WI: Yuri Andropov lived 4 years longer?

[TheKennedyMachine]

Long story short, Yuri Andropov rose to some prominence after Stalin's purges, engaged in partisan activities in the war, was a KGB agent in Hungary up to and during the Hungarian revolution in 1956, and became head of the KGB in 1967.

As head of KGB, he was quite liberal, in that he allowed some dissidents to defect, and didn't so harshly punish others the number of people confined was also small by Soveit standards anyway.

He became General Secretary after Brezhnev died, and began fighting a war on the corruption within the old Brezhnev government.

While he maintained a similar foreign policy as his predecessors, he began looking for ways to improve the efficiency of the Soviet economy, which had begun lagging under Brezhnev. Mainly he looked for inefficiencies and laziness, including famous campaigns to drive people caught in movie theatres and other public places during the day (when they were supposed to be working). He also promoted an anti-alcohol campaign (which has and still does cause Russia much grief), though he never went so far as to ban it, as Gorbachev did.

He seemed to be a somewhat pragmatic character -- strict, but not necessarily mean as Brezhnev. Advocated for slow reforms, but not the shock therapy that his (allegedly) chosen successor Gorbachev vied for.

Andropov's reign was unfortunately cut short, as he died in 1984 of kidney failure -- one has to wonder, though, what if Andropov had managed to live 4 years longer. Would he become the Soviet Union's Deng Xiaoping, and been able to prevent the USSR/Warsaw Pact's ultimate collapse?

 

[Lilitou]

So, I went for this vibe in IVC, although the POD is Brezhnev dying a decade earlier and Andropov's reign being extended due to that, rather than Andropov living longer. Here, Andropov embarks on a programme of reform, largely to tackle political and economic stagnation.

I'd hesitate to compare him to Deng, though, because the necessary reforms to "save" the USSR are vastly different to that Deng pushed through; Deng's reforms were essentially to do broadly popular things which most developing countries which succeed have done, a situation not comparable to the far more developed USSR. So, instead of a liberalisation, you get anti-corruption and strict party discipline combined with a harsh austerity programme to bring Soviet spending back to reasonable levels. It mostly works, but in IVC, he never manages fully to get the party back on top, and the state he leaves behind is one where the KGB and military exert fierce control; a so-called security state.

 

[TheKennedyMachine]

So, I went for this vibe in IVC, although the POD is Brezhnev dying a decade earlier and Andropov's reign being extended due to that, rather than Andropov living longer. Here, Andropov embarks on a programme of reform, largely to tackle political and economic stagnation.

I'd hesitate to compare him to Deng, though, because the necessary reforms to "save" the USSR are vastly different to that Deng pushed through; Deng's reforms were essentially to do broadly popular things which most developing countries which succeed have done, a situation not comparable to the far more developed USSR. So, instead of a liberalisation, you get anti-corruption and strict party discipline combined with a harsh austerity programme to bring Soviet spending back to reasonable levels. It mostly works, but in IVC, he never manages fully to get the party back on top, and the state he leaves behind is one where the KGB and military exert fierce control; a so-called security state.

Does the Soviet-Afghan War still happen?

 

[Lilitou]

Does the Soviet-Afghan War still happen?

I left it unsaid, but in essence, not how it happened OTL. There's an initial attempt, but when that fails he washes his hands of the mess. This does hurt the USSR's reputation on the world stage in the short term, but is better than the far more damaging slow drain that a continued intervention would have wrought, and eventual interventions in Eastern Europe claw back the lost reputation in the long term anyway.

 

[Beata Beatrix]

I have read Russians argue that had Andropov lived five more years or so the USSR would have been saved. I think that's optimistic, to put it mildly.

But! I think his brand of reformism would have helped the USSR certainly. True, the heady brew that was economic inequality, nationalist discontent, and American pressures are too enormous to be make the Union survive... but the grey spymaster image Andropov projected was very popular (as we can see from Putin today – both little Stierlitzes in some strange sense, no?) and I have often wondered if the Warsaw Pact could at the very least have more violently collapsed – Tiananmen Squares in Poland or Estonia, perhaps?

I think a rump quasi-reformist USSR consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus (and perhaps Kazakhstan?) is not at all impossible to imagine, but I don't know if I find it the most likely outcome of the Cold War.

 

[Time Enough]

Does the Soviet-Afghan War still happen?

I left it unsaid, but in essence, not how it happened OTL. There's an initial attempt, but when that fails he washes his hands of the mess. This does hurt the USSR's reputation on the world stage in the short term, but is better than the far more damaging slow drain that a continued intervention would have wrought, and eventual interventions in Eastern Europe claw back the lost reputation in the long term anyway.

