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WI: Hyderabadi Hadramaut?

SinghSong

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The vast majority of Hadramaut (a region in South Arabia, comprising eastern Yemen, parts of western Oman and southern Saudi Arabia), was ruled by the Qu'aiti Sultanate, and fell under a loose British protectorate, the Aden Protectorate, from 1882 to 1967; at which point, the Hadhramaut was annexed by South Yemen. The Qu'aiti Sultanate was a fairly young entity though; founded by 'Umar bin Awadh al-Qu’aiti, a Yafa’i tribesman whose wealth and influence as hereditary Jemadar of the Nizam of Hyderabad's armed forces enabled him to establish the Qu'aiti dynasty in the latter half of the 19th century, with his sons consolidating and expanding his realm. In 1866 though, Sultan Ghalib bin Muhsin, Sheikh of the Kathiri, expelled Ali bin Naji from Ash-Shihr and took possession of the fort. At this time the inland town of Shibam was held by the Qu'aiti tribe, and the Qu'aiti Sheikh, worried that his communication with the seaboard might be cut off, applied to his brothers (still in the service of the Hyderabad State), for assistance against Sultan Ghalib bin Muhsin. The Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad submitted a request for the British Government to mount an armed intervention on behalf of the Qu'aiti Sultanate, or to allow it to dispatch an armed expedition of its own, but the British refused to interfere themselves or to permit Hyderabad to do this.

Nonetheless, this denial of permission was ignored by the brother of the Qu'aiti Sheikh, Awadh (Nawaz) bin Umar (better known by his Hyderabad title of Sultan Nawaz Jang), whose flotilla set sail to establish a blockade on the sea-coast; landing near Shihr in April 1867, attacking the Kathiri and forcing them into retreat, and re-establishing the authority of his brother as ruler of Shihr. In December of the same year, the Kathiri Sheikh attempted to retake the town once more, only to be repulsed by the Qu'aiti; before the Kathiri applied to the British themselves, seeking their assistance in recovering Shihr by force. The British, once again, refused to interfere, but put pressure on Hyderabad, forcing the Nizam's Minister to issue a statement declaring his readiness to prohibit any interference in the affairs of Hadramaut by Hyderabadi subjects. But hostilities continued regardless; with a subsequent schism between its third generation of rulers, whereby the Naqib of Mukalla entered into an alliance with the Kathiri, and the Jemadar of Ash-Shihr purchased a large warship in response, with the aid of their relatives in Hyderabad. But this vessel was confiscated and its crew detained under the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 upon arriving in Aden, and not released until the Qu'aiti Jemadar had bound himself under a heavy penalty to send her back to Bombay at once, without touching at, or undertaking any operations against, any of the ports of Hadhramaut. He further attempted to establish a blockade of Mukalla, and hoarded native craft suspected of being bound for that port, but was compelled to pay an indemnity of Rs. 6142 for plundering three such vessels, and sternly warned of the consequences of such interference with commerce in the future by the British.

The British Government steadily avoided interference or arbitration in the disputes between the Naqib of Mukalla and the Jemadar of Shihr, and took no action regarding them, beyond asking for assurances from the ministers of the Hyderabad State that any persons in the service of the Nizam, who might be convicted of taking part in the quarrel (by supplying money and munitions of war to their relatives on either side) would be dismissed. But at length, in 1876, with there being no prospect of the cessation of hostilities without some authoritative interference, the Political Resident at Aden, acting under the authority of Government, visited the two chiefs, and through his mediation, a two year truce was concluded, and forthwith expanded a year further. No permanent settlement was however effected, and eventually hostilities were resumed in 1880 and resulted in the capture of Burum by the Jemadar of Shihr. Being driven to extremities the Naqib of Mukalla signed the agreements drawn up by the Political Resident, and Burum was evacuated by the Jemadar of Shihr.

No sooner was the Naqib thus relieved from immediate pressure than he repudiated the terms of the settlement. The Government of India thereupon directed that the Jemadar should be replaced in possession of Burum, which was surrendered by the Naqib without further bloodshed. Finally, in November 1881, the latter gave himself up to the Commander of H.M.S. Dragon and was conveyed with his dependants to Aden, while the Jemadar of Shihr was put in possession of Muhalla and its dependencies. From Aden the Naqib went to Zanzibar with a number of Sheikhs and followers, and in 1888 he accepted the maintenance provided for him. In 1882, an Engagement was concluded with the Jemadar of Shihr and Mukalla by which he became a British stipendiary, an allowance of 300 dollars a year being assigned to him, his heirs and successors. At the same time the Jemadar paid over a sum of 100,000 dollars to the Resident, at Aden for the maintenance of the Naqib of Mukalla. On 1 May 1888, a Protectorate Treaty was concluded with the Jemadar Abdulla bin Umar, and his brother Awadh bin Umar/'Sultan Nawaz Jang'. Jemadar Abdulla bin Umar died on 25 November 1888, and Government sanctioned the continuance of the salute and stipend to his brother Awadh bin Umar (Sultan Nawaz Jang).

