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What if no Islamic Revolution in Iran, regional and global consequences?

raharris1973

Well-known member
What if the Islamic Revolution of the late 1970s does not happen in Iran, what would be the medium and long-term domestic, regional, and global consequences?

I will give a simple PoD- when the Shah's doctors first identify his cancer in 1974, they don't keep the news from him [which they did until two or four years later], they tell him right away and he gets a spleenectomy and competent follow-up treatment.

As a result of successful cancer treatment, a healthier Shah, not getting mentally disturbed by side effects of misprescribed drugs and depressed his mortality and failing physical health, is more sound mentally, and more focused on governing.

He survives challenging protest movements, especially militant ones, by suppressing them to whatever degree is necessary, to protect what he sees as his regime's (and dynasty's) achievements so far and continue advancing the country.

If he has any moments of doubt while dousing popular anger with repression, he puts it aside by remembering what's at stake. If he has any worry about being undercut by Jimmy Carter's overall human rights policy, he also pushes those aside, thinking of the generally positive words he tends to hear from US diplomats in country, military and intel figures, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and even Carter's own speech early in his term where he called Iran an 'island of stability'. In any case, after riding out some rough patches, by 1981, Carter is out of office in the USA because of discontent over the economy, Ronald Reagan is President, and he is an enthusiastic supporter of the Shah who sees his as a more important ally than ever containing the USSR in the region after its late 70s invasion of Afghanistan.

Doing a quick review of major 1980s events that will converge and diverge from OTL, here is what I suspect:

Afghan War - yes, it will happen, it will freak out anti-Soviet countries, and Pakistan and Iran, all of whom will support Mujhadeen. The Pakistanis will support fundamentalist Pashtos, the Iranians will support Hazaras and Tajiks. It's not gonna go great for the Soviets.

There is no Iran-Iraq war - Iraq just is not going to see Iran as a target of opportunity, because Iran will not have the deadly mixed appearance of being weak and unstable yet also dangerous, provocative and expansionist. As a result of no war, and other factors, both Iraq and Iran will continue to develop their economies, technology and standard of living, rather than face stagnation, debt, and infrastructure destruction in border zones.

The Israeli 1982 invasion of Lebanon should occur as historical, and be controversial globally and within Israel. Lebanon will have Israeli and Syrian intervention, and be rent by militia fighting.

However, the attacks blowing up the US Embassy and US Marine Barracks in Beirut, attributed the Islamic Jihad Organization section of Iranian-backed Hezbollah, will not occur, allowing the US "peacekeeping" operation in Lebanon to conclude without major humiliation even if without any peacemaking success to point at. Amal will remain the main Shia militia in Lebanon.

The Israeli strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor would probably still occur as historical (in 1981 or 1983, I forget). The Israelis, or possibly the Iranians, who may be concerned about an Iraqi nuke, may need to do an operation to "mow the grass" once more by the end of the decade to avoid being confronted with a working Iraqi nuke.

The western-Saudi agreement to drop oil prices from 1984-86 is likely to still happen as both an anti-Soviet measure and a measure on the Saudis part to discourage oil import substitution and alternate energy. Only this time, Iran would be included in the planning, with adjustments made to accomodate budgeting for the Shah's public works plans. Since Iran would be pro-western in the 1980s unlike OTL, like the Saudis it can still live well off the west even in a low oil price world by investing its sovereign wealth funds in diverse enterprises in the west (and Asia) as well as at home.

Regarding Iran itself, I would imagine a fair lifespan to give the cancer-free Shah would be until 1987, so he lives till age 67 or 68, just a couple more than his Dad, who died in a humiliating exile. His some would be mid-20s by then. Still young, but eligible. For good measure, let's say Khomeini dies the same year in his Iraqi exile, just a couple years earlier than OTL, having had more disappointment and less adrenaline in his life.

