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What if Chamberlain resigns in March 1939?

raharris1973

Well-known member
What if, after Hitler tears up the Munich agreement and invades the rump Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain resigns. He does this in shame citing his misjudgement of Hitler in uncertain times. Who would be the most likely replacement and how does this affect Britain's build up to a near certain war?

His successor would be unlikely to be the annoying, untrusted, has been backbencher W S Churchill, however vindicated Mr. Churchill may feel in his own mind. I guess one can never say never and cannot rule it out 100%. So who might it be: Eden, Hailsham, Halifax or Hoare? Duff Cooper?

The 'mood' for appeasement is definitely over. The country felt it, and by resigning, Chamberlain is acknowledging it himself.

But will Chamberlain's successor/replacement make the same precise moves in the weeks of March-April 1939 that Chamberlain made to instantiate the departure from appeasement?

3 of his steps were:

Introduce limited peacetime conscription.
Decide that yes they would need to send the Army into France should war come.
Issue a guarantee to support Poland if it's attacked.

How would Chamberlain's successor/replacement react to proposed bases for military cooperation with the Soviet Union. If they reflected the Soviet basis for negotiations in OTL, they would look as described as OTL, although I could imagine some minor changes to them would be possible if prior western and German actions are altered:

Considerations of the Soviet side in negotiations with the military missions of Great Britain and France.
August 4, 1939

In negotiations with England and France, several OPTIONS may arise when an armed intervention by our forces is possible.

Option I is when the attack of the aggressors will be directly against FRANCE and ENGLAND.

In this case, France and England should immediately deploy most of their armed forces on the eastern borders of France and Belgium, and from the 16th day of mobilization begin decisive action against primary of the aggressors.

The primary adversary is considered the chief of the aggressors, against which the main forces of France and England should be directed.

Actions against a minor of aggressors should also be of a secondary nature. The theory of first defeating a weak adversary - a secondary aggressor - is not shared by us. The defeat of the primary of the aggressors will remove the secondary of the aggressors out of the war, while initial focus on the secondary aggressor can lead to a decisive attack by the primary aggressor on Paris and the capture of Belgium and Holland, which creates a crisis in the western theater of operations from the very first days of the war giving superiority to the primary aggressor.

Based on this situation, France and England should deploy and put forward at least the following force against the primary aggressor by the 15th day of mobilization on the eastern borders of France and Belgium:

80 infantry divisions
14,000 - 14,500 medium and heavy guns
3500 - 4000 tanks
5000 - 5500 aircraft.

With the force of up to 10 infantry divsions remaining on the Maginot line from Belfort to Metz, France, England and Belgium should

with 70 infantry divisions
13,000 medium and heavy guns
3500 tanks
5000 aircraft

to lead a decisive offensive north of Metz and from Belgium against the Ruhr and Cologne industrial region in the general direction of Magdeburg.

The air forces of France and England must strike at the most important industrial areas of the primary aggressor in the west, at the bases of its navy, along the railways, freeways, as well as at the capital and other major administrative centers of the primary aggressor.

The actions of the combined Anglo-French fleet should pursue following goals: 1) to close the English Channel and break through by strong squadron into the Baltic Sea to act against the fleet of the primary aggressor in the Baltic and against its shores; 2) to obtain consent from the Baltic countries for the temporary occupation by the Anglo-French fleet of the Åland Islands, the Moonsund Archipelago with its islands [Crueldwarf: there is a funny detail in the original document: words ‘by the Anglo-French fleet’ are inserted into the sentence in Stalin’s handwriting], the ports of the Gange, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libava {{* Hanko, Pärnu, Haapsalu, Ainazi, Liepaja.}} for the purposes safeguarding the neutrality and independence of these countries from attacks by Germany; 3) to interdict the supply of ore and other raw materials from Sweden through the Baltic; 4) blockade of the coast of the primary aggressor in the North Sea; 5) dominance in the Mediterranean Sea and the closure of the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles; 6) cruising operations off the coast of Norway, Finland, outside their territorial waters, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk against submarines and cruisers of the aggressor fleet off these coasts.

Poland must obligatory participate in the war by virtue of its agreement with England and France and to strike against East Prussia and Pomerania by forces of at least 40 infantry divisions. Poland must commit itself to let our ground forces north of Minsk through the Vilensky corridor and, if possible, through Lithuania to the borders of East Prussia. It is necessary to ensure that Lithuania renders assistance to the bloc of peace-loving powers.

Our assistance to France and England can be expressed in the joint action of our land, air forces, the Baltic and Northern fleets against the primary of the aggressors.

