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Japan strikes North, 1941

History Learner

Well-known member
Arguably, the failure to attach Japan to the coming campaign against the USSR represented the most serious policy failure of Hitler since triggering the Anglo-French declaration of war in response to his invasion of Poland. Japanese officials had been visiting Berlin in early 1941 and there was the opportunity to invite them into the planning for the coming war; rumors were indeed flowing and the Japanese foreign minister did make inquiries, but was rebuffed by his German counter-part. Unsure of German intentions, the Japanese therefore elected to seek a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviets, securing their flank and allowing them to fully turn their focus southwards for the coming confrontation with the Western Powers; Operation Snow, triggered by Stalin by using Soviet agents within the United States, helped in this regard. Freed of the Japanese threat to the rear, the Soviets were able to fully force the Red Army upon the Wehrmacht and later on were able to import 50% of Lend Lease supplies-vital to the Soviet war effort-through Pacific ports which were only open due to the Japanese abiding by the aforementioned Pact with the Soviets.

This need not have been the case, however, as certainly the Japanese were interested in attacking the USSR and could be sufficiently convinced to do so. The IJA was firmly in favor of it, and was able to keep a lively debate in Tokyo concerning this ongoing until August of 1941, when events with America overtook such arguments and forced the hands of IGHQ. The Japanese foreign minister, despite being rebuffed by the Germans in April and having formed the Pact with the Soviets in the aftermath, was so staunchly in favor of the Strike North faction that he ultimately resigned over the refusal of the Imperial Government to denounce the Treaty he signed! Certainly German security concerns were valid, given the later revelation of the Sorge Spy Ring operating out of Japan, but the inclusion of dozens of Japanese divisions from the elite Kwantung Army as well as the cutting off of the Pacific ports would make such worthwhile. Furthermore, and arguably just as important, is that a Japan that has struck North is a Japan that has not conducted Pearl Harbor and brought the United States into the conflict...
 
@The Red wrote a good article on this. To quote the conclusion:

The fact that a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union can only really be seen as a potential benefit from the German's perspective is rather telling in regards to the overall flaw in this "What If" scenario. The Japanese had their own aims, irrational as they were, that would have prevented them from ever seeing an invasion of the Soviet Union as a priority, with their past experience in fighting the Red Army and the urgency of their resource situation making this an even less likely scenario. The Japanese strike at Pearl Harbour and their subsequent invasion of South East Asia may have been a desperate gamble but it was at least one which potential rewards, invading the Soviet Union would only ever have been a dead end.
 
@The Red wrote a good article on this. To quote the conclusion:

Got to be honest and say I disagree with that article on most points. There was an active and serious debate within Japan at the time on whether to strike North or not, with the decision only swinging firmly against when it became clear the United States was moving to issue sanctions over the occupation of Southern Indochina. On the field of military forces, the balance was decisively in favor of the Japanese, not just in numbers but quality wise as well. I honestly have no idea where the perception of the Japanese being weak in the air comes from, not only from direct comparisons but also recent experience in 1939, where the IJAAF dominated the VVS.

Likewise, contrary to popular belief oil production in the Soviet Far East in 1940 amounted to 588,000 tons and grew to 1,200,000 tons in 1945, which converted to barrels is 10,140,000. To put that into context, total Japanese consumption in 1941 was 32 million barrels. Is it enough to make Japan self sufficient? No, but it is certainly better than OTL-assuming the U.S. still places sanctions on the Japanese in this TTL-and ensures military operations can continue apace uninterrupted.
 
Got to be honest and say I disagree with that article on most points. There was an active and serious debate within Japan at the time on whether to strike North or not, with the decision only swinging firmly against when it became clear the United States was moving to issue sanctions over the occupation of Southern Indochina. On the field of military forces, the balance was decisively in favor of the Japanese, not just in numbers but quality wise as well. I honestly have no idea where the perception of the Japanese being weak in the air comes from, not only from direct comparisons but also recent experience in 1939, where the IJAAF dominated the VVS.

Likewise, contrary to popular belief oil production in the Soviet Far East in 1940 amounted to 588,000 tons and grew to 1,200,000 tons in 1945, which converted to barrels is 10,140,000. To put that into context, total Japanese consumption in 1941 was 32 million barrels. Is it enough to make Japan self sufficient? No, but it is certainly better than OTL-assuming the U.S. still places sanctions on the Japanese in this TTL-and ensures military operations can continue apace uninterrupted.

Against the Soviets? I'm not convinced by this at all. The Japanese forces that could be used in the region lacked the motorisation needed, around half their regiments didn't have trucks. The Soviets had 60,000 trucks in the region compared to 29,000 trucks in the Kwantung Army .

