raharris1973
Well-known member
WI the US-led Coalition occupying Iraq tried to keep employing most of the Iraqi Army and Administration?
A big critique of the occupation was the decommissioning and laying off of the whole Army, and the de-Baathification process, which may have been a similar process of laying off civil administrators with Baath Party ties (which was probably a broad group because it was probably mandatory for lots of government jobs) and privileging Shia and Kurdish opposition parties.
What if, for stability's sake, the Coalition Provisional Authority/Bremer or the Pentagon if left in charge had tried to keep the Iraqi Army and Administration largely intact, setting Iraqi military members and administrators to work with US personnel and contractors on reconstruction work and an organized demobilization? Of course Saddam and his family would be removed. So would a regime 'inner circle' however defined, and regime members with the most infamous reputations. Perhaps everyone on the DoD's most-wanted deck of cards would be disqualified from power, but everybody else would have an opportunity for promotion. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Most-wanted_Iraqi_playing_cards. Or even just a subset of the deck of cards, maybe just the "face cards". Political prisoners would be released and political prisons would be shut down (except for now housing whatever former regime inner circle goes there, and any al-qaeda related terrorists who end up being found or old school guys from the 80s who end up being found like Abu Nidal or Abul Abbas). The opposition parties, ethnosectarian and non-ethnosectarian, would all be allowed to participate.
Would the US have found a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of takers for this collaboration offer to the mid and working level of the Baathist Army, Administration, deep state? Or would a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of those personnel have chosen to play violent resister or spoiler or insurgent, for reasons of pride, patriotism, self-interest, delusions/ambitions of negotiating or dictating a better deal? That is why I posed the question, what if the USA "tried", because proponents of this course of action and critics of the US 'mistake' in abolishing Iraqi state institutions seem to take it for granted that members of these institutions would have just accepted any deal offered by the US. I'm not sure that assumption is warranted. But maybe it would have been the best US bet in the circumstances the US had itself in by March-April 2003.
Anyway, how do you see the occupation, establishment of next Iraqi government, turnover of authority, any insurgent activity, and any US withdrawal or permanent relationship (involving basing or not) evolve with the US taking the approach described here? Does it make Iraq a notably quieter, less lethal place for US forces?
Does George W. Bush ride such quiet to deeper and longer political success? Does he squander the quiet in Iraq, by using that simply as a platform for launching an invasion of Iran or Syria in his second or remaining first term?
A big critique of the occupation was the decommissioning and laying off of the whole Army, and the de-Baathification process, which may have been a similar process of laying off civil administrators with Baath Party ties (which was probably a broad group because it was probably mandatory for lots of government jobs) and privileging Shia and Kurdish opposition parties.
What if, for stability's sake, the Coalition Provisional Authority/Bremer or the Pentagon if left in charge had tried to keep the Iraqi Army and Administration largely intact, setting Iraqi military members and administrators to work with US personnel and contractors on reconstruction work and an organized demobilization? Of course Saddam and his family would be removed. So would a regime 'inner circle' however defined, and regime members with the most infamous reputations. Perhaps everyone on the DoD's most-wanted deck of cards would be disqualified from power, but everybody else would have an opportunity for promotion. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Most-wanted_Iraqi_playing_cards. Or even just a subset of the deck of cards, maybe just the "face cards". Political prisoners would be released and political prisons would be shut down (except for now housing whatever former regime inner circle goes there, and any al-qaeda related terrorists who end up being found or old school guys from the 80s who end up being found like Abu Nidal or Abul Abbas). The opposition parties, ethnosectarian and non-ethnosectarian, would all be allowed to participate.
Would the US have found a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of takers for this collaboration offer to the mid and working level of the Baathist Army, Administration, deep state? Or would a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of those personnel have chosen to play violent resister or spoiler or insurgent, for reasons of pride, patriotism, self-interest, delusions/ambitions of negotiating or dictating a better deal? That is why I posed the question, what if the USA "tried", because proponents of this course of action and critics of the US 'mistake' in abolishing Iraqi state institutions seem to take it for granted that members of these institutions would have just accepted any deal offered by the US. I'm not sure that assumption is warranted. But maybe it would have been the best US bet in the circumstances the US had itself in by March-April 2003.
Anyway, how do you see the occupation, establishment of next Iraqi government, turnover of authority, any insurgent activity, and any US withdrawal or permanent relationship (involving basing or not) evolve with the US taking the approach described here? Does it make Iraq a notably quieter, less lethal place for US forces?
Does George W. Bush ride such quiet to deeper and longer political success? Does he squander the quiet in Iraq, by using that simply as a platform for launching an invasion of Iran or Syria in his second or remaining first term?