• Hi Guest!

    The costs of running this forum are covered by Sea Lion Press. If you'd like to help support the company and the forum, visit patreon.com/sealionpress

The Munich War and Afterwards

ChrisNuttall

Well-known member
Two points:

First, this was inspired by the earlier Munich discussions on this board here - https://forum.sealionpress.co.uk/in...ions-of-an-allied-victory-in-a-1938-war.6574/

Second, absolutely nothing here is intended to be controversial in any way.

Part One:

The Munich War and Aftermath (Part I)


Sir Humphrey Appleby: [Munich] occurred before certain important facts were known, and couldn't happen again.
James Hacker: What important facts?
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Well, that Hitler wanted to conquer Europe.
James Hacker: I thought that everybody knew that.
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Not the Foreign Office.

What Really Happened:

The appeasers of Adolf Hitler have gone down in history as weak and foolish men, and to a very great extent that is exactly what they were. Chamberlain et al were unable to comprehend Hitler’s willingness to bluff, his determination to actually have a war (to the point he was bitterly disappointed when Chamberlain gave him everything he said he wanted), and the fact there was nothing they could give Hitler that would quench his thirst for war. That said, they were also very aware that a long war on the same scale as WW1 would be utterly disastrous for Europe, and hypnotised by the (illusionary) German military might. The Treaty of Munich might have made sense to a western European statesman, but very little sense to anyone else and it was incredible foolish from nearly any other point of view.

Chamberlain did succeed in cutting the ground from under Hitler’s feet, briefly, but Hitler soon recovered and went on to plunge the world into war the following year. It was arguably the single worst foreign policy mistake in modern British history, with repercussions that continue to echo to this day.

What Might Have Happened?

Hitler gets greedy.

Like I said above, Hitler was the only person in 1938 who genuinely wanted the war. He believed, at least at first, that Chamberlain and the rest of the appeasers would stand up to him, surviving a trigger for the war he wanted so much. It must have been a surprise to him when Chamberlain gave him what he wanted on a silver platter, citing Germany’s legitimate claims as an excuse for giving in. And yes, there were quite a few legitimate claims. But those claims did not include the whole of Czechoslovakia and in this timeline, Hitler decides to demand that all of Czechoslovakia is surrendered to Germany.

This is too much, even for Chamberlain. The Czechs themselves had to be forced to concede the territory they surrendered in OTL, and that was suicide given that it handed over their main defence line to Germans. The idea of giving up their entire country is completely unreasonable, clear proof that whatever they say or do Hitler had no intention of respecting their independence any longer than it suited him to do so. Chamberlain could sell Munich to the British Parliament by insisting Germany was only receiving its legitimate claims, but Hitler has now cut the ground out from under his feet by demanding something that he has no claim to. Chamberlain now looks foolish as well as pacifistic, and his rivals - such as Churchill - are using it to prove that there is nothing to be gained by trying to appease Adolf Hitler. In a sense, the anti-German backlash that was fuelled by Hitler’s seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in OTL 1939 has come early.

Czechoslovakia flatly refuses to concede anything to Adolf Hitler. The Poles - who historically took a section of Czechoslovakia for themselves - put their disputes with the Czechs aside and start preparing for war, reasoning that a man that Hitler has to be stopped sooner rather than later. The French suffer a series of political upheavals as it becomes clear that there will be war, if Hitler doesn’t back down, and it isn’t clear to outsiders who is going to win.

Hitler has a choice - he can concede defeat, and admit he went too far too fast, or he can risk war with Czechoslovakia and gamble Poland and France will not intervene. He is not the kind of person to concede defeat, even if Germany could afford to do so. The Nazi economic miracle is nothing of the sort - the Germans need to loot more and more territories in order to keep their economy going, or they will face massive shortfalls that will cripple their rearmament programme. Worse, from Hitler’s point of view, there are plenty of people within the Reich’s government that would happily put a knife in his back if he took a pratfall. The myth of the Fuhrer’s infallibility has not yet taken off, certainly not to the degree it did after OTL Munich. And he is convinced that Germany can win a short victorious war.

The Germans build up along the Czechoslovakia border. They make a big show of their power, displaying tanks and aircraft to intimidate the Czechs. This display is nothing more than a façade; the Germans simply don’t have the men and machines for anything other than a very short conflict, not least because they have troops and aircraft in Spain fighting for Franco. Hitler does start bringing back some of those men, but logistics are not Germany’s strong point and shipping them home takes time he doesn’t have. He is painfully aware that time is ticking away. The French may not have the political nerve to stand up to him, he thinks, but they do have a powerful army and sooner or later someone with more nerve will take the lead in France. Hitler needs to act fast, or not at all.

Hitler launches the invasion after a final attempt to intimidate the Czechs. The Germans make good progress at first, but they rapidly run into heavy defences that slow them down and force them to expend ammunition they simply don’t have in vast quantities. The Czechs have some minor problems with Germans in Czechoslovakia, but many of them remain loyal now their country has been attacked. The German offensive slows as the inefficiencies in the German war machine make themselves manifest, with numerous tanks destroyed or disabled through a shortfall of spare parts. German aircraft prove themselves to be pretty good, but the tactic of sowing panic doesn’t work so well when the target doesn’t have anywhere to run. The Germans rapidly find themselves grinding to a halt, no matter how much Hitler encourages his men to keep advancing. No matter what he does, he cannot hide the fact that Germany is no longer advancing in Czechoslovakia.

The war galvanises both Poland and France. The Poles are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. They have Hitler to the west and Stalin to the east. The Poles suspect that it is only a matter of time before Stalin attacks them, and that committing themselves to a major offensive against Nazi Germany would weaken the defences in the east and invite Stalin to invade. That limits the amount of force they can deploy against Nazi Germany. On the other hand, they will never have a better chance to put Hitler down before it’s too late. The French are initially unenthusiastic about war, but as it becomes clear that Germany is nowhere near as powerful as they believed they get more inclined to intervene.

