Luminosity
Former terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan (PKK) handing Turkish dictator Doğu Perinçek (Worker’s) a rose while visiting the front in Jordan.
Prime Ministers of the Republic of Turkey
2003 - 2010: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Justice and Development majority)
2010 - 2010: Deniz Baykal (Republican People’s - Nationalist Movement coalition)
Aug 2010: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Justice and Development), Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement)
2010 - 2010: Önder Sav (Republican People’s - Nationalist Movement coalition)
2010 - 2011: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Justice and Development minority with Nationalist Movement confidence and supply)
2011 - 2011: Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement minority)
2011 - 2012: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Justice and Development - Peace and Democracy interim election government)
Nov 2011: Önder Sav (Republican People’s), Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement), Selahettin Demirtaş & Gültan Kışanak (Peace and Democracy)
2012 - 2013: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Justice and Development - People’s Democratic Movement coalition)
Jun 2012: Deniz Baykal (Republican People’s), Selahettin Demirtaş and Pervin Buldan (People’s Democratic Movement), Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement)
2013 - 2013: Mustafa Sarıgül (Republican People’s minority with People’s Democratic Movement supply and confidence)
2013 - 2014: Deniz Baykal (Republican People’s minority with People’s Democratic Movement supply and confidence)
2014 - 2014: Deniz Baykal (Republican People’s)
Mar 2014: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Justice and Development), Deniz Baykal (Republican People’s), Selahettin Demirtaş and Pervin Buldan (People’s Democratic Movement), Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Movement)
2014 - 2015: vacant
Presidents of the Republic of Turkey
2000 - 2007: Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Independent)
2007 - 2014: Abdullah Gül (Justice and Development)
2014 - 2021: İlker Başbuğ (Turkish Armed Forces)
John McCain’s close victory against Hillary Clinton in the 2008 elections had grand repercussions for the rest of the world. Not only did his failure to act accordingly to the worsening financial crisis and invasion of Iran along with Israelis create the Second Great Depression, his support for the uprisings in nations across the Middle-East greatly changed the power balance in the region. Perhaps not as directly affected by McCain’s interventionist policies as its neighbors Turkey’s fate nevertheless was forever changed by the Arizonan’s presence.
For most of the 2010s Turkey was led by the progressive conservative AKP, which for some time seemed to have finally make the nation reconcile with its Ottoman past, as a quixotic alliance of Islamists, Market Liberals, Kurds and Progressives slowly dismantled the military dominated Kemalist consensus. This was not without its own challenges though, as the Sledgehammer arrests and the 2007 Republic protests showcased the existing opposition to Erdogan, though the Prime Minister and his allies pushed their reforms on from emancipation of conservative muslims to finally to fulfilling more and more requirements for EU-membership.
For a while it seemed that even the Great Recession, not yet a depression at that time, would be able to slow down the AKP, as Deputy Prime Minister Babacan’s technocratic reforms got the initially seemed to have gotten the nation out of the financial malaise far quicker than any other European country. However, the American Congress’ decision to invade the Islamic Republic of Iran proved to be a rude awakening for the Turkish government, as markets immediately reacted negatively, and only a few months later millions of refugees flooded the nation.
As much as Erdogan may have wanted to help his Muslim brothers and sisters, the public quickly soured against the Prime Minister. This quickly transformed into a new wave of protests against the AKP government, as secular Turkish citizens were worried that Erdogan wanted to transform Turkish society into a nation just like their Eastern neighbor, and was using its citizens to only fast track this goal. Erdogan reacted much more agressively against these protests than he did three years ago, only having him lose further support. With poll numbers dropping, it was no surprise that backbenchers rebelled, and Erdogan had to call new election.
The 72-year old Deniz Baykal had been a recognizable name in the political arena, since the 1970s, when he served in Ecevit’s centre-left governments. When the politician from Antalya finally became leader of the CHP in 1992 he took the party to a more centrist and dogmatic Kemalist direction, which initially saw the party lose support in the 1990s, until they hit a new low in 1999, as they failed to pass the 10% threshold. However, this proved in many regards to be a hail Mary, as it saw them avoid blame for the 2001 economic crisis and become the main alternative to the AKP.