In 1896 though, a quarrel took place between Jemadar Awadh bin Umar and his nephews, Husein and Munassar, over their right of succession and the division of their properly. In September 1901, the Resident tried to bring about a settlement, but failed. A further conference at Aden in February 1902 was no more successful. Jemadar Awadh bin Umar went to India to lay his petition before the Viceroy, while his nephews returned to Shihr after signing a pledge not to interfere with the administration of their country. The agreement was broken, and in June the Resident, accompanied by Jemadar Awadh bin Umar, went to Shihr with an armed force. Husein submitted and was brought to Aden, Munassar following him shortly afterwards. The settlement of the dispute between Awadh bin Umar and his nephews was then submitted to arbitration, which resulted in the award of a large sum of money to Husein and Munassar and their families, and in a permanent salute of 9 guns being sanctioned for the Awadh bin Umar as Jemadar of Shihr and Mukalla, with his title being changed from Jemadar to Sultan. his nephews, however, refused to accept the compensation for the usurping of their birthright as the proper heirs to the throne, and in July 1904 left to return to Hyderabad, with the dispute about their trust money having never been settled. And at the end of 1904, the Sultan purchased a share in the port of Balahaf from the Wahidi Sultanate, but the British refused to sanction the agreement.

In 1917, control of the Aden Protectorate was transferred from the Government of India, which had inherited the British East India Company's interests in various princely states on the strategically important naval route from Europe to India, to the British Foreign Office. And the Aden Protectorate was informally divided into the Eastern and Western Protectorates; the Eastern Protectorate corresponded roughly to the Qu'aiti Sultanate's sphere of control, and its Political Officer was stationed at Mukalla in Qu'aiti, after Sultan Nawaz Jang's grandson, Ali bin Salah, signed a treaty in 1937 appointing the British government as "advisors" in Hadhramaut. But the British exiled Sultan Ali bin Salah to Aden in 1945, on account of his adamant refusal to join their proposed Federation of South Arabia; instead, declaring his intent to pursue a political union-of-the-crowns with the soon-to-be independent State of Hyderabad. And shortly before his exile, this ambitions had been boosted greatly by the marriage he'd secured between his own first-born son and heir, Awadh din Saleh, and Sahibzadi Nazirunissa Begum (granddaughter of both the 6th Nizam of Hyderabad Mahbub Ali Khan, and the former Prime Minister of Hyderabad Viqar-ul-Umrah); with the couple going on to have multiple children, the eldest of these being the final Qu'aiti Sultan, Ghalib II bin Awadh al-Qu'aiti al-Hadhrami (born in London in January 1948).

So then, what if the Qu'aiti Sultans had actually been able to go ahead with their proposed plans, and Ali bin Salah's desired political union between the Qu'aiti Sultanate and the State of Hyderabad had indeed been established? How much would this have shaken things up? Could we conceivably see the Nizam of Hyderabad (and world's wealthiest person, at that time, with an estimated net wealth equivalent to roughly US$33.2 billion in 2021 dollars), Mir Osman Ali Khan, fleeing Operation Polo along with much of the rest of the royal family to seek refuge there (with Hadramaut effectively becoming Hyderabad State's equivalent of Taiwan ITTL)? Or even see Hyderabad's proclaimed status as an independent nation in June 1947 be acknowledged by multiple other nations? Portugal would be one of the likeliest candidates- a draft agreement for the Nizam of Hyderabad to purchase the port of Mormugao was secretly drawn up and sent to Lisbon for approval by the Portuguese government in June 1947 IOTL, with Portuguese PM Antonio de Oliviera Salazar having purportedly been inclined to go ahead with the deal. Might this deal actually go through ITTL?
 
Another utterly fascinating scenario. I'm so glad you're on this board @SinghSong.

I don't think it's super likely that anyone would recognise this state and operation polo wouldn't still happen but the idea of Hyderabad being enclosed entirely within India but also ruling part of south Arabia is fantastic and I would love a vignette set there.
 
