raharris1973
Well-known member
What if the Ottoman Empire had better foreign protection and foreign policy luck after the Crimean War?
Within Austria-Hungary in the early 1870s, after the Franco-Prussian war clearly establishes Prussian hegemony in Germany and excludes Austria-Hungary from Germany and converts German-Austrians largely over to the concept of alignment with the new German Reich, Austria-Hungary debates its future as a great power.
Austria-Hungary is excluded forever from its historic playgrounds of Italy and Germany, thanks to events since 1859. Vienna's freedom of action is circumscribed by its own financial and political weakness, amplified by the Dual Monarchy system, France's weakness, its dependence on Germany, and Germany's commitment to remain on cordial terms with Russia.
The substantive question raised in Vienna is whether or not Austria-Hungary should take on, as its new geopolitical "mission", territorial and strategic expansion in the only direction left to it, southeast, toward the Balkans. The KUK Army General Staff, led by Beck, Viennese industrialists, senior Austrian diplomats, Croatians, and Catholic clerical figures in Cisleithania favor this, and expanding into Bosnia is their immediate focus. However, the Magyar nobility of Hungary, and the political and clerical and military classes of the Kingdom, all strongly oppose any territorial augmentation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that would, through acquisition of Ottoman lands, add to the Empire's Slavic or Orthodox populations, and thereby dilute Magyar influence.
At the end of the day, the Hungarians win the debate and the idea 'political' expansion/territorial acquisition in the Balkans is rejected, to the disappointment of its proponent factions. This is divergent from OTL, where Hungary could slow down or impede Viennese expansionist projects, but not halt them entirely. Here they do. However, to placate the Austrian/Cisleithanian commercial and military interest groups, the Hungarians endorse Austro-Hungarian commercial expansion and strategic infrastructure investment within the Ottoman Balkans.
Where both the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Empire have an unforced, genuine consensus, is their violent agreement that the status quo of Ottoman rule over the Balkan peninsula is superior to any expansion of Russian influence over the region, either direct, or by Orthodox or Slavic proxy states. Generally, Vienna and Budapest views emergence of any new Orthodox or Slavic state, like a Bulgaria, by revolt, as a gain for Russia, or any expansion of existing ones, like Romania, Serbia, Montenegro or Greece, as a gain for Russia and injury to itself.
From Austrian and Hungarian interlocutors, Bismarck, the German Kaiser Wilhelm I, and other leading Germans are all aware of the contours of the internal Austro-Hungarian debate and how it is being resolved. As a result of this, by early 1874, Bismarck is fully convinced that his earlier vision of resolving Russo-Austrian tensions through an outright partition of the Ottoman Balkans into eastern and western halves, which he saw as an ajunct to his Three Emperors League of 1873, is an unworkable solution, undesired by any of its supposed beneficiaries.
It is unworkable for the following reasons:
a) Under Hungarian pressure, the Habsburgs simply fear the consequences of being 'poisoned' by additional Slavs too much to actually be interested in annexed their supposed share of the Balkans.
b) Instinctively, the Hungarians *and* Austrians are unable to think of the Balkans and the Russians and themselves in 'win/win' terms. They both value denying all the Balkans, east and west, to the Russians, more than they value getting any of the Balkans.
c) The Russians even have difficulty viewing the Balkans, Austrians and themselves in 'win/win' terms. They have a jealousy of the idea of *anyone* gaining territory at Ottoman expense except themselves and certain allies they think they can control, like the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians. The Greeks are independent enough of them that the Russians are even jealous of their potential gains.
Therefore, by default and elimination of alternatives, Bismarck's Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, comes around to the viewpoint that the best map for southeast Europe is the current one, where the Ottomans rule most of it, and it should be upheld, without change. Meanwhile, the region can and should be developed as a single economic unit by Austro-Hungarian and German business.
This may not be pleasing with some romantic rebels among Ottoman Christians, but they don't hold the power and the guns. It may not be pleasing to circles in Russia with romantic sympathies for Orthodox Christians and Slavs under Ottoman rule, but Berlin and Vienna can be quite confident in the 1870s, and a considerable period beyond, that if relay their lack of approval for a Russian war of expansion, the chronically cash-poor Russians, humiliated in their last major war in the 1850s, are no fools, and will not launch a new one.
Bismarck and his Austrian counterparts may develop a new appreciation for Metternich, his Karlsbad decrees, and his principles of no changes to the European territorial status quo, no matter what. After all, with German national aspirations satisified, who cares if the ladder is pulled up without the Bulgarians, other South Slavs, Greeks, or Armenians being fully satisfied.