The Poles attack East Prussia. The Germans cry foul - the Poles didn’t bother with a declaration of war - but they are largely ignored. The defences are weak as Hitler has drained down most of the troops for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the fixed defences are insufficient to do more than slow the Poles, and the German line rapidly crumbles. Thousands of German start fleeing West, encouraged - to some degree - by Polish troops. The Poles do not particularly want to uproot vast numbers of Germans, but the risk of having a German minority in their land that could be used as an excuse for war by a later German leader is too dangerous. Hitler orders immediate counter-attacks out of East Germany, but the Germans do not have the resources to do more than bomb a handful of Polish cities. The effects are nowhere near drastic as they were in Spain, and the Poles take heart.

The French, backed by a largely token British force, invade the Rhineland. The advance is slow at first, delayed by German irregulars and French logistics inefficiencies, but rapidly picks up speed as it becomes clear the Germans have nothing more than skeleton forces in the region. Hitler attempts to pull back troops from Czechoslovakia to block the French, and what he thinks is a full-scale invasion from the east (actually, nothing more than Polish cavalry raids), but the Germans have already expended most of their ammunition and mobile units. The Germans can no longer carry out a proper mobile defence, nor do they have the numbers to set up trenches and force the French to storm them one by one. Ironically, the war the French fight is the war they prepared for, slow offences rather than lightning strikes intended to shatter enemy lines and advance through the gap, sowing panic in the rear. They are slowed more by their own logistics failings than German resistance.

Hitler intends to keep fighting. He is encouraged by suggestions that Italy is going to put together a peace conference that will allow Germany to survive with honour. This is nothing more than self-delusion and the smarter German military leaders know it. The war is lost, and Germany is heading towards a defeat that will make 1918 look like a minor setback, rather than total disaster. They put together a coup, and launch it with what forces they have on hand. There is a brief period of confusion in Berlin, with fighting between the SS - such as it was in 1938 - and the German military, before the diehard Nazis are killed or forced to run for their lives. Hitler himself is evacuated by his bodyguard as troops storm the Reichstag, and flown to Switzerland. The Swiss aren’t too keen on giving him asylum, but he is safe for the moment. The new military government is quietly pleased with the outcome. A Hitler who fled is far less dangerous than a prisoner or a dead man who committed suicide by shooting himself in the back. Going into exile discredits Hitler more than anything they could do.

The new military government reaches out to the Allies and requests an armistice, all the while pulling back its troops into more defensible positions and doing what it can to prepare to continue the war if the allies refuse to come to reasonable terms. The military government does not expect to be treated gently, but it dares not risk another Versailles. There is a limit to how much they can blame on the exiled Hitler, and the longer it takes put together a peace treaty the more the new government will take the blame.

The allies themselves are also keen to end the war, although for different reasons. The British and French can afford a short victorious war, but a long drawn-out conflict will be utterly disastrous even if they win. The Czechs want to get the Germans out of their territory and the Poles want to secure their claim to East Prussia, while avoiding a conflict that might invite Stalin to intervene. There are some disputes between the allies, particularly over avoiding another Versailles that would encourage a revanchist German government a decade in the future, but eventually an agreement is hammered out and presented to the Germans.

The terms are surprisingly light. Germany will formally concede all claims to German territory and Germanic populations outside Germany itself. Germany will also concede East Prussia to Poland and demilitarise the Rhineland (again), as well as accepting more reasonable limits on her military power. The Czechs will receive a certain amount of reparations from the Germans, but otherwise the Germans will not have to pay anything to the victorious powers. While some people arguing that Germany should pay for the war, wiser heads point out that Germany is in no condition to pay much of anything - the collapse of the German economy is now all too clear - and demanding payment didn’t work out too well the last time. The German military government grits its teeth and accepts the terms. They are too much the realists to believe there’s anything to be gained by continuing the war.

The aftermath of the war, in Germany, is murky. The Nazi Regime has been effectively destroyed, and the economy has collapsed, which encourages more violence against Jews and others blamed for the crisis even though Hitler is now in comfortable exile. A sizeable number of Germans and Germanics have been evicted from East Prussia and Czechoslovakia, forcing the German state to house and resettle them. The government, desperate for cash, sells tanks and aircraft to other powers, including the Poles (ironically) and the Chinese. They also allow a number of German officers who were a little too close regime for comfort to go into exile themselves, taking their experience to the Chinese, Turks, Iranians, or other powers interested in building up their military power. Germany does not have a great reputation in this timeline, but it is generally agreed that German aircraft and tanks were very good even though they lost the war.

Outside Germany, the results are much better. Chamberlain’s government has staggered on, largely because there isn’t any real opposition. Churchill is now Minister of Defence and angling for the Prime Minister’s job, and he might just get it because Churchill saw through Hitler’s bluff a long time before anyone else. The new French government is much more bullish, now is fought and won a war with Germany and both France and Britain are enjoying a surge of confidence. The war did some economic damage, but nothing they can’t handle. Indeed, for both countries, the fighting helped bring the empires close together, although that will not last long.

The Poles and Czechs are still not very fond of each other, but they have formed a tight alliance out of fear of a rejuvenated Germany or abandonment by the Western allies. The polls work hard to turn East Prussia into another part of Poland, deporting many Germans who refuse to take Polish citizenship or were involved in the Nazi regime. They have become increasingly aware of the horrors of Nazi regime, and they’re determined to make sure there is no resurgence. They are also deeply concerned about the prospect of a war with the Soviet Union. They do not allow themselves any illusions about Stalin, or the manpower at his disposal.

Stalin himself is irked by the outcome. He had hoped that Western Europe would destroy itself, allowing the Russians a chance to walk in and simply take over. The prospect of a grand capitalistic alliance looms large in his paranoia, encouraging him to pull back from Spain and start preparing defences for a prospective attack from the West. The Soviets continue building up their military, but have fewer plans to risk an invasion of Poland and Germany.

The United States barely takes any notice of the war. The US has seen a slight economic upturn through military orders being placed in American factories by Britain and France, but otherwise is very little affected. United States is more concerned about Japan in the Far East than (the now defunct) Nazi Germany or the USSR.