To be fair the Afghan War is very easy to butterfly away, given that the Soviet Intervention was caused by first the Communist coup against Daoud Khan (which I think the Soviets were nonplussed on and surprised by) and then by the fact that Amin was a fucking lunatic who went on a blood thirsty purge spree that shredded any remaining good will the Afghan Communists had.

It’s fairly easy for the 78’ Coup to not happen in the first place, and Daoud Khan constructs an Autocratic Republican Government under his leadership.

I have often wondered if the Warsaw Pact could at the very least have more violently collapsed – Tiananmen Squares in Poland or Estonia, perhaps?

January Events but all over the Warsaw Pact seems likely as the various nations see less peaceful revolutions occur or in some places civil war seems possible.

I think a rump quasi-reformist USSR consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus (and perhaps Kazakhstan?) is not at all impossible to imagine, but I don't know if I find it the most likely outcome of the Cold War.

I could see that as a possibility, but I do think the most likely option is something akin to otl, some autocratic zombie coup government or just civil war.

 

[TheKennedyMachine]

It’s fairly easy for the 78’ Coup to not happen in the first place, and Daoud Khan constructs an Autocratic Republican Government under his leadership.

Really makes you wonder what would've happened with Afghanistan had Khan recognized the threat posed by the PDPA -- would Afghanistan gone down the route of Iran and Iraq? Or something a bit more like OTL?

 

[History Learner]

Andropov's reign was unfortunately cut short, as he died in 1984 of kidney failure -- one has to wonder, though, what if Andropov had managed to live 4 years longer. Would he become the Soviet Union's Deng Xiaoping, and been able to prevent the USSR/Warsaw Pact's ultimate collapse?

More or less, my take is yes. The collapse of the USSR was directly tied into the decisions undertaken by Gorbachev:

As oil prices fell, Gorbachev tried to maintain living standards which resulted in major growth in the budget deficit. Before Gorbachev came to power, the budget was balanced or even had a small surplus. In 1985, the deficit grew to 2% GDP, by 1990, it reached 10% GDP. In 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union, the deficit exceeded astronomical 30% GDP (p. 152).​

The fiscal crisis was partly explained by a collapse in global oil prices but was partly handmade. First, Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign reduced revenues from excise taxes. Second, in order to keep the industrial and agricultural lobbies happy, the government continued to subsidize their inputs and raise prices for their outputs. At the same time, in order to pacify the general public, consumer prices were kept low. Gorbachev also avoided cutting expenditure on public goods and tried to maintain living standards. He decided that–unlike Deng–he would not use force to suppress protesters and therefore tried to avoid the situation where people took to the street to voice their economic grievances. To fund the deficit, the government resorted to borrowing. The foreign debt increased from 30% of GDP in 1985 to 80% of GDP in 1991 (p. 152).​

​

As the markets were growing increasingly reluctant to lend, the government funded the deficit by printing money. The official prices were still controlled, so the monetization of budget deficit resulted in “repressed inflation”, increased shortages and higher prices in black markets. Eventually the Soviet Union ran out of cash and collapsed. Miller’s account shows that both oil price shock and the impact of the anti-alcohol campaign were not the major drivers of the fiscal crisis. The main factors were lack of resolve in tackling the interest groups and in maintaining fiscal discipline as well as incompetence in basic economics.​

 

[History Learner]

I have read Russians argue that had Andropov lived five more years or so the USSR would have been saved. I think that's optimistic, to put it mildly.

But! I think his brand of reformism would have helped the USSR certainly. True, the heady brew that was economic inequality, nationalist discontent, and American pressures are too enormous to be make the Union survive... but the grey spymaster image Andropov projected was very popular (as we can see from Putin today – both little Stierlitzes in some strange sense, no?) and I have often wondered if the Warsaw Pact could at the very least have more violently collapsed – Tiananmen Squares in Poland or Estonia, perhaps?

I think a rump quasi-reformist USSR consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus (and perhaps Kazakhstan?) is not at all impossible to imagine, but I don't know if I find it the most likely outcome of the Cold War.

76% of Soviet voters in early 1991 supported maintaining the federal system of the Soviet Union, including a majority in nine of the 15 republics. Support for retaining the USSR was strongest in Central Asia (All were 94% or above in approval), and even Ukraine voted yes at 71%; Belarus was over 80% approval.

 

[Simon]

Andropov's reign was unfortunately cut short…

Unfortunately?

 

[TheKennedyMachine]

Unfortunately?

Well, to the Warsaw Pact.