WI: Boulanger defeats Germany in 1889

[Jackson Lennock]

In 1889, following Boulanger's victory in the race to be Deputy for Paris, Boulanger's supporters were pushing for him to lead a coup against the Republic. There was a revolt on January 27th by his supporters, but Boulanger spent the night with his mistress instead of taking power then and he also wanted to take power legally rather than extralegally. Ultimately his opponents rallied and the government came after him and his supporters, issuing a warrant for his arrest resulting in his fleeing the country in 1890.

What if Boulanger had taken power in 1889? He was an arch-revanchist who wanted war with Germany and likely would have mobilized France against Germany shortly after taking power. German's officers also viewed Boulanger as a belligerent figure who'd already prompted a near-war crisis, and thus might have taken initial action against France if Boulanger took power.

At the time France had more modern mobilization tactics, better technology, sturdy fortresses, and closed much of the gap with the Germans when it came to reserves. They also had good fortresses. Germany's general staff was comprised of out of touch generals who Willhelm kept around due to personal affinity, and these generals seemed to think that Prussian strategic brilliance would compensate for other shortcomings. Based on what I have quoted below, it feels like a German version of the cult of the offensive.

From here

Post-1871, France underwent a remarkable military revival, as the politicans of the Third Republic had not yet turned against the army and the nation supported the army's rehabilitation. If war had broken out at the time of the Boulanger Crisis, there would have been more French infantry battalions and artillery batteries in the field than the German army could muster AFTER mobilization, and the difference in the number of cavalry squadrons was closing (Germany had 465 to France's 385).

While there was little difference in the cavalry and artillery tactics of the French and the Germans, French infantry had the most progressive tactics of their time. They broke from company columns into smaller formations that assumed a broader, loose order front to survive defenders' fire. Additionally, in 1886, the French began to rearm with the Lebel magazine rifle that had a rate of fire nearly twice that of the German M-71/84 Mauser.

There were a whole series of innovations in the French army that were not found anywhere else: state of the art observation baloons and tricycles for velocipedists of the messenger corps; gun cotton was replaced with cordite (a smokeless explosive) and melinite (a stable nitrogen compound) far superior to the unstable and highly volatile gun cotton employed in the German army. While the speed of mobilization was still lower than in the German army, the gap was not as great as you presume and it was closing, as all militaries in the wake of the German Wars of Unification realized its centrality to Prussia's accomplishment; rail capacity between Paris and the fortresses on the eatsern frontier tripled in between 1877-86. French reservists were to hold the fortresses, while the regular armies would flank the forts, employing a defensive strategy which would have been quite effective given German infantry tactics of the time (see below). The French were only going to counter-attack after the Germans had bashed themselves against the fortesses, which German artillerists were pessimistic about breeching, especially after 1887, when the French fitted the forts between Verdun and Belfort with steel towers and reinforced concrete (and which, by the way, provided the French a huge advantage in heavy artillery-more below on this) and trenches of eastern France, proving they had digested the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War. Also, there was no Belgium option, as in 1914 - the French knew exactly where the Germans were going to strike. (this is the premise of the above about the French destroying and or capturing a force of 100,000 German reinforcements in 1889)

The notion that the fortress building program was drawing money away from the regular army is a faulty one; there is no evidence to support this. Also, one should not confuse the French reserves of the early Third Republic with those of the late Second Empire. Drawing upon the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War and the poor performance of the garde mobile, the law of 1872 addressed the quality of the reserves. Realizing that reserves were the cheapest way of maintaining a strong military, the law required that after five years active service, conscripts enter the reserve, where they would be required to do about two months service per year (past 30, reservists were required to provide a months service). There would be no shortage in the French army of NCOs if one included the reservists (it was only post-1890 that prejudice against the reserves became more prominent). Remember that revenge is an underlying factor behind this war, this ran strong within the French army from the highest General down to the lowliest private, the prejudice that French troops would be less motivated than the German troops stems from hindsight to 1940, and not the late 1880s when there was a revival of French militarism and innovations comparable to the Napoleonic period. In OTL they were itching for a war of revenge with Germany and combined with the improvements in the French army in the years following 1871 would have made for a deadly combination against a German army that had become complacent, more backward in its thinking. More on this below. Furthermore, given the Third Republic's mania for public education, the differences in schooling between the soldiers of both armies would not have been all that great by the late 1880s.

On the administrative side, there existed great divisions, surrounding the forcing out of Armold von Kameke from the War Ministry, which only served to make worse the bitter rivalries that had developed from the mid-1870s between the infantry, cavalry and artillery (and, in the latter case, within its own arm).

The German army of the 1870s-80s was mired in the past concerning its ideas when it came to the battlefield, which is why general trends cannot be projected from 1864-71 to the mid- to late- 1880s. The German army's history during this period was not a steady climb to ever increasing efficency - anything but. In fact, the greatest improvements in the German army came post-1906, not before.

