east of both the Indus and the Naga Rivers, would be the highest risk option for the Sikhs, with little apparent reward to be gained from such a course of action at that point of time beyond national pride, and destabilizing Company rule in Rajasthan and Gujarat. But in the long game, if the Sikh Empire wanted to be a major world power, 'do a Meiji' and to achieve industrialization on its own accord, as alluded to on that map above, control over the region of Sindh as a whole, and that easternmost portion of it most of all, would actually be a massive deal- to the extent that I'm not sure it'd be possible for it to do so without Sindh's mineral resources, so critical to industrialization.

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For reference- without Sindh, even at its maximum territorial extent IOTL, the Sikh Empire'd have to try and industrialize with coal reserves no greater than 363M tonnes, comparable to those of present-day Japan. The addition of just the portion of Sindh west of the Indus River'd increase that more than twenty-fold to 7,687M tonnes, comparable to the peak documented coal reserves of the Empire of Japan in 1925. And the addition of Sindh in its entirety could increase them by more than 500x, up to a maximum potential of 184,651M tonnes (which, even though they're sub-bituminous lignite rather than proper bauxite, would still constitute an energy resource comparable to all of the coal that's estimated to have been used by China, in their industrialization efforts, from 1902 to the present day). That's a big deal, to say the least...
 
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Were most converts to Sikhism Hindus or Muslims?
It's extremely hard to say; the patchy statistics and estimates from respective arbitrary points in its history appear to indicate that they were mostly Muslims, but it's worth considering that the Durrani invasions and accompanying genocides, which had immediately preceded Sikh rule and the subsequent expansion of the Sikh faith from its historical low point (only 70yrs prior to the POD, when the Vadda Ghallughara or 'Great Massacre' of 1762 wiped out 50% or more of the Sikh population in one stroke, reducing the total Sikh population to 10-15k), had obligated all people in the region to identify as 'Muslim' or face summary execution. So how many of them were really converting from Islam to Sikhism, as opposed to merely 'coming out' as Sikh (and Hindu, for that matter) under the Sikhs' rule when it was expedient or advantageous to do so, as opposed to inviting overwhelming religious persecution, and the prospect of being either forcibly converted to Islam or put to death, as it had done during the period of Durrani dominion over the Punjab region and Kashmir valley?

It's vaguely comparable to the situation in post-Cold War Russia, where on paper, there've been a massive and unprecedented number of converts to Christianity and other faiths from State Atheism since the fall of the Soviet Union. Have 81.5% of the Russian population truly been religiously converted in the past 30yrs, or have the majority of them just 'come out' as holding the religious beliefs which they held all along, but were forbidden from publicly doing so under Soviet rule? And a comparison could potentially be drawn between the explosive growth of Sikhism, under the Sikh Confederacy and Sikh Empire, and that of the SBNR ("spiritual but not affiliated") movement in post-Soviet Russia, with Sikhism in those times espousing a more individualistic, libertarian, anti-dogmatic and non-restrictive approach to spirituality than all of the other established alternatives, and thus offering the greatest appeal to those who sought to make the most of their newfound freedom to religious expression.
 
It's extremely hard to say; the patchy statistics and estimates from respective arbitrary points in its history appear to indicate that they were mostly Muslims, but it's worth considering that the Durrani invasions and accompanying genocides, which had immediately preceded Sikh rule and the subsequent expansion of the Sikh faith from its historical low point (only 70yrs prior to the POD, when the Vadda Ghallughara or 'Great Massacre' of 1762 wiped out 50% or more of the Sikh population in one stroke, reducing the total Sikh population to 10-15k), had obligated all people in the region to identify as 'Muslim' or face summary execution. So how many of them were really converting from Islam to Sikhism, as opposed to merely 'coming out' as Sikh (and Hindu, for that matter) under the Sikhs' rule when it was expedient or advantageous to do so, as opposed to inviting overwhelming religious persecution, and the prospect of being either forcibly converted to Islam or put to death, as it had done during the period of Durrani dominion over the Punjab region and Kashmir valley?

It's vaguely comparable to the situation in post-Cold War Russia, where on paper, there've been a massive and unprecedented number of converts to Christianity and other faiths from State Atheism since the fall of the Soviet Union. Have 81.5% of the Russian population truly been religiously converted in the past 30yrs, or have the majority of them just 'come out' as holding the religious beliefs which they held all along, but were forbidden from publicly doing so under Soviet rule? And a comparison could potentially be drawn between the explosive growth of Sikhism, under the Sikh Confederacy and Sikh Empire, and that of the SBNR ("spiritual but not affiliated") movement in post-Soviet Russia, with Sikhism in those times espousing a more individualistic, libertarian, anti-dogmatic and non-restrictive approach to spirituality than all of the other established alternatives, and thus offering the greatest appeal to those who sought to make the most of their newfound freedom to religious expression.
Thanks for the reply.
There is an article about the situatuon in Russia,
.
Also, it's "spiritual but not religious".
 
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