WI: Jordan divided along the Zarqa in 1971

[Jackson Lennock]

In the tail end of the Black September War, Syria intervened with the ostensible intention of establishing a PLO safe zone at Irbid. The Fedayeen meanwhile weren't defeated until the Ajiloun offensive in 1971. In the meanwhile, the Iraqis were in control of Eastern Jordan throughout much of the War. What if Jordan ended up divided alone the Zarqa?

 

[Wendell]

This probably only helps hardline Israeli ultranationalists in the long term who will say that there is a Palestinian state and therefore they (the Israelis) are free to construct settlements in the lands Israel captured from Jordan in the 1967 war.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

This probably only helps hardline Israeli ultranationalists in the long term who will say that there is a Palestinian state and therefore they (the Israelis) are free to construct settlements in the lands Israel captured from Jordan in the 1967 war.

Maybe. But that didn't really catch on as a policy until Likud's win in 1977.

The issue is that rump Jordan would likely end up very close to Israel out of necessity and the two countries might get joined at the hip. My guess is Hussein and Israel would make friends fast and Israel returns much of the West Bank in exchange for the right to stick troops in the east of it.

 

[fluttersky]

If it's actually a long term division along the Zarqa recognized by both the PLO and Jordan (rather than a temporary ceasefire), then I suppose it would involve official Jordanian ceding of both Cisjordan and the area north of the Zarqa to the PLO, which would presumably declare itself to be an independent state as they did in reality following the dropping of Jordanian claims to the WB. So there would be an actual Palestinian state with its temporary capital in Irbid but of course laying claim to all of Israel.

I'm not convinced Jordan would necessarily have poor relations with this state or immediately go for normalization with Israel- the entire Arab world had poor relations with Israel at this point- though I imagine Jordan wouldn't play a major role in an alternate Yom Kippur War.

There are obviously major butterflies like no Lebanese Civil War. It's possible that the existence of an actual Palestinian state might spook Begin into not going along with the Camp David accords and keeping the Sinai.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

If it's actually a long term division along the Zarqa recognized by both the PLO and Jordan (rather than a temporary ceasefire), then I suppose it would involve official Jordanian ceding of both Cisjordan and the area north of the Zarqa to the PLO, which would presumably declare itself to be an independent state as they did in reality following the dropping of Jordanian claims to the WB. So there would be an actual Palestinian state with its temporary capital in Irbid but of course laying claim to all of Israel.

I'm not convinced Jordan would necessarily have poor relations with this state or immediately go for normalization with Israel- the entire Arab world had poor relations with Israel at this point- though I imagine Jordan wouldn't play a major role in an alternate Yom Kippur War.

There are obviously major butterflies like no Lebanese Civil War. It's possible that the existence of an actual Palestinian state might spook Begin into not going along with the Camp David accords and keeping the Sinai.

Ah, I was assuming temporary ceasefire. Given Hussein's ambitions, I doubt he'd recognize a separatist state in the North of his Kingdom.

The Cairo Accords which allowed the PLO to use Lebanon as a base of operations preceded Black September, as they were in 1969. The South Lebanon insurgency also began in 1968. My guess is that there would still be active efforts to attack Israel from Lebanon, which would still prompt the sort of backlash that fosters the Lebanese Civil War.

 

[Wendell]

This will suck for Jordanian Palestinians.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

This will suck for Jordanian Palestinians.

Perhaps. But Black September wasn't Jordanian vs Palestinian, it was Hashemite vs. PLO. Conservative/Traditional Palestinians sided with the monarchy and anti-Hashemite non-Palestinians (mix of tribal grievance reasons and ideological reasons) sided with the PLO. And Hussein's sense of self and vision for his country is still tied to his claim to representing the Palestinians of the West Bank and the holy sites of Jerusalem.

 

[Alex Richards]

Genuinely I think this goes one of two ways:

1. Damascus and Baghdad talk the PLO into agreeing to 'officially' recognise the civil authority of Jordan over the area while remaining operational there. Hussein is caught on a tight balancing act and may end up recognising the independence of Palestine/dropping claims to the West Bank earlier.

2. The PLO declare themselves the legitimate government of a Palestine that spans both sides of the Jordan, backed by Iraq and Syria- potentially Egypt as well. Hussein reacts to this by accusing the Arab League of betrayal and offers to recognise the independence of Israel immediately in return for getting the West Bank back, maybe joint custody over the Old City and basing rights.

If Israel accepts this and get their troops in position to prevent a larger Syrian-Iraqi intervention we probably see a two stage evolution where initially Hussein is seen as the greatest betrayer of the Arab people by other governments; but if it lasts longer enough 'which government do you back' becomes the big political faultine of the area.

...

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Genuinely I think this goes one of two ways:

1. Damascus and Baghdad talk the PLO into agreeing to 'officially' recognise the civil authority of Jordan over the area while remaining operational there. Hussein is caught on a tight balancing act and may end up recognising the independence of Palestine/dropping claims to the West Bank earlier.

2. The PLO declare themselves the legitimate government of a Palestine that spans both sides of the Jordan, backed by Iraq and Syria- potentially Egypt as well. Hussein reacts to this by accusing the Arab League of betrayal and offers to recognise the independence of Israel immediately in return for getting the West Bank back, maybe joint custody over the Old City and basing rights.

If Israel accepts this and get their troops in position to prevent a larger Syrian-Iraqi intervention we probably see a two stage evolution where initially Hussein is seen as the greatest betrayer of the Arab people by other governments; but if it lasts longer enough 'which government do you back' becomes the big political faultine of the area.

...

Hussein's abandonment of the West Bank had in part to do with a belief after the First Intifada that he wasn't wanted. He also did this in order to nudge the Israelis toward having to deal with the PLO. I don't think either is applicable in this circumstance.

The tight balancing act seems plausible to me. Hussein would be boxed in by the Arab States and prevented from getting too cozy with Israel/America. Meanwhile Hussein OTL tried to make agreements with Arafat in the 80s despite Arafat trying to kill him four or five times and killing his Prime Minister.

Syria also doesn't want to let Arafat be too independent. They intervened in Lebanon's Civil War to prevent a PLO takeover of Lebanon after all, before switching to champion the Palestinian cause after Sadat made peace with Israel.

Things could get weird in the Yom Kippur War. With Arafat's desire to jump into the conflict and the prospect of Syrian and Iraqi troops attacking into the Jordan Valley, Israel would be spread thinner. But Syria and Arafat would have to keep an eye on Hussein. On the other hand, Hussein attacking PLO-Jordan during the War against Israel would look bad.

Maybe Jordan would be more involved with Egypt's peace efforts. A good way to boost Hussein's prestige would be to end Israeli occupation of much of the West Bank. A problem OTL was that Israel didn't want to return territory without security guarantees, whereas Jordan said peace and returning territory was the basis for a security guarantee. Israel suggested the Allon Plan (but didn't even commit to it...) which Hussein thought was a joke of an idea, and the Israelis themselves couldn't really come up with what they wanted. Hussein's maximum territorial cessions in 1967-1970 that he was willing to go for were minor border adjustments like the no man's lands and reunification of previously divided villages under Israeli control.



Also, there is another aspect to this that I forgot to consider: Israel would likely move into the Gilead Heights (the "Jordanian Golan") if the PLO took control of the North of Jordan.