What it doesn't do is address the terrible state of the Qing navy, or get the Qing interested in- much less committed to- exercising dominion over Japan.
Problem to a great extent is that there really isn't much of a reason for the Qing to want to take Japan. Japan is nowhere near as good as China for agriculture, and as for raw materials and so forth, there's very little to be had, hence why China has traditionally always looked Southward for expansion as opposed to Eastward. Because of the buffer that is Korea, the Japanese had prior to the late 19th century never been a threat to China. Not even Hideyoshi was ever much cause for concern. The enemies to fear have always been the Turkic peoples in the North and in the West.
Alternatively, how about an earlier modernisation of Japan; say if someone manages to open them up in the 1790s or 1800s (be it the Revolutionary French, British, Americans or Russians), which could lead to conflict between Japan and China which causes the Qing enough problems to motivate them enough to go for complete conquest?
Is it possible that an earlier Sino-Japanese War and an earlier, perhaps more serious defeat for the Qing could lead to a revanchist faction arising in the Qing Court, dedicating itself to the destruction of the Japanese Empire?
If China hasn't already been opened up, if there isn't already all kinds of western powers vying for political influence there, there is really no reason to open up Japan.
It wasn't that there wasn't enough of a desire for revenge in the Qing Court. It was that the Qing Court was at a complete and total loss at figuring out a way to obtain a revenge with the cards that they'd been handed.
In all fairness, the Russians had expressed interest in opening up Japan as early as 1778 and the Americans had tried in 1803. Perhaps there could be some sort of incident leading to a sort of Opium War situation?
So with an earlier war and perhaps more time to reform the Qing state is it possible that they could try for a conquest?
If by opening up, you merely mean, send a trading vessel over to Japan with some diplomat and try to persuade the Japanese to sign some sort of trade agreement so the Dutch doesn't have monopoly, then, yes, two prior attempts had been made by the Russians in the late 18th century
I don't know of this episode in 1803 by the Americans though
But even so, the notion that the Qing would try to conquer Japan after having first a Sino-Japanese War (and that somehow even more seriously than in OTL) is a bit, well, ambitious.
To conquer Japan, they're going to need a considerable navy, and the means to bring over countless soldiers to the Japanese islands. China isn't really in a position to start building such a thing in the 1880s-1890s.
It's going to be difficult to get a war much earlier. The Meiji Restoration didn't properly get started until 1866, and even though the Boshin War (1868-9) put an end to the Tokugawa shogunate, military reform would take another decade and was a very difficult process, resulting in uprisings, like the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877.
But even so, the notion that the Qing would try to conquer Japan after having first a Sino-Japanese War (and that somehow even more seriously than in OTL) is a bit, well, ambitious. They'd likely just go for trying to reclaim (some of) what they lost or go for better terms. To conquer Japan, they're going to need a considerable navy, and the means to bring over countless soldiers to the Japanese islands. China isn't really in a position to start building such a thing in the 1880s-1890s.
I was think that if something had gone awry in either of these attempts that the Russians could deem it necessary to send a more.. substantial force.
Captain William Robert Stewart entered Nagasaki harbour and tried to start trade through Dejima, and Captain John Derby had tried to begin an opium trade with Japan I believe in the same year. Again, perhaps if something went awry some sort of conflict could arise?
The reason why I said it should be more serious in TTL is so that the Chinese would feel sufficiently aggrieved that they would go for total conquest. If the scale of OTL's defeat would be enough to give rise to these sentiments then that's fine, I just assumed they wouldn't be.
Do you think it is something they could aim for in the long term, perhaps in time for an ATL Russo-Japanese War or WW1?
China did have such a thing in the 1880s though, with their navy, on paper, having been significantly stronger and more powerful than the Japanese Navy. And going into the late 1880s, the Beiyang Fleet became increasingly powerful, becoming the largest fleet in Asia and the 8th in the world during the late 1880s in terms of tonnage- with its two brand-new modern battleships, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan, having been commissioned and constructed to order in German shipyards. These battleships were completed in May 1883 and April 1884 respectively, but it was originally agreed that delivery would be delayed until both were ready, and in the interim, with the Sino-French War looming, the French persuaded the German government to delay their release until after the conclusion of the conflict.
And also, shortly after the year in which the Sino-French War and Gapsin Coup both took place, in 1888, the construction of new ships was almost completely stopped by the Qing, with this attributed to the Qing dynasty's high expenditures in other fields, and to Grand Tutor Weng Tonghe's advice to the Guangxu Emperor to cut all funding to the navy and army- peace had been reached with the French, and Japan was deemed far too weak and insignificant to pose a true threat. And during the early 1890s, there were several natural disasters which the emperor considered it far more pressing to expend funds on, with the training of the fleet and personnel essentially coming to a standstill as a result, which eventually contributed to its defeat in the Battle of the Yalu River against Japan.
