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PM's Election Maps And Stuff Thread

Closed list with 6-10 members per district has been a pretty common approach in the past for this kind of conservative implementation of PR. Or semi-closed lists (where you can bump up people within a list, or just vote for it as is, but not modify it willy-nilly as you can with panachage or pure open-list).
Actually semi-closed sounds about right for the kind of system I had in mind. That way the parties get to do their selection processes without making their candidates completely unaccountable, which is the sort of balance they'd be trying for to placate voters. I'm still not convinced they'd acquiesce to county PR though, particularly with how much the 'local constituency' model is entrenched in British electoral politics.
 
Iceland 2009
I just realised I’ve been sitting on an Iceland 2009 map for ages and never got round to doing a writeup for it, which is a shame because it’s a fairly interesting election and I probably could’ve and should’ve a long time ago.
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The 2009 election remains the high watermark for the left-wing Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), though their current poll numbers are very healthy and there’s a possibility they could surpass that if they hold steady by the next election, and to date mark the only time since its founding that the Independence Party has not been the biggest party in the Althing. The reason for these big reversals in fortune was, of course, the severe consequences of the Great Recession in Iceland.

The Independence Party had been in power continuously since 1991, first in coalition with the old Social Democratic Party from 1991 to 1995, then with Iceland’s other major party the Progressive Party up until 2006, and then with the SDA (which had formed in 2000 after the three separate social democratic parties presented a joint list in 1999) after the Progressives pulled out of the coalition. Initially this had seen the SDA’s until-then meteoric growth take a hit, with the party losing seats at the 2007 election, not helped by the fact it had long been seen as too soft-left by a faction that proceeded to leave to form the green socialist Left-Green Movement, but the Independence Party would proceed to spectacularly self-destruct in the brief parliamentary term that followed.

See, between 1991 and 2004, the Independence Party’s leader Davið Oddsson, had served as Prime Minister and enacted a swathe of privatisation and tax cut plans. While he had resigned due to a combination of an agreement with the Independence Party limiting his time left in office and a failed bill trying to establish restrictions on media company ownership that President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson had vetoed, he served Minister for Foreign Affairs for a year and then became Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland. Under his watch, and arguably because of his government’s policies, the Central Bank would prove impotent when the Great Recession caused a crisis of confidence in three of Iceland’s biggest banks, Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki.

These banks had been expanding internationally, and now had assets 11 times the size of Iceland’s GDP and accrued the country 7 times that in external debt; the most obvious way this manifested was in the Icesave dispute where the UK and Netherlands claimed Iceland owed them the insurance for deposits investors there had made into Landsbanki before it folded. All three of the banks were taken into government ownership and renamed to try to distance them from the mismanagement which had led to their collapse, a humiliating development for the Independence Party, and most of their international operations were cut back, causing a decline in foreign involvement in Iceland’s economy; famously, a year later McDonald’s closed its last Icelandic branch, and the last ever cheeseburger brought there was turned into an exhibition piece by the buyer.

The public response to this is perhaps best summed up by a phrase popularised by comedian and later Mayor of Rekjavik Jón Gnarr in a comedy sketch on the end-of-year comedy special Áramótaskaupið– ‘Helvítis fokking fokk!!’, which apparently roughly translates as ‘What the fuckity fucking fuck!!’ and is officially my favourite slogan in the history of politics. In the winter of 2008-9, all hell broke loose with protestors demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Geir Haarde and for new elections to be called immediately; the protests were the biggest in Iceland’s history, and the police using tear gas on the protestors was an even worse look for the government. Another act of public disobedience, where people banged pots and pans to disrupt the Althing’s first meeting of the year, gave the protests their popular nickname- the ‘Kitchenware Revolution’.

