1999 - 2003:
Bülent Ecevit (Democratic Left)
1999 (Coalition) def. Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement), Recai Kutan (Felicity), Mesut Yılmaz (Motherland), Tansu Çiller (True Path)
2000: Chief Justice Ahmet Necdet Sezer elected President.
By 2002 Bülent Ecevit’s health had worsened to such a degree that he was effectively incapable of continuing his duties as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, Ecevit initially continued to resist his rival and the party’s deputy leader Hüsamettin Özkan’s private calls for resignation. Ecevit rebuked these calls, nearly leading to a split of the party after a
Cumhuriyet writer caught wind of the story, and published it. The ensuing fallout forced Özkan and Ecevit back to the table, where the latter’s wife Rahşan moderated a meeting between the two in the Prime Minister’s hospital room. Ultimately, the two came to an agreement to put party above politics, and endorse Minister of Foreign Affairs, and architect of the normalization of relations with Greece and chief negotiator of EU accession, İsmail Cem as their new party leader and candidate in the upcoming general elections. However, quick handling by Cem forced the two into
de facto retirement, and the establishment of the Cem-Bahçeli-Yılmaz triumvirate, though Ecevit continued to be the figurehead from his hospital bed.
This new triumvirate seemed initially to have ushered in a reset of relations between the Democratic Left (DSP) and Nationalist Movement (MHP) as Cem called for a halt on the hunt of ultranationalists involved with the criminal underworld and the Deep State, the two being increasingly hard to keep apart. Serenity slowly returned to the government as former World Bank Vice-President Kemal Derviş’ return to Turkey, and installment as Minister of Economic Affairs had brought down inflation rates to more manageable levels. If not for the sudden surge of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the polls, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition could have finished their term.
The AKP’s rise brought fear into the harts of the most secular elements of both the Armed Forces and the Deep State, even if it had already fallen from its record high polling numbers at 35%. The government parties similarly feared the possibility of a strong AKP following the next elections, and Bahçeli was finally convinced to lower the electoral threshold to 7%, despite his fears that this would open the door to Kurdish parties achieving representation in government. Only three months after this electoral reform, the government finally collapsed, as Bahçeli’s MHP filed a motion of no-confidence. The official story is that the leader of the MHP was worried about the increasing political liberalization of Kurdish civil society organizations’ right to assembly, a prerequisite for entrance into the EU, though conspiracy theories argue that the Deep State became increasingly worried about the DSP’s close ties with the
Hizmet movement of exiled preacher Fetullah Gülen, and the possibility of an AKP-DSP-DYP (True Path) coalition inviting the preacher back to Turkey. Thus, conspiracy theorists argue, the Deep State threatened Bahçeli with release of evidence of him being a homosexual, leading to the MHP leader doing as the shadowy actors in the state wished, and called for early elections while the AKP’s numbers were down.
2003 - 2003:
Abdullah Gül (Justice and Development)
2003 - 2008:
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Justice and Development)
2003 (Coalition) def. Deniz Baykal (Republican (People’s), İsmail Cem (Democratic Left), Tansu Çiller (True Path), Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement), Mesut Yılmaz (Motherland), Cem Uzan (Youth)
As the 2003 elections neared, the results became increasingly unpredictable. Electoral reform had lowered the threshold to 7%, which led to many ‘strategic voters’ voting closer to their consciousness. This was mainly to the detriment of Erdoğan and his AKP, as the centre-right had rallied around him just a few months earlier, though now some voters returned back to the more conventional secular centre-right parties, while many other voters flocked to the syncretic populist campaign of businessman Cem Uzan, who handed out free chicken döner to every person . Nevertheless, the AKP finished in a convincing first place, with only the CHP being anywhere near close.
Though President Sezer privately attempted to convince CHP leader Baykal that he should form a broad secular coalition, but Baykal thought it would be better to give in to the public’s urges for the AKP to be given a ‘chance’. However, Baykal didn’t exactly roll over for Erdoğan. He told the former Mayor of Istanbul in coalition talks that he expected the new government to continue strict adherence to state secularism, as well as the continuation of Derviş at Economic Affairs. Erdoğan agreed surprisingly quickly with these offers, though Baykal’s last wish, his return to the Minister of Foreign Affairs-office, became more of a stumbling block, as Erdoğan instead preferred his number two Abdullah Gül. Ultimately, Erdoğan relented to Baykal, and allowed him to attempt to fulfill his wishes of the Party of Atatürk realizing EU-membership, despite the AKP’s continued worries about a formerly dictatorial party being at the helm of Turkish democratization.
