What if Bachir Gemayel had not been assassinated?

[Jackson Lennock]

What if Bachir Gemayel had not been assassinated?

Gemayel was somebody who could make peace with Israel, but he put Lebanon first. He viewed Lebanon as something other than an Arab country, though with Arab characteristics (for comparison, think of Malta or Sicily I suppose). He rejected partition and (if I am understanding correctly) cantonalization. He led the Maronite militias and was from a Phalange background, but wasn't ideologically committed to the Phalange's ideas himself. His first priority was a nondenominational Lebanon, and I imagine he was not going to make peace with Israel his priority in that respect (much to the consternation of Begin and Sharon, who really were less-than-realistic about what they could achieve in Lebanon). A path-to-peace agreement in which an opening of some trade relations, a framework for eventual normalization being established could be achieved, and a joint commitment against the PLO could be attained though.

Without Gemayel's death, there would be no Sabra and Shatila. Whether it's the Phalange or the Lebanese Army which sweeps the camps to clear out remaining PLO elements (the Israelis tried to get the Lebanese Army to do it instead, out of some sense that the Phalange may have too much bloodlust after Gemayel's assassination), the lack of a desire for revenge by the Phalange would prevent the massacre seen historically. Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon would accordingly be slower, and the country's government would be better able to secure itself in the Israeli-occupied portions.

With the Christians already united under him, the easiest group to bring into his tent would probably be the Southern wing of Amal. The Shia of South Lebanon had gotten sick of the Palestinians and greeted the Israelis as liberators when they first moved into the country. The Southern branch of Amal historically offered to be peacekeeper for the Israelis, but the Israelis went with the South Lebanon Army instead.

Meanwhile, Bachir's brother Amine didn't have the force of will or respect from others to establish himself as leader of the Government. Bachir's charisma and forcefulness helped mend and unite class divides and factionalism in Maronite society that his brother while President OTL couldn't. The result was that he had neither the manpower or the revenues to actually govern. A slower Israeli withdrawal, handing over of positions to the Lebanese Government of Bachir, and integration of the Shia of South Lebanon into Bachir's government would be very different than OTL's chaotic mess.

The make-or-break moment would be the Mountain War in the Chouf against Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party-led National Salvation Front.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

My guess is that the Lebanese Civil War will end with a Ukraine-style stalemate. Eventually there will be a line that nobody recognizes as a border de jure, but is a de facto border for ceasefire purposes. It may be too difficult to force the Syrians out of Tripoli or Baalbek.

Gemayel will be in the awkward position of securing support from both Israel/America/Europe and Saddam Hussein (who will have a desire to prop up Gemayel at the expense of Assad). Oomph. Meanwhile the Iran-Syria alignment will be a force against him too.

Maybe this would be the result by 1990.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

An interesting tidbit. Menachem Begin and Etienne Saqr discussed the expulsion of most Palestinians from Lebanon. Saqr suggested the Maronite position (although Saqr was peculiar insofar as he was nonconfessional, viewing the maronites simply as first among equals) was that about 20,000 could remain. Begin suggested that Muslim Palestinians in Lebanon would go to Syria, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia but that Israel would accept the Christians.

I assume Gemayel would not be able to deliver a peace deal with Israel under Begin. For starters, I think he always was misleading the Israelis in that respect. His objective was a unified country, and he didn't want to alienate the Sunni populations which remained sympathetic to the Palestinian Cause. The Shia population by this point was not as pro-Palestinian, due to the nastiness of the PLO in "Fatahland." But to hold power in Lebanon, Gemayel would need the Sunni elites.

My guess is that the family members of those who went to Tunis (14,000 fighters) would be deported there. Gemayel may be able to do what Hussein did, and secure a formal peace agreement with Israel in the 1990s as a result of Oslo. Assuming some sort of right of return is in that, I suspect the Israelis would be willing to accept (i) Christians, as Begin said, and (ii) family reunification. Palestinians who cooperated with Syrians would probably be sent to Syria as they're forced out of the country. I also imagine many Palestinians in southern camps might be relocated to Sunni parts of the country, just to keep them away from the Israelis.