In late January, Geir agreed to resign, citing his recent diagnosis of oesophageal cancer and definitely nothing else, and Ólafur invited the SDA’s Social Affairs Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir to form a coalition with the Left-Greens. Jóhanna was one of the only government ministers whose conduct the public approved of, and had a good working relationship with the Left-Greens even though they didn’t command a majority in the Althing combined, which stood the two left-wing parties in good stead for the election Jóhanna proceeded to call.

That election would see the combined left win a majority in the Althing for the first time in history, with the Independence Party losing nearly 13 percentage points and 9 of its 25 seats (it likely only avoided losing more thanks to interim chairman, and later PM and Centre Party leader Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, accepting the public demand for an early election). The Left-Greens even topped the poll in the Northeast constituency where its leader Steingrímur J. Sigfússon is based. The newly-formed Citizens’ Movement also won 4 seats, a sign of how the Kitchenware Revolution would give rise to minor parties in Iceland for quite some time to come.

While the new government would be famously radical in many areas, notably including Jóhanna’s status as the world’s first LGBTQ person elected as a head of state, its ban on strip clubs and its invocation of the Landsdómur (national court) for the first time ever to try to convict Geir for misconduct during the financial crisis, it ended up falling short in many others. Davið Oddsson faced few consequences, becoming editor of the Morgunblaðið newspaper in September 2009, a post he holds to this day; attempts at a new citizen-drafted constitution proved heavily protracted; and the SDA’s efforts to bring Iceland into the EU were stymied by opposition from across the political spectrum, especially with the Icesave dispute damaging trust in European cooperation.

The SDA-Left-Green government would ultimately office after a landslide defeat in 2013 having run out of time to push for many of their reforms and lost popularity over their handling of others, with a new Independence-Progressive coalition being formed which unceremoniously threw out the constitutional plans and attempts to join the EU.
 
Saarland 1947-55
Max mentioning Saarland in his recent Germany posts made me remember I had a map of the
elections in the Saar Protectorate lying around.

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During its time as an independent nation, the Saarland was effectively in a disputed position internationally between France and West Germany, but with an initial bias towards France due to the whole 'Nazi annexation' thing, a trade agreement with the country, and the fact pro-German parties weren't allowed to run at first. The dominant party in the 1947 and 1952 elections was the Christian People's Party of the Saarland (Christliche Volkspartei des Saarlandes, CVP), which won majorities in those elections. This was in no small part due to its leader Johannes Hoffmann, who had been an anti-Nazi dissident after the Saarland's annexation, and its stance as ideologically very similar to the CDU without being pro-German.

Other parties in the Saarland at the time included the Social Democratic Party of the Saarland (Sozialdemokratische Partei des Saarlandes, SPS), a social democratic party obviously close to the SPD but with the same ambiguous position on the Saarland's foreign policy as the CVP, even having Cabinet positions at times; the Democratic Party of the Saarland (Demokratische Partei Saar, DPS), the local branch of the FDP which was initially also sympathetic to France but then became home to a lot of ex-Nazi Party members who wanted the Saarland to rejoin Germany, for which the party was banned in 1951 (I get the impression it was for the German revanchism and not the former Nazism, depressingly); and the Communist Party of the Saarland (Kommunistische Partei Saar, KP), who (shock!) were communists, though notably they were actually the only party whose members voted against ratifying the Constitution.

I mentioned before how Hoffmann was ideologically very similar to the CDU, but where his ideology differed (and differed from France, in fact) was in foreign policy. He argued for Saarland to establish a separatist position where it would become a unifying European buffer state of sorts. To this end, as the Saar's Prime Minister he advocated for the Saar Statute that would make it independent with the trade agreement with France continuing.

However, public opposition to the Statute and the continued French cooperation it represented had grown significantly, not helped by the chaotic policies of the Fourth Republic in contrast to West Germany's emerging prosperity. The 1952 election saw 24.5% of the vote going to blank ballots for the banned pro-German parties, and in turn Hoffmann and his rule became an enemy of the movement too; in the October 1955 referendum on the Saar Statute, the No campaign used the slogan 'Der Dicke muss weg' (literally 'The fat guy has to go').