Technopobic senior officers dominated all three branches, managing to write their positively atavistic doctrines into the regulations. Drawing the wrong lesson from St. Privat, the infantry was to attack in massed company and battalion columns because management was deemed easiest in such formations - of course, they also provided unmissable targets in the age of repeating rifles; compounding the problem, the Germans drew the wrong lessons from Mars-la-Tour, with the infantry adopting the three wave tactics of the previous century The artillery situation in the German army was equally dismal and very divided. The field artillery, still basking in the glory of Sedan (a situation which was unlikely to happen again) consumed virtually all the funding to the detriment of the heavy artillery. Thoughtful officers who pointed to the lesson of Plevna were simply disregarded or shunted off into perhaps the greatest dead end in the German army of the time - the heavy artillery, relegated to fortresses. The belief that the Germans would have enjoyed an advantage in heavy artillery at the time of Boulanger is a faulty one, given it was probably the most underfunded branch of the German army.

the Germans were living in the past - and many of them were accepting of this based upon a chimera. One German military writer, while noting that Germany's wealthy neighbors may have superior equipment, weapons, technical education, and an armor of fortresses ... their officer corps could not match Germany's in warlike intelligence, independence, initiative and moral strength - this clearly is a recipe for slaughter. German casualties likely would have been disastrously high in a war with France at the time of Boulanger, and not everyone in the German army was blind to this. Von der Goltz, a thoughtful officer, observed the French maneuvers of 1878 for the General Staff and left impressed by how modern the French army appeared, compared to when he had last seen it in 1870. He mused that the tendency of the winner in a war to grow complacent has overtaken the German army and realized that what had succeeded in 1870 was unlikely to work again - the French army was more up to date than the German army; eight years later, French observers at the German manuevers came to exactly the same conclusion as von der Goltz had. Even Waldersee, who was the proponent of the preemptive strike against France should Boulanger stage a successful coup, admitted there were serious problems in the German army. There was an inclination to return to antiquated battle formations (the cavalry was perfecting Frederickian tactics) and, as he stated, the more distance there is between us and our last war, the more backward our judgement has become.

The French had a very good chance of defeating Germany at the time of the Boulanger Crisis. And the result of a Franco-Prussian War in 1889-90 would have more likely resulted in a resounding French victory.

Furthermore, The German army at the time of Boulanger was hardly an unbeatable one. At its senior uniformed level, it was a virtual gerontocracy, with 18 rather elderly corps commanders whom the aged Kaiser Wilhelm refused to retire out of personal affection. The average age was 64 but a few were in their 70s, the oldest being 76 (the youngest was 49); they largely were averse to field service ( for obvious reasons) and the French were well aware of this.

I don't think Europe as a whole would tolerate France grabbing the Rhineland if the French defeated Germany. But Alsace-Lorraine, Saarland, Palatinate, and Kehl seem in the cards. The same goes for Germany's. It's worth considering that if France takes Alsace-Lorraine, Saarland, Kehl, and Palatinate that closes the population gap by perhaps as many as 4 million people. So instead of 39.7 French to 67.8 Germans, it is 43.7 French to 63.8 Germans (1.7x ratio versus 1.46 ratio). France also has about 2/5 of Europe's Iron Ore and the coal of Saarland nearby. That's a recipe for a French Ruhr equivalent. France meanwhile has a defensible boundary on the highlands in the area north of Saar and Palatinate.

As a tangential matter, America might take advantage of the tumult to seize West Samoa. This was during the Samoa Crisis. The US might go further - taking German New Guinea, Palau, the Marshall Islands - and annexing Hawaii.

 

[RyanF]

I don't really know how much a war with Germany, let alone a successful one, is a given following a Boulanger coup.

His dithering when presented with the opportunity OTL, instead running straight to his mistress, perhaps speaks that he was not the brilliant tactician many thought he was.

Considering too that a year to the day after said mistress died of TB he took his own life over her grave, I'm inclined to think had he actually gone through with a coup he'd have been out on his ear before long.

In the spirit of answering the original question, not all of those roughly 4 million people would be happy with the new border. Nor would the 64 million Germans. Bismarck is out, Bavaria would be pissed off about losing their territory thanks to Prussian cock-ups. Austria might cosy up to France, and I wonder how a French general taking power in a coup then grabbing bits of Europe might look in the UK.

 

[Death's Companion]

Not really sure France is going to win this one either tbh. There are more Germans than Frenchmen and a larger economy.

And yes France seems to have several advantages in this time period but its also France, the French Army is always invincible in peace time. Its when it fights wars that the bother starts.

It also seems to assume that the French would start the war but also be on the defensive?