A very fascinating scenario indeed.

If there is a Hyderabadi Hadhramaut, this intensifies Hyderabadi efforts to get a coastline (in the form of some coastal Andhra district) in the short term. On the other hand, Britain was very reluctant to allow Hyderabad naval access, and this might make it less likely. Perhaps a land swap in addition to a payment would make Britain accept - in that case it might get more tenable, and Hyderabad would actually be able to have a navy rather than depending on Britain's. The Nizam trying to get Mormugao is an interesting scenario in its own right, although I really wonder why Salazar was willing to do something as extreme as give up Goa's main port. Of course, it would be an exclave, which would make it easy to invade - maybe that's why Salazar was willing?

Hyderabad would invest in a navy to ensure it keeps Qu'ait secure, but on the other hand more money put into the navy means less money put into the impressive modernization efforts the Nizams put into Hyderabad proper. Perhaps trade would reduce results of it, although I'm not sure what would be traded between the two. In OTL Hyderabad appointed many administrators from North India (a remnant of Mughal policy probably), maybe here they'd also appoint Qu'aiti administrators.

On the other hand, none of this improves the core issues of the Hyderabadi state, namely its feudalism and overrepresentation of Muslims in government - a toxic combination. When Hyderabad appointed Hindus to administration, it invariably appointed North Indian Hindus rather than local ones. I guess if trade creates a new merchant class it might be able to weaken that. On the other hand, more trade with the entirely-Muslim Hadhramaut might also strengthen the formation of a separate Muslim identity, which would only worsen its issues. Long term, the way Hyderabad ended - the chiefly-Hindu peasantry holding a communist rebellion against the almost-entirely Muslim elite, and the elite reacting by establishing Razakar paramilitaries committing war crimes - wouldn't be changed by this, and of course any Indian state would react to this with Operation Polo. And I don't think the Nizam would leave for his faraway domains. On the other hand, I could see Razakars fleeing to the Hadhramaut and becoming influential in the Qu'aiti Sultanate, along with much of the Hyderabadi navy. Considering that Jinnah viewed Hyderabad as a fellow Muslim state, maybe a Pakistani-Qu'aiti alliance would be the result.
 
A very fascinating scenario indeed.

If there is a Hyderabadi Hadhramaut, this intensifies Hyderabadi efforts to get a coastline (in the form of some coastal Andhra district) in the short term. On the other hand, Britain was very reluctant to allow Hyderabad naval access, and this might make it less likely. Perhaps a land swap in addition to a payment would make Britain accept - in that case it might get more tenable, and Hyderabad would actually be able to have a navy rather than depending on Britain's. The Nizam trying to get Mormugao is an interesting scenario in its own right, although I really wonder why Salazar was willing to do something as extreme as give up Goa's main port. Of course, it would be an exclave, which would make it easy to invade - maybe that's why Salazar was willing?

Hyderabad would invest in a navy to ensure it keeps Qu'ait secure, but on the other hand more money put into the navy means less money put into the impressive modernization efforts the Nizams put into Hyderabad proper. Perhaps trade would reduce results of it, although I'm not sure what would be traded between the two. In OTL Hyderabad appointed many administrators from North India (a remnant of Mughal policy probably), maybe here they'd also appoint Qu'aiti administrators.

On the other hand, none of this improves the core issues of the Hyderabadi state, namely its feudalism and overrepresentation of Muslims in government - a toxic combination. When Hyderabad appointed Hindus to administration, it invariably appointed North Indian Hindus rather than local ones. I guess if trade creates a new merchant class it might be able to weaken that. On the other hand, more trade with the entirely-Muslim Hadhramaut might also strengthen the formation of a separate Muslim identity, which would only worsen its issues. Long term, the way Hyderabad ended - the chiefly-Hindu peasantry holding a communist rebellion against the almost-entirely Muslim elite, and the elite reacting by establishing Razakar paramilitaries committing war crimes - wouldn't be changed by this, and of course any Indian state would react to this with Operation Polo. And I don't think the Nizam would leave for his faraway domains. On the other hand, I could see Razakars fleeing to the Hadhramaut and becoming influential in the Qu'aiti Sultanate, along with much of the Hyderabadi navy. Considering that Jinnah viewed Hyderabad as a fellow Muslim state, maybe a Pakistani-Qu'aiti alliance would be the result.