Hence my original assessment that this period, in the mid to late 1880's, presented by far the best window of opportunity for China to maintain its naval superiority over Japan. And that the easiest way to do this would ironically be to have Japan and the Gaehwapa achieve greater, slightly more lasting success in the Gapsin Coup, and its initial foray into Korea; since the Qing would at the very least have been forced to assess the Japanese threat to China as being significantly greater than IOTL, and actually maintain its naval supremacy, rather than simply giving up on new naval construction and development only a few years later, and leaving its navy with an early-mover disadvantage by the time the Japanese did decide to wage war against it (in a manner akin to Italy in WW2).
And if the French do forge their military alliance with the Japanese, as PM Ferry had given the order for his ambassador to Japan to so (only for the ambassador to deliberately refuse to pass the request on to the Japanese, having held the opinion that it'd only bring about Japan's demise and fall to the Qing), with the subsequent fall of Ferry's government and secret talks between the French and Chinese still being held in Paris in February and March 1885, to bring an end to the war between the two, Qing China and Japan would still be at war with one another. And would the French be able to (or want to) keep blocking the delivery of the Beiyang Fleet's two delayed German Battleships? Or to go to war with the Qing Chinese, yet again, so soon, just to protect and defend their ally-of-convenience, Japan from facing retribution?
Or would they (and the British, and the other European colonial powers) be more interested in seeing both nations expend their military strength fighting each other to the bitter end, and then swooping in to strip whatever territories they could conquer or extort from the weakened parties? Perhaps even with France itself covertly aspiring for Japan's defeat to be as total as possible, setting the end-goal of attempting to secure Japan for itself as a French protectorate, in a similar manner to Tonkin and Annam?
Of course they couldn't have- and it'd take some divergence for the Qing Chinese Navy to retain its early lead over the Imperial Japanese Navy, let alone overtake them again from behind, without major structural and governmental changes. But either of the first two of those (conquest of Okinawa, or concessions on Kyushu) could well be realistic stepping stones to the eventual conquest of the entire archipelago. Particularly when/if said 'conquest' merely involves the establishment/restoration of a similar relationship to that which had already established between Qing China and Korea in October 1882- forcing its government to sign a new similar new set of trade regulations permitting Chinese merchants to trade in Korea and giving them substantial advantages over the Westerners, as well as granting the Chinese unilateral extraterritoriality privileges in civil and criminal cases, effectively rendering them a semi-colony of Qing China, and indisputably placing them under Qing Chinese dominion.We're not talking about mere naval superiority here.
Nor are we talking about a navy that might be big enough to conquer Okinawa.
We're not even talking about a navy that would be big enough to have the Japanese agree to some concessions on Kyushu.
We're talking about a navy big enough to conquer the entire Japanese archipelago.
The Chinese could never have achieved that level of superiority between the 1880s and the 1910s.
If the Japanese just ignore them long enough (as was what the Japanese tended to do with foreigners not coming to the port city of Nagasaki), eventually the Russians will be forced to turn back.
With the time frames that you're looking at it just isn't anywhere near logistically feasible, I'm afraid. You cannot have China go from suffering an even worse defeat at the hands of Japan in an alternate Sino-Japanese War (even if you place it in the 1880s) to being able to conquer the entire archipelago by the 1910s. The governmental infrastructure isn't there. The technology isn't there. The military organization isn't there.
The Chinese could never have achieved that level of superiority between the 1880s and the 1910s.
Annexation of Japan via total military occupation by the Qing Chinese would indeed be nigh-on impossible, IMHO; but it's not really required to meet this challenge.
Of course they couldn't have- and it'd take some divergence for the Qing Chinese Navy to retain its early lead over the Imperial Japanese Navy, let alone overtake them again from behind, without major structural and governmental changes. But either of the first two of those (conquest of Okinawa, or concessions on Kyushu) could well be realistic stepping stones to the eventual conquest of the entire archipelago.
Annexation of Japan via total military occupation by the Qing Chinese would indeed be nigh-on impossible, IMHO; but it's not really required to meet this challenge. Forcing Japan to sign a near-identical treaty to the one that they'd coerced the Koreans to sign a few years earlier in 1882, after narrowly winning a few pivotal naval battles, landing a moderately sized invasion force on Okinawa or Kyushu, and then using gunboat diplomacy by keeping one of their shiny new battleships moored in or just outside Edo Bay during peace negotiations, sounds far more plausible, IMHO. And of course, the challenge didn't mention anything about how long Japan would remain nominally under Qing Chinese dominion either, before choosing to revoke the terms of said signed treaty and fully restoring its independence from Qing China...
How long did you think it would take them?
Alternatively could there be some sort of internal conflict in Japan during the 19th century that would have made things substantially easier for the Qing?
Ass-dumb Q: does this question change very much if we look at any sort of post-Yuan conquest of Japan?