Whilst states undergoing a coup are not exactly famous for their potent and quick decision making, if the Germans decide to attack at once and the French Army doesn't know its in a war yet because the necessary steps to completing a coup is controlling communications it doesn't seem likely to end well for the French.

Basically having checked the thread this spawned from the author seems to think France could march to Berlin and annex the Rhineland and then build up a navy capable of defeating the Royal Navy. So like... yeah he's an idiot.

 

[Octosteel]

Not really sure France is going to win this one either tbh. There are more Germans than Frenchmen and a larger economy.

And yes France seems to have several advantages in this time period but its also France, the French Army is always invincible in peace time. Its when it fights wars that the bother starts.

It also seems to assume that the French would start the war but also be on the defensive?


Whilst states undergoing a coup are not exactly famous for their potent and quick decision making, if the Germans decide to attack at once and the French Army doesn't know its in a war yet because the necessary steps to completing a coup is controlling communications it doesn't seem likely to end well for the French.

Basically having checked the thread this spawned from the author seems to think France could march to Berlin and annex the Rhineland and then build up a navy capable of defeating the Royal Navy. So like... yeah he's an idiot.

It seems more likely that if Germany is "losing" they will hunker down and drag the war out if necessary so they can win. Maybe we see early trench warfare. Regardless, I don't think you can take that much territory in a short war like that.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Not really sure France is going to win this one either tbh. There are more Germans than Frenchmen and a larger economy.

And yes France seems to have several advantages in this time period but its also France, the French Army is always invincible in peace time. Its when it fights wars that the bother starts.

It also seems to assume that the French would start the war but also be on the defensive?


Whilst states undergoing a coup are not exactly famous for their potent and quick decision making, if the Germans decide to attack at once and the French Army doesn't know its in a war yet because the necessary steps to completing a coup is controlling communications it doesn't seem likely to end well for the French.

Basically having checked the thread this spawned from the author seems to think France could march to Berlin and annex the Rhineland and then build up a navy capable of defeating the Royal Navy. So like... yeah he's an idiot.

That seemed silly, which is why I didn't mention it.

 

[Death's Companion]

That seemed silly, which is why I didn't mention it.

Yeah but we're meant to take the rest of it at face value?

 

[Charles EP M.]

Taking it as read Boulanger does take over and does win a war with territory annexed, wouldn't a big outcome being another war with Germany someday as their revanchists want vengeance?

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Taking it as read Boulanger does take over and does win a war with territory annexed, wouldn't a big outcome being another war with Germany someday as their revanchists want vengeance?

Probably. That's what happened after WWI OTL after all. Here it'd be a more even match though, since France has a bigger population and industrial base compared to Germany.

 

[Charles EP M.]

More Franco-German clashes feel also like this changes how western Europe sees the latter years of the late 19th century and the early 20th, no "lights going out over Europe" if conflicts have happened every X years and there's no long period of peace.

 

[RyanF]

More Franco-German clashes feel also like this changes how western Europe sees the latter years of the late 19th century and the early 20th, no "lights going out over Europe" if conflicts have happened every X years and there's no long period of peace.

"The lights are strobing over Europe again."

 

[Jackson Lennock]

More Franco-German clashes feel also like this changes how western Europe sees the latter years of the late 19th century and the early 20th, no "lights going out over Europe" if conflicts have happened every X years and there's no long period of peace.

I suspect it would be 15 to 20 years before the next Franco-German War in Europe. France has already gotten its victory, and there wasn't a major Franco-German crisis OTL until Agadir. Germany would have internal political tumult following a defeat by France. France's defeat of Germany also wouldn't be as humiliating as Prussia's of France (no occupation of the German capital, for example). The border is also in the Saar-Nahe Hills: a defensible line for the French, but distance from the major population or industrial centers of Germany.

"The lights are strobing over Europe again."

Europe's love of house music comes a century early.

 

[Octosteel]

I really don't think france would be taking anything more than Alsace Lorraine.

 

[raharris1973]

I really don't think france would be taking anything more than Alsace Lorraine.

Would Germany have an equally determined revanche-boner if a) France succeeds in simply taking back Alsace-Lorraine (and maybe some overseas colonies) or b) France succeeds in taking back Alsace-Lorraine, plus taking additional land in Europe, like Saar or Palatinate (and overseas colonies)?

Might a) especially combined with no indemnities/reparations charged, result in a situation where Germany and France can 'call it even' and avoid sequel wars in ensuing decades and even a prospect of possibly allying with each other against others?

 

[ForceA1]

The extent of the modernisation of the Sére de Rivières Fortress system is overstated. The vast majority were not updated to modern standards in the aftermath of the Torpedo-Shell Crisis, and even then many of these improvements did not take place until the 1890s or later, and were not fully complete at the beginning of the First World War.