raharris1973
Well-known member
It was well within the realm of physical and political possibility for Australia, or metro Britain, to have beaten Japan to the punch and occupied some or all of the Micronesian island chains that in OTL became the Japanese League of Nations Mandate in the interwar years.
Without changing history much, Australia/Britain is the second-most likely inheritor of these islands after Japan, because WWI, more likely than the USA for instance.
The Japanese occupied the later mandated islands as an afterthought, initially without civilian government or Genro direction, initially thinking of only Qingdao in China when threatening and declaring war on Germany in August-September 1914. The Japanese Navy stretched its orders to work against the threat of German raiders in the Pacific, to occupy the lightly held German islands of Micronesia north of the equator only in October 1914.
In the southern hemisphere, the Antipodean Dominions of the British Empire were much quicker off the mark initially, with the New Zealanders occupying western (German) Samoa, and the Australians occupying northeastern (German) Papua New Guinea and moving on the Bismarck archipelago by no later than mid-September 1914. Rabaul was certainly snatched before September was over. A British force also seized the phosphate-rich island of Nauru before the month was out, the German *South* Pacific was *kaput*. The islands north of the Pacific, scarcely guarded, were still left.
In OTL, I read once that the Australians (and British) did not move further immediately beyond Papua and the Bismarcks primarily because they essentially assumed they had the German Pacific 'in the bag' because New Guinea was the administrative center of it all.
What if they kept on going at their August-September pace?
I imagine as a PoD, the Australian PM Andy Fisher, or in the weeks he was traveling to New Zealand, Acting PM Billy Hughes, out of a mixture of pride and ambition with the capture of the Bismarcks, asks 'what else is next?' and orders the advance to continue, and Australian Captains and commanders, keen for promotion and easy glory, are ready to continue hopping from island to island. Why shouldn't the energetic Australians keep showing what they can do, since they haven't suffered any setbacks so far?
The next logical leap from the Bismarcks/Rabaul is the Carolines chain, the largest, and home to anchorages like Truk (aka Chu'uk), and the German cable and wireless stations at Yap. Next closest would be the Palaus, to the west, nearer to the Philippines. East of the Carolines would be the Marshall Islands and atolls. If the British have any Naval ships with troops or landing parties afloat around their Gilbert or Phoenix Islands possessions--and they may not, those might be much more closely and better positioned to land in the Marshalls than any Australians or New Zealanders.
The furthest of the German island possessions in the central Pacific would be the Marianas. They would be reachable in a step-by-step process after the Australians or British occupied the Carolines, to completely liquidate the German Pacific empire. The Marianas are far closer to Japan's Bonin islands than to any pre-war portion of the British Empire or Dominions, so it probably is a bit more realistic that Japan ultimately would get to the Marianas first and claim them for the post-war, even if the British Empire/Dominions got the rest of Micronesia, but it is not guaranteed.
Let's assume whoever occupies any islands gets them as League Mandates. That is what happened in OTL, and no power really has leverage, or strong motive, to overturn wartime possession.
These islands will all be the @$$-end of nowhere for metro-Britain, and even for Australia's burgeoning sub-empire. Neither interwar Australia, nor interwar Britain will have much budget to invest in any of these island groups or fortify them. However, they will not be available for Japan to fortify with air and naval bases during the interwar era and use as a large, unobserved practice maneuver space.
Without the interposition of multiple Japanese island chains between the US and Hawaii and the Philippines and Guam in the western Pacific, both as an obstacle, and, if conquered, as a highway, step-path, or breadcrumb trail for advancing, how will Japanese and American Navies plan differently for war? Since they mostly planned for a strictly bilateral war, the Micronesian chains would be considered neutral rather than enemy or friendly most of the time. How would British or Australian defense planning change, if at all, in the interwar? Would Australia simply require a larger interwar Navy with some longer-ranged ships?
If we put a butterfly net over the interwar era and World War Two as we know it starts, how does the Pacific War change?
Without changing history much, Australia/Britain is the second-most likely inheritor of these islands after Japan, because WWI, more likely than the USA for instance.
The Japanese occupied the later mandated islands as an afterthought, initially without civilian government or Genro direction, initially thinking of only Qingdao in China when threatening and declaring war on Germany in August-September 1914. The Japanese Navy stretched its orders to work against the threat of German raiders in the Pacific, to occupy the lightly held German islands of Micronesia north of the equator only in October 1914.
In the southern hemisphere, the Antipodean Dominions of the British Empire were much quicker off the mark initially, with the New Zealanders occupying western (German) Samoa, and the Australians occupying northeastern (German) Papua New Guinea and moving on the Bismarck archipelago by no later than mid-September 1914. Rabaul was certainly snatched before September was over. A British force also seized the phosphate-rich island of Nauru before the month was out, the German *South* Pacific was *kaput*. The islands north of the Pacific, scarcely guarded, were still left.
In OTL, I read once that the Australians (and British) did not move further immediately beyond Papua and the Bismarcks primarily because they essentially assumed they had the German Pacific 'in the bag' because New Guinea was the administrative center of it all.
What if they kept on going at their August-September pace?
I imagine as a PoD, the Australian PM Andy Fisher, or in the weeks he was traveling to New Zealand, Acting PM Billy Hughes, out of a mixture of pride and ambition with the capture of the Bismarcks, asks 'what else is next?' and orders the advance to continue, and Australian Captains and commanders, keen for promotion and easy glory, are ready to continue hopping from island to island. Why shouldn't the energetic Australians keep showing what they can do, since they haven't suffered any setbacks so far?
The next logical leap from the Bismarcks/Rabaul is the Carolines chain, the largest, and home to anchorages like Truk (aka Chu'uk), and the German cable and wireless stations at Yap. Next closest would be the Palaus, to the west, nearer to the Philippines. East of the Carolines would be the Marshall Islands and atolls. If the British have any Naval ships with troops or landing parties afloat around their Gilbert or Phoenix Islands possessions--and they may not, those might be much more closely and better positioned to land in the Marshalls than any Australians or New Zealanders.
The furthest of the German island possessions in the central Pacific would be the Marianas. They would be reachable in a step-by-step process after the Australians or British occupied the Carolines, to completely liquidate the German Pacific empire. The Marianas are far closer to Japan's Bonin islands than to any pre-war portion of the British Empire or Dominions, so it probably is a bit more realistic that Japan ultimately would get to the Marianas first and claim them for the post-war, even if the British Empire/Dominions got the rest of Micronesia, but it is not guaranteed.
Let's assume whoever occupies any islands gets them as League Mandates. That is what happened in OTL, and no power really has leverage, or strong motive, to overturn wartime possession.
These islands will all be the @$$-end of nowhere for metro-Britain, and even for Australia's burgeoning sub-empire. Neither interwar Australia, nor interwar Britain will have much budget to invest in any of these island groups or fortify them. However, they will not be available for Japan to fortify with air and naval bases during the interwar era and use as a large, unobserved practice maneuver space.
Without the interposition of multiple Japanese island chains between the US and Hawaii and the Philippines and Guam in the western Pacific, both as an obstacle, and, if conquered, as a highway, step-path, or breadcrumb trail for advancing, how will Japanese and American Navies plan differently for war? Since they mostly planned for a strictly bilateral war, the Micronesian chains would be considered neutral rather than enemy or friendly most of the time. How would British or Australian defense planning change, if at all, in the interwar? Would Australia simply require a larger interwar Navy with some longer-ranged ships?
If we put a butterfly net over the interwar era and World War Two as we know it starts, how does the Pacific War change?