• Hi Guest!

    The costs of running this forum are covered by Sea Lion Press. If you'd like to help support the company and the forum, visit patreon.com/sealionpress

The Russian Republic Withdraws from WWI

Jackson Lennock

Well-known member
What if Russia under the Provisional Government withdrew from the First World War in April or May of 1917? The Russians cede Congress Poland and Ober Ost and open up to trade with Germany, but the borders elsewhere remain the same.

The Ottomans would probably be indignant since they wouldn't even get Kars and Batumi. I don't see why the Russians would give up Kars or Batumi when their troops in 1917 were in control of most of Western Armenia. Baghdad fell in Marc 1917, but without having to fight the Russians the Turks probably can defend Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Mosul, Jerusalem, and Aqaba. It's also possible the Turks would be so mad to have gotten nothing that they'd try to negotiate a separate peace though.

The Americans declared war on April 6, 1917. I imagine they aren't taking that back just because the Russians withdrew. But if the Germans can shift troops from east to west a year earlier than OTL and purchase supplies (especially grain) from Russia to undermine the British blockade a bit, the Germans might win before the Americans can get enough troops to Europe to make a difference.

Lenin doesn't get sent by the Germans to Russia here. How does the Russian Republic develop without the Bolshevik Coup? Various generals might adopt a stabbed-in-the-back myth (especially since they could argue that with the Americans on the way, Russia could have won). Certain peoples and regions are bound to secure or retain autonomy ("Ukraine" comprised of OTL Poltava, Podolia, Volyhnia, Chernigov, and Kyiv Governorates - which was recognized OTL by Moscow as an autonomy; Finland which was already autonomous; Buhkhara and Kokand which were protectorates; a "Transcaucasia" federation comprised of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) but other groups would be bound to make demands as well and some regions (like Ukraine) probably would demand more autonomy or more lands to be under their authority. There would be a mix of right-wingers annoyed with the Republic, Leftists, and Regional/Nationalist movements producing instability.


The Russian Civil War produced between 7 and 12 million dead. Another 2 million fled Russia. If the Republic merely has unstable internal politics short of war, then that's a lot less misery.
 
The Americans declared war on April 6, 1917. I imagine they aren't taking that back just because the Russians withdrew. But if the Germans can shift troops from east to west a year earlier than OTL and purchase supplies (especially grain) from Russia to undermine the British blockade a bit, the Germans might win before the Americans can get enough troops to Europe to make a difference.

Occupying Ukraine alone tied down ~20 German divisions, and the Bolsheviks refusing to sign a Treaty until February meant the transfer of Eastern Front Divisions did not gather pace until the Spring Offensive was well underway. Even with these constraints, the Germans came within three miles of Amiens; taking it would've crippled the BEF's logistics and left them incapable of the offense while also collapsing something like 70% of French war production. If the Germans follow this up by taking Hazebrouck, BEF logistics no longer exist and the existing planning was to blow 90% of their heavy equipment in place and stage a 1918 Dunkirk.

Lenin doesn't get sent by the Germans to Russia here. How does the Russian Republic develop without the Bolshevik Coup? Various generals might adopt a stabbed-in-the-back myth (especially since they could argue that with the Americans on the way, Russia could have won). Certain peoples and regions are bound to secure or retain autonomy ("Ukraine" comprised of OTL Poltava, Podolia, Volyhnia, Chernigov, and Kyiv Governorates - which was recognized OTL by Moscow as an autonomy; Finland which was already autonomous; Buhkhara and Kokand which were protectorates; a "Transcaucasia" federation comprised of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) but other groups would be bound to make demands as well and some regions (like Ukraine) probably would demand more autonomy or more lands to be under their authority. There would be a mix of right-wingers annoyed with the Republic, Leftists, and Regional/Nationalist movements producing instability.

I'm skeptical of such as a general rule. The main Ukrainian nationalist areas remain in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and there is no 1918-1921 period of domestic rule followed by the 1920s-1930s Ukrainization efforts by the Soviets. Trans-Caucasus is much the same, but especially amplified here since the Russian Army is largely victorious on this front.