In the mid-1870s, the still likely Hercegovinian and Bulgarian revolts with test the German-Austrian pro-Ottoman status quo policy. So will probable Serbian and Montenegrin interventions, which those states may find are irrepressible domestic reflexes. But those states will be defeated, and Russia without getting any perceived 'permission' from either Austria or Germany, will not go to war with the Ottomans.
Bismarck and the Austrians will find Gladstone of Britain their most surprising and annoying critic, lambasting them as shields and enablers of the bloody Turk in the Bulgarian horrors.
Nevertheless, without external aid, I expect the Ottomans to pacify the Balkan Christian rebellions of the 1870s in a long, ugly counterinsurgency.
This leaves Berlin and Vienna feeling vindicated in their policy, even if Socialists and left-leaning liberals and liberals in countries to the west and Russia criticize it.
.
The Ottoman Empire, while trading with all western states, appreciates more Vienna and Berlin's 'no [political] strings attached' approach. Berlin and Vienna position themselves, de facto, as the guarantor of the Ottomans' European borders against external aggression, and the armorer, banker and trainer of its forces against rebels. Note I said only European borders. Not wanting to commit themselves to potential conflict with France or Italy in North Africa, nor Britain in the Persian Gulf, Berlin and Vienna make it clear to the Ottomans that they are on their own defending their African and Asian borders.
What are the likely effects of this altered geopolitical situation, where the Ottoman Empire is not defeated by Russia in a war, and retains a European border on the Sava and Danube rivers, on the internal conditions of the larger Ottoman empire, in the latter decades of the 19th century? In particular, what about in the lands that are still Ottoman as a result of the PoD, like Thessaly, Bosnia, Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, Dobruja?
Are there any knock-on effects of significance from this change in the Balkans to British electoral politics, or to what France ends up doing in Tunisia in 1881, or Britain in Egypt in 1882, or Russia in Central and Eastern Asia in the 1880s or 1890s?
Are the developments of, attractions, and antagonisms of the different powers within Europe altered in any way as we wrap up the 19th century and move into the 20th, beyond the existence of fewer, smaller Balkan players, and a somewhat closer alignment of Germany and Austria-Hungary with the Ottomans?
When is the next round of Balkan Christian and national revolts after the failed 1870s ones, if they come at all?
Within Austria-Hungary in the early 1870s, after the Franco-Prussian war clearly establishes Prussian hegemony in Germany and excludes Austria-Hungary from Germany and converts German-Austrians largely over to the concept of alignment with the new German Reich, Austria-Hungary debates its future as a great power.
Austria-Hungary is excluded forever from its historic playgrounds of Italy and Germany, thanks to events since 1859. Vienna's freedom of action is circumscribed by its own financial and political weakness, amplified by the Dual Monarchy system, France's weakness, its dependence on Germany, and Germany's commitment to remain on cordial terms with Russia.
The substantive question raised in Vienna is whether or not Austria-Hungary should take on, as its new geopolitical "mission", territorial and strategic expansion in the only direction left to it, southeast, toward the Balkans. The KUK Army General Staff, led by Beck, Viennese industrialists, senior Austrian diplomats, Croatians, and Catholic clerical figures in Cisleithania favor this, and expanding into Bosnia is their immediate focus. However, the Magyar nobility of Hungary, and the political and clerical and military classes of the Kingdom, all strongly oppose any territorial augmentation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that would, through acquisition of Ottoman lands, add to the Empire's Slavic or Orthodox populations, and thereby dilute Magyar influence.
At the end of the day, the Hungarians win the debate and the idea 'political' expansion/territorial acquisition in the Balkans is rejected, to the disappointment of its proponent factions. This is divergent from OTL, where Hungary could slow down or impede Viennese expansionist projects, but not halt them entirely. Here they do. However, to placate the Austrian/Cisleithanian commercial and military interest groups, the Hungarians endorse Austro-Hungarian commercial expansion and strategic infrastructure investment within the Ottoman Balkans.
Where both the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Empire have an unforced, genuine consensus, is their violent agreement that the status quo of Ottoman rule over the Balkan peninsula is superior to any expansion of Russian influence over the region, either direct, or by Orthodox or Slavic proxy states. Generally, Vienna and Budapest views emergence of any new Orthodox or Slavic state, like a Bulgaria, by revolt, as a gain for Russia, or any expansion of existing ones, like Romania, Serbia, Montenegro or Greece, as a gain for Russia and injury to itself.