Indeed, that referendum saw a strong vote against the Statute (I would include a map of it here but the results are reported on district boundaries rather than the three constituencies the Lantag elections were done on, so I'll do that once I've got a good basemap for it) that led Hoffmann to resign and new elections to be called. This time, pro-German parties were allowed to run, including the CDU and DSP (the SPD by another name- I think I can trust they don't need introducing!), as well as the DPS, which had became very popular after the ban on it was lifted due to its steadfast support for the nationalist movement and came just 1.2% behind the CDU. The Heimatbund alliance of these three pro-German parties took a combined 63.9% of the vote and 33 (rising to 34 after electoral appeals) of the 50 seats in the Landtag.

With public opinion in Saarland now clearly majority pro-German unification, the French and West German governments negotiated the Saar Treaty, allowing Saarland to become a German state in exchange for channellizing the Moselle and teaching French as the first foreign language of the province. This was agreed in October 1956, and on the 1st January 1957 Saarland joined West Germany. Interestingly, DPS leader Heinrich Schneider would be elected as the first member of the Bundestag for Saarbrücken at the election later that year, the second-to-last time to date that the FDP has won a constituency seat.
 
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Very nice work. Another thing worth noting is that these three constituencies are still in use for Landtag elections in the Saar with only very slight modifications, which means it's one of three states (AFAIK; the others being Bremen and Hamburg) that don't have any kind of single-member element in their state elections.
 
Japan House of Councillors 1992
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I finally got round to doing a follow-up to the 1989 House of Councillors election map I made a while back. Surprisingly, despite the fact that this was just shy of a year before the election which famously shattered the 1955 system, and the fact the 1989 election was by far the JSP's finest hour after it split in the 50s, 1992 was a much more quiet election than either of those, and in many ways makes for a standard 'green map' of the LDP sweeping the country.

Having said that, there are still interesting points. For one thing, the LDP lost seats again, which isn't that surprising considering the Lost Decade had begun by this point even if the party hadn't split, but the JSP actually gained some, hitting their highest seat total after 1965 in this election. This was not only despite the party being well into its death spiral, but also despite their voteshare almost halving compared to 1989 thanks to the free trade dispute dying down and Takako Doi not being leader anymore.

The really notable part, though, is that future Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's Japan New Party, founded less than two months prior, won four seats with 8% of the vote in the national constituency, a premonition of things to come. I also suspect the Independent elected in Hosokawa's native Kumamoto Prefecture (and the others that ran) was probably aligned with them too, though I can't find much info on their allegiances.
 
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Czech Republic 1996
Considering I made a whole Czechoslovakia TL on the Other Place, I may as well map the first election in the independent Czech Republic.
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Following the Velvet Divorce, the Czech Republic continued on with its National Council elected in 1992 as the legislature, with the first election held three years later. The two Václavs- Havel, the President and leader of the Civic Forum independence movement and previously a signatory of Charter 77, and Klaus, the first independent Czech Prime Minister- had a pretty spotty working relationship, as Klaus wanted to introduce a more intensive neoliberal policy. Nevertheless, Klaus's party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and Havel's, the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), were in coalition with the refounded version of the pre-coup People's Party (now known as the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, KDU-ČSL).

The left were finally starting to get a more coherent strategy, as the Czechoslovak Party of Social Democrats (ČSSD) led by Miloš Zeman led a vigorous campaign that involved a national road trip on an old bus named 'Zemák' (which apparently means 'countryman', 'potato' and 'Zeman's Karosa (the make of the bus)'- Zeman's personal brand is weirdly heavily tied into buses, to the point that Czech Wikipedia has a whole article about the various buses called Zemák he's used in his campaigns). Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) had had control of it taken over by the anti-revisionist wing, further strengthening the ČSSD as a left-wing alternative.

