very shallow, very quick scenario mostly inspired by
@allthepresidentsmen and
@Blackentheborg that is supposed to be very generic
State of the Third Smuta, c. 2032
July 2032. Ten years since the sudden and mysterious death of Vladimir Putin, who molded Russian society and politics in his view. Five years since the failed coup attempt in Ukraine, which left behind a dead President, angry soldiers on both sides and massacres in Donbas and Kherson. Two years since the assassination of President Patrushev, the last remaining compromise candidate within the Putinist cesspool, and vicious post-election riots amidst economic troubles.
- Tsaritsyn Government ("Russian State", "Army of the Black Hundreds"): Konstantin Malofeyev (Tsargrad)
Increasingly finding pushed out of Ivanovo and Samara Oblasts, which - after the first shock-and-awe operations in 2031 - has come as an unpleasant surprise to the Regent, whose mental and physical health has increasingly seen better days. The Black Hundreds' generals are under pressure to strike back
immediately, even as their attempts to batter down the Feds' defenses along the Volga are distracting precious attention from Ukrainian and Azerbaijani "humanitarian efforts" along the border. The state pogroms being enacted against "deviants", Circassians and suspected VSU operatives aren't helping at all.
All-Russian Federal Front ("The Feds")
Technically should be considered a single faction, but its nature as a
de facto alliance of opposition forces and regional Putinists opposed to Malofeyev makes this tentative; they're primarily based in the Northwest and the Urals.
- St. Petersburg Government: Daniil Yegorov (All-Russian People's Front)
Not the youngest nor the most charismatic member of the Russian government before or after 2030, Yegorov has faced difficulties with energizing the Front's supporters. His best qualities include having a good grasp of English and having a background that's palatable to the establishment in Brussels and Washington D.C. (and God knows he's been phoning them almost weekly), and that simultaneously served as a boon to the propaganda coming out of Tsaritsyn... at least until the siege of Moscow happened.
- Novosibirsk Oblast: Dmitry Savelyev (All-Russian People's Front)
Despite suspected nationalist leanings and a very tenuous relationship with the local opposition - most prominently represented by libertarian and Navalny stalwart Sergei Boiko - Savelyev has been
exceedingly helpful in securing the oblast for Yegorov, though his extreme closeness to the Azerbaijani government makes people wonder.
- Yekaterinburg Oblast: Yevgeny Roizman (Independent)
Humanitarian efforts to bring aid to Yekaterinburg and surrounding oblasts have made Roizman the
de facto leader of the Urals and one of the most popular politicians in Russia, more so than any All-Russian People's Front leader. At the ripe old age of 70, Roizman has secured agreements between Front members in the Urals, kept drugs out of Yekaterinburg, and secured relative normalcy for the newly-renamed oblast — which has made the place once called "the City of Devils" a key target for Malofeyev and co.
- People's Freedom Front: Isabel Magkoeva | Denis Parfyonov | Nikolai Kasyan (collective leadership)
Y'know, these guys used to have a department focused on electoral politics as well, but half of Moscow being bathed in fire by Malofeyev and co. has made their radicalization and shift to partisan activity full and permanent. On the other hand, a lot of Muscovites currently residing in Syktyvkar will likely vote for them regardless of who's on the ballot in 2036.
also Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Mordovia and Tyumen are kinda relevant I guess
Secessionist States
-
Republic of Buryatia: Bair Tsyrenov (Communist)
Has maintained a degree of stability and a more-or-less civil political system between Garmazhapova's New Democrats and Tsyrenov's Communists, despite the increasing presence of PLA "consultants" and Shanghai-born businessmen backing the latter, frequent forest fires, and ethnic tension partly inflamed by Tsargrad agents. This state of affairs might not last for too long.
-
Republic of Chechnya: Adam Osmayev (Chechen National Congress)
In the process of cleaning out Kadyrovite holdouts down south. To their credit, a lot of Ramzan's sons and relatives have been willing to leak crucial info on their own kin's operations, but most Kadyrovite lieutenants being aware that there's a 90% chance of them being killed or imprisoned for life has made large-scale operations difficult, as have increased clashes with Ingushes, Ossetians and Baku.
- Far Eastern Republic: Nikita Kozhemyako (Far Eastern Democratic)
Technically Acting President, the son of Vladivostok's very own businessman with criminal connections-turned-
multiregional governor once again showed up to clarify that the presidential elections - and the expected ascension of Anton Furgal, after his father fell comatose - will be held
any day now. The "security problem" in Zabaikalye is still being fought to no avail, though the PLA units in Blagoveshchensk have promised to help out.
- Republic of Sakha — Yakutia: Arsen Tomsky (Independent)
The largest and the wealthiest of the breakaway states in Siberia, Sakha made their decision to assert their independence clear when it seemed Krasnoyarsk was to be controlled by Malofeyev's men. A lot of money from inDriver's operations in Bogota, Cairo and Shanghai is supporting Sakha's growing economy, as is the arrival of American and East Asian investors; the remoteness of St. Petersburg compared to Washington D.C.'s finances (and men) makes Sakha's future relationship to Russia proper rather dubious.
- Republic of Tuva: Eres Kara-sal (New Tuva)
Rather less stable than Buryatia - the overall crime and economic situation fairly appalling even before the Smuta - but Kara-sal remains just popular enough that he continues to receive backing from the local elites, and aid from Mongolia and China remains steady.