US invasion of the Canary Islands in 1898

[Ricardolindo]

During the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States apparently considered invading the Canary Islands instead of the Philippines but the plan didn't go ahead. What if it did? Would the invasion be successful? Would the United States actually demand the Canary Islands in a peace treaty and if so, would the European great powers allow them to take the Canary Islands?

 

[Ricardolindo]

During the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States apparently considered invading the Canary Islands instead of the Philippines but the plan didn't go ahead. What if it did? Would the invasion be successful? Would the United States actually demand the Canary Islands in a peace treaty and if so, would the European great powers allow them to take the Canary Islands?

So, does anyone else have any thoughts on this?

 

[raharris1973]

During the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States apparently considered invading the Canary Islands instead of the Philippines but the plan didn't go ahead. What if it did? Would the invasion be successful? Would the United States actually demand the Canary Islands in a peace treaty and if so, would the European great powers allow them to take the Canary Islands?

I don't know if it was an 'instead of' the Philippines kind of thing. I think it was just an option separately considered.

There would be no guarantees of success in life. I suppose American naval hardware would still be way better than Spanish at the time, serving to the American advantage. I don't know anything about the forts or garrisons on the islands.

To my knowledge, there was no rebelliousness nor secessionism on the island, so the local population would be objecting every step of the way to invasion, occupation and demands to be handed over in the peace.

Any of the European great powers of the day, Britain, France, Germany, probably Italy too, with the advantage of proximity, could doom a US invasion/occupation of the islands. Any of them may, with some merit, complain to the Americans about their being hypocritical about their Monroe Doctrine, demanding no colonizing the Americas while trying to make a colony near Europe/Africa. But no particular country that I know of has a particular compulsion to take the task of confronting the Americans on for themselves at this time, except possibly as part of some strategy to win Spain as an ally in the European balance.

Unlike with other acquisitions from Spain, the US could not completely dismiss the threat of a later counter-invasion or war of revenge from Spain at a time when it might be better prepared. Not only is not far from Spain, but Spanish forces would be doing 'innocent passage' in between Spain and Rio De Oro right next to the islands all the time. And like in the Philippines and, to some extent Cuba, guerrilla resistance could be a concern.

All in all, I'd file it in the 'not recommended' and 'juice not worth the squeeze' categories.

 

[raharris1973]

Thinking about this a little more.

It probably was not intended as anything more than a temporary wartime occupation to compel Spain to sue for peace, with the US unlikely to insist on annexation.

But let's play along, and say that the United States demands and receives the conquered and occupied islands in the peace treaty, and they are administered as an insular territory, possibly under some sort of regime similar to that imposed on Puerto Rico.

The United States now has a trans-Atlantic possession offering naval bases to project US power to the eastern Atlantic and not far from the Mediterranean.

It can protect the vital American trade road to...pretty much nowhere...the people-less and penniless Sahara desert and Morocco.

Now that's a bit of an overstatement, with sovereign coaling station and repair base, the US Navy's effective patrolling radius on a short term basis in the neighborhood of Western Europe, Western Africa and the Western Mediterranean will be improved.

The US will be interested in Moroccan affairs (more so than it actually was). And if the Perdicaris affair is not butterflied away (and the McKinley assassination and TR Presidency are not butterflied away) President Roosevelt can intervene in Tangier in even greater force than OTL Perdicaris_affair.

Like OTL, I would expect the US to be invited to the 1906 Algeciras Conference on Morocco, and vote with the overall navally and regionally stronger powers, Britain, France, and Spain - over Germany, as in OTL.

Supposing the Great War starts like the historic Great War, US naval forces will more often be close to the early naval action, and perhaps feel somewhat more empowered to challenge the British tightening of the paper blockade of Germany, and increasingly, the neutrals, between 1914 and 1916.

However, geographically, again, the Canaries are nowhere near the North Sea and direct trade routes to Germany, nor the Netherlands, nor the Nordic neutrals. Nor are they near German colonies, or at least ones that don't fall fast (like Togo) or fall under close, effective Allied blockade (Kamerun) rather quickly.

Perhaps direct radio communications between the US and Germany last longer, I'm not sure.

In any case, the US position in the Canaries may marginally improve the American ability to assert its neutral trading rights with the Iberian neutrals, and Italy and Greece - along with some transshipping trade to the CPs, at least as long as some of those remain neutral. Of course, Italy is destined to join the Allies in 1915, Portugal in 1916, and Greece in 1917, pretty much cutting off the US Canaries and Spain from effective trade routes with Germany and Austria and Turkey and Bulgaria.

 

[Ricardolindo]

Thinking about this a little more.

It probably was not intended as anything more than a temporary wartime occupation to compel Spain to sue for peace, with the US unlikely to insist on annexation.

But let's play along, and say that the United States demands and receives the conquered and occupied islands in the peace treaty, and they are administered as an insular territory, possibly under some sort of regime similar to that imposed on Puerto Rico.

The United States now has a trans-Atlantic possession offering naval bases to project US power to the eastern Atlantic and not far from the Mediterranean.

It can protect the vital American trade road to...pretty much nowhere...the people-less and penniless Sahara desert and Morocco.

Now that's a bit of an overstatement, with sovereign coaling station and repair base, the US Navy's effective patrolling radius on a short term basis in the neighborhood of Western Europe, Western Africa and the Western Mediterranean will be improved.

The US will be interested in Moroccan affairs (more so than it actually was). And if the Perdicaris affair is not butterflied away (and the McKinley assassination and TR Presidency are not butterflied away) President Roosevelt can intervene in Tangier in even greater force than OTL Perdicaris_affair.

Like OTL, I would expect the US to be invited to the 1906 Algeciras Conference on Morocco, and vote with the overall navally and regionally stronger powers, Britain, France, and Spain - over Germany, as in OTL.