However unlike Erdogan, Baykal did not have a majority in parliament, and he had to struck a deal with the nationalist MHP. While many in Turkey were initially somewhat hopeful that the new government could solve both the financial and refugee crisis that were at the forefront of Turkish politics. Baykal and Bahceli nevertheless quickly proved the Turkish peoples’ weariness of coalition governments, as they quickly started infighting, while their economic policies consisted out of little more than printing and redistributing money, which only caused inflation. As if things couldn’t get any worse for Baykal, he was forced to resign a few months into his premiership after a leaked video of him having sex with the Minister of Tourism surfaced the internet.
Baykal may have left in shame, but he did have the final say in who would succeed him, and he chose his close ally Önder Sav. If conservatives were worried about Baykal’s secularism, they were outright terrified of Sav. The new Prime Minister immediately tried to lift many of the liberalizations on state secularism, though would be largely unable to convince his coalition partners to join him in this effort. Only a few days after Sav celebrated his birthday, his prime ministership was over, as Baykal announced he lost confidence in the government, and wanted new elections.
Worried about the consensus this could set President Gül quickly invited Bahceli and Erdogan to the Çankaya Mansion, and convinced the latter to support a new AKP government. While Erdogan was convinced he had learned from the mistakes of the past year, and would quickly be able to get a majority again, reality proved not to his liking, as only days after re-entering the prime ministership scandals of various party members were printed all across the national media. Erdogan was convinced that only one group could be behind this.
Since the 1970s there have been conspiracies in Turkey on the existence of a secret deep state. This became progressively less secret, as the existence of such a group was all but confirmed during the 1990s with intelligence agencies, ministers, terrorists, businessmen, and organized crime leaders caught conspiring with each other. However, leading political actors proved to be largely unable, and in many cases unwilling, to combat this problem. It wasn’t until Erdogan came into office that the group was slowly weakened, though not without its difficulties, as the secular ultranationalist group still largely existed deep in the shadows of the Turkish state.
When Erdogan re-entered office he quickly noted that they had largely regrouped, largely thanks to the MHP. Initially, he tried to combat this by once again supporting bureaucrats of the Gülen movement, a Pro-Western Islamist fraternal movement/cult, though without a parliamentary majority he was largely unable to do so. In these efforts, Erdogan neglected the worsening economic problems, once again aiding in his increasing unpopularity, though at least a vote of no confidence seemed unlikely, as he and Bahceli had reached an agreement.
However, this changed when the Prime Minister’s son was caught funneling millions of liras out of the country. Erdogan tried to paint the scandal as an attack on himself by “secret organizations”, but when a phone recording of the father and son surfaced, which showed compromising evidence, he once again had to leave the office, as Bahceli served as caretaker until new elections were held.
The past three years had seriously hurt both the CHP and AKP, and for a short while it seriously seemed as if Bahceli would finish the elections in first place. The nationalist’s lackluster efforts at combatting the growing economic crisis, and corruption scandals of his own saw his poll numbers quickly fall again, and he finished the elections once again in third place. While the fact that no party managed to even get 30% was surprising, the biggest surprise of the election was the incredible result for Turkey’s newest parliamentary party
Years of economic crisis had seriously dampened the faith of the Turkish public in the existing political parties, and thus it should be no surprise that a new left-wing alliance entered parliament. However, this movement being led by the Kurdish movement, and getting a whopping 18% was. The Kurds had so far failed to get more than 7%, and now with their socialist and liberal allies, they more than doubled their best ever result.
Despite initially announcing that they would not support a coalition led by Erdogan, Demirtas came back from this promise, and entered a caretaker government with the Islamist, as no majority was able to be formed in parliament, and new elections would be held only a few months later. When these elections proved to once again not be able to combine the necessary numbers for a majority in parliament, despite a last minute effort for a AKP-CHP coalition, Demirtas decided to continue his coalition with the AKP, as he extracted major reforms for Kurds and other minorities.
The AKP-HDP coalition proved to be something of a horror story for the deep state, especially when the two combined started challenging it again. The Kurdish language became the all but official co-language in the Southeast, civil unions for same-sex couples were legalized, and the government started negotiations with the PKK for an end to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, despite protests from Bahceli and his nationalist allies.