The Japanese, at first, take little notice of the war too. The Japanese are trying desperately to drive the Chinese Nationalists out of the war, or at least force them to come to terms. The Japanese have the edge on the ground, and they have done immense damage to the Chinese army at the Battle of Shanghai, but the sheer size of China makes it impossible for them to bring the Chinese to a final decisive battle. They can beat the Chinese army in the field, yet they cannot keep Chinese insurgents from harassing their forces and targeting their supply lines. As the ramifications of the Munich War continue to spread, the Japanese discover the exiled Germans have been training the Chinese in use of modern weapons and tactics, making the Chinese War far more costly for Japan. The Japanese are not on the verge of losing - yet - but a long drawn out conflict is not in their interests. They are becoming increasingly aware that the British and French can afford to send more troops to the Far East, now the threat of a major European war has receded. The prospect of economic sanctions, as reports of Japanese atrocities continue to spread, cannot be dismissed. Japan is slowly becoming aware that is caught in a deadly trap. If the British and French - and perhaps the Americans - start tightening the economic noose, Japan will have no choice but to fight or effectively herself on the mercy of the western powers.

Military officers across the globe study the fighting in hopes of determining what lessons can be learnt from the brief war. Their conclusions are somewhat mixed. They believe that tanks have their value of the modern battlefield, but the idea of a lightning strike through the lines appears to have been discredited. The value of fixed defences appears to have been proven, although the Czechs have the advantage of terrain and the opponent who simply didn’t have the supplies for a long conflict. Airpower has proven its value, but bombing cities is no longer so feared and the dangers of aircraft harrying retreating troops is grossly underestimated. Most powers start improving their anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, including designs that can be used for both purposes.

The fighting in Spain splutters on, now that German troops and aircraft have been withdrawn. Mussolini continues to back Franco, but the Italian contribution is becoming increasingly expensive and showing no real return. The British and French are much more aggressive about enforcing the blockade now, making it harder for the Italians to openly support Franco and causing dissidents in Italy to question the wisdom of the Spanish involvement and, in fact, the wisdom of Mussolini himself. Franco still has a slight edge over his opponents, but with the prospect of the French supporting the Republicans in Spain looming on the horizon he can no longer sure of victory. The prospect of Italy frittering away what little military power it has, preventing them from causing trouble elsewhere, suits the British and French just fine.

In mid/late 1939, European statesmen have good reason to believe the world is going their way. Germany has been taught a salutary lesson. Italy is no real threat without Germany and Mussolini seems intent on making it much less a threat anyway. The Soviet Union is a long way away, and Japan is deeply enmeshed in China. There appear to be no threats on the horizon. And then, everything changes …
 
Interesting world you have put together here. Lots of butterflies from a short 1938 war.

China: I can see sane heads in Japan wanting to pause and consolidate their gains, even come to some sort of deal, maybe brokered by Britain or even the USA. The insane option is to attack American interests.

USSR: I can see Stalin looking east if Japan does not draw down. Perhaps some excuse in Mongolia or a ship sunk in mysterious circumstances to see the Red Army sweeping through Manchuko.

USA: They are probably looking at the state of their army and navy in the wake of the short war and the rising Japanese spectre. The boost in sales from the 1938 could see a tech jump, though it might take a bit more to see some of the WW2 inventions.

France: I can see the French here intervening in Spain. Mussolini is an idiot and France now has a legion of veterans who can squish Franco. The Intervention in Spain is likely to be quick as I can see Franco folding, esp if Italy simply pulls out.

Italy: If Mussolini loses in Spain, as likely, then he is likely gone- however unlike Hitler, I could see Mussolini simply resigning and walking away head held high to a 'retirement' in a villa somewhere and the Fascist experiment sorta continuing for a while before transitioning into a democracy in say the late 1940's.

UK: Churchill probably becomes PM for the Pacific war, he likely does well to lead the Empire and UK through it, but he will not be as well regarded without British cities being bombed, and the fighting on the doorstep - Asia is a long, long way off.

Clever Imperialists like Chamberlain will use the war to reform the Empire, possibly push Imperial Confederation, and I could see it working, Britain is not bankrupt and destoryed like OTL '45, and the Imperial Reform was clearly needed; India becomes a Domain, but will eventually slip away in the 50's, as ITTL I see the Empire falling apart slowly into a stronger Commonwealth. Palestine is not abandoned and the various holdings are given self-rule, Dominion status, or independence slowly, and better planned.

Overall, even if a Pacific war breaks out I see this world avoiding the Cold War, nukes might still get invented, but I suspect its much later like the 60's sometime. Imperialism will still roll back, but it wil be slowly and more planned.

Of course, it is possible Hitler managed to coup the Swiss or Italians and launch another war in Europe, but I suspect its not likely since the Swiss will have him locked down tight.

Nice work.
 
And then, everything changes …
Cute suspenseful cliffhanger line.

Stalin himself is irked by the outcome. He had hoped that Western Europe would destroy itself, allowing the Russians a chance to walk in and simply take over.
But he's not going to cry too much or be too agitated by it. While seeing a western war as a potential opportunity, I doubt he had a super-detailed vision in his read that chaos and warfare in the west would definitely mean revolutions in Berlin or Paris by a particular year, or expansion of the USSR to Konigsberg specifically, or definite establishment of a Soviet security cordon by 1945 extending from Lubeck in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic. In other words, he does not have a vivid perception of what superpower position the USSR acquired in OTL, and therefore, what it is "missing" in the alternate timeline. Also, the end of the war and deposition of Hitler, while closing a window of opportunity, probably at least provides a small sense of relief that that loudmouth Hitler is out of power and the continent isn't on fire.