Even if the AKP and CHP had reached an agreement, they still needed one more party to form a government, and Çiller’s True Path Party (DYP) was seen as the ideal candidate by both. Baykal had already established good working relations with Çiller a few years earlier, serving at Foreign Affairs in her government, and the DYP later went on to form a coalition with the AKP’s predecessor. However, it was that cooperation that had broken the DYP, as the party that once functioned as the political wing of the Deep State, was now a small party with nothing more to show than the small cult of personality it had built around it’s two leaders Tansu Çiller and Mehmet Ağır. It would ultimately be Ağır that dragged the party back into government, being installed back to his former office at the powerful Ministry of the Interior in return, despite loud protests from human rights associations due to Ağır’s involvement in the Susurluk Scandal, and close ties to the Deep State, organized crime, and paramilitary death squads in the Kurdish provinces.
Despite some fears in secular circles, Erdoğan did not bring back Sharia Law after he convinced the opposition parties DSP and MHP to aid him in repealing his political ban. In fact, Erdoğan focussed very little on socially conservative issues, even allowing the ban on wearing the hijab in universities stay in place for now. Instead, his main focus lay with the economy in initial years, continuing Derviş’ neoliberal reforms, as an improving economic situation would allow him to realize his goals in later years, or at least so he believed.
To the surprise of everyone in government bar Ağır, the PKK mostly regrouped after the capture of their leader Öcalan, and his calls for them to lay down their weapons, nearly destroyed the organizations. However, a combination of political liberalization and a return to more violent tactics by the military, allowed the PKK to continue their fight against the Turkish state. Aside from the PKK, the Erdoğan government also found itself in conflict with elements of the Deep State, as some of the more radical elements known publicly as “Ergenekon” started false-flag attacks against Kurdish owned businesses, as well as waging propaganda war with the government, and the aligned Hizmet movement, through the increasingly widely available Internet.
2007 Constitutional Referendum: Yes (57.9%)
2007 (Coalition) def. Deniz Baykal (Republican People’s), Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement), Mehmet Ağır (Democrat), Murat Karayalçın (Democratic Left), Cem Uzan (Youth)
2007 Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu elected president
The Erdoğan government countered by leaking reports on their deeds through aligned media, though their coalition partner DYP, and to a lesser extent the CHP, sabotaged these attempts, leading to the AKP’s attempts at waging a successful propaganda war leading only to marginal gains in public support for combatting “out of control bureaucrats and lobbyists”.
However, the assassination of legendary investigative journalist Mehmet Ali Birand and popular game show host Mehmat Ali Erbil (no relation) by a 19-year old ultranationalist affiliated with the MHP-aligned ‘Idealist Hearths’, as well as his earlier plans to assassinate the Prime Minister led to public outcry across multiple circles, and allowed Erdoğan to rally liberals, Kurds, and reformist social democrats behind him. This was first demonstrated with the 2007 referendum, which lowered parliamentary terms to four years, and lowered the threshold to 5% saw a comfortable victory for Erdoğan and his allies.
This was subsequently followed by the AKP’s announcement that they would nominate İhsanoğlu to replace outgoing President Sezer. This announcement led to protests in strongly Kemalist Ankara, as well as Istanbul, Izmir, and other cities, as the replacement of a secular hardliner with the Chairman of an Islamic organization indicated to many Kemalists that Erdoğan’s attempts at implementing Sharia Law had officially started.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Deniz Baykal saw his polling numbers decline throughout the years, as orthodox Kemalists saw his cooperation with the Islamist Erdoğan as nothing more than spitting at Atatürk’s grave. Baykal also booked little success with EU-accession talks, as the Turkish government’s continued reforms saw little actual progress in the country’s attempt to become a part of the European government, with Frencg President Chirac and German Chancellor Stoiber continuing to give excuses to block Turkey’s candidacy. In the secularist protests, as well as uncertainty in the DSP after party leader Cem’s sudden death, Baykal saw an attempt for him to shore up his support, and announced his exit from the government, and called for new elections.