A slow economic uptick following the landslide election of Barack Obama only proved to be further good news for Erdogan, who saw his poll numbers rise increasingly, and was already slowly preparing to dump the Kurds. However, he would never be able to do so. Demirtas and his allies were ready to ignore Erdogan’s corrupt past, but new corruption scandals for prominent AKP members put a serious strain on the coalition. The HDP found it increasingly hard to justify its alliance with Erdogan, and when the man himself was embroiled in another major political scandal, they had seen enough, and announced a step back from government.
Initially, new elections seemed all but inevitable, but quick handling from new CHP leader Mustafa Sarigül saw his party re-enter government with confidence and supply from the Kurds. The energetic reformist would lead the most left-wing government in Turkish history, and was considered to be part of a wider movement with the likes of Obama and Montebourg. Backed by a strong team of left-wing economists Sarigül seemed to have paved the way for the recovery of the Turkish economy, even as its neighbor Greece fell into increasing turmoil with the European Union. For the first time in years the Turkish people seemed to be hopeful about their future again, though a new scandal once again changed this, as it was revealed that the Prime Minister had physically assaulted the wife of a political rival when he was the Mayor of Sisli. Sarigül resigned, and a criminal investigation was started, while the CHP’s factions were unable to reach a consensus candidate until they once again settled for Baykal.
Though some in the HDP were worried about Baykal’s more nationalistic views, the bigger worry for many was his health, as the Prime Minister spent more and more time visiting hospitals, while the Turkish economy slowly entered a recession again. This situation caused many to draw parallels with the last Ecevit government a decade ago, which also saw a sick Prime Minister refusing to resign, and an economic crisis. However, the HDP were willing to back the PM for some time, though this also came to an end as they opposed his proposals for austerity politics, and saw their own polling numbers slowly fall again. It was thus for these reasons, that Turkey once again went to the polls in March 2014.
If the past couple of elections had shown the nation one thing, it was that the democratic system still worked, and governments could be formed. The Turks were no Greeks who had fallen to a fascist military coup led by the Golden Dawn movement. These perceived superiorities would be challenged by the new elections though, as for the first time there genuinely seemed no possibility of a new government formation, with all four parties refusing to compromise on not wanting Erdogan or old man Baykal as PM, or not wanting to form a coalition with the “fascists” or “terrorists”. Baykal led the country as interim, while Gül’s term as President was also coming to an end, and the country suddenly had two offices to fill. Erdogan tried to reach a power sharing agreement with Baykal giving the latter the PM spot, while he would succeed his former deputy Gül as President, but a wheelchair-bound Baykal flatly rebuked this offer.
Whit Turkey’s democracy increasingly unable to govern itself an increasing number of bureaucrats and military officials were questioning the validity of the system. Most of this just stayed with philosophical conversations, though some young officers slowly started to hatch plans in secret. These plans came into fruition when a Greek terrorist, posing as a tourist, opened fire on a crowd in Istanbul killing hundreds. Parliament’s response was once again considered to be not good enough.
Only a week after this event Turkey woke up with young military officials having successfully committed a coup, the new President, recently resigned Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ, only learning about this plan and his new role as president a few hours earlier by some of the coup plotters. Martial Law was implemented throughout the country, parliament abolished, the constitution suspended and later on replaced, and all political parties and movements were banned. On top of this some political leaders, most notably Erdogan and Demirtas, were imprisoned by the new military governments. Despite protests from the West, Turkey once again found itself without a civilian government.