The prospect of a grand capitalistic alliance looms large in his paranoia, encouraging him to pull back from Spain and start preparing defences for a prospective attack from the West.
Yes, the single most irksome thing to Stalin will be the territorial expansion, and suspected increased confidence, of Poland. After that, it would be the prospect that the Poles, Czechs, French and British may remain allied after the defeat of Germany, and hostile to the USSR.

encouraging him to pull back from Spain and start preparing defences for a prospective attack from the West. The Soviets continue building up their military, but have fewer plans to risk an invasion of Poland and Germany.
Since Spain is no longer a useful tool to counter or drag down Germany, I can understand it becoming less important to the USSR. Stalin has also ensured liquidation of dissenting rival leftist (Trotskyist, Anarchist) elements. So, at this point, the effort in Spain mainly functions to tie down the anti-communist, anti-Soviet Italian regime. That's nice, but not the same priority as it was earlier to also counter Germany and bolster the French united front. So, I can see reducing and quieting the Soviet effort in Spain. It also does not want to have Britain and France be joining Italy in their annoyance at Soviet involvement. And it's probably grabbed all the payments Spain can afford.

And, there is another worthy recipient for Soviet foreign and military aid, dealing with a country of much greater concern to the Soviet Union than Italy. It is a country the USSR is already helping out a good bit. That is Chiang Kai-shek's China, with him formally heading a United Front alliance of China's Nationalists and Communists, but most important for the USSR, fighting against the aggressive Japanese Empire.....so the USSR doesn't have to.

They are becoming increasingly aware that the British and French can afford to send more troops to the Far East, now the threat of a major European war has receded.
Or the Soviets.

Indeed, diplomatically, the Soviets and western countries all agree they don't like Japan beating up on China, and are willing to say so in the world press and League of Nations. There are no Soviet-Polish, Soviet-Romanian, Soviet-Baltic type border dispute to make anti-Japanese cooperation as complicated as anti-German cooperation in Europe would have been.

If the British and French - and perhaps the Americans - start tightening the economic noose, Japan will have no choice but to fight or effectively herself on the mercy of the western powers.
And however, the Soviets might exploit such a vulnerable Japanese position. Unless the Japanese somehow bought the Soviets off. And one can only imagine the exorbitant cost of concessions the Japanese would have to offer the Soviets to make agreements with Japan that put them at cross-purposes with the economically mighty western powers.

China: I can see sane heads in Japan wanting to pause and consolidate their gains, even come to some sort of deal, maybe brokered by Britain or even the USA. The insane option is to attack American interests.
This would still be quite insane and "unforced" at this point, because of the lack of meaningful sanctions or inhibitions to Japanese purchases in the USA, British, French, and Dutch Empires, and the measured, not rapid, pace of the US build-up, and Japan not having reached peak competitive strength or full development of its carrier air arm yet. In OTL, Japan struck when there was a remarkable coincidence of intense adversary pressures (US sanctions and fleet/air buildup and stiffening attitude) and window of opportunity (German successes occupying, invading, or otherwise engaging and "busying" the western powers and Soviets). At least where the scenario stands now, Japan has neither thing.

USSR: I can see Stalin looking east if Japan does not draw down. Perhaps some excuse in Mongolia or a ship sunk in mysterious circumstances to see the Red Army sweeping through Manchuko.
It is not guaranteed to be a sweep like August 1945, without the years of practice, development and learning from fighting the Germans, further refinement of applied technology, American submarine and bombing 'tenderization' of Japan, and generous American lend-lease support specifically to Soviet Pacific front forces. The Soviets can dominate armor, mechanized, and artillery fighting from early on, and can win a protracted conflict, but will have to manage a triumph at the end of their logistics, applying theory to practice for the first time.

USA: They are probably looking at the state of their army and navy in the wake of the short war and the rising Japanese spectre. The boost in sales from the 1938 could see a tech jump, though it might take a bit more to see some of the WW2 inventions.

France: I can see the French here intervening in Spain. Mussolini is an idiot and France now has a legion of veterans who can squish Franco. The Intervention in Spain is likely to be quick as I can see Franco folding, esp if Italy simply pulls out.

Italy: If Mussolini loses in Spain, as likely, then he is likely gone- however unlike Hitler, I could see Mussolini simply resigning and walking away head held high to a 'retirement' in a villa somewhere and the Fascist experiment sorta continuing for a while before transitioning into a democracy in say the late 1940's.
All interesting and plausible.

UK: Churchill probably becomes PM for the Pacific war, he likely does well to lead the Empire and UK through it, but he will not be as well regarded without British cities being bombed, and the fighting on the doorstep - Asia is a long, long way off.
If there is one - (a Pacific War), and if a Pacific War, and winning it, doesn't create a grind that brings a hunger for Labour to come to power, Churchill may spoil a postwar victory war-won mandate by being obtusely stubborn on Indian independence matters and having an Indian war of independence blow up on his watch.

Clever Imperialists like Chamberlain will use the war to reform the Empire, possibly push Imperial Confederation, and I could see it working, Britain is not bankrupt and destoryed like OTL '45, and the Imperial Reform was clearly needed; India becomes a Domain, but will eventually slip away in the 50's, as ITTL I see the Empire falling apart slowly into a stronger Commonwealth. Palestine is not abandoned and the various holdings are given self-rule, Dominion status, or independence slowly, and better planned.

Overall, even if a Pacific war breaks out I see this world avoiding the Cold War, nukes might still get invented, but I suspect its much later like the 60's sometime. Imperialism will still roll back, but it wil be slowly and more planned.
I think this nuance, especially with regard to India and Egypt, is going to require keeping Mr. Churchill away from 10 Downing Street.
 
But he's not going to cry too much or be too agitated by it. While seeing a western war as a potential opportunity, I doubt he had a super-detailed vision in his read that chaos and warfare in the west would definitely mean revolutions in Berlin or Paris by a particular year, or expansion of the USSR to Konigsberg specifically, or definite establishment of a Soviet security cordon by 1945 extending from Lubeck in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic. In other words, he does not have a vivid perception of what superpower position the USSR acquired in OTL, and therefore, what it is "missing" in the alternate timeline. Also, the end of the war and deposition of Hitler, while closing a window of opportunity, probably at least provides a small sense of relief that that loudmouth Hitler is out of power and the continent isn't on fire.