Baykal quickly returned back to his comfortable second place spot in the polling, though the AKP had made significant gains since the last elections, and continued their trend upwards, as they finished with slightly above 35% of the vote, making a government without them effectively impossible, due to the animosity between the other parties. Baykal’s CHP suffered minor losses, though still had some distance with the third placed MHP, which made gains with a strongly anti-PKK message, as well as moderating their previously more hardline position on secularism, paving the way for coalition talks with the AKP.
The other parties were a no-go for the Prime Minister, as his former subordinate Mehmet Ağır took over leadership of the DYP, and attracted many ANAP MP’s to re-establish the Democrat Party, which was banned after the 1960 coup, and ran on a strong anti-Erdoğan platform, as well as being the only candidate that had positive things to say about the Deep State. Murat Karayalçın abandoned his position as an elder statesman in the CHP to form a daring coalition with moderate elements of the Kurdish political movement, and ran a campaign which called for more distributionist economics, as well as calls for more rights to Turkey’s ethnic minorities, and became the first major party candidate to talk openly about LGBT+ right. Lastly, Cem Uzan faced multiple corruption charges, and saw nearly 2/3 of his party’s MPs defect, though he nevertheless managed to scrape past the new 5% threshold with a campaign filled with name calling the PM, meaning that he would at least have political protection from his trials for a little longer.
2008: Republic of Turkey v. Justice and Development Party, AKP banned by Supreme Court, and prominent members not allowed to hold political office for five years.
2008 - 2009:
Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP-CHP-MHP-DP)
Despite comfortably securing a second term, electing his preferred candidate as president, and being one of the finalists for the Times 2007 Person of the Year the problems kept on piling up for Prime Minister Erdoğan. On the 18th of March 2008, documents requesting a closure trial of the ruling AKP were presented to the Constitutional Court of Turkey. On 31 May 2008, the Constitutional Court announced that it would hear the case concerning the closure of the party. The case was taken up by all 11 judges of the Supreme Court, and more than 50 speeches of PM Erdoğan were quoted by the prosecutor as arguments for the closure of his party and his ban for politics for 5 years.
In a narrow 7 to 4 decision (the minimum amount needed) the Supreme Court reached the opinion that the AKP had violated the principals of secularism, causing a whirlwind across Turkey as well as the rest of the world. The decision led to a wave of rioting by AKP supporters, with more than fourteen people being killed as a result of harsh police reaction to the protests. Furthermore, DSP leader Karayalçın was seriously injured after self-proclaimed members of “Al-Qaeda in Turkey” set off a fire bomb near him. While some had hoped that Erdoğan would be able to calm the protesters down, he instead took the first flight to New York City, not to return for fifteen years, and effectively destroying any chance of a comeback in 2013.
Bolstered by Erdoğan’s demise many hardline Kemalists called for the removal of President İhsanoğlu, judging him insufficiently secular as well, though these calls saw little popularity in the
Meclis, as this would only further throw Turkey into chaos, at a moment where global markets were already showing serious signs of a recession. Only Cem Uzan echoed these calls in parliament, the rest of the parties instead negotiating with the President on whether Baykal or Acting PM Bahçeli should be Erdogan’s replacement.
Surprising everyone, İhsanoğlu instead invited Mesut Yılmaz to form a new government. Yılmaz’ political career was deemed effectively over after most of his MPs crossed the aisle, and joined the Democrat Party. In fact, Yılmaz was barely elected as an Independent himself, running in the same province as Erdoğan, and barely scraping through to a victory. Upon his election, Yılmaz attempted to reassemble his Motherland Party (ANAP) by convincing MPs from other parties to join him, his caucus being seven man strong by the time Erdoğan was removed by the Supreme Court.
Yılmaz grabbed the opportunity to return as Prime Minister after more than nine years with both hands, and invited other nationalist parties, aside from Uzan’s Youth Party, to form a new government. This new coalition quickly proved to be unable to whither the new crisis that Turkey found itself in, as a significant part of the population considered them to be illegitimate, furthermore disagreements on fiscal policy, as well as outdated interpretation on the working mechanisms of the global economy, only further dragged the Turkish economy into a recession. Lastly, EU accession talks came to an immediate standstill. Led by Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Joost Langendijk, once one of the biggest supporters of Turkish membership, the EU effectively turned their back onto Turkey.