From Haaretz

“The picture that remains with me of him is of an honest, direct person who didn’t mince his words. He didn’t lie, at most he was silent when something was inconvenient for him. When we pushed him to sign a peace agreement with Israel, he would say, ‘I will be the third Arab leader who will sign,’ or ‘That’s not relevant,’ or ‘I belong to the Arab world, I am accountable to the Arab League, it’s better for you if we have informal relations.’

The Mountain War may perhaps be avoided entirely. The LF and Lebanese Army used the Israeli presence to position themselves in parts of the country they previously hadn't. There would be no need to "conquer" the Chouf if the Israelis are just handing over the place to Gemayel. The LF decision to take the Chouf by force was also partly in response to the death of Gemayel.

Also noteworthy - Bashir Gemayel would probably ratify the May 17 Agreement (committing Israel to withdrawal for the most part). Bashir was a firmer, less parochial (ergo, more Lebanese nationalism minded, rather than on inter-clan Maronite oligarch antics), and more anti-Syrian. Syria torpedoed the agreement in considerable part because it didn't want to leave Lebanon and Israeli withdrawal was contingent on Syrian withdrawal (though the Israelis pulled out anyway for the most part). Amin was afraid of Syria after they killed his brother, and had less wiggle room for the agreement politically after Sabra and Shatila. Amin also seems less committed to the sort of political and social reforms to benefit muslims than Bachir was, and was more interested in preserving the Gemayel family's wealth and status. Amin also soured relations with Sharon in a way Bachir wouldn't have, as the personal relations were very strong. The gist is that Bachir would have more Israeli support than Amin did and probably get better control of big chunks of the country.

From Haaretz.

The relations grew closer. All told, Gemayel met with Sharon 12 times, in Lebanon and in Israel. He was also invited to stay at Sharon’s home, Sycamore Ranch, in the Negev, and he also got along well with the rest of the top echelon. Begin called him “my son,” Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan sometimes addressed him as “my brother.” “Bashir knew the way to Begin’s heart, he would quote him things he’d read about the Irgun [pre-state underground militia led by Begin],” Azoulay relates. “I was present at many of the meetings with Begin and Sharon, to which Bashir always came with his policy adviser Jean Nader. I was in charge of taking the minutes. An organized summary came out after each such meeting. Raful [Eitan] would sometimes take him aside to huddle with him a little, who knows what they talked about there…

Reading further, Gemayel and Sakr wanted Israeli assistance in forcing the Syrians out of the rest of Lebanon and said they would only get to the Palestinian issue after. Israel provided some assistance in November 1983 bombing. And apparently the Israelis weren't as interested in policing the Druze receiving resupply from Syria after Amin vetoed the May 17 Agreement. They didn't find Amin as trustworthy as Bachir (whose assassination caused a lot of involved Israelis to break out in tears). The Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf (as they were playing buffer between LF and Druze militias) meanwhile was ultimately was escalated things there; the Israelis would be in less of a hurry to pull out if Bachir was in charge, Amin hadn't mishandled the politics and alienated the Shia and Druze, and the Israeli public wasn't enraged over being aligned with the factions that did Sabra and Shatilla.

Looking at this 1982 WaPo Piece

Describing initiatives of newly elected President Amin Gemayel as "shy but positive," Jumblatt said he agrees that all foreign troops--Syrian as well as Israeli--must withdraw simultaneously. He considered Gemayel "too soft" on the Israelis.

A long-time political foe of Bashir Gemayel, Jumblatt did not support his brother Amin for the presidency.

Depite his sense of uneasiness over the new government, Jumblatt conceded that he would accept a position should he be asked. Such as move, to enlist Druze support, is looked upon as a possibility in Beirut.

I'm not sure if Bachir would bring Jumblatt into his government. But the prospect of a diplomatic resolution seems more tenable. Israel would be more willing to support Bachir, Bachir would better handle diverse politics, and the Israelis would be taking some action against the Syrians in the Beqaa.


Anybody interested in a timeline crossing the "less successful 1967" thread with this one?