Because of the continued strength of the Rally for the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ), neither the left nor the right held enough seats to form a majority government, with the ODS-led coalition 2 seats short of one. This led to the ČSSD having to tolerate the government, which gradually led to it returning to government over the course of the next brief term, and contributed quite a bit to the corruption endemic in modern Czech politics.

One little thing of note about the electoral system is that the 1996 and 1998 elections didn't have a constituency for overseas voters. As far as I can tell (the most immediate explanation I could find was genuinely on the Japanese Wikipedia of all places, so I may have misunderstood), it instead had a second round of seat allocation, based on taking the votes for the main parties above the 5% threshold that didn't contribute to netting seats and allocating them in one national constituency.
 
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The left were finally starting to get a more coherent strategy, as the Czechoslovak Party of Social Democrats (ČSSD) led by Miloš Zeman led a vigorous campaign that involved a national road trip on an old bus named 'Zemák' (which apparently means 'countryman', 'potato' and 'Zeman's Karosa (the make of the bus)'. Zeman's personal brand is weirdly heavily tied into buses with that name. Meanwhile, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) had had control of it taken over by the anti-revisionist wing, further strengthening the ČSSD as a left-wing alternative.
I do wonder what could have happened if Zeman was unable to tie himself to the Social Democrats and the revisionist wing of the Communists shifted the party to the centre…probably a lot of chaos but who knows.
 
I do wonder what could have happened if Zeman was unable to tie himself to the Social Democrats and the revisionist wing of the Communists shifted the party to the centre…probably a lot of chaos but who knows.
It's definitely interesting to consider. I would assume the ČSSD would've been relegated to a minor party, while more reformist influence in the Communists could've either developed it into a postcommunist governing party akin to what happened in OTL Lithuania or Poland or a perpetual kingmaker that affects how the bigger parties can or can't pass economic reforms.

The needle I'd love to see get threaded (silly though it is) is the Communists somehow keeping that name instead of shifting to a name referring to democratic socialism (and to the Czech Republic instead of Bohemia and Moravia for that matter), but still reforming themselves and eventually leading a democratic government.
 
Communists could've either developed it into a postcommunist governing party akin to what happened in OTL Lithuania or Poland or a perpetual kingmaker that affects how the bigger parties can or can't pass economic reforms.
That’s what I was thinking, probably with someone like Marie Stiborová playing a more prominent role etc. In a way Milos Zeman seemed to kind of want to construct that style of party the CSSD but that party was to well established for that to work fully I think.

The needle I'd love to see get threaded (silly though it is) is the Communists somehow keeping that name instead of shifting to a name referring to democratic socialism (and to the Czech Republic instead of Bohemia and Moravia for that matter), but still reforming themselves and eventually leading a democratic government.
That would be quite an amusing scenario.

I was pondering a possible scenario where Zeman forms a government in 96’ in keeping with the general mood of the Mid 90s in Eastern Europe but I didn’t know how to construct that (same with a possible Slovakia ousting Vladimír Mečiar in the Mid 90s somehow).
 
Czech Republic 1998
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The 1996-98 session of the Chamber of Deputies saw the unstable ODS-led governing coalition collapse partly due to economic decline and partly because of a scandal in which it was revealed that two people claimed to be the ODS’s biggest sponsors were pseudonyms for Milan Šrejber, who privatised the Třinec Iron and Steel Works. Just to twist the knife further for the ODS, it was revealed in November 1997 that the party had a secret Swiss bank account, which made any attempts to fix the apparent embezzlement look pretty farcical.

The ODA and KDU-ČSL withdrew all support for the government in response, and the ODS’s Interior Minister Jan Ruml challenged Václav Klaus for the party leadership. You might have expected him to win, but Klaus had strengthened his position with the ODS rank and file with the fact that he was in Sarajevo at the time, and coined the nickname ‘Sarajevském atentátu’ (‘Sarajevo assassinations’) for his treatment among his supporters; it’s likely that his being at the Bosnian front also helped his image of being both a strong leader and disconnected from the ODS’s corruption. Nethertheless, Klaus stood down in favour of Czech National Bank governor Josef Tošovský, who led a caretaker government until new elections could be held in the summer of 1998.