Another point worth touching upon, relating to Hyderabad's feudalism and over-representation of Muslims in its government; the last Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Osman Ali Khan, arranged a matrimonial alliance with the deposed last Ottoman Caliph Abdulmejid II, whereby the Nizam's first son Azam Jah married the Caliph's daughter Princess Durrushehvar of the Ottoman Empire in Nice on 12 November 1932 (with the couple having two sons); in the hopes that the matrimonial alliance between the Nizam and Abdulmejid II would lead to the emergence of a new candidate for the Sharifian Caliphate (the nominal supreme religious and political leader of all Muslims across the world), who could be more acceptable to both the world powers than King Hussein bin Ali of Mecca or Ibn Saud of Nejd, as a rightful, legitimate successor to the Ottoman Sultans' abolished Caliphate.

How much more plausible might these hopes be if the Qu'aiti Sultanate's dominions (which also included control over the southern Empty Quarter before the rise of the House of Saud, with the Idrisid Emirate of Asir being the only entity which separated them from Mecca, and its newly independent ruler Emir Al-Idrisi being willing to ally and sign protectorate treaties with anyone who'd protect it from Nejd, Hejaz and Yemen, having been bought over by Italy during the Italo-Turkish War, and mounted a large-scale rebellion against the Ottomans during said conflict, in open defiance of the Ottoman's proclaimation of Jihad against Italy) were nominally overseas terriories of Hyderabad? The deposed Ottoman monarch's cause evoked the greatest religious passion and sympathy among Indian Muslims, fuelling the Khilafat Movement (and Malabar Rebellion), which played a major role in the growth of the League's popular appeal and the subsequent Pakistan Movement (which effectively rose to take its place, after the Khilafat's leadership fragmented on different political lines in the aftermath of Ataturk's victory and rise to power in independent Turkey).

With Nizam Mukarram Jah being the inheritor to the Ottomans' Sharifian Caliphate, and nominal supreme religious and political leadership over the world's Muslim population, how much could this shake things up, if Mir Osman Ali Khan does indeed choose to go ahead with securing this matrimonial alliance ITTL? It'd almost certainly significantly weaken his position with the chiefly-Hindu peasantry; but if they did manage to win out in the power struggle to become the custodians of Mecca over the Saudis, Hashemites, al-Qasimis and Idrisids in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire's collapse (having by far the most wealth, modern firepower and international influence to bring to bear), and gained widespread acknowledgement of their Caliphate, might we even see the Khilafat Movement never fragmenting? And how much might this have weakened the Pakistan Movement- perhaps even enough to butterfly away Pakistani independence altogether?
 
Fascinating bit of history, thanks for posting.

For ultimate historical irony, a TL where this happens and Gwadar stays part of Oman, so an Indian state is running part of Arabia while an Arab one is running part of (what was historically seen as) India.

Probably the best way to get the British on side would be if Hyderabad managed to pull this off swiftly and neatly as a fait accompli, so it causes less paperwork for the Raj to just shrug and go through Hyderabad in future when dealing with south Arabia - though it would depend a lot on who was on the ground making the decisions, and who was in power in London. It's the sort of thing that'd be much likelier to happen if it had been a century earlier.
 
Another point worth touching upon, relating to Hyderabad's feudalism and over-representation of Muslims in its government; the last Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Osman Ali Khan, arranged a matrimonial alliance with the deposed last Ottoman Caliph Abdulmejid II, whereby the Nizam's first son Azam Jah married the Caliph's daughter Princess Durrushehvar of the Ottoman Empire in Nice on 12 November 1932 (with the couple having two sons); in the hopes that the matrimonial alliance between the Nizam and Abdulmejid II would lead to the emergence of a new candidate for the Sharifian Caliphate (the nominal supreme religious and political leader of all Muslims across the world), who could be more acceptable to both the world powers than King Hussein bin Ali of Mecca or Ibn Saud of Nejd, as a rightful, legitimate successor to the Ottoman Sultans' abolished Caliphate.

How much more plausible might these hopes be if the Qu'aiti Sultanate's dominions (which also included control over the southern Empty Quarter before the rise of the House of Saud, with the Idrisid Emirate of Asir being the only entity which separated them from Mecca, and its newly independent ruler Emir Al-Idrisi being willing to ally and sign protectorate treaties with anyone who'd protect it from Nejd, Hejaz and Yemen, having been bought over by Italy during the Italo-Turkish War, and mounted a large-scale rebellion against the Ottomans during said conflict, in open defiance of the Ottoman's proclaimation of Jihad against Italy) were nominally overseas terriories of Hyderabad? The deposed Ottoman monarch's cause evoked the greatest religious passion and sympathy among Indian Muslims, fuelling the Khilafat Movement (and Malabar Rebellion), which played a major role in the growth of the League's popular appeal and the subsequent Pakistan Movement (which effectively rose to take its place, after the Khilafat's leadership fragmented on different political lines in the aftermath of Ataturk's victory and rise to power in independent Turkey).

