raharris1973
Well-known member
When Louis Napoleon, the original Napoleon's nephew, was elected French President in December 1848, Europe, which admittedly did have many other disturbances and ructions to worry about, doesn't seem to have erupted into panic about the conqueror's line being back in charge. In turn, he as new French President seemed to run a pretty normal foreign policy. He did end up sending some French forces abroad to intervene militarily in his first year as President, but it was on a relatively small scale and for a conservative cause, restoring the Pope's temporal power over Rome and the province of Lazio.
He waited several years to do something more dramatic internationally, getting himself crowned Emperor by plebiscite in 1852 then initiating the Eastern Crisis in 1853 and fighting the Crimean War, on Britain's side, for a change, from 1854.
In this ATL, he takes a bolder and more unilateral path. There's any number of directions he can go, or try to go, in 1849.
A) One of the simplest and most natural directions to intervene could be an invasion of Belgium, long an objective of French foreign policy. Since Belgium had succeeded in winning independence via revolt 18 years earlier, the revolutionary spirit of 1848 really didn't take root in Belgium. Some small groups were inspired to revolt and some support came from across the border in 1848 but it had been easily crushed.
Here is a summary of the Belgian situation in 1848 from wiki:
I would think that it spoil Napoleon III's genuine achievement of rapprochement with Britain, and Britain would freak out, along with others and Europe. I imagine Britain declaring war. However, Britain always relied on a continental coalition, and would one be available to help during the disorders ongoing into 1849? For instance, ordinarily, the Netherlands wouldn't relish having France as a neighbor, but could the Dutch government be won over to the French side if Louis Napoleon offers them a partition of Belgium, reclaiming Flemish lands only lost 18 years earlier? Would the Prussians be up for forming an anti-French coalition at this time while dealing with revolutionary and constitutional disturbances internally and in the other German states. The high German national sentiment of the time could either distract from French activity, because of differences coming to a head over how to constitute Germany, or throw Germans across a wide political spectrum enthusiastically into a confrontational stance with France. Anti-Frenchism for historical reasons *can* be a unifying thread for Germans, but is not a guaranteed slam-dunk, especially when the the Germans already had the Schleswig issue and the Danish enemy to rally against, and with Britain (and Russia) calling for Prusso-German restraint against Denmark, German ears may not be too receptive from arguments from them that the Germans should now turn in the other direction and fight against the French in Belgium.
The Austrians would ideologically oppose French moves but would still be tactically preoccupied with suppression of the Hungarians and Italians, limiting what they can do.
B) Another direction the French could go, likely in tandem with action in Belgium rather than as a stand-alone action, could be an an invasion of the Prussian and Bavarian Rhineland in order to achieve France's "natural" borders in the north east. That action by itself would constitute a declaration of war against Prussia and Bavaria and a concern of the German Confederation and lesser German states collectively. German liberal and radical ambition, still extant in 1849, would likely be crushed between the millstones of Prussia calling for patriotic and confederal resistance by the Kings and Princes on their own terms, and the foreign French invader from the outside. So, in the end the struggle in the Rhineland comes down to the military and economic physical capacities and the populations of France 1849 versus Prussia and the lesser German states in 1849. The Austrians would not be able to contribute much as they reassembled their empire and put down the Italians (which they might not do as thoroughly here). The Germans would almost certainly enjoy financial support from Britain, and quite possibly troop reinforcements from the Russian empire.
C) A third direction could be a French intervention in Italy. This could fit in with the historic Napoleon III's OTL biography in two ways. An intervention in Italy, unlike the proposed more northerly interventions, does not threaten the status quo of the channel ports, and thus has a greater chance of preserving Napoleon III's OTL goal of maintaining good relations with Britain, in contrast to the usual Anglo-French doom loop. It also fits in with his background as a Carbonari boy.
A February - March intervention could see the French intervene to prevent the second and final defeat of Piedmont, a defeat of Austrian forces, possibly their ouster from the quadrilateral, and a link-up with the Venetian forces of the Republic of San Marco. This could result in the ouster of Austria from all of northern Italy and its unification in some federation, with Piedmont as the most experienced member. With regard to Rome and the Papal States, Louis Napoleon can stick with his OTL policy of appeasing the French Catholic vote, being anti-revolutionary and supporting full restoration of Papal temporal powers there. Or, he could decide to go all-in on the Carbonari, support the Roman Republic and its federation with the other Italian states (and possibly Sicily and Naples) and write off a loss of a block of ultramontane Catholic supporters, figuring his margin of victory in 1848 was so large he can afford to lose 10-20 % of it.
D) Possibly, instead of any of the above, a more modest piecemeal border expansion plan could be his method, perhaps simply quick attacks, followed by attempts at quick settlements, to restore the northeastern borders with Belgium, Prussian and Bavaria to what they were in 1814 (so Saar and a few other select areas), and in Italy, while betraying Italian liberal nationalism and crushing the Roman Republic, he could possibly double-team Piedmont while the Austrians are beating it, siezing Savoy and Nice, and setting up a foundation for an alliance with Austria.