As for Iran going forward under the son and into the 1990s, I don't think it has to stay perfectly secular, and there probably would be alternations of political liberalization and clamping down. But political liberalization was pretty globally popular in the late 1980s. More public displays of faith and modesty may become 'trendy' in Iran, as happened in Pakistan and Egypt and Turkey. But let's just say that whatever changes are evolutionary or constitutional and not revolutionary, there's not a velayat e-faqih constitution installed, and by 2023, the furthest Iran may have wandered in that direction is having an illiberal, semi-democratic Erdoganist Islamicist ruling party and chief executive.

Macro-trends of economic stagnation, and a desire to remedy it, and medium trends like the Afghan war and the unfavorable drop in energy prices, all parallel to OTL, are likely to point the USSR to Glasnost, Perestroika, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then USSR over 1989-91.

The east bloc collapse will mean no more subsidized arms at least for Mideast radical nationalist regimes like Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Libya. Anything they try to buy from Russia or other former Soviet Republics will have to be cash on the nail going into the 1990s. No eastern bloc funding for the PLO either.

Without Iran and Syria in combination backing Hezbollah, and that group becoming increasingly effective in wearying Israel in Lebanon over the course of the 1990s, Israel's endgame in Lebanon will be something different from unilateral withdrawal. At any point between 1985 and 2005 it might instead have been a negotiated withdrawal, involving a peace agreement or nonbelligerency agreement, or a permanent occupation of the south Lebanon security zone in the absence of an agreement. What do you see happening here?

Lack of a Hezbollah success provides less inspiration for Hamas to apply a similar model in Gaza and the West Bank. And with Iran not being an Islamic Fundamentalist regime getting practice in supporting the Hezbollah resistance model, Iran will not get drawn in as a supporter to Hamas attempting to follow any similar models in the occupied territories. But none of this stopped the Intifadeh of the late 1980s.

Regardless, with no successful resistance in Lebanon and no foreign countries backing Hezbollah or Hamas resistance to oppose the Israelis or provide any kind of deterrent counter-force to the Israelis, what kind of expansionist and annexationist or expulsionist schemes would the Israeli governments have become emboldened to do at what points over the 1990s and 2000s in what land in the Middle East region?
 
I know @David Flin has some knowledge of Iran. From what he's said, I'm not sure that the Shah avoiding cancer is going to be enough to save the regime.
 
I know @David Flin has some knowledge of Iran. From what he's said, I'm not sure that the Shah avoiding cancer is going to be enough to save the regime.

How the Shah would have turned out personality-wise avoiding cancer is a bit of a tabula rasa.

In OTL, by the mid-1970s, he was on a collision course with a revolution, and the only question was how bad it would be and who would end up on top.

Dithering, corrupt as all hell, petulant, setting up divisions within the society. It was never going to end well.

Getting a wise Shah out of it probably requires magic wands, but I'm in no position to say how different he would be had the cancer been treated properly and early. My guess? There's still going to be a revolution, but it will take a different course.
 
corrupt as all hell
What exemplifies the imperial corruption to you? Lavish royal lifestyle and celebrations, like the big Persian civilization celebration?

Juxtaposed with poverty for average people?

Because it seems while the Shah benefitted in 1953 from the western intel services, US and UK, striking back against oil nationalization, and a restoration of their profits [although in redistributed shares between the Shah, Iranian government, AIOC, and American majors], he adjusted ownership and pricing much more to his liking and national advantage in the 1960s and 1970s, and funded broad-based education and development programs. So he didn't seem like a stereotypical latin, 'the peasants can stay illiterate behind the plows' kind of banana republican dictator or monarch.

'Corruption' is a weird term. Is it an accusation you find thrown about much in British internal politics? Or is it not, as I suspect, and in Britain the arguments are about how much money to tax and spend and what and who to spend it on. In America, 'corruption' isn't really part of a self-description of what happens in our own country, even though we dispute the basic purpose and legitimate functions of government all the time. However, Anglos, at least in America, are prone to throw the 'corruption' label at any 'exotic' developing country, third world or second world, whose system is at all different or difficult to understand or has somebody complaining about it. People in these countries translate their complaint as 'corruption' all the time, but it can be hard to know if it's monetary, civic, or something more subjective like 'spiritual'.