Consequently, Klaus defeated Ruml in the leadership contest easily. Ruml’s faction then left the ODS to form the Freedom Union (US), which initially surged in the polls, helped by the ODS being tarnished and the ODA choosing not to contest the election. However, the US would soon be drowned out thanks to their support for the Tošovský government and the ODS recovering some of their popularity thanks to Klaus’s continued leadership- there was little difference in the US and ODS policy platforms, but the ODS stressing the personally popular Klaus benefitted the party despite its scandals.

However, the favourites for the 1998 election were definitely the ČSSD; as part of his continued obsession with buses, Miloš Zeman personally requested Tony Blair provide him with a pair of Routemasters to campaign with. The party also benefitted from a pledge to fight corruption (Zeman tied himself to the Mani Pulite anti-corruption campaign in Italy) and halt privatization, though its recycling of slogans from 1996 was perhaps less inspiring.

The results saw a comfortable victory for the ČSSD, but a much better performance for the ODS than expected. After securing President Havel’s support to form a government, Zeman reached out to the KDU-ČSL and US for a government, but Ruml refused to work with Zeman even if the KDU-ČSL leader Josef Lux was allowed to become PM instead.

As a result, Zeman opened talks with Klaus to arrange what was known as the ‘Treaty on creating a stable political environment in the Czech Republic’, or more commonly the ‘Opposition Agreement’ (Czech: Opoziční smlouva). This committed the ČSSD and ODS to cooperating to keep each other in government, with the opposition party being granted the chairmanship of the houses of parliament and the control bodies in exchange for forfeiting the right to call a motion of no confidence in the government, as well as agreeing to bipartisan foreign and domestic affairs ‘with preferential consideration of stability, prosperity and the position of the Czech Republic in the world’.

As you might guess, this basically meant the ČSSD got to enter government in exchange for accepting the post-neoliberal consensus and committing the Czech Republic to international cooperation. And of course it led to absolutely no more corruption in Czech politics ever.
 
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As you might guess, this basically meant the ČSSD got to enter government in exchange for accepting the post-neoliberal consensus and committing the Czech Republic to international cooperation. And of course it led to absolutely no more corruption in Czech politics ever.
I see no issues with this system whatsoever. (Also sounds quite a bit like the December Agreement, if anyone still remembers that - feels like a lifetime ago)

Was there ever a chance of Zeman working with the Communists, or was that just a bogeyman raised by Klaus to scare voters back into his camp? Would’ve been interesting to have a genuine left-wing coalition in a former Eastern Bloc country in the 90s - then again, Poland had a couple of those, and it didn’t change all that much for them in the long run.
 
Was there ever a chance of Zeman working with the Communists, or was that just a bogeyman raised by Klaus to scare voters back into his camp? Would’ve been interesting to have a genuine left-wing coalition in a former Eastern Bloc country in the 90s - then again, Poland had a couple of those, and it didn’t change all that much for them in the long run.
I assume it was the latter considering the Czech Communists are and were famously anti-revisionist and Zeman distanced himself from the KSČ after the Prague Spring was crushed. If Svoboda and the reformists had still been in control of the party, I suspect it could've happened, but as is the KSČM's whole appeal by this point was (and from what I understand still is) a Czech brand of Ostalgia or Yugo-nostalgia. IIRC some of them even called for a return to a People's Republic if they came to power.
 
I assume it was the latter considering the Czech Communists are and were famously anti-revisionist and Zeman distanced himself from the KSČ after the Prague Spring was crushed. If Svoboda and the reformists had still been in control of the party, I suspect it could've happened, but as is the KSČM's whole appeal by this point was (and from what I understand still is) a Czech brand of Ostalgia or Yugo-nostalgia. IIRC some of them even called for a return to a People's Republic if they came to power.
I was thinking you probably need the KSCM to go down a root similar to the Slovakian counterparts. Now of course, given everything we know about Slovakian politics, this was probably for the best (actually that would be intriguing Alt Hist to see, Czech and Slovakia both under different Centre Left coalitions in the 90s).