I always had the impression that Stalin thought the French and Germans would grind each other down in 1940, weakening them both so the USSR could eventually stab Hitler in the back. Germany's near-complete victory, so quickly, shocked hell out of him.

Chris
 
I always had the impression that Stalin thought the French and Germans would grind each other down in 1940, weakening them both so the USSR could eventually stab Hitler in the back. Germany's near-complete victory, so quickly, shocked hell out of him.

Chris
Right, but just because German near-complete victory in 1940 was so surprising, and disappointing, doesn't mean rapid German defeat in a 1938 war would be as surprising, and thus as disappointing, or as prominent in his plans for the future. Certainly countries make some national planning assumptions and have vague opportunities about how what other countries will do that will represent threats and opportunities, but national leaders mostly think about what they are doing, what they and their governments are personally involved with. If something surprising happens in a fight between two powers in a war your own country is not involved in, it can upset your vague speculation or expected scenario, but he'll shrug it off pretty quickly and adapt to the new, real situation, and try to forget he ever, wrongly, predicted anything other than what occurred. That's just how the minds of confident, decisive, executives work.
 
I repeat my previous disclaimer - nothing here is intended to be controversial.

The Munich War And Aftermath Part 2

What Has Happened So Far?


Faced with the prospect of being deprived of his wished-for war, Adolf Hitler demanded that the entirety of Czechoslovakia was to be surrendered to Nazi Germany. This was too much, even for Chamberlain, and his demands were summarily rejected. Delighted, Hitler ordered the German Army to invade Czechoslovakia, a move that led rapidly to disaster. The Czech defences held, the shortcomings in the German military rapidly made themselves evident, and both Poland and France invaded Germany. The German Army, all too aware that Germany was staring down the barrel of another Versailles Treaty, overthrew Hitler and sent him into exile, and then made peace with the Western Allies.

Europe breathed a sigh of relief, but all too soon another war beckoned.

Part Two – The Tientsin Crisis

The Spanish Civil War has already diverged significantly from the conflict of OTL. The combination of German forces and support being withdrawn, and additional support from France to the Republicans, ensures the balance of power starts to tip against Franco and his backers in Italy. The Nationalists suffer a series of defeats that undermine their position in Spain, eventually resulting in Franco leading his loyalists into exile in Spanish Morocco and effective end of the Spanish Civil War. The Republicans take control of Mainland Spain and start trying to repair the damage caused by three years of extremely brutal war. It isn’t an easy task. There are too many factions with their own plans for Spain’s future, and too many hopes raised by the Republican victory. The future may not be peaceful.

Franco’s defeat leads to Mussolini’s fall from power. Italy expended vast amounts of blood and treasure in Spain, to the point it actually harmed their plans for modernising their army, and they have nothing to show for it. Discontent with the fascist regime grew stronger until a somewhat comical palace coup removes Mussolini from power and replaces him with a provisional government that pledges loyalty to the King but is actually a combination of several different factions. The Italians still have an empire, including Ethiopia, yet maintaining that Empire is incredibly difficult even without British and French opposition. The wiser heads argue to abandon Ethiopia now, and concentrate on Libya, but is very hard to do so without accusations of betrayal. Desperate for hard currency, Italy starts selling what weapons it can to China. The Italian government would be quite happy to sell to Japan as well, or even the Soviet Union, but Britain and France react harshly against it. Without a strong backer, Italy is economically vulnerable and militarily weak.

The situation in China is slowly shifting against Japan. The Chinese Nationalists have direct support and training from German (and to a lesser extent Italian) advisers, as well as semi-modern weapons and support. They also have lines of credit with Britain and France, allowing them to purchase more weapons from their backers and ship them into China. The Chinese are not as capable as the Japanese, man for man, but they are getting stronger with every passing month. As more soldiers are trained, they train other soldiers; each successive victory is harder to Japan, while territory they take - no matter how brutally they try to hold down - is never truly secure. The Chinese Communists are a lesser threat, at least in the short-term, but they do receive help from the Soviet Union. They can also slip across the border into Soviet territory if they are on the verge of losing.

The foreign situation is not much better. The Japanese believe (correctly) that British and French possessions in China are being used to ship weapons to the Chinese Nationalists. They are also uneasy aware that defenders of those positions have been strengthened, and that the British and French are reinforcing their military in Malaysia and Indochina (Vietnam). The Dutch have been trying to reinforce the Dutch East Indies, while the Americans have been preparing the Philippines for independence (which the Japanese believe will never be actually granted) and building up both American and Filipino military forces. In the north, the Soviet Union remains a major threat. The Russians are building up their own forces in the region and while the Japanese are not impressed with the Russians as fighters (and regard the results of Changkufeng/Khasan (1938) as inconclusive) they have to admit the Russians have significant manpower and armoured superiority. Japan believes itself to be increasingly surrounded by hostile powers. They are not entirely wrong. The British and French (and to a lesser extent the Americans) are hoping the Japanese will exhaust themselves fighting the Chinese.

The Japanese spend most of 1939 trying to figure out a way out of the trap. Their options are very limited. Doing nothing means a constant bloody sore, and effusion of blood and treasure, and successive attempts to force a decisive battle have failed. They might be prepared to evacuate parts of Occupied China, but giving up all of China is not an option and they fear if they make one concession they will be bullied into making more. Worse, war with one European power probably means having to fight all of them (and perhaps even the Americans). The Japanese military spends considerable time trying to figure out a way to seize the Dutch East Indies, without putting themselves in a hopeless position, and draws a blank. Japan, it seems, has a choice between fighting or shameful surrender.

This realisation triggers off a prolonged political crisis in Japan. The Kwantung Army commanders want to fight, or at least engage in brinkmanship in hopes of convincing Europeans to back off. The Japanese Navy is more aware of the balance of power. Japan has a local advantage, and her carriers are better than anything the British and French have immediately available, but victory cannot be guaranteed even if the Americans stay out of the war. A couple of years of development would give the Japanese a considerable advantage, assuming the British and French don’t make advances of their own, yet Japan might not have the time. The disputes between the Kwantung Army grow more violent as time goes on, raising the risk of the Kwantung Army acting independently and dragging Japan into war it cannot win.