He waited several years to do something more dramatic internationally, getting himself crowned Emperor by plebiscite in 1852 then initiating the Eastern Crisis in 1853 and fighting the Crimean War, on Britain's side, for a change, from 1854.
In this ATL, he takes a bolder and more unilateral path. There's any number of directions he can go, or try to go, in 1849.
A) One of the simplest and most natural directions to intervene could be an invasion of Belgium, long an objective of French foreign policy. Since Belgium had succeeded in winning independence via revolt 18 years earlier, the revolutionary spirit of 1848 really didn't take root in Belgium. Some small groups were inspired to revolt and some support came from across the border in 1848 but it had been easily crushed.
Here is a summary of the Belgian situation in 1848 from wiki:
But how would a full-scale French invasion, back by the Parisian state, in say Feb-March 1849, go?
I would think that it spoil Napoleon III's genuine achievement of rapprochement with Britain, and Britain would freak out, along with others and Europe. I imagine Britain declaring war. However, Britain always relied on a continental coalition, and would one be available to help during the disorders ongoing into 1849? For instance, ordinarily, the Netherlands wouldn't relish having France as a neighbor, but could the Dutch government be won over to the French side if Louis Napoleon offers them a partition of Belgium, reclaiming Flemish lands only lost 18 years earlier? Would the Prussians be up for forming an anti-French coalition at this time while dealing with revolutionary and constitutional disturbances internally and in the other German states. The high German national sentiment of the time could either distract from French activity, because of differences coming to a head over how to constitute Germany, or throw Germans across a wide political spectrum enthusiastically into a confrontational stance with France. Anti-Frenchism for historical reasons *can* be a unifying thread for Germans, but is not a guaranteed slam-dunk, especially when the the Germans already had the Schleswig issue and the Danish enemy to rally against, and with Britain (and Russia) calling for Prusso-German restraint against Denmark, German ears may not be too receptive from arguments from them that the Germans should now turn in the other direction and fight against the French in Belgium.
The Austrians would ideologically oppose French moves but would still be tactically preoccupied with suppression of the Hungarians and Italians, limiting what they can do.
B) Another direction the French could go, likely in tandem with action in Belgium rather than as a stand-alone action, could be an an invasion of the Prussian and Bavarian Rhineland in order to achieve France's "natural" borders in the north east. That action by itself would constitute a declaration of war against Prussia and Bavaria and a concern of the German Confederation and lesser German states collectively. German liberal and radical ambition, still extant in 1849, would likely be crushed between the millstones of Prussia calling for patriotic and confederal resistance by the Kings and Princes on their own terms, and the foreign French invader from the outside. So, in the end the struggle in the Rhineland comes down to the military and economic physical capacities and the populations of France 1849 versus Prussia and the lesser German states in 1849. The Austrians would not be able to contribute much as they reassembled their empire and put down the Italians (which they might not do as thoroughly here). The Germans would almost certainly enjoy financial support from Britain, and quite possibly troop reinforcements from the Russian empire.
C) A third direction could be a French intervention in Italy. This could fit in with the historic Napoleon III's OTL biography in two ways. An intervention in Italy, unlike the proposed more northerly interventions, does not threaten the status quo of the channel ports, and thus has a greater chance of preserving Napoleon III's OTL goal of maintaining good relations with Britain, in contrast to the usual Anglo-French doom loop. It also fits in with his background as a Carbonari boy.
A February - March intervention could see the French intervene to prevent the second and final defeat of Piedmont, a defeat of Austrian forces, possibly their ouster from the quadrilateral, and a link-up with the Venetian forces of the Republic of San Marco. This could result in the ouster of Austria from all of northern Italy and its unification in some federation, with Piedmont as the most experienced member. With regard to Rome and the Papal States, Louis Napoleon can stick with his OTL policy of appeasing the French Catholic vote, being anti-revolutionary and supporting full restoration of Papal temporal powers there. Or, he could decide to go all-in on the Carbonari, support the Roman Republic and its federation with the other Italian states (and possibly Sicily and Naples) and write off a loss of a block of ultramontane Catholic supporters, figuring his margin of victory in 1848 was so large he can afford to lose 10-20 % of it.
D) Possibly, instead of any of the above, a more modest piecemeal border expansion plan could be his method, perhaps simply quick attacks, followed by attempts at quick settlements, to restore the northeastern borders with Belgium, Prussian and Bavaria to what they were in 1814 (so Saar and a few other select areas), and in Italy, while betraying Italian liberal nationalism and crushing the Roman Republic, he could possibly double-team Piedmont while the Austrians are beating it, siezing Savoy and Nice, and setting up a foundation for an alliance with Austria.
