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Whites win Russia civil war

Well, there might be some sort of restoration of democracy in Russia--with or without a figurehead monarch. The Russian military would probably maintain a large behind the scenes role like the German Wehrmacht did in the Weimar Republic, though. Given that most of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe became dictatorships by 1938 in real life, the odds would not be in Russia's favor in regards to democracy permanently being capable of being maintained there. So, the odds are that Russia would become a right-wing dictatorship in the 1920s and/or 1930s--with or without a figurehead monarch--just like the rest of its neighborhood would have. What would have happened afterwards would have been an interesting question. For instance, would this new Russia be interested in reconquering its lost territories? Would it be willing to start a war over these territories? Also, would it want to expand anywhere else--such as southward? Basically, a right-wing dictatorship can be peaceful like Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal was, but it can also be aggressive and expansionist like Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan, Horthy's Hungary, et cetera were. It really depends on the specific dictator that's in power in any particular country and on exactly what opportunities he actually has in regards to war-making, aggression, and territorial expansion.
 
What would be the effects of the whites winning civil war??
The problem with this question is that there was no unified "white" side. There were a number of factions in the anti-Bolshevik camp, running the whole width of the political spectrum from monarchists to Socialist-Revolutionaries. After achieving victory, they would probably start going at each other in a civil war 2.0.

There is also the problem that most White military leaders were Great Russian nationalists and opposed the independence of Ukraine, Finland, Poland, the Baltic States, etc. If they win the result may be a new series of offensives to reclaim secessionist territories, or at the very least a strong irredentist ambition that would make Russia a hostile neighbor for years to come.

The Russian military would probably maintain a large behind the scenes role like the German Wehrmacht did in the Weimar Republic,
Nitpick: during Weimar it was called the Reichswehr.
 
The problem with this question is that there was no unified "white" side. There were a number of factions in the anti-Bolshevik camp, running the whole width of the political spectrum from monarchists to Socialist-Revolutionaries. After achieving victory, they would probably start going at each other in a civil war 2.0.

Sort of like the Mujahideen in 1990s Afghanistan, eh?

There is also the problem that most White military leaders were Great Russian nationalists and opposed the independence of Ukraine, Finland, Poland, the Baltic States, etc. If they win the result may be a new series of offensives to reclaim secessionist territories, or at the very least a strong irredentist ambition that would make Russia a hostile neighbor for years to come.

Yeah, they'll probably try to reconquer what they can immediately and what they'll fail to reconquer immediately, they'll aim to reconquer later--though that might be more of a challenge if, for instance, those countries are already going to become League of Nations members by then and thus receive international recognition of their independence. Stalin didn't care about what the LoN thought--and neither did Hitler--but this wouldn't necessarily be true of all White Russian leaders.

Nitpick: during Weimar it was called the Reichswehr.

Thanks.
 
There is also the problem that most White military leaders were Great Russian nationalists and opposed the independence of Ukraine, Finland, Poland, the Baltic States, etc. If they win the result may be a new series of offensives to reclaim secessionist territories, or at the very least a strong irredentist ambition that would make Russia a hostile neighbor for years to come.

Actually, Denikin was willing to recognize Poland's independence, read https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/denikin-vs-poland-who-wins.468412/post-18982700.
 
Read https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...in-the-russian-civil-war.445641/post-17159678. They probably would have also recognized Finland and the Baltic states' independence. However, only Kornilov was willing to recognize Ukraine's independence and it's very unlikely that he would have prevailed.
Regardless, sorry if this sounds strange, but could you, please, edit the quote to remove the first thing, like I did?
Did I fix it now? It sure looks like I did.

Anyway, David T doesn't actually mention anything about Baltic independence here. It's worth noting that recognizing Baltic independence would have cut off Russia from most of the Baltic Sea.
 
Did I fix it now? It sure looks like I did.

Anyway, David T doesn't actually mention anything about Baltic independence here. It's worth noting that recognizing Baltic independence would have cut off Russia from most of the Baltic Sea.