It would ultimately be domestic affairs that led to the quick downfall of the Yılmaz government, as his close links to organized crime were revealed in an investigative piece in the
Cumhuriyet newspaper. Yılmaz’ close links weren’t a surprise to most people, as he was always known as a politician who rubbed shoulders with organized crime, though unlike the rest of the secular right he kept his distance from the Deep State, placing himself as one of the biggest opponents of the post-modern coup of 1997, despite the coup plotters installing him as PM immediately afterwards. Initially, few expected Yılmaz to fall as a result of this information, though voices calling for his removal became louder after it was revealed with which members of organized crime he was affiliated.
Sedat Peker had a long and violent past in both organized crime and the Turanist movement. Throughout the 1990s he continued his rise, building close relations with multiple politicians, though he would nevertheless be imprisoned in 1999 for protection racketeering, coercion, and more, though he would be imprisoned for less than a year after involvement by a still anonymous member of Yılmaz’ ANAP. Following Erdoğan’s rise to power, Peker was recruited by the “Ergenekon” conspiracy, and became an enforcer of the Deep State. When Yılmaz returned to power, Peker attempted to use a video of the new PM being beat up in an Hungarian night club over gambling debts as a way to blackmail him into rescinding many of the reforms Erdoğan had mate in the Southeast, and ordered him to hand power in the region back over to the military. To this day it is unknown who released all of this information, though the headquarters of
Cumhuriyet would be shot at by multiple gunman, leading to the death of editor-in-chief Can Dündar, as well as four others.
President İhsanoğlu was horrified by all of this, having spent most of his life living abroad, the former academic wasn’t aware of just how bad things in Turkey were. He thus made the drastic decision to sack Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, and called for a “clean society”, as well as declaring that “there is no authority above the people”. The speech would briefly propel the up-to-then still conservative President into brief stardom, and gave him enough room to nominate his preferred candidate for PM, as well as rolling back the power of the deep state.
2009 - 2009:
Kemal Derviş (Independent)
2009 - 2010:
Kemal Derviş (Democratic Left)
2010 - 2010: Faik Öztrak (Democratic Left)
Calls for Kemal Derviş to run for Prime Minister ever since his return to Turkey, and had only grown ever since he was declared the savior of the economy following the ‘Derviş reforms’. He was popular with both leftists, and people on the right, serving both in the Ecevit cabinet as well as in Erdoğan’s first two years. After resigning as Minister of Economic Affairs, Derviş became Administrator of the United Nations Development Program, though an early return to Turkey seemed plausible as the CHP and DSP jointly nominated him for the presidency, in which he ultimately came second.
Derviş immediately resigned from the UN after İhsanoğlu offered him to form a government, and returned back to Turkey to much fanfare. Derviş invited all parties in parliament to take part in his new government, and filled his cabinet with young unknown names, which was unusual for a gerontocratic nation like Turkey. One of his most notable appointment was his former right-hand man Faik Öztrak, who served as MP for the CHP after leaving the DSP following its move away from nationalism, at Economic Affairs. The cabinet also included some members of the AKP’s successor parties, leading to some worrying about Derviş inviting Erdoğan back.
Initially, Derviş along with Öztrak focussed all their energy on restoring the Turkish economy. Most analysts expected the duo to repeat their austerity measures from 2001, though Derviş surprised everyone by going with (New) Keynesian spending instead. Despite initial worries of rising inflation rates, Derviş’ scheme worked as only Poland exited a state of recession quicker than Turkey. Not long after, Derviş finally decided to join a political party of his own, and announce his willingness to run in the upcoming elections.
Ever since Karayalçın was shot following the ban of the AKP, the DSP had been in a mess. As the party leader was more busy with his health concerns, the coalition of nationalistic social democrats and Kurdish moderates quickly were fighting for control, which the former won, as many Kurds merely felt like ‘guests’ in the DSP, and opted to leave the party and joined more radical Kurdish caucuses instead. The party was barely polling above the 5% threshold when Derviş announced his intention to run for its leadership, which he was pretty much given immediately. Derviş quickly put his allies to work on a party manifesto for the 2009 local elections, which ended up being a lite-version of the 2007 manifesto, as the calls for Kurdish and Queer rights were moderates a tad down, as well as placing a greater focus on the PM’s successes.