The Russian Civil War produced between 7 and 12 million dead. Another 2 million fled Russia. If the Republic merely has unstable internal politics short of war, then that's a lot less misery.

Russian demographers suggest the Russian population, in modern borders, would be 250 million or so without the Bolsheviks, given their policies from Lenin onward and the Civil War, and no WWII disaster.
 
I've seen 260-280 million. Though it could be higher with more immigration.
You're probably correct, I might be misremembering. As for immigration, might understanding was said studies only looked at natural growth. Without ~40 to 50 million dead and TFRs around 6 per woman, you can get some major growth; without Soviet emphasis on urbanization in particular their fertility transition would be much delayed.
 
You're probably correct, I might be misremembering. As for immigration, might understanding was said studies only looked at natural growth. Without ~40 to 50 million dead and TFRs around 6 per woman, you can get some major growth; without Soviet emphasis on urbanization in particular their fertility transition would be much delayed.
Yes, only natural growth was likely examined. Though if Russia becomes as prosperous as France by the late 20th century, then it could also become a major immigration magnet for both skilled and unskilled labor. Initially they would have a lot of unskilled labor in Central Asia but eventually even CA's fertility will decline to sub-replacement levels.
 
I don't think Russia could become as wealthy as France. Because it's so cold, it's difficult to construct roads in large parts of the country (the concrete doesn't settle right) and much of the country is either flooding or on fire for much of the year. It makes the cost of doing things comparably expensive, to say the least.

Becoming as wealthy as OTL Spain or Greece seems plausible though. Ukraine, Belarus, and Volga-Russia could become quite wealthy.



The Russian Republic OTL recognized Transcaucasia and Ukraine as autonomies under Kerensky. It seems likely to me that they'd be recognized on paper here as well.
 
What if Russia under the Provisional Government withdrew from the First World War in April or May of 1917? The Russians cede Congress Poland and Ober Ost and open up to trade with Germany, but the borders elsewhere remain the same.

The Ottomans would probably be indignant since they wouldn't even get Kars and Batumi. I don't see why the Russians would give up Kars or Batumi when their troops in 1917 were in control of most of Western Armenia. Baghdad fell in Marc 1917, but without having to fight the Russians the Turks probably can defend Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Mosul, Jerusalem, and Aqaba. It's also possible the Turks would be so mad to have gotten nothing that they'd try to negotiate a separate peace though.

The Americans declared war on April 6, 1917. I imagine they aren't taking that back just because the Russians withdrew. But if the Germans can shift troops from east to west a year earlier than OTL and purchase supplies (especially grain) from Russia to undermine the British blockade a bit, the Germans might win before the Americans can get enough troops to Europe to make a difference.

Lenin doesn't get sent by the Germans to Russia here. How does the Russian Republic develop without the Bolshevik Coup? Various generals might adopt a stabbed-in-the-back myth (especially since they could argue that with the Americans on the way, Russia could have won). Certain peoples and regions are bound to secure or retain autonomy ("Ukraine" comprised of OTL Poltava, Podolia, Volyhnia, Chernigov, and Kyiv Governorates - which was recognized OTL by Moscow as an autonomy; Finland which was already autonomous; Buhkhara and Kokand which were protectorates; a "Transcaucasia" federation comprised of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) but other groups would be bound to make demands as well and some regions (like Ukraine) probably would demand more autonomy or more lands to be under their authority. There would be a mix of right-wingers annoyed with the Republic, Leftists, and Regional/Nationalist movements producing instability.


The Russian Civil War produced between 7 and 12 million dead. Another 2 million fled Russia. If the Republic merely has unstable internal politics short of war, then that's a lot less misery.
I know this thread is over a year old, but this scenario is implausible. The Provisional Government under Kerensky could not have politically afforded to make peace. At the time, not even the Bolsheviks wanted peace.
 
I know this thread is over a year old, but this scenario is implausible. The Provisional Government under Kerensky could not have politically afforded to make peace. At the time, not even the Bolsheviks wanted peace.