All in all, we see plenty of things in the non-western world that are corrupt by any measure. Other times, the accusation of 'corruption' means the accuser is envious somebody else has control of money or power *they* wish they controlled instead.
 
What exemplifies the imperial corruption to you? Lavish royal lifestyle and celebrations, like the big Persian civilization celebration?

There will now be a short delay while I try to find my reference books on the subject. In my cough "copious free time".

One I am aware is a very specific example: at Isfahan, there was a planned construction of housing for guest workers of high repute (ie, management types rather than labourers).

Nothing exceptional about this. Other than all the delays involved. Which were overcome by the transfer of funds in the form of US$ banknotes to the relevant parties, when the delay mysteriously disappeared.

Or the delightful habit of soldiers being paid by their officers receiving the money and - in theory - distributing it appropriately. Naturally, this never happened, and equally naturally, the unpaid soldiers took impromptu taxes to cover it from the local people.

Or the block of houses near the Armenian quarter in Isfahan that was demolished so that a statue to the Shah could be built.
 
Iran was going to implode during the 1970s and the Shah was an easy target for the entire regime, in part because of his megalomania and also because of his throttling of his country's democratic development to benefit his autocratic regime. Not to mention that all that oil boom didn't really benefit the people, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, as the effects of that only reached a small portion of society. There's a reason why even Saudi Arabia was nervous about the Iranian Revolution, for starters. When all possible avenues for peaceful change are blocked, and most obvious elements of civil society have been severely compromised or outright banned by a security state that can rival even East Germany's Stasi, the only real outlets left were either in religion or in extremist movements like the Tudeh. That it ended up being primarily religious could have been avoided, but the role of religion could not be. That's what made Iran in 1979 different from, say, Russia in 1917.

Now, could the Revolution in Iran have turned out differently? Of course it could be; while it's impossible to separate religion from the Revolution (thank you Shariati), the Revolution as a whole didn't have based entirely around it. However, even ensuring the Shah's cancer is caught early would not stop the momentum and hunger for change that his regime was too ossified to capture. To really get an Iran with no revolution, in fact, probably requires a different approach towards Mossadegh back in the 1950s - back around the time when it could still be possible to have opportunities for change, yet still traumatized to some degree by Reza Shah's regime and the joint British-Russian invasion and colonization of Iran during the Second World War. Had Mossadegh not been overthrown, Iran would have ended up in a much different place and would not have needed a Revolution to overthrow the regime. In fact, Mossadegh should have been a natural ally for the Eisenhower administration - as long as Mossadegh publicly proclaimed he was fighting Communism (which would probably mean fighting against the Tudeh), the US would probably allow him to do whatever he felt was necessary to modernize Iran (while also bringing on board the ulama, as the Iranian Constitution of 1906 requires that all legislation must be compatible with the Quran and Shariah), even if the Shah disagreed.
 
The best way to stop the Islamic Revolution  and have a mostly stable secular-ish state does seem to change the 50s, for sure. Have the Shah win out in the 70s but never address all the lingering pressure & discontent, something inevitably blows up - I wouldn't see it lasting much beyond the Cold War
 
The Iranian revolution against the Shah's regime or anything close to what it was by the 1970s is something I can imagine as a plausible argument. I think it's defensible and plausible. Alternatives are plausible too, but yeah.

That's why I'm wary of saying Jimmy Carter's human rights policy *made* the Shah and his regime chicken-out, and all-out support would have necessarilly stopped the revolution with 'a whiff of grapeshot'.

Even Anthony James Joes, an author who focuses on the military and security screw-ups that attended every major successful revolution and insurgency since the French Revolution, while he details errors in the Shah's security posture, allows there is a possibility the regime might have fallen to popular rage no matter how hard to repress it.