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Prime Ministers of the Republic of Turkey
2014 - 2015: vacant
2015 - 2021: Doğu Perinçek (Patriot)
Jun 2015: Tuncay Özkan (New Party)
Jun 2020: Osman Pamukoğlu (New Party), Metin Feyzioğlu (Republican People’s), Tuğrul Türkeş (Nationalist Movement)
2021 - 2023: Kemal Kerinçsiz (Patriot)
Presidents of the Republic of Turkey
2014 - 2021: İlker Başbuğ (Turkish Armed Forces)
2021 - 2023: Doğu Perinçek (Patriot)
Having found itself in a state of war with its neighbor Greece, the Turkish public seemed to be largely willing to back the new military government. Despite initially crossing the Martisa river, the Greek army found itself unable to reach the Marmara sea, and with reinforcements coming in from the Iranian border, plus the aid of American air support, Turkey was able to push the Greeks back over the border. On top of this Greek islands were slowly being conquered by the Turkish navy one by one. With the war slowly coming to a halt calls for peace grew, and ultimately peace talks led by Russian Prime-Ministee Naryshkin, who came to power following Putin’s death in a conspiratorial plane crash.
With peace having returned to Turkey, President Basbug was preparing plans for a return to a democratic state of affairs. Basbug, not being a fan on the military coup that brought him into office, wanted the implementation of a French-style Semi-Presidential system, and told his juniors that he would not run in the next election. Fearing that the president would turn on them, especially after his sympathetic words for the plight of the supporters of the still imprisoned Demirtas, the young military officials decided to speed up their plans.
As all of them were subscribers to the Luminosity movement, they believed that the Turkish revolution would happen in two steps. They already fulfilled the first step by staging a military coup, though the second step, the proletariat revolution, would have to be hastened significantly, due to the possible counterrevolutionary in the presidency. It was thus that dozens of military officials, without consulting the President, announced the appointment of Acting Secretary of Justice Dogu Perincek as Peime-Minister.
This announcement was received by wide spread protests from Islamists, liberals, Kurds, and other leftists. Perincek had been imprisoned from 2008 to 2012 on allegations of planning a coup, though largely proven to be a false, and the Turkish public still did not trust him, each for different reasons. Kurds saw in him an ultranationalist who would role back the rights they had gained over the past few years, liberals saw him as a Maoist who would dismantle the free market and severe relations with the West, while Islamists and other conservatives were critical of his unapologetic left-wing and secular views. Needless to say there was wide scale opposition to his appointment, but the heavy handed armed forces quickly put any protests that threatened to happen down.
These fears proved to be largely true, only months into his Prime Ministership Perincek announced Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO, and that it would instead seek closer relations with China and especially Russia. This, needless to say, worried Western leaders, but with the new non-interventionist consensus in American foreign policy limited their possibilities. He would also once again ban the use of the hijab in public spaces, and brand many religious institutions as terroristic organizations, while at the same time rolling back LGBTQ+ rights. Big businesses were not safe either, as in order to realize his ‘National Democratic Revolution’ Perincek would nationalize many key industries and businesses, which unsuccessfully tried to flee West with their assets. Lastly, Perincek also all but destroyed the Kurdish political movement, though he did not return to the horror days of the 1980s, and instead largely respected, and in some instances even expanded, the status of the Kurdish language and Kurdish nationhood, despite protests from some of his allies.
Perincek’s early years were not all bad though, as he supported plans to improve gender equality, which due to their archaic nature only had limited success, and his release of convicted terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan, despite massive protests with hundreds of casualties, helped in stopping the conflict with the PKK. As the 2010s were coming to and end Perincek had established an hegemonic status over Turkish politics, becoming the most powerful politician since Atatürk, though this era would also
see him faced with his biggest personal problem to date, the increasingly worsening relations between China and Russia.
In Perincek’s world view China and Russia should be natural allies against the United States and other Western powers. However, Naryshkin’s expansionist government was at odds with Bo Xilai’s PRC, which had slowly been returning to its Maoist roots since the Second Great Depression. Despite Perincek’s efforts to improve relations between the two, he eventually came to the conclusion that he had to pick a side, which was a lot easier said than done. He had been a Maoist since he was a teenager, and thus held great sympathy to Xilai’s government, while on the other hand Dugin’s sway over the Russian government, and its increasingly anti-Western and militaristic rhetoric greatly impressed him as well. Ultimately, Perincek chose for Russia, as he concluded that anti-Americanism is more important than anything else. A few months later, Russia along with other former Soviet states formed the Eurasian Federation, which intended to include the missing parts like the Baltics and Georgia at a later date.
