WI: Korea Partitioned between the USSR and USA at the 39th Parallel

[Jackson Lennock]

The division of Korea is weird, to say the least. The Americans seem to have done so based upon a National Geographic Map which had a line at the 38th parallel. The Americans initially considered putting the line at the 39th parallel, but higher ups said to give the Soviets more out of fear they'd turn it down. Stalin got the proposal and was surprised the Americans didn't demand more. Meanwhile, Stalin was content to divide Korea rather than press for more because he hoped for an occupation zone in Japan that didn't pan out.

Meanwhile the Americans probably weren't even interested in Korea all that much prior to the Korean War. They worried about it being a base for Soviet planes to attack Japan, but didn't have many plans for it. From what I can tell, much of the reason for the US interest in Korea was in order to control the relevant ports for evacuation of Japanese in the peninsula. The Americans were concerned about lynch mobs and anti-Japanese race riots by the Koreans against the Japanese.

The Americans seemed to sort of ignore the looming threat of invasion by the North of the South until it actually happened, because of the above-mentioned disinterest. The Americans were certainly on edge following the Iran Crisis of 1946 and the Turkish Straits Crisis of 1946, but then with the Berlin Blockade/Airlift of 1946-1948, Czechoslovak Coup of 1948, and fall of China in the end of 1949, the Americans became sufficiently freaked out by the spread of Communism to pay closer attention to Korea.

Anyways, North Korea would have a population about a third smaller than OTL by the start of the Korean War. But it's also worth accounting for how OTL in the Korean War there were ~603,000 South Korean Soldiers and ~267,000 North Korean soldiers. South Korean soldiers were mostly trained and equipped for counter-insurgency operations, not formal warfare. Some 8,000 South Korean soldiers and police died from 1948 to 1950 in the insurgency operations and undeclared border conflict between the two Koreas. But here there could be a bigger disparity (~190,000 North Koreans against ~680,000 South Koreans?) and the additional territory for the South (and less wealth/resources to pull from in the north) could mean that less North Korean assistance gets to insurgents in the South. There also were between 50,000 and 70,000 PLA veterans in North Korea at the start of the Korean War (many of whom were Koreans who were either in exile from Japanese Korea or from the Gando region). And it's worth noting that while the Americans were primarily training and advising the South, the Soviets were arming the North. So the North was definitely better qualitatively, and I suspect that still would be the case.

 

[Roger II]

Does this affect NK decisionmaking? Are we sure that a smaller NK will have the confidence or impetus to actually invade and forcibly reunite Korea?

 

[TheKennedyMachine]

Does this affect NK decisionmaking? Are we sure that a smaller NK will have the confidence or impetus to actually invade and forcibly reunite Korea?

I think a smaller Korea might butterfly the Korean War altogether.

 

[SinghSong]

So, for context, this mentions that the division of Korea would've looked like this then (effectively establishing that same buffer zone between Russia and Japan in Korea, north of the 39th parallel, which Imperial Russia had demanded from Imperial Japan as a prelude to the Russo-Japanese War):

Which kind of also begs the question of whether such a reduced 'rump remnant' North Korea would even be deemed viable as an independent state by the Soviets, or whether it'd be enlarged further to the north, with the Soviet Occupation Force in Manchuria handing the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture back to North Korea instead of to China.

Also, one wonders whether, even with such an enlargement, North Korea's Soviet Civil Administration would ever elect to simply withdraw (especially after the rest of the Allies deny Stalin that occupation zone in Japan which he wanted), or whether the Soviet occupation force might just remain in place there on a more permanent basis, making North and South Korea more analogous to East and West Germany.

Which would greatly reduce the likelihood of a Korean War, along with the likelihood of reunification when(/if) the Soviet Union collapses, but might also significantly increase the risk of North Korea simply being permanently annexed and incorporated as a constituent republic of the USSR...

 

[Charles EP M.]

The removal of North Korea not just as a threat but as a thing that exists - the north now a lost nation of brothers suffering under Soviet conquest - feels like a huge impact on the south as well, dictatorships and the KCIA can't justify the existence of a potential new invasion as a reason for their dirty acts. The US will still pop up because now this is about being on the USSR's border but that will be different too, there'd still be a ground force as a "don't invade here" gesture but the big issue would be missile bases, radar stations etc (and probably Koreans going "actually do we want to be a nuclear target?" during the Cold War).

 

[Roger II]

The removal of North Korea not just as a threat but as a thing that exists - the north now a lost nation of brothers suffering under Soviet conquest - feels like a huge impact on the south as well, dictatorships and the KCIA can't justify the existence of a potential new invasion as a reason for their dirty acts. The US will still pop up because now this is about being on the USSR's border but that will be different too, there'd still be a ground force as a "don't invade here" gesture but the big issue would be missile bases, radar stations etc (and probably Koreans going "actually do we want to be a nuclear target?" during the Cold War).

Come to think of it, without a Korean War, does anti-China sentiment set in as hard or as fast, or is there more interest in prising China out of the Soviet sphere on Yugoslav lines?