With Nizam Mukarram Jah being the inheritor to the Ottomans' Sharifian Caliphate, and nominal supreme religious and political leadership over the world's Muslim population, how much could this shake things up, if Mir Osman Ali Khan does indeed choose to go ahead with securing this matrimonial alliance ITTL? It'd almost certainly significantly weaken his position with the chiefly-Hindu peasantry; but if they did manage to win out in the power struggle to become the custodians of Mecca over the Saudis, Hashemites, al-Qasimis and Idrisids in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire's collapse (having by far the most wealth, modern firepower and international influence to bring to bear), and gained widespread acknowledgement of their Caliphate, might we even see the Khilafat Movement never fragmenting? And how much might this have weakened the Pakistan Movement- perhaps even enough to butterfly away Pakistani independence altogether?

I'm not so sure if the world's Muslims would accept this claim to the Caliphate (and of course this would not be Sharifian), what with the general ideologies percolating across the Muslim world. Secularism and Muslim modernism are of course extremely different ideologies, but neither of them would look too kindly at the pseudo-restoration of the Ottoman caliphate - a caliphate that both Arabs and Turks were nation-building in contrast to. Furthermore, the 1930s did see the interwar Grand Mufti of Palestine, Amin al-Husseini, fantasize about restoring the caliphate under his leadership, and though he was a fairly popular figure across the Muslim world (despite his Nazi collaborationism) - he held Islamic conferences, and he even met Jinnah in Lahore in 1946 - he did not come anywhere close to restoring the Caliphate. If the Nizam declares, based on a marriage relation, himself to be Caliph, it's unlikely to be successful. And an attempt to invade Hejaz from Qu'ait seems like a stretch - unless there's some local ruler who accepts Hyderabadi leadership and resists the Saudis, maybe.

But maybe in India, many Muslims would accept this - not a radical stretch with the popularity of the Khilafat movement, and of course the INC would endorse it as part of Hindu-Muslim unity - at least, right up until Indian nationalism turns against princely states in the 1930s. It would not be unanimous at all, and many would disagree with this claim. The Pakistan movement was founded on Muslim modernism (a distinct ideology from secularism) - which isn't that compatible with it. I suspect Moplah is happening anyways, the issues of a Hindu elite vs. a Muslim peasantry (the opposite of Hyderabad!) are too great. The British would likely get the Caliph-Nizam to issue declarations against violence and disobedience, and I suspect that would weaken the Nizam's claim to the Caliphate further. But this would all change the complex politics of early 20th century India massively.
 
Fascinating bit of history, thanks for posting.

For ultimate historical irony, a TL where this happens and Gwadar stays part of Oman, so an Indian state is running part of Arabia while an Arab one is running part of (what was historically seen as) India.

Probably the best way to get the British on side would be if Hyderabad managed to pull this off swiftly and neatly as a fait accompli, so it causes less paperwork for the Raj to just shrug and go through Hyderabad in future when dealing with south Arabia - though it would depend a lot on who was on the ground making the decisions, and who was in power in London. It's the sort of thing that'd be much likelier to happen if it had been a century earlier.
Those were my thoughts as well, and one of the main reasons I went to the trouble of including all the backstory. IMHO, most plausible time would've been back in 1866, when the Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad submitted a request for the British Government to mount an armed intervention on behalf of the Qu'aiti Sultanate or to permit it to dispatch an armed expedition of its own, only for the British to refuse both IOTL; with the POD being a bureaucratic oversight, whereby the Minister of the Nizam simply neglects to address the possibility of dispatching an armed expedition of its own, preventing the British Government from denying them permission to do so beforehand.

As such, Awadh bin Umar aka 'Sultan Nawaz Jang' still proceeds as IOTL, but with a slightly larger and better equipped flotilla; succeeding as IOTL, and thus being retrospectively conferred Hyderabad's official support. And with this having already been pulled off as a fait accompli, the British are content to acknowledge Hadramaut's status as a "land of petty tribal chiefdoms under the loose suzerainty of Hyderabad", settling for simply dispatching a British Agent to be stationed at Muhalla and/or Ash-Shihr, and ensuring that access to its ports are denied to other Europeans' ships.
 
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