- Location
- Tamaki Makaurau
The 1966 election was a slightly unusual one, in that it featured a constitutional referendum whose result would apply to the election that was being held. The UBD government opened the floor to a reform of the Executive to return from a Colegiado to a Presidential system, and all the participants therefore presented both a list of Colegiado candidates and a Presidential ticket (this time with a Vice-President for the first time), with the former holding office if, for whatever reason, the referendum failed. With the history of the Colegiado and the increasing economic distress of the country borne in mind, it shouldn't be a surprise to learn that a Presidential system gained the support of about 60% of the voters - however, the compromise motion of the Blanco and Colorado parties (the Reforma Naranja) only got 47%, with the rest going to the individual Blanco and Colorado motions that couldn't be removed from the ballot. Worth an honourable mention is the Reforma Amarilla of the Communist Party, which sought to make serious and responsible changes while retaining a Collegiate model, and helped push FIDEL to its best ever result - 5.7%.
Within the other minor parties, things went less well: the Christian Democrats suffered a split in which the old guard of Catholic conservatives formed the 'Civic Christian Movement' and sank beneath the waterline, preventing the Uruguayan party from emulating the success of the Chileans (some of the PDC went even further, expressing support for Cuba and coming on board with the liberation theology that would be codified in the Medellin Conference of 1968). The Union Popular, meanwhile, split between Enrique Erro's gang (who kept the name and the Deputies, but none of the votes) and the Socialist Party. The Socialists had always made a point of only presenting a single list to the electorate, to show their distaste for the factional tactics of the traditional parties - but now, the Socialists were subject to factionalism themselves, and thus the moderate social democrat Emilio Frugoni presented his own list against the more radical (again, comparable to the Chilean socialists) majority. Neither won a seat, even though the factions' votes were pooled.
Four years of government in difficult circumstances and the death of Daniel Fernandez Crespo had finished the Union Blanca Democratica as an organisation, and the Blanco corner was carried forward by three rival candidates for the Presidency (I'm not going to pay attention to the Colegiado candidates here, in the interests of brevity): the most intelligent of Herrera's followers, Martin Echegoyen, had been in politics for fifty years and represented the resurgence of conservative interests within the National Party. He won a plurality of the Blanco vote but was outnumbered by the others - rather confusingly named Alberto Gallinal Heber and Alberto Heber Usher. Both were grandsons of Alberto Heber Jackson, whose widow had remarried Luis Alberto de Herrera. Despite this family connection, both were vying for the UBD vote. Heber Usher had been a Herrerista follower of Fernandez Crespo, while Gallinal Usher had come from the Independent National Party. As the UBD no longer existed, both ran with the support of minor lists, so that Gallinal Usher ran as a member of the National Movement of Rocha despite - notably - not being from Rocha. The result between the two candidates of the left was therefore more than usually subject to local fluctuations based on departmental machines and personalities, which is presumably how Heber Usher managed to win Rivera.
In the red corner, the death of Luis Batlle Berres had left a gap in the leadership of List 15, which was of course filled by his son, Jorge Batlle. Jorge did not follow his father's expansionist and state-driven ideas, being more openly fond of the market (he would later be called a neoliberal, when that word was coined). Opposing Batlle from the left were two rival candidates, Amilcar Vasconcellos (who had lost the List 15 primary against Batlle and lured Renan Rodriguez temporarily from List 99 to serve as his running mate; his organisation was the short-lived List 315) and Zelmar Michelini of List 99. If either of these men had joined forces with Batlle, their votes would have been enough to take him over the line against Oscar Gestido of the Union Colorada y Batllista. With 21% of the national vote, Gestido won the presidency for the right. A former General, he represented the ingress of the military into civilian politics, but was essentially benign and showed no intention of using emergency powers for anything other than emergencies (in this case, to close the money markets when the peso collapsed). His death of a heart attack in 1967 would mark the real beginning of Uruguay's tribulations.
Within the other minor parties, things went less well: the Christian Democrats suffered a split in which the old guard of Catholic conservatives formed the 'Civic Christian Movement' and sank beneath the waterline, preventing the Uruguayan party from emulating the success of the Chileans (some of the PDC went even further, expressing support for Cuba and coming on board with the liberation theology that would be codified in the Medellin Conference of 1968). The Union Popular, meanwhile, split between Enrique Erro's gang (who kept the name and the Deputies, but none of the votes) and the Socialist Party. The Socialists had always made a point of only presenting a single list to the electorate, to show their distaste for the factional tactics of the traditional parties - but now, the Socialists were subject to factionalism themselves, and thus the moderate social democrat Emilio Frugoni presented his own list against the more radical (again, comparable to the Chilean socialists) majority. Neither won a seat, even though the factions' votes were pooled.
Four years of government in difficult circumstances and the death of Daniel Fernandez Crespo had finished the Union Blanca Democratica as an organisation, and the Blanco corner was carried forward by three rival candidates for the Presidency (I'm not going to pay attention to the Colegiado candidates here, in the interests of brevity): the most intelligent of Herrera's followers, Martin Echegoyen, had been in politics for fifty years and represented the resurgence of conservative interests within the National Party. He won a plurality of the Blanco vote but was outnumbered by the others - rather confusingly named Alberto Gallinal Heber and Alberto Heber Usher. Both were grandsons of Alberto Heber Jackson, whose widow had remarried Luis Alberto de Herrera. Despite this family connection, both were vying for the UBD vote. Heber Usher had been a Herrerista follower of Fernandez Crespo, while Gallinal Usher had come from the Independent National Party. As the UBD no longer existed, both ran with the support of minor lists, so that Gallinal Usher ran as a member of the National Movement of Rocha despite - notably - not being from Rocha. The result between the two candidates of the left was therefore more than usually subject to local fluctuations based on departmental machines and personalities, which is presumably how Heber Usher managed to win Rivera.
In the red corner, the death of Luis Batlle Berres had left a gap in the leadership of List 15, which was of course filled by his son, Jorge Batlle. Jorge did not follow his father's expansionist and state-driven ideas, being more openly fond of the market (he would later be called a neoliberal, when that word was coined). Opposing Batlle from the left were two rival candidates, Amilcar Vasconcellos (who had lost the List 15 primary against Batlle and lured Renan Rodriguez temporarily from List 99 to serve as his running mate; his organisation was the short-lived List 315) and Zelmar Michelini of List 99. If either of these men had joined forces with Batlle, their votes would have been enough to take him over the line against Oscar Gestido of the Union Colorada y Batllista. With 21% of the national vote, Gestido won the presidency for the right. A former General, he represented the ingress of the military into civilian politics, but was essentially benign and showed no intention of using emergency powers for anything other than emergencies (in this case, to close the money markets when the peso collapsed). His death of a heart attack in 1967 would mark the real beginning of Uruguay's tribulations.