Yes, you fixed it, thanks. I know David Tenner didn't mention the Baltic states but as he noted the difference between Finnish and Polish nationalities, on one hand, and Ukrainian nationality, on the other hand, considering that Baltic peoples, like Finns and Poles and unlike Ukrainians, are not East Slavs, I find it plausible.
 
I'm not sure how plausible it is for the Boshelvists to lose with a POD after November 11th 1918. They weren't in a great position in Summer 1919, but still held Moscow, St. Petersburg, Smolensk and Kiev. But if it did happen I imagine Russia would be a failed state for quite a long time, and I find it exceedingly doubtful that what would emerge at the end would be anything approaching a 'democracy'.
 
I'm not sure how plausible it is for the Boshelvists to lose with a POD after November 11th 1918. They weren't in a great position in Summer 1919, but still held Moscow, St. Petersburg, Smolensk and Kiev. But if it did happen I imagine Russia would be a failed state for quite a long time, and I find it exceedingly doubtful that what would emerge at the end would be anything approaching a 'democracy'.
I imagine it'd end up a lot like China around the same time, with its own Warlord Era on the cards, though I'm not sure if any of the generals would try to declare themselves Tsar like Yuan Shikai did.
 
I imagine it'd end up a lot like China around the same time, with its own Warlord Era on the cards, though I'm not sure if any of the generals would try to declare themselves Tsar like Yuan Shikai did.

Yeah I imagine you're right, but its relative proximity to the imperial core of western europe would mean even more interference for Russia.
 
It would depend which faction(s) actually retook Moscow and St Petersburg as to who came out on top , t least in the sense of controlling the capitals - and whoever took them might well not be on good terms with the leaders of the main military force in other parts of Russia. For instance, I can see a more strongly-backed Deniken managing to take Moscow from the South in autumn 1919,perhaps if Lloyd George had listened more confidently to Churchill and sent in more Allied troops to garrison major towns on the rail routes of Ukraine to the rear of the White army (so Deniken could spare more men for the advance), Deniken had had a large Cossack cavalry force, and D and his political allies had managed to keep all the suspicious Ukrainian factions (eg Nestor Makhno) on side for longer. Deniken's large army would sweep into Moscow from the S with opposition too weak to stop them, in the same way as major Mongol/ Crimean Turk raids in earlier centuries, and the Bolsheviks would have to evacuate their govt to Tver. At the same time the smaller but well-equipped Baltic army of Yudenich, backed by the Estonians and Latvians (in return for treaties of independence for them which the nationalist 'Great Russian' officers around Deniken would not like but could not stop) would surround St Petersburg, and if a disaster like Trotsky being killed disheartened the Reds and the British navy entered the Neva to 'stop a Bolshevik massacre threat in St Petersburg') the resistance might have to melt away. The Bolsheviks would intend to mount a guerilla war, but would be reduced to a dwindling area around Tver and Nizhni Novgorod and would have no major towns; they could be mopped up when the main White army from Siberia under Kolchak moved in from the E.