The crisis comes at Tientsin (Tianjin), in late 1939. The British settlements and treaty ports have been used to ship supplies to China, despite strong objections from the Japanese, and provide a degree of safe harbour for Chinese insurgents. The British are technically neutral, but they are very much in favour of the Chinese. In both timelines, the Chinese Nationalists assassinated a high level Japanese collaborator in Tientsin. In this timeline, with increasing tension between the Japanese and Europeans, and the Japanese government and the Kwantung Army, the incident becomes a great deal worse very quickly. Local army commanders blockade the settlement, without even waiting to see if the British will arrest and extradite the insurgents responsible. The blockades spread up and down the Chinese coast, with British settlements and concessions sealed off and British shipping harassed by Japanese coastal forces. There are a handful of incidents that would, in earlier days, have led to war. By the time the Japanese government realises that it has a crisis on its hands, it is already too late to prevent a major incident. Even if it wanted to call a halt, it might find it politically impossible.

The incident sparks off a political crisis in Britain. Word spreads rapidly, with stories being embellished in the telling and igniting a firestorm of yellow peril articles and calls for action in the newspapers. Chamberlain is a particularly weak Prime Minister, and somewhat unwell at the time, and he finds it difficult to cope with the crisis. The Royal Navy makes it clear that the only way to challenge the Japanese is a major fleet deployment the Far East, which would be extremely expensive even if war is averted. However, it might have to be done. The resolution of the Munich War suggests, very strongly, that standing up to Japan is the only way to prevent war, an attitude loudly espoused by Winston Churchill. Other politicians are much less sanguine about the outcome of the war, although they do have to admit that Britain has far fewer worries in Europe now that Hitler and Mussolini are in exile. The French have no qualms, in this timeline, about seeing the British battle fleet heading to the Far East.

The exchange of diplomatic notes is inconclusive. The Japanese government is caught in a nasty trap. The Kwantung Army is demanding the complete surrender of British possessions in China, an end to all British support for the Chinese, and recognition of Japan’s conquests and de facto hegemony over China. They also want guaranteed shipments of oil and war materials from Britain and British territory, ensuring the Japanese war machine will not grind to a halt. The Japanese government is certain the British will reject these demands, but the risk of a military coup is very high. The incident has triggered off a firestorm of nationalism in Japan, and there have already been a number of incidents that could easily lead to the government’s fall.

The British Government is not much better off. Chamberlain is caught between war hawks such as Churchill, who believe Britain must stand up to Japan, and politicians who suspect the war will be fatal to the British Empire even if the British win. Chamberlain sounds out opinions from the Dominions (Australia and New Zealand are very wary of Japan and would welcome increased British protection; China and South Africa are less concerned) and the United States. The Americans are reluctant to get involved, and refused to make any major commitments, but with a war crisis brewing they move additional troops to the Philippines and ships to Pearl Harbour.

Chamberlain moves troops and ships himself to the Far East, while discussing joint military strategy with the French and Dutch and attempting to find a diplomatic solution. The talks go in circles for quite some time; the least one side can accept, for reasons both foreign and domestic, is more than the other side can reasonably offer. Matters are not helped by the Chinese, scenting a chance to bring the Europeans into the war on their side, launching a series of small yet sharp counter-attacks against Japanese positions. None of these attacks are ready dangerous, in a strategic sense, but they give hope to the Chinese and severely embarrass the Japanese government.

The Japanese government hastily draws up plans for war. It doesn’t want to risk implementing these plans, but it sees little choice. Even if the Kwantung Army doesn’t launch a coup, or start acting completely independently in China, Japan cannot afford to knuckle down and surrender. Showing weakness would be disastrous, they feel, and they might be right. There are already economic sanctions being put into place, and the Japanese economy is feeling the pinch. They believe they have enough supplies for three to six months of war. After that, if they don’t secure the supplies they need, Japan is doomed. Worse, Japanese painfully aware that the British and French are getting stronger. At some point, the balance of power will shift painfully and permanently again Japan.

The Japanese make one final attempt to come to terms, then start the countdown to war. Japanese troops in China are prepared to strike at European territories, while the Japanese Navy puts to sea and heads to Singapore. Japanese merchant ships are recalled so they can be used to carry troops to the (hopefully) newly-conquered territories. The Japanese issue an ultimatum and strike. There is a certain degree of warning, and the British and French are prepared for an attack. The Japanese carriers still do a considerable amount of damage as their aircraft swoop down over Singapore, but the fight is by no means lopsided. British and French aircraft are reasonably as good as the Japanese and, without commitment to Europe, they can afford to send the best.

The Japanese have very trouble overrunning the British and French possessions in China, although reports of Japanese atrocities - not remotely exaggerated - convince most European troops to fight to the bitter end. They have a much harder time of it in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. They succeed in landing troops in Indochina, but their logistics are not great and they are facing French and native troops who know the area a great deal better. Their shipping lines are also dangerously exposed to British and French submarines, limiting their ability to move fast over the very poor road network. On the other hand, the Japanese rapidly prove they are not as inferior as the pre-war Europeans thought; they are primarily light infantry - their tanks are no match for British and French designs - and very aggressive, skilled at finding weak spots and attacking through them. They also manage to land across the Dutch East Indies, securing the valuable targets very quickly, and defeating the Dutch Navy in a pitched battle. The Dutch earn some respect from the Japanese, but it doesn’t save their territory.

The naval war helps trigger a political crisis in Britain. Two battleships are lost very quickly to Japanese air attack, owing to poor coordination between the fleet and the airbases on the ground. Chamberlain takes the brunt of the blame, and is accused of letting Japanese think they could get away with attacking British territory. His government falls. Churchill becomes Prime Minister, and promises total war. This is not warmly welcomed everywhere. Churchill has a spine, which is more than can be said for Chamberlain, but he is also an arch imperialist and is determined to keep control of the British Empire. Saner voices argue that the Empire has become untenable, and that Britain really needs to downsize, but the imperialists refuse to listen.

