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When is the earliest we can get a "Great War"?

Major Crimson

Here occasionally and quietly
So the "Great War" is a tried and tested AH trope - the WW1 equivalent when industrial warfare reaches such a point that a multilateral Great Power Conflict becomes that horrific, bloody slog usually replete with trenches, rapid technological advancement, machine guns, early aerial warfare and so on.

But what point in OTL tech/time does this become viable? Effectively what you need are Empires big enough to engage in such a conflict (indeed the immediate conflict itself is almost unimportant, as it can quickly snowball into a major conflict ala OTL WW1) but what really makes it a "Great War" is, in my mind, the adoption of particular technologies.

The key developments needed, I think, are:

  • Mass adoption of repeating rifles (perhaps specifically bolt action but any repeater might do)
  • Adoption of *reliable machine guns (recoil or gas operated)
  • Adoption of modern artillery
  • Development of state infrastructure sufficient to mobilise huge portions of the male population in a rapid manner
  • The development of modern theatre level war plans (?)
Other technologies (aerial warfare, tanks, infiltration tactics) can I think be developed during the "Great War" and aren't a requirement to start one.

We see the inklings of some of these in earlier conflicts (ACW, Crimea, Franco-Prussian War, etc) and some mainstream AH has pursued inbetween scenarios; TL-191's Second Mexican War very deliberately is painted as a half-way house between the ACW and WW1. Looking at the casualty rates and brutality of fighting in certain parts of the American Civil War, some of the basics are already there but clearly not enough. Likewise the Franco-Prussian War has more important hallmarks (rapid mobilisation via railroad, theatre-level planning, modern heavy artillery) but ends too quickly to demonstrate the real Great War trappings. In part this is because of the political pressures on both sides, particularly France, but absent those pressures, could France have dug in and dragged out the war into something altogether more world changing?

I think most of what you need for a Great War in this fashion is in place by at least the mid-1890s, following the adoption of the Maxim gun. Of course, the war would (as in our own Great War) lead to a massive acceleration in war technology so perhaps such a conflict could come earlier? The 1880s or even 1870s? As mentioned above, is the technology of the Franco-Prussian War sufficient for such a "Great War"?

So yeah, thoughts? Anything I'm missing or have overlooked?
 
It only become possible after Haber Bosch is adopted on a mass scale, otherwise nitrates just can’t keep up with demand.
So we are talking 1910s? And in any war before 1910s whoever is the non-British side automatically loses the war in a year or something, for lack of imported nitrates? Or both sides grind to a halt? Spell out the non-Haber Bosch consequences and do the math for us, and tell us when the earliest time this threshold it met, in your view.
 
Picking up one of Major's point, while not fitting the criteria precisely, in many ways we see traits of the Great War in the American Civil War, i.e. trench warfare, military trains, repeating rifles and pistols, machine guns (Ager and Gatling II), iron-clad naval and river vessels, submarines, grenades, sea mines and mobilisation and supply on both sides. I am always surprised that in the run up to the Great War more attention was not paid to the American Civil War which was more like what was going to happen both on the Western and Eastern Fronts (if you like, reversed) than any of the colonial wars fought in the 50 years from 1865.

Wars always advance technology, not simply military, thus if a great war had broken out in the late 19th Century while there might not have been a leap to get to your criteria, it is likely that there would have been developments taking technology closer to that seen in 1914 than otherwise have been the case. Biological warfare using smallpox had been employed against the indigenous population of North America by the British as early as the 1760s and would continue to be used by the USA. Thus, some elements which may have gone into the Great War - the Germans used infected horses then though they did not have huge effect - might have kicked in to a greater extent because other technologies had not advanced as far as your criteria require.
 
I am always surprised that in the run up to the Great War more attention was not paid to the American Civil War which was more like what was going to happen both on the Western and Eastern Fronts (if you like, reversed) than any of the colonial wars fought in the 50 years from 1865.

Worth pointing out that in the run-up to the great war there was an example of a war between colonizing industrial or industrializing nations for people to study-the Russo-Japanese War.
 
Plenty of people studied previous conflicts. They weren't morons.*

It's just that those conflicts did not teach the lessons that we assume they must have. We treat those conflicts as lead ups to World War One, and see what was similar, and shake our heads and make snarky comments about the foolish generals who could not see the oh so obvious lessons. But without World War One, you have a different set of lessons.