Assuming that Kolchak had managed to shore up an alliance with the Constituent Assembly and its forced, backed by the Czech legion, at Samara not ended up staging a coup against them, the precarious alliance of 'moderate democrats' and 'civilians' wanting a constitutional regime (even accepting the initial settlement of Feb 1917 ie an elected Assembly, SR participation in a civilian-led govt, civil rights, and one man one vote) and rigidly nationalist, conservative generals around Kolchak would be uneasy partners and the generals from Siberia could link up to Deniken's more right-wing generals once they were in charge in Moscow. I would assume that to stave off chaos and a famine (which would be necessary for practical reasons to keep Allied / League of Nations expenditure on Russia down and send the war-weary Allied troops home) an international coalition of Great Power politicians , led by UK, US and France, would convene a 'control commission' in Moscow to sort out a coalition govt between the White factions and make it clear 'no agreement no money from us' - this would concentrate minds on patching up a formal if mutually mistrustful govt of rival factions for a year or two. With the US retreating into isolation and Woodrow Wilson ill and Congress mutinous about any involvement, much would depend on the UK - Churchill running the conference ? - sorting something out before the Greek/ Turkish crisis of 1919-22 escalated. Or with UK troops having to stay to help mop up the Bolsheviks, perhaps Lloyd George would be unable to spare the time and troops for backing up Greece and so avoid the Chanak crisis in 1922 - staying in power until his 'overreach leads to a Conservative revolt at the 1923 general election and the fall of the Coalition?
It would help if a fairly well respected Romanov close to the line of succession was available to be placed at the top of the new constitution as a source of unity for the regime and loyalty for those troops who were still monarchist - eg if GD Michael had not fallen into Red hands in Nov 1917, by being able to escape from the St Petersburg region quickly at the time of the coup and take refuge with White troops (eg Kornilov) then head off to Finland. There were rumours he had made it to Siberia in summer 1918 and a man claiming to be him turned up at Osmk behind Kolchak's lines but later disappeared and was probably a fake ; what if he had been real and had not been shot in custody in June 1918 but reached the Siberian army to be adopted as their nominal monarch? Alternatively the Allies could have insisted on the Assembly, moved from Samara to Moscow after its fall, adopting next heir GD Cyril as the new constitutional Czar, or the popular (esp with soldiers) ex-military hero GD Nicholas Nicholaevich, who in OTL headed an exile 'govt' briefly in France in mid-1920s, been elected as nominal Czar. I agree that the right-wing generals and the democrats would not have stayed allied for long and a later military coup and right-wing oligarchy was probable, eg in the name of restoring order and prosperity if the Assembly and its rival ministers could not hold together or run a stable govt; but that might be a few years down the line.


Accepting Finnish and Baltic independence would be essential and probably forced by the Allies, and a civil war in Ukraine after Deniken's army moved away N or even a 'grab' by the new Polish state for Kiev would be possible, ditto a precarious nationalist / military breakaway Ukraine backed up by Poland in the early 1920s to keep the old Russian enemy weak. Invading this and restoring it to Russia would be a bonus for any military-led regime in Moscow as a matter of 'national honour', but the weak new Russia would be unable to reconquer Georgia or Azerbaijan and these would stay as independent states reliant on the Allies - with UK interest in controlling the Baku oilfields. The effects of the Great Depression on trade and investment could easily push a weak Russian economy and squabbling civilian parties, despised by the nationalists and military and accused of 'betraying' Russia in 1917 by abandoning the Czar and nation (and Church) to godless socialists in the Provisional Govt, into chaos and visible failure. This would then feed a right-wing narrative of the need for a strongman and a strong Orthodox Russia, and arguably feed into a sort of Russian semi-fascism leading to a coup and right-wing govt. Either a restored Czar if so inclined (Cyril?) or a prestigious 'hero of the civil war' (Kolchak?), probably neither of these much good at politics so more of a figurehead, would be put at the top of a regime like the post-1935 Polish oligarchy or
a Salazar-style one-party state. This would be a natural ally of the similarly inclined and anti-Socialist regimes of King Carol in Rumania (the more religious 'Great Russians' could be linked to the Iron Guard), the 1935-43 Bulgarian royal-led govt, and Horthy in Hungary and have a Russian sponsorship for the 'Little Entente' to get Russian prestige for a return to its pre-1914 meddling in the Balkans.

But as we have a rightist and anti-Communist regime in Moscow plus perhaps some fringe anti-Semitism (with Jews like Trotsky accused of stabbing Russia in the back in 1917 and played up as 'aliens') there is no possible Nazi narrative of a 'Bolshevik threat' in Russia to be crushed. The Russian regime is 'Slav' so 'racially inferior', but is a political ally of a right-wing Germany unless Ukraine has survived as indep state and both great powers want to take it over. Do Russia and Germany form a secret alliance to mutually turn on their foe Poland and split it up, or do the Nazis want Eastwards expansion too much to ally to Russia for long? Do they want to manipulate ideological allies into power in Russia in return for the latter giving them a free hand in Ukraine?
 