 

[TheKennedyMachine]

Come to think of it, without a Korean War, does anti-China sentiment set in as hard or as fast, or is there more interest in prising China out of the Soviet sphere on Yugoslav lines?

I don't think so. Even though China went communist in 1949, and there was a lot of uneasiness over that -- genuine anti-Chinese sentiment didn't hit until October 1950, when Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River.

I agree with Charles' speculation in that Korea will probably become the Asian Continent's West Germany/East Germany.

 

[raharris1973]

Which kind of also begs the question of whether such a reduced 'rump remnant' North Korea would even be deemed viable as an independent state by the Soviets, or whether it'd be enlarged further to the north, with the Soviet Occupation Force in Manchuria handing the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture back to North Korea instead of to China.

Messing with the Manchuria border, transferring land, ultimately from China, to 'compensate' a smaller North Korea, is just too risky diplomatically for Stalin and the Soviet Union. It is not like Stalin knows based on peering into OTL that there is an ideal size for North Korea, he has fallen short, and he needs to somehow balance it out. Transferring land from China, a perm 5 member of the UN, is just asking for diplomatic trouble with either Chiang or Mao or both. He wasn't willing to do that for the loyal Mongolians. He won't be willing to do that for his new Korean pals.

Also, one wonders whether, even with such an enlargement, North Korea's Soviet Civil Administration would ever elect to simply withdraw (especially after the rest of the Allies deny Stalin that occupation zone in Japan which he wanted), or whether the Soviet occupation force might just remain in place there on a more permanent basis, making North and South Korea more analogous to East and West Germany.

They won't just withdraw, leaving a vacuum for Americans and American puppets, saying, 'wah, we're not viable' they don't have an ideal size they're working toward. *If they think a state with under half the land area and only 25% of the population is not worthwhile, they might, down the road, try to leverage an eventual withdrawal for a neutralization of Korea, and a western withdrawal as well, along the lines of the Austrian State Treaty.

Or, they might, as in East Germany, set up a puppet state and puppet Army, but not set it loose for offensive operations, and keep their own forces in place for additional protection.

Which would greatly reduce the likelihood of a Korean War, along with the likelihood of reunification when(/if) the Soviet Union collapses, but might also significantly increase the risk of North Korea simply being permanently annexed and incorporated as a constituent republic of the USSR...

I agree an East Germany/West Germany situation reduces significantly the chances of 'unleashing' outright war on the peninsula. As for annexing northern Korea and incorporating it into the USSR, I again see this as too diplomatically risky, there were no wartime diplomatic agreements to justify anything of the sort.

 

[Conster]

If I'm not mistaken, doesn't this entail even less arable land for North Korea?

 

[raharris1973]

If I'm not mistaken, doesn't this entail even less arable land for North Korea?

A bit less, yes, but they still have some valleys with some substantial rice crop land, large forestry resources, large mineral rich mountains and mountain and riverine enabled hydropower that was a boon to their industrial development relative to the south before the war and even somewhat after.

They also still have their capital of Pyongyang, even though it is uncomfortably close to the border, much like Seoul was to the original 38th parallel.

 

[fluttersky]

They also still have their capital of Pyongyang, even though it is uncomfortably close to the border, much like Seoul was to the original 38th parallel.

Significantly worse than the Seoul situation as some of the southern outer suburbs of Pyongyang would in fact be in South Korea.

 

[raharris1973]

And it's worth noting that while the Americans were primarily training and advising the South, the Soviets were arming the North. So the North was definitely better qualitatively, and I suspect that still would be the case.

This is a good and important point. While smaller, North Korea is certainly not 'unviable' in a demographic, economic, industrial, territorial, nor military sense.

I would suspect the southern zone would still be more chaotic and internally divided and facing a leftist insurgency. Governance in the north should be smoother, like in OTL. The North Koreans would still have qualitative superiority, the South Koreans would still be underequipped and internally policing focused, they would just be better manned and their zonal government would have greater strategic depth overall, and to the capital in particular.

Under these circumstances I think it 80-85% more likely that Kim Il-Sung and his Soviet advisor Terenti Shtykov are unable con, or convince Stalin that permitting a North Korean invasion is just the perfect way to prick the South Korean pimple and unleash an internal uprising without anyone in the imperialist world being able to respond effectively.

Meanwhile, even though he will still be poorly armed, Syngman Rhee will be even more tempted than OTL to attack north.

If Syngman does this in 1950, or 1951, it would be "interesting" situation. Assumiing the probable armament of both sides, mini-North Korea would probably do alright on its own seeing off the attack, and potentially capturing the initiative and then some protective buffer terrain. The outset of the conflict would leave the US and its allies feeling disturbed and threatened by possible escalation and potential communist gains, but diplomatically embarrassed by credible multiple western and neutral reports of the southern side being the instigator of large-scale attack, rendering the President and State Department doubtful of getting full Security Council and General Assembly support for action of behalf of South Korea, even if like in OTL, the USSR is boycotting.

