What if Brooke attends ARCADIA instead of Dill? No ABDACOM/Combined CoS?

[HJ Tulp]

In Masters and Commanders, Andrew Roberts writes that newly appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke disliked the fact that Churchill didn't bring him along for the ARCADIA conference with the Americans. What if John Dill get's ill (or maybe even die?) and Brooke goes along anyway? How would the conference play out and what would be other long-term consequences?

Possibilities:

1. Brooke was very much against the formation of ABDACOM but by the time he was part of the decision-making progress, that decision had practically been made as Marshall convinced Roosevelt and the two of them convinced Churchill. If Brooke is at ARCADIA he might be able to convince Churchill to stand strong on this. Maybe this results in a smaller version of ABDACOM or no ABDACOM at all?

2. In the same vein: Brooke also opposed the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. What if that is never instated?

3. Roberts asserts that Dill attending allowed him to establish close and friendly relations with Marshall. The two trusted eachother so much that they would share classified cables from their bosses, Churchill and Roosevelt. If Dill isn't at ARCADIA, does he become Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission and later on, Senior British Representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff? Probably yes, though the relationship with Marshall will start building later than OTL. Does that have consequences? What if John Dill dies? Who becomes the British representative in that case? And how does that affect Anglo-American relations?

 

[raharris1973]

1. Brooke was very much against the formation of ABDACOM but by the time he was part of the decision-making progress, that decision had practically been made as Marshall convinced Roosevelt and the two of them convinced Churchill. If Brooke is at ARCADIA he might be able to convince Churchill to stand strong on this. Maybe this results in a smaller version of ABDACOM or no ABDACOM at all?

What are the practical consequences of having a different command arrangement of all the scratch, under-resourced Allied forces being caught on the backfoot by insanely aggressive and resourceful Japanese opponents who have a plan to take, take, and take more at this point in the war?

2. In the same vein: Brooke also opposed the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. What if that is never instated?

What do you think happens?

 

[David Flin]

2. In the same vein: Brooke also opposed the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. What if that is never instated?

One future development is that it will hamper greatly intelligence cooperation between USA and UK in future years, which has been quite close post-WW2 - despite the desires of Angleton - (as seen in the Washington station) and asset-sharing.

 

[HJ Tulp]

What are the practical consequences of having a different command arrangement of all the scratch, under-resourced Allied forces being caught on the backfoot by insanely aggressive and resourceful Japanese opponents who have a plan to take, take, and take more at this point in the war

In my opinion ABDACOM was another problem for allied forces in SEA, instead of a solution. Its headquarters and command arrangements - though they improved in time - were a chaos and with the British under Wavell in the drivers seat the whole organization was infected by their Singaporitis.

What do you think happens?

Interallied cooperation on a strategic level is not my forte I have to admit. I assume that there were times where the two main allies disagreed and the CCS made the decision in the end. That could end up differently ATL.

One future development is that it will hamper greatly intelligence cooperation between USA and UK in future years, which has been quite close post-WW2 - despite the desires of Angleton - (as seen in the Washington station) and asset-sharing.

This would certainly put either a hold or a delay on the forming of the special relationship I assume yes!

 

[raharris1973]

In my opinion ABDACOM was another problem for allied forces in SEA, instead of a solution. Its headquarters and command arrangements - though they improved in time - were a chaos and with the British under Wavell in the drivers seat the whole organization was infected by their Singaporitis.

Would have been better off putting your guy - Van Mook? in charge? US Admiral Hart? Or, what the heck, every Nation, Admiral and General for himself?

 

[HJ Tulp]

Van Mook was luitenant-Governor General and minister of colonial affairs. A politician and not a officer. Very much unsuited for the job. Helfrich or Ten Poorten (or Van Beerenschot in a TL where he doesn't die in a crash) would be the top Dutch military officers in the DEI. Neither of them was suited for the job though, and that's without taking into regard that the Dutch were very much the minor power compared to the UK and the US. An American (or Australian?) commander would have been better, though who would that be? Deserved or not, Hart didn't instill confidence when he was commanding ABDAFLOAT, let alone the whole outfit, and I shudder the thought of MacArthur getting the job!

Or, what the heck, every Nation, Admiral and General for himself?

ABDACOM could have worked if it was set up half a year before the Japanese offensive started, instead of a month after the start of hostilities. I do think that it did more harm than good. Commanders had to suddenly change their methods of communication, found out there was a new command structure and that they now had to report to some other commander who often spoke a different language, new encryption systems were used (or at least that was attempted), intelligence flowed differently (the RNLN had integrated it's recon planes into the operational command so Dorniers could directly communicate with surface units or submarines, ABDACOM put them under ABDA-AIR so recon reports had to go through ABDA-AIR, to ABDACOM, through ABDAFLOAT and only then to the operational units) and it harmed relations between the UK and the US on one hand and the minor allies on the other, as the first two had basically made ABDACOM public without any consultation with the minors.

It would be far less disruptive if there would have been regional commands following the national lines (or a variant on that). Joint commands are very, very difficult if they are between long term allies and have enough time to get the recalibrate. None of those things were present in SEA in 1941.