This development payed off, as former party leader Karayalçın was elected Mayor of Ankara, while Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who routinely attempted to mediate between the party’s two warring factions, was elected Mayor of Istanbul with over 40% of the vote. Victories in Izmir, Eskişehir, as well as several cities in the East and Southeast, saw the map color firmly blue, and only further cement Derviş’ image as Turkey’s savior. For a few months the PM truly seemed unstoppable, though a sex scandal, and his immediate resignation when it was revealed, ended his career just as quickly. Derviş went into semi-retirement afterwards, occasionally being mentioned as a possible presidential candidate.
One of the last things Derviş did as PM was to name his protégé Öztrak as his successor, and call for general elections. Though Öztrak respected his predecessor for all he did for his career, you did not have to be a mindreader to see that the only thing that Öztrak felt in 2010 towards his former boss was resentment, as Derviş dealt Öztrak a near impossible set of cards.
After multiple years of near constant political crisis, Turkey found itself in the midst of a moral crisis, and Öztrak thought he should react accordingly, removing LGBT+ almost completely from the party platform, as well as placing more emphasis on the nationalistic past of the party, and how its founder Ecevit was the hero who saved Turkish Cypriots from Greek domination. Only months after they had been convinced to come back, many progressives were shown the metaphorical door again, as the party became increasingly less distinguishable from the CHP, something which only became more apparent once the leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal, had his own, more compromising, sex scandal, and was subsequently forced to resign. Many cartoonist had a field day with this comparison, though it was the new CHP leader, Önder Sav’s, love for cartoons that at least somewhat saved the DSP, as the CHP leader displayed cartoons of the prophet Muhammad during campaign events, which made the DSP, and its social moderatism, seem much more acceptable. Ultimately, Öztrak finished in an embarrassing fourth place, despite an improving economy, as his wooden campaign simply managed to make too many enemies, though the outgoing PM realized it could have always been worse.
2010 - 2013:
Abdüllatif Şener (Turkey)
2010 (Coalition) def. Mehmet Ali Şahin (People’s Voice), Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement), Selahattin Demirtaş (Peace and Freedom), Faik Öztrak (Democratic Left), Abdüllatif Şener (Turkey), Önder Sav (Republican People’s), Süleyman Soylu (Democrat), Numan Kurtulmuş (Felicity), Cem Boyner (New Democracy Movement)
First elected to parliament in 1991, Abdüllatif Şener was always something of an anomaly in the Turkish Islamist movement. Despite almost always being one of the loudest internal critics, Şener still managed to continuously reach higher office, serving as Minister of Finance in the Islamist Erbakan government, and as Erdoğan’s Deputy PM during close to the entirety of his first term. A few weeks before the 2007 Constitutional Referendum Şener announced his opposition to the referendum, as well as his resignation as Deputy Prime Minister, and member of the AKP. Overnight Şener became a hero among those who voted “NO” in the referendum, as he was one of the most prominent Islamists to oppose the referendum.
Despite being offered a chance of another term in parliament by multiple parties, Şener decided to take a break, though he came back a year later as one of the biggest opponents of the Supreme Court’s ruling outside of the AKP. A few months later, Şener along with more than a dozen AKP remnants found the Turkey Party, becoming one of the many post-AKP parties, though undoubtedly one of the most moderate.
Şener’s Turkey Party attracted multiple high profile former AKP members, most notably the liberal Ali Babacan, as well as members of the ‘Islamic Left’ like Mehmet Bekaroğlu and Ertuğrul Günay. While Mehmet Ali Şahin took most of the party apparatus, and it’s supporters, it was vital for the Turkey Party to attract such attractive names, as a means to set itself apart from the numerous other centre-right parties.