Logistically how they are getting supplied and fed without the required vehicles? You going to live off the land in Siberia?

And the idea that the IJAAF dominated the VVS in 1939 is one I struggle to agree with when they completely surrendered the skies to the soviets.

@Bonniecanuck is the woman to know more, she did an internship under Jin Chengmin, the Chinese historian who is the curator of the Unit 731 Museum and learned a lot about japanese forces in that theatre but from the little I know, I think you are somewhat overestimating the Japanese here.
 
Against the Soviets? I'm not convinced by this at all. The Japanese forces that could be used in the region lacked the motorisation needed, around half their regiments didn't have trucks. The Soviets had 60,000 trucks in the region compared to 29,000 trucks in the Kwantung Army .

Logistically how they are getting supplied and fed without the required vehicles? You going to live off the land in Siberia?

And the idea that the IJAAF dominated the VVS in 1939 is one I struggle to agree with when they completely surrendered the skies to the soviets.

@Bonniecanuck is the woman to know more, she did an internship under Jin Chengmin, the Chinese historian who is the curator of the Unit 731 Museum and learned a lot about japanese forces in that theatre but from the little I know, I think you are somewhat overestimating the Japanese here.

Plus striking south focuses on fighting the Chinese ulcer by cutting off supplies, and gaining needed supplies of oil, men, and materials from the malay archipelago to put the end of the chinese conflict which striking north doesn't bring much but the amur. it seems to me that you already want a conclusion that you decided and except everyone to agree with you afterwards.
 
There's clearly a lot of bods in Japan who would like to Strike North but South does seem the easier (in short-term) gains, ties in with China, and benefits Japan a lot more than Germany. Obvious exception here is no Pearl Harbor, though as @The Red notes there'd still be embargoes so the Japanese are logistically stuffed unless they can loot things from the Soviets.

A war where both of the main Axis are ground to a halt on Soviet soil (and you also have the Chinese Communists as one of the major threats to Japan) and American troops aren't liberating places, now that seems a war that gets you a very different post-war setup and Cold War.
 
Against the Soviets? I'm not convinced by this at all. The Japanese forces that could be used in the region lacked the motorisation needed, around half their regiments didn't have trucks. The Soviets had 60,000 trucks in the region compared to 29,000 trucks in the Kwantung Army .

Logistically how they are getting supplied and fed without the required vehicles? You going to live off the land in Siberia?

And the idea that the IJAAF dominated the VVS in 1939 is one I struggle to agree with when they completely surrendered the skies to the soviets.

@Bonniecanuck is the woman to know more, she did an internship under Jin Chengmin, the Chinese historian who is the curator of the Unit 731 Museum and learned a lot about japanese forces in that theatre but from the little I know, I think you are somewhat overestimating the Japanese here.

I'm not really sure where that impression of a lack of motorization or those overall numbers are pulled from, given we know Japanese Divisions in the Kwantung Army had a comparable level of motorization to 1941 German Divisions participating in Barbarossa. During the 1939 engagement at Khalkhin Gol, for example, 1st Battalion of the 64th Infantry Regiment had around 100 vehicles under its control. The Soviets, meanwhile, had only amassed an advantage in motor vehicles by stripping European and Central Asian depots of resources, something they most definitely could not do in 1941 for obvious reasons. Overall, the Red Army and IJA were about equally motorized, and the Kwantung Army probably moreso in 1941.

As for logistics, they would be operating the same way the Soviets and Germans did: railroads. Manchuria had a network to utilize while the Soviets had the Trans-Siberian only, which in 1941 had yet to even be double tracked. Not only could the Japanese sustain themselves logistically via their own network, it also conferred upon them the strategic advantage of interior lines, allowing them to strike and destroy the Soviet armies on the border in detail.

Finally: what is your statements about the air in 1939 based upon?
 
There's clearly a lot of bods in Japan who would like to Strike North but South does seem the easier (in short-term) gains, ties in with China, and benefits Japan a lot more than Germany. Obvious exception here is no Pearl Harbor, though as @The Red notes there'd still be embargoes so the Japanese are logistically stuffed unless they can loot things from the Soviets.

A war where both of the main Axis are ground to a halt on Soviet soil (and you also have the Chinese Communists as one of the major threats to Japan) and American troops aren't liberating places, now that seems a war that gets you a very different post-war setup and Cold War.

The CCP had been effectively neutralized as a threat in 1940 by the Hundred Regiments Offensive, not really becoming effective again until 1944-1945. As for the Japanese strike effecting the Post-War and Cold War, you are correct, but not for the reasons you think:

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