This later date would be 17 November 2020, as Eurasian troops invaded the Baltic states, and kicked off the Third World War. To the surprise of many in the West, shred through NATO armies like paper, and one after the other European capital fell, as Kazakh troops reached the beaches of Normandy. It was only then that Turkey finally joined the war, as it played an important role in the occupation of West European cities with large Turkish populations, which most of the time were quite wary of the Perincek regime, especially those that had fled it over the past years.
Turkey found itself the odd member out in this new Europe, as most of its new allies were led by Eurasian installed far-right puppet regimes, which generally did not hold positive views on Turks, though they were forced to hide it, and the far-left, which played a role in puppet governments in almost all of Europe, even leading some like the Czech Republic, were largely looking at Turkey for ideological inspiration. Nonetheless, Perincek was looking at the Middle-East, as he deemed the annexation of Cyprus not enough, and invaded the quasi-independent Republic of Iraqi Kurdistan.
In Iraq, the Turkish Armed Forces proved to be surprisingly weak, and they once again had to be bailed out by a stronger ally, this time Eurasia. Instead of learning from this experience, Perincek instead pushed further, and aided the Iranians in their war against the Saudis, and the other Arab states, while also aiding Assas in pressuring the Israelis to hand increasingly large amounts of territory back territory to the Palestinian forces.
One of the most defining elements of Turkey’s role in the Middle-East was the ideological vigor with which it fought the Muslim Brotherhood led states across the Middle-East. Branding the conflict as a civilizational one, and arguing that Turkey would finish Atatürks dream of a secular socialist Middle-East. Though initially successful due to Eurasian backing, Turkish and other pro-Eurasian forces were slowly being pushed back by NATO and its allies, most notably India.
The war also had a negative effect on the homefront, as initial nationalistic support had largely down, and the worsening living standards had lowered Perincek’s popularity at home. This was not necessarily a huge issue at first, but following the Liberation of Cyprus, and especially the invasion of Alanya, it started to become clear to the Turkish people that they were fighting a losing war. This had an important psychological effect, as it increased support for the partisan fighting, which had been erupting across the nation, and consisted of wide-ranging ideologies from Islamism, to communism, to liberalism.
The Turkish Armed Forces and especially the Eurasians fought against these partisans with increasing violence, which only increased support for them by the populace, as they felt like they were an occupied nation. At the same time American troops were liberating Berlin and Tirana, Eurasian forces were slowly being pushed out of China, Indian forces had crossed the Iranian border, Turkish forces held less and less Saudi lands, and Greek communist partisans liberated the southern part of their nation. Only a few months later NATO troops liberated Sofia, and from there entered Turkey. When it became clear to the Turkish government that they would be unable to defend Istanbul, they reached the conclusion that Perincek had to go, and asked the Americans and their allies for peace.
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Presidents of the Worker’s Republic of Turkey
2023 - 2025: Doğu Perinçek (Worker’s)
2025 - 2025: Mehmet Perinçek (Worker’s)
Presidents of the Republic of Turkey
2023 - 2023: Hulusi Akar (Turkish Armed Forces)
2023 - 2026: David L. Goldfein (United States Air Force)
Prime Ministers of the Republic of Turkey
2023 - 2024: Hulusi Akar (Turkish Armed Forces)
2024 - 2024: Cem Toker (Liberal Democrat)
2024 - 2026: Ali Babacan (Liberal Democrat)
Perincek’s removal from the Presidency, and the hanging of PM Kerincsiz did not mean the end conflict in Turkey. With the aid of Eurasian forces Perincek re-established himself in East Turkey, and formed the Worker’s Republic. Perincek tried to regain the trust of the Turkish people by nationalizing the few companies that were left, and finally moving to a Marxist-Leninist system of economics and society, but he was unable to combat the increasing sympathy that the Turkish resistance enjoyed. This was made all the worst when the Kurdish resistance, with American intelligence aid, overnight reappeared, and further pushed Perincek into a corner.