On the other hand, we've often accepted scenarios where just the righ turn of luck or effectively applied use of repression suppresses revolutions as significant as the French or Russian as plausible, and that might arguably be the case with the Iranian, even as late as the 1970s, with a healthy, determined Shah.

---However, related to this concept, when I very first conceived of a scenario where the Shah or Imperial hardliners hold on to power in the 70s through repression, back in the 90s (possibly late 90s on soc.history.what-if, or earlier, in offline musings) all I imagined it doing was something like @Charles EP M. suggested:

The best way to stop the Islamic Revolution  and have a mostly stable secular-ish state does seem to change the 50s, for sure. Have the Shah win out in the 70s but never address all the lingering pressure & discontent, something inevitably blows up - I wouldn't see it lasting much beyond the Cold War

Basically this, the 1970s just buys the Imperial regime ten or so more years of life, until circa 1989, or 1991, when, in the assumed parallel timeline, with the parallel collapsing of the Soviet bloc, liberalization and people power movements being trending, and US unequivocal support for rightist dictators eroding as the Cold War 'need' for them evaporated, would allow something very like the 1978-79 revolution, ultimately captured by Islamic fundamentalists to happen. I just suppose a successor of Khomeini, rather than Khomeini himself, would be alive to take charge of it.

Of course, from a 1990s perspective, buying the regime another decade seemed like a geopolitically significant period of time.
 
The Iranian revolution against the Shah's regime or anything close to what it was by the 1970s is something I can imagine as a plausible argument. I think it's defensible and plausible. Alternatives are plausible too, but yeah.

That's why I'm wary of saying Jimmy Carter's human rights policy *made* the Shah and his regime chicken-out, and all-out support would have necessarilly stopped the revolution with 'a whiff of grapeshot'.

Once we hit the 1970s, something is going to give and it's going to get messy.

Note that something like 10% of the entire population marched in demonstrations on the two days of 10-11 December 1978. To give an idea of scale, that's around 25 million marching in the USA.

Something was going to happen.
 
Of course, from a 1990s perspective, buying the regime another decade seemed like a geopolitically significant period of time.

No state sponsoring of shifty groups (though maybe they all go to Libya more), no Iraq-Iran War, no resulting invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm (or at least not due to that war), a larger population of Iran...
 
There might be a Juan Carlos situation if the regime has already been shaken by large but not terminal riots and mass strikes hitting the economy, which do not spiral into outright rebellion as there are a lower number of flashpoints plus a more hesitant (as he is having drastic medical treatment abroad?) Shah. If this occurs in Carter's Presidency in the US and angry crowds are targeting US personnel and assets, eg sacking US-owned properties, and there are a few but only sporadic attacks on Americans by Islamist urban guerillas inflitrating from Iraq then the US government could decide to pressurise the Pahlavis to loosen their political control. Alarmed US businesses fearing for their assets and profits and CIA securocrats fearing that the Tudeh party (Communists) will make hay out of the regime's unpopularity and recruit guerillas - with the Soviets arming the latter to stir up trouble and perhaps start a revolt in Azerbaijan which they can aid - could then favour a forced liberalization in order to decrease tension by weaning most of the opposition in the streets away from joining in either the Islamic or the Tudeh troublemakers .

Under a Democrat President the argument of going down the Spanish route which as of 1979-80 was visibly working (the attempted right wing backlash coup in Madrid was 1981) might prevail , especially with human rights enthusiast Carter, as opposed to the classical Republican line of 'these people are all Commies, we need to be firm and shoot them down, lets help SAVAK instead' which would be more likely if and when a Rep President wins the 1980 election and takes over. Reagan being loudly patriotic and anti-Communist, he's more likely to take a tough pro-regime line if the riots are still on but not yet overwhelming and the Shah is still alive and in power as of Jan 1981 . But a Carter govt that faces this dilemma before the crucial final stages of a close election in Oct - Nov 1980 could risk telling the regime to reopen multi-party politics , shift money to helping the poor in major urban areas with welfare and housing, and putting top corrupt business crooks on trial . The ailing current Shah could then be told to abdicate and hand over a lot of his wealth to a special Foundation to aid the ordinary citizens so his son can take over as front-man of a new govt headed by veteran National Front personnel and with a freer Parliament recalled and the US military behind the scenes funding but keeping a close eye on the Iranian military leadership so there's no right wing coup - and telling them that they get lots of funds for weapons and can keep their assets if they play ball.