The Japanese rapidly discover they have problems. The Americans in the Philippines are positioned right across their shipping lines, in a perfect position to interdict their shipping. The United States has resolved to stay out of the war for the moment, but the Americans are still moving more troops and resources to the naval bases, convincing the Japanese they are planning to join the war at the best possible moment. The fighting in Indochina is inconclusive. The Japanese push the French back, sometimes with help from Indochinese nationalists, but they tend to have problems when they go up against heavy fortifications and tanks. The British and French air forces are also learning lessons from the war; the Japanese find it harder to maintain air cover as they are forced to fight to control the skies.

The Japanese work hard to push an Asian nationalist narrative, pressing to liberate the Indochinese, Malaysians, Indians, and everyone else from the European yoke. This argument is not as convincing as it should be, and is badly undermined by Japanese atrocities against the Chinese, and the Japanese failure to produce a string of stunning victories means that most nationalists are prepared to sit on the fence and wait for a clear winner before committing themselves. The Japanese do succeed in recruiting a number of volunteers, mainly from Indochina or the East Indies, but their military value is questionable. The Japanese do not intend to let the natives have any real freedom after the fighting is over. As this becomes more obvious, the flow of recruits slows rapidly to a trickle.

The Japanese finish overrunning Indochina in early 1940, with the remnants of the French army moving into Malaysia and preparing to make a stand at Singapore with the British troops. The Japanese are unsure what to do next. Singapore has not been as effective a naval base as the British hoped, but is still a thorn in their side. The Royal Navy’s submarines are doing sterling work, harassing Japanese ships as they try to take troops the war zone and move war materials back to Japan. The Japanese also aware that the Royal Navy has taken losses, but is still a major threat. Japanese admirals are dreaming of a major naval battle, a clash of the titans between British and Japanese battleships. The Japanese Army is unsure if it wishes to push south and take Singapore, head west into Burma or try to push down to Australia. All three options have their advantages, but also major disadvantages. The Japanese are painfully aware that they cannot afford heavy losses. Their logistics are also paining them. If they fail to knock the British out of the war, their economy will simply grind to a halt.

The Chinese have problems as the flow of supplies from Europe is cut off - the Communists can and do receive support from the USSR - but they are still determined to go on the offensive as more and more Japanese troops are redeployed to fight the Europeans. The Nationalists launch a series of heavier attacks, trying to draw the Japanese into kill zones that will minimise their advantages and bleed them white, and actually succeed in retaking some territory. The Communists launch a set of attacks themselves, although they are partly restrained by the USSR. This threatens to become a millstone around their necks.

Stalin is quite happy to see the war go on as long as possible. The Japanese were a potential threat, and he expected there would be another clash between Japan and Russia even without a European War. The Russians build up their positions along the border, officially for defensive purposes only, and expand their logistics to the point they can take the offensive if Stalin says the word. Stalin has nothing solidly in mind, but he intends to be ready when opportunity comes calling. He also sees opportunities elsewhere. Russia has long-standing disputes with Finland, Romania, Iran, and Turkey. Who knows what opportunities will arise in the future?
 
This is a very, very minor note in the larger scheme of things and may be rendered moot by future parts, but assuming no war with Finland or anything substantially similar to the World War II-era Siege St. Petersburg/Leningrad should be much larger than OTL. Historically speaking, it was consistently larger than Moscow for the first two centuries of its existence, only falling behind the old capital around 1916-1917 due to famine, and grew rather rapidly over the course of the New Economic Policy and industrialization reaching the 3 million mark around 1939. I do believe that deportations and the potential war with Europe looming over the horizon can and will produce an impact, but overall it's entirely possible that ITTL St. Pete's population and size is much closer to Moscow compared to OTL.
A sizeable number of Germans and Germanics have been evicted from East Prussia and Czechoslovakia, forcing the German state to house and resettle them. The government, desperate for cash, sells tanks and aircraft to other powers, including the Poles (ironically) and the Chinese. They also allow a number of German officers who were a little too close regime for comfort to go into exile themselves, taking their experience to the Chinese, Turks, Iranians, or other powers interested in building up their military power. Germany does not have a great reputation in this timeline, but it is generally agreed that German aircraft and tanks were very good even though they lost the war.
Hrm. Wonder how many go to the Soviet Union, or to the Baltic states; depending on circumstances, I think Latvia would be most amenable to receiving a certain amount of German officers, given that the local German community was larger, more active and had more political rights IOTL. In the USSR on the other hand, a number of German communities were already being deported over the course of the late 1930s in light of worsening relations with Germany, but the Volga German ASSR existed well until the Great Patriotic War and will likely exist for longer ITTL, especially in light of expulsion by the Polish authorities.
 
Well the expected war in the Pacific has started. Churchill gets his moment, but will he be remembered as well ITL without the Battle of Britain and D-Day?

I wonder how easy it would be to sink a few American ships with UK subs and bring the US in? Maybe a few sneak torpedoes into Pearl?

More please!
 
Two points:

First, this was inspired by the earlier Munich discussions on this board here - https://forum.sealionpress.co.uk/in...ions-of-an-allied-victory-in-a-1938-war.6574/

Second, absolutely nothing here is intended to be controversial in any way.

Part One:

The Munich War and Aftermath (Part I)


Sir Humphrey Appleby: [Munich] occurred before certain important facts were known, and couldn't happen again.
James Hacker: What important facts?
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Well, that Hitler wanted to conquer Europe.
James Hacker: I thought that everybody knew that.
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Not the Foreign Office.

What Really Happened:

The appeasers of Adolf Hitler have gone down in history as weak and foolish men, and to a very great extent that is exactly what they were. Chamberlain et al were unable to comprehend Hitler’s willingness to bluff, his determination to actually have a war (to the point he was bitterly disappointed when Chamberlain gave him everything he said he wanted), and the fact there was nothing they could give Hitler that would quench his thirst for war. That said, they were also very aware that a long war on the same scale as WW1 would be utterly disastrous for Europe, and hypnotised by the (illusionary) German military might. The Treaty of Munich might have made sense to a western European statesman, but very little sense to anyone else and it was incredible foolish from nearly any other point of view.