At the same time Hulusi Akar, probably the most pro-Western general at that time, handed power over Turkey largely to NATO, who established one of their own in Goldfein, though he largely seemed to be an appointment due to internal politicking within the American armed forces. The occupying forces slowly started to reintegrate a civilian government into Turkey, though due to a decade of Perincek found little political movements left that were sufficiently non-fascistic. The Americans ultimately settled on Cem Toker and the Liberal Democrats, who were one of the few legal genuine opposition parties, the others being controlled opposition, though Toker’s incompetence quickly made apparent why he was allowed to criticize the Prime Minister on national television. Pretty much the day he entered office, Toker attempted to privatize key industries, without taking into consideration their importance for the war effort. Only a few weeks after Toker was inagurated, Goldfein had to personally ask an increasingly ailing President Biden for permission to remove him from office. Toker would be released by Erdogans former number two, Ali Babacan, who had been in a teaching position in Georgetown.
Whit the war increasingly coming to a close tensions between the Chinese and Americans started to slightly worsen, as they tried to reach an agreement on who would get what. Perincek tried to convince the Chinese to forgive him and support him, though they obviously never returned his calls. When Dugin and Naryshkin became aware of his plans to cross them, they decided they were done with him, and arranged his death by getting him to visit Dersim/Tunceli where he would be caught, hanged and shot by the Turkish and Kurdish resistance. Dogu Perincek, the last living member of the Turkish 1968 generation, suffered a similar fate as his former brothers in law, although they became folk heroes, while Perincek was regarded as the worst thing that happened to Turkey. He would be succeeded by his more pro-Eurasian son, though he would be caught a few months later, and given the death sentence by a more formal court. The war would officially end following the Eurasian capitulation after the fall of Moscow in early December 2025.
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Presidents of the Federal Republic of Turkey
2026 - 2031: Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (Independent)
Prime-Ministers of the Federal Republic of Turkey
2026 - 2030: Ahmet Davutoğlu (New Democratic majority)
2026: Ahmet Şık (Communist), Ali Babacan (Liberal Democrat), Muharrem İnce (Social Democrat)
2028: Ahmet Şık (Popular Front), Sedat Peker (Journey)
2030 - 2036:
Ekrem İmamoğlu (New Democratic majority)
Co-Presidents of the Democratic Federation of the Upper Middle-East
2025 - 2030: Hevrin Khalaf and Selahettin Demirtaş (New Democracy)
2026: various
2027: various
2029: Ahmed Khalil and Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman (Kurdistan Peace and Prosperity Alliance)
The end of WW3 started a new era for Turkey, as the Republic was officially dismantled, and a federation was put into place. While Kilicdaroglu, leader of the bureaucracy during the NATO occupation, was an easy pick for the presidency, the prime-ministership saw a lot more discussion among decision makers. Babacan’s work was greatly appreciated by the Americans and British, but with a new cold war brewing with the Chinese, his anti-communist credentials were questioned, which were especially important as former journalist turned partisan Ahmet Sik and his communist movement led some polls. NATO ultimately landed on another former Erdogan ally, Ahmet Davutoglu.
Not only was Davutoglu more conservative, and therefore explicitly anti-communist, he was also supportive of American interventionism, and envisioned an important role for Turkey as an American ally against the People’s Republic of China. As prime minister Davutoglu worked on his goals of a Hellenoturkic union, though when this failed he largely settled on closer cooperation through the European Union, of which Turkey became a member in 2029.
At the same time his New Democracy party pushed for legislative reform which established a FPTP system, effectively forcing the electorate into a two party system, aside from Peker’s far-right Journey Party. This way he hoped that his New Democracy party, by now ranging from the centre-left to right-wing, while Sik’s Popular Front was made up of Communists and Socialists. Davutoglu governed for slightly more than four years before announcing his resignation due to health reasons, and was followed by Imamoglu belonging to the centre-left wing of the party.
Turkey did not survive the war in one piece, as the Kurdish majority southeast declared independence, and through a complicated game of politics between Xilai and the new President Kander was allowed to become a part of a neutral Kurdistan. Demirtas, who unlike Erdogan survived his prison years, was liberated from his prison near the Bulgarian border, only days after the invasion of Turkey, and would play a pivotal role in the establishment of a free Kurdistan. Unsurprisingly, he would be the first male co-president of the Democratic Federation, along with Kurdish-Syrian freedom fighter turned politician Hevrin Khalaf.