The new regime might fall later as 'too little too late' and the Republican govt in the US from 1981 - if Reagan wins with no visible humiliation for Carter in Iran to ruin his foreign policy reputation in 1980 - could decide that backing the Iranian military and cracking down would be safer and more helpful to their business allies and would scare the Soviets off . A regime that fails to deliver on massive - and contradictory - expectations to a huge and febrile populace which has tasted freedom and wants more can collapse, not last if it is too factional and riven by intrigue and its not in full control of the country or its military - cf Kerensky in Russia in 1917, though he had the problem of unpopularity due to keeping on with an unpopular war too. Unlike the semi-similar France in 1790-1, the new regime would be led by a new and seemingly untainted ruler not the man who had been in charge before the dam broke in 1789 - though the new Shah's relatives and court generals and nobles would be a source of popular hatred and Islamist opposition propaganda as 'corrupt and meddling' and would need to be marginalised. It could easily all go wrong - but if there's a capable combined US and Iran regime security thrust at the time of the 'reforms' in 1979-80 to keep the OTL group of pro-Khomeini urban and clerical activists in the major cities on the defensive and Khomeini has been isolated in exile (in France?) and banned from any public statements with his mail searched for inflammatory cassettes of his speeches it might just 'hold the ring' until new secular and moderate Islamic parties can emerge to forge a coalition in a powerful Assembly and set up a legitimate elected govt. But the US govt would have to have the sense to direct a move to broaden social cohesion via social reforms and reining in corruption at the top, which I can really only see a Democratic President having the nerve and the ideology to do - would angry asset-stripping US international business tycoons denied a free hand in Iran plus CIA hawks stop a Reagan govt even thinking about this?
 
would angry asset-stripping US international business tycoons denied a free hand in Iran plus CIA hawks stop a Reagan govt even thinking about this?
If convinced it was the cleverest, and only, way to outfox the Soviet Union and Iranian (Tudeh) Communists. If not, and they thought parliament and National Front were 'opening the door to Tudeh and left radicals, including ironically MEK, they could support a military crackdown all the more. They would underestimate the threat of clerical fundamentalist forces. But these are exactly the forces who, for example, put the thumb on the scale of the 1982 El Salvadoran election to ensure victory for Christian Democrat Joes Napoleon Duarte because it had more centrist, better 'optics' than the higher vote-getting far-right ARENA party of death squad leader Roberto D'Aubisson. Reagan's folks also were able to 'read the room', eventually, amid popular demonstrations against Marcos, Baby Doc Duvalier, and Augusto Pinochet to eventually support the departure of all three, albeit under media and Congressional pressure. That was a second Reagan term thing and might have been a maturation thing as well.
 
Because of the Islamic Revolution, planes that were meant for Iran ended up sold to Israel instead. Operation Opera (the bombing of Osirak) would either have failed or been a suicide mission for the pilot without those planes. OTL it was already expected to be a one way trip for the pilot.

If it failed, Iraq might have a nuclear weapon.
 
Because of the Islamic Revolution, planes that were meant for Iran ended up sold to Israel instead. Operation Opera (the bombing of Osirak) would either have failed or been a suicide mission for the pilot without those planes. OTL it was already expected to be a one way trip for the pilot.

If it failed, Iraq might have a nuclear weapon.
Really, the resulting available hardware was that much of an upgrade for the Israelis.
 
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