From Austrian and Hungarian interlocutors, Bismarck, the German Kaiser Wilhelm I, and other leading Germans are all aware of the contours of the internal Austro-Hungarian debate and how it is being resolved. As a result of this, by early 1874, Bismarck is fully convinced that his earlier vision of resolving Russo-Austrian tensions through an outright partition of the Ottoman Balkans into eastern and western halves, which he saw as an ajunct to his Three Emperors League of 1873, is an unworkable solution, undesired by any of its supposed beneficiaries.
It is unworkable for the following reasons:
a) Under Hungarian pressure, the Habsburgs simply fear the consequences of being 'poisoned' by additional Slavs too much to actually be interested in annexed their supposed share of the Balkans.
b) Instinctively, the Hungarians *and* Austrians are unable to think of the Balkans and the Russians and themselves in 'win/win' terms. They both value denying all the Balkans, east and west, to the Russians, more than they value getting any of the Balkans.
c) The Russians even have difficulty viewing the Balkans, Austrians and themselves in 'win/win' terms. They have a jealousy of the idea of *anyone* gaining territory at Ottoman expense except themselves and certain allies they think they can control, like the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians. The Greeks are independent enough of them that the Russians are even jealous of their potential gains.
Therefore, by default and elimination of alternatives, Bismarck's Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, comes around to the viewpoint that the best map for southeast Europe is the current one, where the Ottomans rule most of it, and it should be upheld, without change. Meanwhile, the region can and should be developed as a single economic unit by Austro-Hungarian and German business.
This may not be pleasing with some romantic rebels among Ottoman Christians, but they don't hold the power and the guns. It may not be pleasing to circles in Russia with romantic sympathies for Orthodox Christians and Slavs under Ottoman rule, but Berlin and Vienna can be quite confident in the 1870s, and a considerable period beyond, that if relay their lack of approval for a Russian war of expansion, the chronically cash-poor Russians, humiliated in their last major war in the 1850s, are no fools, and will not launch a new one.
Bismarck and his Austrian counterparts may develop a new appreciation for Metternich, his Karlsbad decrees, and his principles of no changes to the European territorial status quo, no matter what. After all, with German national aspirations satisified, who cares if the ladder is pulled up without the Bulgarians, other South Slavs, Greeks, or Armenians being fully satisfied.
In the mid-1870s, the still likely Hercegovinian and Bulgarian revolts with test the German-Austrian pro-Ottoman status quo policy. So will probable Serbian and Montenegrin interventions, which those states may find are irrepressible domestic reflexes. But those states will be defeated, and Russia without getting any perceived 'permission' from either Austria or Germany, will not go to war with the Ottomans.
Bismarck and the Austrians will find Gladstone of Britain their most surprising and annoying critic, lambasting them as shields and enablers of the bloody Turk in the Bulgarian horrors.
Nevertheless, without external aid, I expect the Ottomans to pacify the Balkan Christian rebellions of the 1870s in a long, ugly counterinsurgency.
This leaves Berlin and Vienna feeling vindicated in their policy, even if Socialists and left-leaning liberals and liberals in countries to the west and Russia criticize it.
.
The Ottoman Empire, while trading with all western states, appreciates more Vienna and Berlin's 'no [political] strings attached' approach. Berlin and Vienna position themselves, de facto, as the guarantor of the Ottomans' European borders against external aggression, and the armorer, banker and trainer of its forces against rebels. Note I said only European borders. Not wanting to commit themselves to potential conflict with France or Italy in North Africa, nor Britain in the Persian Gulf, Berlin and Vienna make it clear to the Ottomans that they are on their own defending their African and Asian borders.
What are the likely effects of this altered geopolitical situation, where the Ottoman Empire is not defeated by Russia in a war, and retains a European border on the Sava and Danube rivers, on the internal conditions of the larger Ottoman empire, in the latter decades of the 19th century? In particular, what about in the lands that are still Ottoman as a result of the PoD, like Thessaly, Bosnia, Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, Dobruja?
Are there any knock-on effects of significance from this change in the Balkans to British electoral politics, or to what France ends up doing in Tunisia in 1881, or Britain in Egypt in 1882, or Russia in Central and Eastern Asia in the 1880s or 1890s?
Are the developments of, attractions, and antagonisms of the different powers within Europe altered in any way as we wrap up the 19th century and move into the 20th, beyond the existence of fewer, smaller Balkan players, and a somewhat closer alignment of Germany and Austria-Hungary with the Ottomans?
When is the next round of Balkan Christian and national revolts after the failed 1870s ones, if they come at all?