It would depend which faction(s) actually retook Moscow and St Petersburg as to who came out on top , t least in the sense of controlling the capitals - and whoever took them might well not be on good terms with the leaders of the main military force in other parts of Russia. For instance, I can see a more strongly-backed Deniken managing to take Moscow from the South in autumn 1919,perhaps if Lloyd George had listened more confidently to Churchill and sent in more Allied troops to garrison major towns on the rail routes of Ukraine to the rear of the White army (so Deniken could spare more men for the advance), Deniken had had a large Cossack cavalry force, and D and his political allies had managed to keep all the suspicious Ukrainian factions (eg Nestor Makhno) on side for longer. Deniken's large army would sweep into Moscow from the S with opposition too weak to stop them, in the same way as major Mongol/ Crimean Turk raids in earlier centuries, and the Bolsheviks would have to evacuate their govt to Tver.

Cavalry armies are famously bad at taking major urban areas, especially post machine gun. Correct me if I'm wrong but no horsetribe managed to do anything to Moscow post the mongol invasion in the 13th century.
 
Cavalry armies are famously bad at taking major urban areas, especially post machine gun. Correct me if I'm wrong but no horsetribe managed to do anything to Moscow post the mongol invasion in the 13th century.

The crimeans burned Moscow to the ground in the late 1500s but I couldn't tell you how much of a cavalry army that was.
 
OP I recommend Lord Roem's Limpid Stream from SLP. An interesting take on a Russia without Lenin. Not quite the whites winning the civil war (not the civil war as it was like IOTL but still)
 
My point about the advantages of a stronger Cossack cavalry presence in Deniken's army is more about:
1. their enhanced ability to side-step Bolshevik defences in towns en route to Moscow, eg Tula, and sweep past them onwards. That could spread panic and also cut off large numbers of Red Army troops in towns S of Moscow before they had time to retreat - or lead to the Cossacks pulling up or dynamiting the railway sleepers so the Reds can't evacuate by train. A sort of equivalent of what Lawrence did to the Turks on the Aqaba railway in 1916-17, perhaps with one of the British M16 agents superintending a team of saboteurs who were moving with the Deniken army. Stephen Alley is more likely than the more famous Sidney Reilly, with SR mostly operative in Moscow and St Petersburg behind the Bolshevik lines.
2. Cutting off Moscow from any attempt to bring in troops or food from St Petersburg or towns to the NE. I agree that fighting in the streets of Moscow would be difficult, but if the Whites had cut the city off Deniken could bring up heavier artillery from Kiev and shell the resisting districts in to submission ; an urban revolt against the Russian army had been crushed before , in St P in 1905.But the Whites could be too short of troops to take a solidly entrenched Bolshevik urban district until they had reinforcements from the Volga, possibly the first Samara troops or the Czech Legion if we assume that the Whites had managed to hang onto the lower Volga in autumn 1918 not retreat East.
 
My point isn't that it would be impossible for the Whites to take Moscow and St. Petersburg, but rather that to do so they would have to ruin the city. Neither of the cities could be taken in a nice sharp charge, but rather would have to be bombed into submission. Resistance would be especially fierce in the most economically vital parts of the city, the industrial districts, and with every shell Russia would be making itself more economically backwards. In 1905 the Moscow revolt, which was a few hundred untrained workers and professional revolutionaries, was put down by bombarding the industrial regions, any attempt to repeat the feat in 1919 would have to be far more extensive. Also even if it went relatively undamaged during the fighting I'm confident the Bolshevists would detonate the Kremlin and the Winter Palace if defeat was certain. All of this would contribute immensely to Russia failed-stateness.
 
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