Supposing the Great War starts like the historic Great War, US naval forces will more often be close to the early naval action, and perhaps feel somewhat more empowered to challenge the British tightening of the paper blockade of Germany, and increasingly, the neutrals, between 1914 and 1916.

However, geographically, again, the Canaries are nowhere near the North Sea and direct trade routes to Germany, nor the Netherlands, nor the Nordic neutrals. Nor are they near German colonies, or at least ones that don't fall fast (like Togo) or fall under close, effective Allied blockade (Kamerun) rather quickly.

Perhaps direct radio communications between the US and Germany last longer, I'm not sure.

In any case, the US position in the Canaries may marginally improve the American ability to assert its neutral trading rights with the Iberian neutrals, and Italy and Greece - along with some transshipping trade to the CPs, at least as long as some of those remain neutral. Of course, Italy is destined to join the Allies in 1915, Portugal in 1916, and Greece in 1917, pretty much cutting off the US Canaries and Spain from effective trade routes with Germany and Austria and Turkey and Bulgaria.

I agree that the United States probably wouldn't annex the Canary Islands.
However, if they did, could they have preserved Moroccan independence in the 1906 Algeciras Conference?

 

[raharris1973]

I agree that the United States probably wouldn't annex the Canary Islands.
However, if they did, could they have preserved Moroccan independence in the 1906 Algeciras Conference?

I don't think so. Technically the conference upheld formal sovereignty, with a dominating share of French influence, and the votes in favor of this were a pre-negotiated cartel of France-Italy-Britain-Spain-Russia, that's five powers, easily outvoting the at most, 3rd vote the USA could add to the OTL negative German and Austro-Hungarian votes.

And I think it would have been foolish, and uncharacteristic of Theodore Roosevelt, to even try to oppose the larger pro-French Atlantic cartel. Despite all Roosevelt's adventurous talk, and his occassional embrace in domestic American politics of the interests of the average American man against large, wealthy businesses, in international affairs he was no sentimental champion of the underdog* or upstart, Moroccan, or German.

He believed that a hierarchy of powerful and weak nations was a fact of life, necessary, and appropriate. The fact that the Raisuli affair even happened in the first place would not have impressed him with the Moroccans capacity for self-government.

The strain of the US already keeping order throughout the Caribbean, the Filipino insurrection, and the Canaries, and the strong French, Spanish, British, and German interests at play would tell him that Morocco is in no way a realistic American colonial goal.

So like OTL, Roosevelt would most likely have the USA vote favorably alongside the French-siding majority and not with the German pot-stirrers.

*He was sympathetic to the Japanese takeover of Korea. Thought weakness and disorder in China permitted Japan little choice but to show a strong hand there (so he shared none of the outrage of some Sinophile American contemporaries). He never demagogued the Irish or Indian independence issues against the the British either. Despite the briefest flirtation before and during the Boer Wars with the Boers (remember his Dutch ancestry), he quickly dropped that issue as any impediment to Anglo-American relations. In his initial private correspondence he was even unsentimental about the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 - tough luck to them for being in the neighborhood and not being ready! What started to bother him about the Germans in the Great War was the excessive overall grwoth of their power and ambition and their threat to American shipping. Had he been POTUS at Versailles, he would quite readily used the note from Ho Chi Minh as mere tissue paper.

 

[Ricardolindo]

I don't think so. Technically the conference upheld formal sovereignty, with a dominating share of French influence, and the votes in favor of this were a pre-negotiated cartel of France-Italy-Britain-Spain-Russia, that's five powers, easily outvoting the at most, 3rd vote the USA could add to the OTL negative German and Austro-Hungarian votes.

And I think it would have been foolish, and uncharacteristic of Theodore Roosevelt, to even try to oppose the larger pro-French Atlantic cartel. Despite all Roosevelt's adventurous talk, and his occassional embrace in domestic American politics of the interests of the average American man against large, wealthy businesses, in international affairs he was no sentimental champion of the underdog* or upstart, Moroccan, or German.

He believed that a hierarchy of powerful and weak nations was a fact of life, necessary, and appropriate. The fact that the Raisuli affair even happened in the first place would not have impressed him with the Moroccans capacity for self-government.

The strain of the US already keeping order throughout the Caribbean, the Filipino insurrection, and the Canaries, and the strong French, Spanish, British, and German interests at play would tell him that Morocco is in no way a realistic American colonial goal.

So like OTL, Roosevelt would most likely have the USA vote favorably alongside the French-siding majority and not with the German pot-stirrers.

*He was sympathetic to the Japanese takeover of Korea. Thought weakness and disorder in China permitted Japan little choice but to show a strong hand there (so he shared none of the outrage of some Sinophile American contemporaries). He never demagogued the Irish or Indian independence issues against the the British either. Despite the briefest flirtation before and during the Boer Wars with the Boers (remember his Dutch ancestry), he quickly dropped that issue as any impediment to Anglo-American relations. In his initial private correspondence he was even unsentimental about the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 - tough luck to them for being in the neighborhood and not being ready! What started to bother him about the Germans in the Great War was the excessive overall grwoth of their power and ambition and their threat to American shipping. Had he been POTUS at Versailles, he would quite readily used the note from Ho Chi Minh as mere tissue paper.

Theodore Roosevelt did support Venezuela in 1902-1903, though. Admittedly, the Monroe Doctrine applied there.

 

[raharris1973]

Theodore Roosevelt did support Venezuela in 1902-1903, though. Admittedly, the Monroe Doctrine applied there.

Yeah that was about who was appropriate to exert 'discipline' where. Roosevelt hoped to clear that up with his Corollary to the doctrine...'we'll do it, so you don't have, Mr. overseas great power'