What does the South African War teach the British? That entrenched positions can be circumvented with speed and offence. Lesson: the cavalry is still a vital tool of the battlefield.

What does the Franco-Prussian War teach the French? That motivated attackers can overcome defenders with sufficient drive, even when the defenders have modern artillery and machine guns. Lesson: Offence is king.

What does the Russo-Japanese War teach everyone? Mass attacks of infantry can overwhelm an entrenched position. Lesson: mass infantry attacks work.

What does the American Civil War teach the Americans, who did study it intensively? Not a damn thing, because warfare had changed massively in seventy years and the AEF was hopelessly inadequate to the task in front of it when it arrived on the battlefield in 1917.



* Alright, so Cardona was a moron and so were a few others, but generally speaking they weren't morons.
 
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Plenty of people studied previous conflicts. They weren't morons.*

It's just that those conflicts did not teach the lessons that we assume they must have. We treat those conflicts as lead ups to World War One, and see what was similar, and shake our heads and make snarky comments about the foolish generals who could not see the oh so obvious lessons. But without World War One, you have a different set of lessons.

What does the South African War teach the British? That entrenched positions can be circumvented with speed and offence. Lesson: the cavalry is still a vital tool of the battlefiedl.

What does the Franco-Prussian War teach the French? That motivated attackers can overcome defenders with sufficient drive, even when the defenders have modern artillery and machine guns. Lesson: Offence is king.

What does the Russo-Japanese War teach everyone? Mass attacks of infantry can overwhelm an entrenched position. Lesson: mass infantry attacks work.

What does the American Civil War teach the Americans, who did study it intensively? Not a damn thing, because warfare had changed massively in seventy years and the AEF was hopelessly inadequate to the task in front of it when it arrived on the battlefield in 1917.



* Alright, so Cardona was a moron and so were a few others, but generally speaking they weren't morons.
European observers also basically wrote off a good chunk of the civil war experience because neither side had Calvary or Artillery arms worth much in a European context as those need to be built up over decades. They saw several indecisive and bloody battles as a natural result of commanders lacking a means of deciding the battle and capitalising on success.
 
What does the American Civil War teach the Americans, who did study it intensively? Not a damn thing, because warfare had changed massively in seventy years and the AEF was hopelessly inadequate to the task in front of it when it arrived on the battlefield in 1917.
Sorry for being pedantic, but the time between the American Civil War and World War I was fifty years, not seventy years.
 
It only become possible after Haber Bosch is adopted on a mass scale, otherwise nitrates just can’t keep up with demand.
This is a very interesting point, do you think there is any hope that earlier methods (Birkeland–Eyde) could substitute or is it simply too inefficient?
 
This is a very interesting point, do you think there is any hope that earlier methods (Birkeland–Eyde) could substitute or is it simply too inefficient?
They could up to a point, but you get much before 1910 and the power generating capacity to use any of them at scale isn't there. Finger in the air date for that capacity existing is probably something like 1904-5, but it's something you could probably scale up in the first year of war if you didn't e.g. conscript all the technicians and get them massacred before then.

On the other hand, an 1890 army is going to be less powder-hungry than a 1915 one.

A war prior to 1910 where Britain can close the seas (so one where Britain is involved, and not fighting some sort of pan-European coalition of literally everyone else) is one which ends quicker than OTL WW1, but not necessarily quite as quick as "over by Christmas".

Whether a Napoleonic-style close blockade to cut off all trade even for the Central Powers (much less France or Russia) is feasible for an RN with no radio and ships half as quick as 1914 is another question - my suspicion is "ultimately yes, but casualties are going to be utterly murderous when the other side's navy catch the blockade squadrons". I don't think any reasonable combination of non-UK Great Powers can actually do it to any other in the 1880-1910 or so period.
 
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I don't think any reasonable combination of non-UK Great Powers can actually do it to any other in the 1880-1910 or so period.
This is important, because there are multiple coalition war possibilities where Britain may not be involved as a belligerent, or may not be involved at first.

So France and Germany can't do it (the total nitrate starve blockade) to each other, and neither can do it to Russia, nor Russia to them.
 
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