In this case, we would have directed against East Prussia, north of Minsk, 70% of the infantry forces allocated by England and France against the primary of the aggressors of the, as well as the cavalry, in particular:

56 infantry divisions
6 cavalry divisions
8500-9000 medium and heavy guns
3300 tanks
3000 aircraft
and a total of 2,053,000 people.

Our air forces undertake operations against East Prussia and the primary aggressor’s concentrated air and ground forces, against its fleet and bases in the Baltic, and operate in coordination with our ground units.

Our Northern Navy is cruising off the coast of Finland and Norway outside their territorial waters, together with the Anglo-French squadrons.

As for our Baltic Fleet, in the case of a favorable resolution of the issue, it will be based together with the combined fleet of France and England on the Gange, Åland and Moonsund archipelagos, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libava in order to protect the independence of the Baltic countries.

Under these conditions, the Baltic Fleet can develop its cruising operations, the actions of submarines and the laying of mines off the coast of East Prussia, Danzig and Pomerania. Baltic Fleet submarines impede the supply of industrial raw materials from Sweden to the primary aggressor.

The command of all our armed forces remains with us, and the coordination of military operations with England and France is achieved by a special agreement during the war.

Our forces operate compactly and do not allocate any units to other armies.

Option II of the possible outbreak of hostilities is when POLAND is the object of the attack.

If France and England also declare war on the aggressors by virtue of their treaty with Poland and immediately oppose them, the USSR will have to oppose the aggressors by virtue of its treaty with England and France.

Poland can be attacked not only by the main aggressor, but, in all likelihood, Hungary will take part in the war against Poland.

It must be assumed that in this case, Romania will enter the war on the side of Poland. True, her assistance will be limited, since Romania itself will be constrained by Bulgaria and Hungary, but still Romania should be obliged to put up at least

20 infantry divisions
3 cavalry divisions
2276 medium and heavy guns
240 tanks
440 aircraft.

France and England must deploy with their armed forces, as indicated in Option I, and deliver the main blow against the primary of the aggressors.

The development of operations of the armed forces of France and England should be carried out, as indicated in Option I.

Our participation in the war can only happen when France and England agree with Poland and, if possible, also with Lithuania on the passage of our troops north of Minsk through the Vilnius corridor and on providing our Baltic Fleet with a joint base with the combined Anglo-French fleet, as indicated in option I.

In this case, we allocate forces, as indicated in option I, and direct them against East Prussia.

France and England must require Poland to deploy at least 40 infantry divisions with the appropriate artillery against East Prussia and Pomerania. At the same time, Poland is obliged to ensure the maneuver of our troops in the north-east of Poland by providing us with railways and rolling stock for the transportation of military supplies and food.

The simultaneous invasion of aggressors in southern Poland (Galicia) by Slovakia and Hungary will require us to deploy additional forces on the borders with Poland and Romania, but in conjunction with the forces allocated for action against East Prussia it will be equal toh the forces deployed by England and France against the primary aggressor, i.e., 80 infantry divisions, 12 cavalry divisions, 9,500-10,000 medium and heavy guns, 3,500-4,000 tanks, 3,000-3,500 aircraft.

The command of our armed forces remains with us. Coordination of hostilities with England and France is achieved by special agreement during the war.

Option III for the beginning of hostilities is when Hungary, Bulgaria, with the help of the primary aggressor, attack ROMANIA.

If England and France declare war on the aggressors and deploy forces against the main aggressor by the 15th day of mobilization, as indicated in option I:

80 infantry divisions
14,000 - 14,500 medium and heavy guns
3500 - 4000 tanks
5000 - 5500 aircraft

and launch a decisive attack on the 16th day of mobilization against the primary aggressor, they can turn to us for military cooperation.

Our proposals of France and England in this version should be summarized: 1) in the mandatory Polish participation in the war; 2) in the passage of our forces, as indicated in option I, through the Vilnius corridor and Lithuania, as well as in the joint deployment of the Baltic Fleet with the British and English in the eastern part of the Baltic, as indicated in option I; 3) in Poland’s obligation to deploy and forward to the front 40 infantry divisions against East Prussia and Pomerania; and 4) in Poland’s obligation to allow passage of our troops through Galicia south of Lvov.

In this case, we also set 70% of the infantry forces sent by France and England against the main aggressor, not counting 12 cavalry divisions, namely:

56 infantry divisions
12 cavalry divisions
8500 - 9000 medium and heavy guns
3300 tanks
3000 aircraft
2,075,000 people in total.

Forces deployed to north of Minsk for action against East Prussia:

26 rifle divisions
6 cavalry divisions
4000 medium and heavy guns
1300 tanks
1,500 aircraft
and a total of 926,000 people.