I wonder what the difference the ODA running again would have made (I suspect Zeman actually having enough sway to get the Christian Democrats to begrudgingly join).
 
Despite the threadmark title, no, this isn't anything to do with the Olympics.

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Sometimes Japan produces strong ‘Ireland’ energy and I have to say, a party of Stodgy Corporatist Right Wingers slightly beating a party of weird Neoliberal Right Wing Populists is certainly incredibly Irish I must say.
 
Sometimes Japan produces strong ‘Ireland’ energy and I have to say, a party of Stodgy Corporatist Right Wingers slightly beating a party of weird Neoliberal Right Wing Populists is certainly incredibly Irish I must say.
I've thought that quite a bit myself actually. The smattering of amusingly ideologically diverse leftist parties that make little difference to the actual government only adds to that.
 
Ukraine 1999
Apologies to @vjw for this. 😛
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I was tempted to call 1999 Ukraine's weirdest election, but considering this is the same country that's had two separate presidential elections connected to revolutions, one of which was voted on three times, and which elected its equivalent of Malcolm Tucker who subsequently became a war hero, that doesn't seem right. What's weird about 1999 is the voting patterns and parties involved.

Ukranian politics is generally defined by an east-west divide- the east tends to support Russophilic parties, whereas the west is much more pro-European- though from my understanding, ideologically most parties and candidates are fairly close together on major social and economic issues and tend to be fairly personal vehicles. Back when it was a thing, the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) broke both those rules, being fairly strong across the country and having a revisionist communist philosophy.

Leonid Kuchma is a good example of a politician who threaded that needle, winning his first term by pledging to liberalise trade while also improving relations with Russia through the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty, where the two promised not to invade each other's territory (which certainly aged well).

However, Kuchma's popularity had been damaged by his decision to interfere with the funeral of Orthodox Patriarch Voldymyr Romaniuk in 1995 and the suspicious deaths of Yevhen Shcherban and Viacheslav Chornovil, two political opponents of his (though nothing has been proven about Kuchma actually being involved in either's death, his involvement with Georgiy Gongadze's kidnapping and murder means it's very likely he was involved), while politically his privatisations and efforts to keep Ukraine non-aligned through his Multi-Vector Policy ingratiated him to western voters and alienated him from eastern and left-leaning ones.

A lot of candidates hoped to capitalise on this alienation, and while Chornovil had been the frontrunner for the Europhilic opposition, his death left them without an obvious figurehead- the most prominent Kuchma opponents running for the presidency were now KPU leader Petro Symonenko and Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) leader Oleksandr Moroz. Moroz had run with the KPU's support in 1994, but this time he became one of the 'Kaniv Four', who sought to endorse a single candidate.

This went badly for him as the grouping fell apart, and one of them (Verkhovna Rada Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko) just endorsed Symonenko instead. While Moroz did win Poltava and Vinnytsia Oblasts, he polled less than half a percent above LaRouchite Russophile Nataliya Vitrenko of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSPU) and only managed just over half of Symonenko's vote, putting the KPU leader against Kuchma in the second round.

The second round vote was basically between Kuchma presenting himself as a moderate and sweeping the allegations against him under the rug, while Symonenko's campaign presented what Wikipedia calls 'classic Communist content' (which makes it sound like a greatest hits album to me- Dizzy With Success: The Very Best of Stalinism, anyone?). Ironically, I'm not really sure why the voting patterns turned out the way they did- guessing it's just due to socio-economic factors in the east and anti-Russian attitudes in the west, but I'd definitely appreciate if anyone could elaborate on them.
 
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