In one sense, I think that’s true – it would be politically difficult for the Russians to leave the war, but at the same time the desire for peace was VERY intense in Russia, which means they might not be able to afford NOT to leave the war. Historically, they tried to stay in the line, which led directly to the Communist takeover and Lenin conceding peace on very unfavourable terms (although he was right to note that Germany would lose the war, leading to Russia recovering much of what it had lost.)

A peace in 1917 might be better for Russia, as the Kerensky offensive would not have taken place or failed so badly – it’s at least possible that Germany and Russia would come to terms, with minimal concessions (or that Germany would put Russia on the back burner, intending to crush Russia after dealing with France and Britain).

Chris
 
In one sense, I think that’s true – it would be politically difficult for the Russians to leave the war, but at the same time the desire for peace was VERY intense in Russia, which means they might not be able to afford NOT to leave the war. Historically, they tried to stay in the line, which led directly to the Communist takeover and Lenin conceding peace on very unfavourable terms (although he was right to note that Germany would lose the war, leading to Russia recovering much of what it had lost.)

A peace in 1917 might be better for Russia, as the Kerensky offensive would not have taken place or failed so badly – it’s at least possible that Germany and Russia would come to terms, with minimal concessions (or that Germany would put Russia on the back burner, intending to crush Russia after dealing with France and Britain).

Chris

Let's quote two historians here:

(1) Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution, p. 255: "In 1917, the liberal and moderate socialist parties all joined the provisional government and supported its commitment to remaining in the war. Their stance was reasonable. To make a separate peace with Germany-—the only peace that was ever actually going to be on offer-—risked placing the fate of Europe and of the Russian Revolution in the kaiser's hands. With the Russian masses increasingly hostile to the war, the moderate socialists' position nevertheless allowed the only organized party outside the government—the Bolsheviks—to mobilize grassroots support. If the Bolsheviks in 1917 had openly advocated a separate peace with Germany, then their cause would have been ruined. By arguing-—even often believing—-that they could end the war without making a separate peace with Berlin, they avoided this trap." https://books.google.com/books?id=nqGvDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA355

(2) Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks, pp. 334-5: "Following its overthrow, the Provisional Government did not lack excellent advice as to what steps it might have taken to preserve democracy in Russia. The usual criticism concerns its failure to make peace and thus to remove the most persuasive element of the Bolsheviks' propaganda. But to argue this is to misunderstand the situation of Russia right after the February Revolution. As was natural in a country that had suffered so many casualties, Russia longed for peace. To an overwhelming majority of politicians and, as we have seen, to the masses of population and soldiers as well, the only way to a speedy peace was defeat of Germany. From the perspective of two world wars such resolution looks foolish and suicidal. But to the average Russian of 1917 a separate peace with Germany and Austria meant only one thing: a victory of the Central Powers and Europe's domination by Imperial Germany. Russia undoubtedly could have gotten a better peace then than subsequently at Brest Litovsk. But who could conceive of the Western Allies, then barely holding out, being capable of withstanding the assault of all Germany's armies? And in a German-dominated Europe would Russia be allowed to preserve her territorial integrity, or her newly won republican and democratic freedoms? Thus it was not only the notions of honor and of loyalty to the allies that made the generals and politicians believe that a victorious prosecution of war was a matter of life and death for Russia, and especially democratic Russia.

"But the criticism overlooks an even more basic fact. Had it believed it necessary and beneficial, the Provisional Government and the General Staff still could not have concluded a separate peace. Its severest critics, the "internationalist Mensheviks" and the Bolsheviks, all pleaded for peace, but one to be concluded with the "German workers and soldiers" after they had overthrown their Emperor and generals. Had the Provisional Government at any point shown the slightest inclination to do what the Bolsheviks subsequently did at Brest Litovsk, it immediately would have been denounced for selling out to the Kaiser, for betraying the Revolution and the international proletariat. And Lenin's voice would have been the most insistent in this denunciation." https://books.google.com/books?id=dN5V8WX5WP0C&pg=PA334 https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA335
 
Back
Top