The North Korean defense is probably effective enough that they regain the initiative and push the fighting below the 39th, but also radio/telephone to Moscow and Beijing that the South is turning out to be a 'Paper Tiger' and that Russia and China need only keep providing arms and supplies generously and the DPRK can crush the ROK forces entirely, inspire internal uprisings in the ROK, march south and unify the peninsula under Pyongyang. Moscow and Beijing may lose some liaison personnel in initial border attacks and bombardments of the north, and that would make them both angry, and disturbed about potentially larger imperialist adoption of a wider offensive plan.

Moscow will definitely want the Pyongyang regime to survive and want the South Korean invasion to fail,and be seen to fail. But it will likely find Kim's exuberant predictions about a counter-offensive crushing the ROKs and allowing Pyongyang to unite the peninsula overoptimistic. He will advise some caution, saying watch out, the imperialists probably have a larger plan, or trap set.

Meanwhile, even while trying to figure out what to do with regard to Korea itself [and probably the Americans will privately be advising the South Koreans to return to their pre-war positions and fortify themselves at the first sign of resistance], the first consensus American reaction will be to send the 7th fleet into the Taiwan Straits to 'neutralize' them and prevent the 'spread' of fighting there. It is an easy US move to make, since the 7th Fleet is right there between Japan and the Philippines, and it can be sold to American anticommunists as protecting Taiwan from Communists, and to a global and American general audience as separating potential combatants and preserving peace, while it also can address the Truman Administration's probable fears that Chiang Kai-shek may be about to escalate his anti-Communist bombing and blockade operations into something more serious like a raid or invasion.

When announced most Americans will at least credit Truman with 'doing something' while some in the western world will agree, while others will see it as interfering with China. The PRC will loudly denounce it. Meanwhile, I think Mao would probably see the Korean theater as an opportunity to show off 'New China's internationalist anti-imperialist cred and strength, get revenge on the USA by crushing its protege ROK Army, pay back North Korean comradeship, and protect the northeast Chinese border, and volunteer swiftly to send all available ground forces to help the active defense of North Korea, which includes counterattacks.

Since in the beginning days of this ROK-initiated war, there are not US troops sent to the ground in Korea, the Chinese will not be seeing an intervention decision as being as risky as their OTL September-October 1950 intervention decision. I think the Chinese under Mao, without much internal opposition (less than the OTL decision) decide to offer their direct military help to the North Koreans, just awaiting discussions with the Koreans and the Soviets.

Ironically, I think the North Koreans at first would be the most resistant to Chinese entry into direct fighting, out of pure national pride, saying they can do it all themselves, as long as they are given unlimited logistics and weapons assistance, and maybe some defensive air support.

But I think the Soviets would like the Chinese proposal, and see mass Chinese troop intervention, which would start on the smaller side, but then grow over time, simply because of where troops are deployed at the moment, as just the thing needed in Korea to make Kim Il-Sung's "crush the ROK, crush Syngman Rhee" dream feasible, and deter America from getting any ideas of sending US troops on to the peninsula - which is seen as low probability, but not impossible, already.

So I think Stalin and Mao tell Kim to be a good little internationalist and accept fraternal help of Chinese Volunteer Forces, and as soon as forces of any tactically meaningful and visible size can be shown and filmed crossing over, and then going into battle, these are publicized, to maximize the publicity and deterrent effect and the intimidation, demoralization, propaganda effect against stalled or retreating ROK forces.

Open Chinese intervention in Korea, before US troops are even on the ground, makes SCAP and JCS estimates of intervening by tactical air, or on the ground, in Korea, entirely pessimistic.

The soundest military advice MacArthur and Bradley and others will feel they can give Truman is to write off the use of military force to preserve South Korea, and just try his luck with diplomatic efforts to get a ceasefire. There will be precious little leverage for that - so it likely won't happen. In the likely event of mainland South Korea's destruction and occupation by the Communists (followed by a probable evacuation of its government, Army remnants, and many refugees to Quelpart/Cheju-Do island, far offshore), which will be embarrassing, the Administration, military, and Agencies, will most likely have to write off the Syngman Rhee regime as having committed suicide by aggressive stupidity.

Losing South Korea without a fight (by America) will be bad politically for Truman, and seen as bad. It will hurt in the midterms if it happens before then. Probably wouldn't hurt more than the real situation though, even though there's more lost real estate, because the real situation was unpopular in OTL.

If Truman feels compelled to 'show the flag' in this TL to stop commies somewhere on land, he's already doing it at sea, his choice is to reinforce the French in Indochina.

That makes him look like he's 'doing something' but it will not be popular if it happens (more like a grimly tolerated necessity at best) and will introduce its own complications. The French may actually still be resistant to American boots on the ground at this stage of the Indochina War, wanting to do it themselves, just aided by American money, logistics, and firepower.

Regardless, Truman is toast for the 1952 election, whether he starts the US ground war in Vietnam (and Indochina) early, or does not.