Aside from the Turkey Party (TP), and the People’s Voice (HSP), other parties that participated in the election included; Devlet Bahçeli’s MHP as always, PM’s Öztrak’s DSP, the CHP under arch-Kemalist Önder Sav, The Democrat Party (DP) now led by Süleyman Soylu, after Ağır was quitely pushed away for being too close to the deep state, and now running on a centre-right to right-wing Kemalist platform, the Felicity Party (SP) under Numan Kurtulmuş, which is trying to take anti-Western Islamism back to the mainstream, and businessman Cem Boyner’s liberal New Democracy Movement (YDH).
However, the most notable party in the 2010 elections was undoubtedly Demirtaş’ BDP, as the Kurdish political movement finally decided to enter the elections united and independent from the DSP, along with their socialist and other minority allies. For a brief moment, the party polled as high as 20% indicating just how quickly the tide was shifting, though this did cause a reaction by many Turkish nationalists, who took their support to the MHP, the most notable anti-Kurdish party, in an effort to stop the rise of the BDP.
Ultimately, no party came even close to a majority, though it was the Islamist HSP which came first, showing that Erdoğanism still had plenty of fans in the nation. Nevertheless, Şahin’s HSP was excluded by many parties, and thus didn’t even come close to forming a majority, as a result President İhsanoğlu opted to invite second-placed Bahçeli instead, starting the longest coalition formation talks in the history of the Turkish Republic.
Almost 6 months later, a total of five parties agreed on forming a government, though in actuality they agreed on almost nothing, as the new government included both far-right parties like the MHP, as well as the liberal YDH, which was openly calling for Kurdish to be recognized as a co-official language in the Southeast. Abdüllatif Şener was picked as a compromise PM, being the only acceptable name for all five party leaders.
Şener’s government got off to a rocky start, as inflation rates continued to rise, and worries about the economy grew. The new government tried to counter this by doubling down on the continuation of so-called ‘Mega Projects’, as roads, bridges, and entire districts were being built for the past eight years, something which started under Erdoğan, and continued under Şener. These projects were mainly led by Minister of Infrastructure Mustafa Sarıgül (DSP), who also served under Derviş and Öztrak, during which he caught the ire of many environmental organizations, as well as left-wing groups, as many poor residents of especially Istanbul were removed to make place for gigantic hotels or shopping malls.
The anger towards this negligence of the environment, as well as continuing economic downfall, lack of progress on Kurdish rights and other civil liberties, as well as the police getting increasingly violent under Minister of the Interior and Democrat party leader Süleyman Soylu, all culminated into the Taksim protests, which quickly developed from small protests to protect a park in the Taksim square to strikes, marches, and protests across the country.
Soylu’s harsh tactics against the protesters only further inspired them, as the protests kept getting bigger and more pluralistic, with people from all walks of life and ideologies joining the protests, though the protests itself had a clear anti-capitalist perspective, calling for the end of neoliberalism, end new elections. Initially, Şener attempted to reason with the protesters, announcing that the park would be left alone, that he would enter new negotiations with the trade unions, and even fired the Chief of the Istanbul Police Department, though Soylu and his allies in the bureaucracy kept the PM from going ‘too far’.
Ultimately, all of it mattered very little as Mayor of Istanbul Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, already supportive of the protesters, marched from his mayoral office to the heart of Taksim, and stated in a televised speech that he would form a new political party, which would be based upon the ideals espoused by the Taksim protests. This announcement was met with thunderous applause by protesters nearby, turning the already popular mayor into a left-wing superstar. Seven days later enough DSP and YDH MPs had left to join the Mayor’s new party that Prime Minister Şener no longer had a majority, leading to another early election.
2013 - 0000:
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (Workers and Farmers)
2013 (Coalition) def. Süleyman Soylu (Democrat), Mehmet Ali Şahin (People’s Voice), Emine Ülker Tarhan (Republican People’s), Ali Koç (The Independents)
2014: Former ECHR Judge Rıza Türmen elected as President
Their guards, their judges and their prosecutors
All against the public
Laws, regulations, all decisions
All against the public
Magazines, newspapers, all publications
All against the public
None of this will save them
None of this will save them
They will not be able to stop the flowing flood of the people
They will not be able to stop the flowing flood of the people
Panzers, handcuffs, all their guns
All against the public
Dungeons, prisons, torture houses
All against the public
Exchanges, companies and their powers
All against the public
None of this will save them
None of this will save them
They will not be able to stop the flowing flood of the people
They will not be able to stop the flowing flood of the people
