WI: Neutral Germany Post-1945?

[MAC161]

(Just a random pondering, inspired by a passing mention/story element in a draft I wrote for Lilitou's "Alternate Elections" anthology)

What would it take for a united, neutral Germany to be created in the wake of WWII (late 1940s-early 1950s)? The closest I've found to any proposals on this process is the 1952 "Stalin Note", which may have been a ploy (as Adenauer firmly believed), a test of the Western Alliance, or a genuine offer to set up a neutralist, largely disarmed German state (though presumably still with a strong Communist element, as I doubt the USSR would relinquish all influence, and would remain wary of any revanchism no matter how much of a buffer existed with the Warsaw Pact).

If somehow this kind of agreement is made and lasts, would the borders of a neutral Germany still be what they became in OTL's 1989? Also, what does this do for/to NATO, and the broader Cold War?

 

[History Learner]

(Just a random pondering, inspired by a passing mention/story element in a draft I wrote for Lilitou's "Alternate Elections" anthology)

What would it take for a united, neutral Germany to be created in the wake of WWII (late 1940s-early 1950s)? The closest I've found to any proposals on this process is the 1952 "Stalin Note", which may have been a ploy (as Adenauer firmly believed), a test of the Western Alliance, or a genuine offer to set up a neutralist, largely disarmed German state (though presumably still with a strong Communist element, as I doubt the USSR would relinquish all influence, and would remain wary of any revanchism no matter how much of a buffer existed with the Warsaw Pact).

If somehow this kind of agreement is made and lasts, would the borders of a neutral Germany still be what they became in OTL's 1989? Also, what does this do for/to NATO, and the broader Cold War?

In 1947, the Soviets extended a genuine offer:

Molotov in 1947 proposed that with a few amendments--like restricting the president's powers--the Weimar Constitution should be used as the constitution for a united Germany. Just how serious the Soviets were about unification in 1947 is debatable but at least some historians (like Carolyn Woods Eisenberg) think they were serious--*provided* they got reparations from current production. https://books.google.com/books?id=JlRZM_VKzrMC&pg=PA487 Marc Trachtenberg, who is very skeptical that the "Stalin Note" of 1952 was intended seriously, thinks there is a much more plausible case for 1947 as a lost opportunity: "Ulam refers specifically to the 1947 Moscow conference and the Stalin Note business in 1952. Of these two, I personally think the 1947 affair is more puzzling. There is a vast, mostly German language, literature on the 1952 episode, and there is a good deal of evidence bearing on this issue in U.S., British and French archives. Many of the documents to be found in those western sources are quite suggestive, but the piece of evidence that struck me as decisive came from a Soviet source. This new evidence was cited on p. 127 of John Gaddis's WE NOW KNOW: "Soviet diplomat Vladimir Semyonov," Gaddis writes, "recalled Stalin asking: was it certain the Americans would turn the note down? Only when assured that it was did the Soviet leader give his approval, but with the warning that there would be grave consequences for Semyonov if this did not prove to be the case." (Gaddis's source for this is an unpublished 1994 paper by Alexei Filitov.) This, I thought--and if I'm wrong, I'd appreciate it if someone could tell me why--was as close to a smoking gun as we ever get in historical work.​

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"There are other reasons for not taking the Stalin Note affair too seriously, but the 1947 business is another matter entirely. The puzzle here is that when you read the records of the Moscow conference, Soviet policy does not seem the least bit intransigent. But the Americans, and especially Secretary of State Marshall, had exactly the opposite impression..." http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/comment8.htm​