After Japan withdrew from the League Of Nations in 1933, it didn't reject the concept of international cooperation, but instead made overtures to several other nations outside the League's framework. And the nation which it made the greatest effort to court was that with which it had forged its most enduring and important alliance to date, the British Empire; with Japan demonstrating great interest in cementing an 'Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact' in 1934, ideally as the first step towards restoring the hitherto annulled Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Japan's overtures were well-received in Britain, and particularly promoted by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain- who spoke of the need to "restore their ruffled feelings"- as well as Treasury Undersecretary Warren Fisher. A complex series of communiques and commissioned studies were exchanged, but in the end, negotiations broke down over the China question. The official British position was that “Great Britain was quite ready to recognize that because of Japan’s proximity to China she was in an especially favorable position to satisfy certain economic needs of China”- i.e, pursue its colonialist interests there- but that “Great Britain could not recognize any special position of Japan in China and had not the slightest intention of limiting Great Britain’s economic interests in China.”
As such, Neville Chamberlain was unable to amass the support required to secure the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, mostly due to his inability to persuade the British government to extend official recognition to the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, or indeed to "make any political commitments to Japan"; without which, the greatly reduced vestige of a treaty was deemed worthless by the Japanese, who refused to sign it. And even in mid-1937, with the 2nd Sino-Japanese War well under way, Neville Chamberlain still advocated an appeasement policy toward Imperial Japan (as indeed did the Imperial British Army, which treated the Imperial Japanese Army with great respect and often encouraged the Foreign Office to ally with Japan, abandon China, and form a united front against Nazi Germany, the Soviets, and the anti-Colonialist nationalist movements in China and India respectively). It was acknowledged that there simply was no way for Britain to remain Japan’s ally without alienating the United States.
However, Chamberlain was willing to risk this, with his supporters in Parliament asserting that they “could not see any reason why Britain should oppose Japan”, emphasizing that Japan had made Manchuria the most prosperous part of China, she needed markets, peace and order, and she had to defend her interests against Chinese nationalists, just as Britain did against Indian nationalists in the British Raj. And in a case of ‘whataboutism’ which should be all too familiar to us today, several politicians like Leo Amery backed him up, insisting that “Our whole policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stands condemned if we condemn Japan”, and advocating that the Imperial Japanese should be brought into the fold of the Stresa Front alongside with Fascist Italy; believing that Communism and anti-Colonialism posed the true greatest threats to the British Empire, and citing the nominally anti-colonialist USA as an prospective enemy, not an ally, of the British Empire.
But a narrow majority of British MPs, the British Royal Navy (whose clear dominance over the British Army clique enabled them to wield far more influence over British foreign and military policy, much as was the case in Imperial Japan at the same time), and the overwhelming majority of the general British public, refused to accept the premise that it’d be hypocritical to condemn the Japanese for doing the same things which they themselves had been doing in India and Egypt, and with British Exceptionalism and Denialism still being at its height, chose to condemn the Japanese anyway. This rendered Chamberlain’s position untenable, and forced him to reluctantly abandon any hopes of restoring the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
But his perceived predilection towards mending ties with the Japanese, rather than further strengthening ties with the Americans, still greatly damaged his government’s relationship with that of Roosevelt in the USA, and prevailing general opinion of the British in the US; to the extent that it was, at the time, still highlighted as a noted factor in the USA’s refusal to lend support to the Allies against Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers in response to the invasion of Poland, or join the war prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume IV
Appeasement in Asia: Britain, Japan and the Path to War - Season 1 - History Hit
https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/4148/1/Scully13MPhil.pdf
So then, what if Neville Chamberlain had indeed been able to muster enough support to cement the proposed Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact in 1934; somehow managing to promise a commitment on behalf of the British to extend official recognition to Manchukuo, and thus convincing the Japanese to sign the treaty? How much of a boon could this have been for Anglo-Japanese relations, and how much of a blow might this have been to Anglo-US relations? And how differently do you envision that the Marco Polo Bridge incident, Second Sino-Japanese War, and WW2, might wind up playing out ITTL?
As such, Neville Chamberlain was unable to amass the support required to secure the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, mostly due to his inability to persuade the British government to extend official recognition to the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, or indeed to "make any political commitments to Japan"; without which, the greatly reduced vestige of a treaty was deemed worthless by the Japanese, who refused to sign it. And even in mid-1937, with the 2nd Sino-Japanese War well under way, Neville Chamberlain still advocated an appeasement policy toward Imperial Japan (as indeed did the Imperial British Army, which treated the Imperial Japanese Army with great respect and often encouraged the Foreign Office to ally with Japan, abandon China, and form a united front against Nazi Germany, the Soviets, and the anti-Colonialist nationalist movements in China and India respectively). It was acknowledged that there simply was no way for Britain to remain Japan’s ally without alienating the United States.
However, Chamberlain was willing to risk this, with his supporters in Parliament asserting that they “could not see any reason why Britain should oppose Japan”, emphasizing that Japan had made Manchuria the most prosperous part of China, she needed markets, peace and order, and she had to defend her interests against Chinese nationalists, just as Britain did against Indian nationalists in the British Raj. And in a case of ‘whataboutism’ which should be all too familiar to us today, several politicians like Leo Amery backed him up, insisting that “Our whole policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stands condemned if we condemn Japan”, and advocating that the Imperial Japanese should be brought into the fold of the Stresa Front alongside with Fascist Italy; believing that Communism and anti-Colonialism posed the true greatest threats to the British Empire, and citing the nominally anti-colonialist USA as an prospective enemy, not an ally, of the British Empire.
But a narrow majority of British MPs, the British Royal Navy (whose clear dominance over the British Army clique enabled them to wield far more influence over British foreign and military policy, much as was the case in Imperial Japan at the same time), and the overwhelming majority of the general British public, refused to accept the premise that it’d be hypocritical to condemn the Japanese for doing the same things which they themselves had been doing in India and Egypt, and with British Exceptionalism and Denialism still being at its height, chose to condemn the Japanese anyway. This rendered Chamberlain’s position untenable, and forced him to reluctantly abandon any hopes of restoring the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
But his perceived predilection towards mending ties with the Japanese, rather than further strengthening ties with the Americans, still greatly damaged his government’s relationship with that of Roosevelt in the USA, and prevailing general opinion of the British in the US; to the extent that it was, at the time, still highlighted as a noted factor in the USA’s refusal to lend support to the Allies against Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers in response to the invasion of Poland, or join the war prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume IV
Appeasement in Asia: Britain, Japan and the Path to War - Season 1 - History Hit
https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/4148/1/Scully13MPhil.pdf
So then, what if Neville Chamberlain had indeed been able to muster enough support to cement the proposed Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact in 1934; somehow managing to promise a commitment on behalf of the British to extend official recognition to Manchukuo, and thus convincing the Japanese to sign the treaty? How much of a boon could this have been for Anglo-Japanese relations, and how much of a blow might this have been to Anglo-US relations? And how differently do you envision that the Marco Polo Bridge incident, Second Sino-Japanese War, and WW2, might wind up playing out ITTL?