For actions south of Polesie, for direct support to Romania (France and England must achieve the passage of our troops through the Romanian territory and the southern part of Galicia), we will be sent:

30 rifle divisions
6 cavalry divisions
5000 medium and heavy guns
2000 tanks
1,500 aircraft
a total of 1,149,000 people.

These our forces are deployed on the border of the USSR with Romania and in the southern part of Galicia and operate south of the Carpathians, receiving an independent sector of the front.

The command of our troops remains with us. In this option, the actions of our Northern and Baltic fleets are carried out, as set out in option I, therefore, the tasks for the combined Anglo-French fleet remain the same as indicated in option I.

Bulgaria may be involved in the attack on Romania, so France and England must commit themselves to making Turkey and Greece to join the war.

If both of these states take part in the war, then our Black Sea Fleet, having barred the mouth of the Danube from the inflitration of aggressor submarines into the Black Sea and blocking Varna (the Bulgarian military port), together with the Turkish fleet carry out cruising and submarine operations in the eastern Mediterranean. However, under all circumstances, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be firmly closed from the penetration of surface squadrons of opponents and their submarines into the Marmara and Black Seas.

IV. A possible variant of the outbreak of hostilities, when aggression will be directed against Turkey, and, perhaps, in this case, Bulgaria will join the war on the side of the aggressors.

France and England, by virtue of an agreement with Turkey, declare war on the aggressors.

If France and England turn to us for military cooperation, this cooperation can be provided if:

1) Poland’s participate in the war against the primary aggressor and the passage of our troops is allowed through the Vilnius corridor and by agreement with Lithuania through its territory for actions against East Prussia;

2) joint operations of combined Anglo-French fleet and our Baltic Fleet in the eastern part of the Baltic, as indicated in option I; 3) the participation of Romania in the war and the passage of our troops through Romania for operations in the south of Romania.

In this case, we expose and deploy forces as indicated in option III.

The tasks of our Black Sea Fleet will be the same as indicated in the previous version (III).

The actions of the armies of France and England should amount to an attack against the primary aggressor as the main target, as set out in Option I.

The actions of the combined Anglo-French fleet should be amended against what is stated in Option I - to act towards decisive defeat of the combined fleet of aggressors in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in its eastern part.

V. A possible variant of military operations is when the aggression of the primary aggressor is directed against the USSR through the territories of Finland, Estonia and Latvia,

In this case, France and England, according to the agreement, must immediately enter the war with the aggressors. Poland, bound by a treaty with England and France and having our guarantee, must act on option I.

Our demand for the deployment of 40 Polish infantry divisions against East Prussia and in Poznan remains.

If in the Option I we alone deployed 70% of the armed forces that England and France directed against the primary aggressor attacking one of these powers, then in the event of the primary aggressor attacking us, we must demand from France and England to deploy forces on the 15th day of mobilization equal to 70% of what we deploy against the primary aggressor according to this option.

We can deploy 120 infantry divisions. Therefore, we must demand the deployment of the following English and French forces against the primary aggressor north of Belfort and to Belgium:

84 infantry divisions
13,000 to 13,500 medium and heavy guns
from 3,000 to 3,500 tanks
from 5,000 to 5,500 aircraft.

From the 16th day of mobilization, these forces must launch a decisive attack against the primary aggressor north of Metz and from Belgium with the general direction of the main attack toward Magdeburg.

The air forces of France and England must inflict a powerful blow on the industrial areas of the primary aggressor, on the bases of his navy, on railways, highways, as well as on the capital and major administrative centers.

The actions of the Anglo-French Navy should occur according to option I.

The command of our armed forces remains with us. Coordination of the military action is achieved by special agreement during the war.

It is hard to imagine that the primary aggressor would send part of his forces against us through Romania. However, this option is not excluded, and therefore in this case, Poland, Turkey and Greece should be involved in providing assistance to Romania by England and France, and some of our troops are provided with a passage through Galicia and Romania.

The actions of our Black Sea Fleet should be coordinated with the actions of the Turkish Fleet, as set out in version IV.

When the primary aggressor attacks us, we must demand the deployment of the above forces by France, England and Belgium, their decisive offensive from the 16th day of mobilization against the primary aggressor and the most active Polish participation in the war, as well as the unhindered passage of our troops through the territory of the Vilnius corridor and Galicia with the provision of rolling stock.

The foregoing is a prerequisite for negotiations, during which the positions of France and England will be clarified in a sincere desire to conclude an agreement.

Signed by B. Shaposhnikov
 
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