Strategos' Risk
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What if Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Governor of Southern Rhodesia, opposed UDI to the extent of ordering the arrest of Ian Smith?
There was a previous thread that discussed British military intervention in Rhodesia in response to UDI. As part of the discussion, I found this thesis paper that is focused on British responses to the Rhodesian Crisis:
The full excerpts I quoted in this post, but here's the relevant setup. Scenario in bold:
Suppose that the Rhodesian senior military leadership convinces Gibbs to arrest Smith. Do they receive a revolt among the rank and file? Does this result in a quick young officers-style coup of the Rhodesian military? Or could it lead to a full-blown civil war among the white population of Rhodesia, already in the context of a larger civil war? What side does Ken Flower, opportunist spymaster extraordinare, take?
Also, what is the legal implications of this? Did Gibbs have the authority to order an arrest of Smith? Do the revolting pro-Rhodesian Front soldiers have a right to protest it by overthrowing their leadership? Does Ian Smith use this opportunity to take on greater powers in an autogolpe type situation? How does this impact Rhodesian attitudes towards the Crown? International attitudes towards the Rhodesians?
There was a previous thread that discussed British military intervention in Rhodesia in response to UDI. As part of the discussion, I found this thesis paper that is focused on British responses to the Rhodesian Crisis:
The full excerpts I quoted in this post, but here's the relevant setup. Scenario in bold:
In November 1965, [Rhodesian Air Vice Marshal Harold] Hawkins actually advised Johns that UDI was imminent and, further, ‘he had told his stations that he would not issue any illegal orders i.e. orders would be confined to those necessary for the country’s security.’ This might be considered slightly ambiguous, but Hawkins also referred to the hard-liners in the Rhodesian Front as ‘madmen’, which is a reasonable indication of his hostility to UDI.71 The attitude of the Rhodesian Service Chiefs, even after the purge of Anderson and Bentley, might therefore have helped to prevent a full-scale confrontation between British and Rhodesian forces.
Attitudes among senior Rhodesian Army officers were not sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front regime. On the morning of UDI the Governor in Salisbury, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, received a visit from four Army officers who arrived armed at Government House. They informed Gibbs that if he provided them with a warrant for the arrest of Smith as a rebel against the Queen, they would do their duty. The Governor refused, and the soldiers left. In Gibbs’ obituary Patrick Keatley commented that ‘This was the fatal moment of hesitation.’72 The Governor had in fact considered the possibility of resisting UDI. He consulted Ken Flower, Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to ascertain his views. Flower recalled in his memoirs:
"Although I considered that the loyalty of the Chiefs of Staff, Putterill and Hawkins, was not in doubt and that many of their senior officers would follow their lead, I advised Gibbs that an appeal for their support would put them in an almost impossible position, between the government that paid them and an overseas Queen to whom they owed their allegiance."73
Flower also advised that the possibility of bloodshed could not be discounted because the attitude among middle and junior ranks was more belligerent, especially in the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), which Flower said ‘would willingly “jump into the Makabusi (a muddy river on the outskirts of the city [Salisbury]) for Smith, even if this meant going against their seniors.’ Some former RLI troops have since expressed a view that they would, without question, have fought against British troops or any other invading force. Victor Lee Walker, a Captain in 1RLI who at the time of UDI was seconded to the Military Intelligence Section of the CIO, has commented:
"The general feeling within the RLI, and other Rhodesian Defence organisations was one of intense loyalty to the country and its government and all members were prepared to fight for Rhodesia (this was later proved during the terrorist campaign). I was prepared to resist any intervention in our country’s affairs as were all my fellow officers who were still serving in 1RLI."
The Rhodesian Front could also have counted on the support of the Territorial Force and reservists, who reflected the political mood of the European population in Rhodesia and were therefore likely to offer some resistance to British military intervention.
67 Putterill told the Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation that he would support the Governor if so requested. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 56. When Putterill retired, he joined the multi- racial Centre Party in protest against the Rhodesian Front’s racial Constitution of 1969; he also opposed the regime’s efforts to make Rhodesia a republic. See Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 28; and Good, UDI, p. 57.
72 Patrick Keatley, Obituary of Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Guardian Weekly, 18 November 1990. Quoted in Alan Megahey, Sir Humphrey Gibbs: Beleaguered Governor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 110-11. In his autobiography Wilson’s security adviser, George Wigg, suggests that he was in favour of demanding Ian Smith’s arrest. George Wigg (London: Michael Joseph, 1972), p. 326.
Suppose that the Rhodesian senior military leadership convinces Gibbs to arrest Smith. Do they receive a revolt among the rank and file? Does this result in a quick young officers-style coup of the Rhodesian military? Or could it lead to a full-blown civil war among the white population of Rhodesia, already in the context of a larger civil war? What side does Ken Flower, opportunist spymaster extraordinare, take?
Also, what is the legal implications of this? Did Gibbs have the authority to order an arrest of Smith? Do the revolting pro-Rhodesian Front soldiers have a right to protest it by overthrowing their leadership? Does Ian Smith use this opportunity to take on greater powers in an autogolpe type situation? How does this impact Rhodesian attitudes towards the Crown? International attitudes towards the Rhodesians?