Chamberlain did succeed in cutting the ground from under Hitler’s feet, briefly, but Hitler soon recovered and went on to plunge the world into war the following year. It was arguably the single worst foreign policy mistake in modern British history, with repercussions that continue to echo to this day.

What Might Have Happened?

Hitler gets greedy.

Like I said above, Hitler was the only person in 1938 who genuinely wanted the war. He believed, at least at first, that Chamberlain and the rest of the appeasers would stand up to him, surviving a trigger for the war he wanted so much. It must have been a surprise to him when Chamberlain gave him what he wanted on a silver platter, citing Germany’s legitimate claims as an excuse for giving in. And yes, there were quite a few legitimate claims. But those claims did not include the whole of Czechoslovakia and in this timeline, Hitler decides to demand that all of Czechoslovakia is surrendered to Germany.

This is too much, even for Chamberlain. The Czechs themselves had to be forced to concede the territory they surrendered in OTL, and that was suicide given that it handed over their main defence line to Germans. The idea of giving up their entire country is completely unreasonable, clear proof that whatever they say or do Hitler had no intention of respecting their independence any longer than it suited him to do so. Chamberlain could sell Munich to the British Parliament by insisting Germany was only receiving its legitimate claims, but Hitler has now cut the ground out from under his feet by demanding something that he has no claim to. Chamberlain now looks foolish as well as pacifistic, and his rivals - such as Churchill - are using it to prove that there is nothing to be gained by trying to appease Adolf Hitler. In a sense, the anti-German backlash that was fuelled by Hitler’s seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in OTL 1939 has come early.

Czechoslovakia flatly refuses to concede anything to Adolf Hitler. The Poles - who historically took a section of Czechoslovakia for themselves - put their disputes with the Czechs aside and start preparing for war, reasoning that a man that Hitler has to be stopped sooner rather than later. The French suffer a series of political upheavals as it becomes clear that there will be war, if Hitler doesn’t back down, and it isn’t clear to outsiders who is going to win.

Hitler has a choice - he can concede defeat, and admit he went too far too fast, or he can risk war with Czechoslovakia and gamble Poland and France will not intervene. He is not the kind of person to concede defeat, even if Germany could afford to do so. The Nazi economic miracle is nothing of the sort - the Germans need to loot more and more territories in order to keep their economy going, or they will face massive shortfalls that will cripple their rearmament programme. Worse, from Hitler’s point of view, there are plenty of people within the Reich’s government that would happily put a knife in his back if he took a pratfall. The myth of the Fuhrer’s infallibility has not yet taken off, certainly not to the degree it did after OTL Munich. And he is convinced that Germany can win a short victorious war.

The Germans build up along the Czechoslovakia border. They make a big show of their power, displaying tanks and aircraft to intimidate the Czechs. This display is nothing more than a façade; the Germans simply don’t have the men and machines for anything other than a very short conflict, not least because they have troops and aircraft in Spain fighting for Franco. Hitler does start bringing back some of those men, but logistics are not Germany’s strong point and shipping them home takes time he doesn’t have. He is painfully aware that time is ticking away. The French may not have the political nerve to stand up to him, he thinks, but they do have a powerful army and sooner or later someone with more nerve will take the lead in France. Hitler needs to act fast, or not at all.

Hitler launches the invasion after a final attempt to intimidate the Czechs. The Germans make good progress at first, but they rapidly run into heavy defences that slow them down and force them to expend ammunition they simply don’t have in vast quantities. The Czechs have some minor problems with Germans in Czechoslovakia, but many of them remain loyal now their country has been attacked. The German offensive slows as the inefficiencies in the German war machine make themselves manifest, with numerous tanks destroyed or disabled through a shortfall of spare parts. German aircraft prove themselves to be pretty good, but the tactic of sowing panic doesn’t work so well when the target doesn’t have anywhere to run. The Germans rapidly find themselves grinding to a halt, no matter how much Hitler encourages his men to keep advancing. No matter what he does, he cannot hide the fact that Germany is no longer advancing in Czechoslovakia.

The war galvanises both Poland and France. The Poles are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. They have Hitler to the west and Stalin to the east. The Poles suspect that it is only a matter of time before Stalin attacks them, and that committing themselves to a major offensive against Nazi Germany would weaken the defences in the east and invite Stalin to invade. That limits the amount of force they can deploy against Nazi Germany. On the other hand, they will never have a better chance to put Hitler down before it’s too late. The French are initially unenthusiastic about war, but as it becomes clear that Germany is nowhere near as powerful as they believed they get more inclined to intervene.

The Poles attack East Prussia. The Germans cry foul - the Poles didn’t bother with a declaration of war - but they are largely ignored. The defences are weak as Hitler has drained down most of the troops for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the fixed defences are insufficient to do more than slow the Poles, and the German line rapidly crumbles. Thousands of German start fleeing West, encouraged - to some degree - by Polish troops. The Poles do not particularly want to uproot vast numbers of Germans, but the risk of having a German minority in their land that could be used as an excuse for war by a later German leader is too dangerous. Hitler orders immediate counter-attacks out of East Germany, but the Germans do not have the resources to do more than bomb a handful of Polish cities. The effects are nowhere near drastic as they were in Spain, and the Poles take heart.

The French, backed by a largely token British force, invade the Rhineland. The advance is slow at first, delayed by German irregulars and French logistics inefficiencies, but rapidly picks up speed as it becomes clear the Germans have nothing more than skeleton forces in the region. Hitler attempts to pull back troops from Czechoslovakia to block the French, and what he thinks is a full-scale invasion from the east (actually, nothing more than Polish cavalry raids), but the Germans have already expended most of their ammunition and mobile units. The Germans can no longer carry out a proper mobile defence, nor do they have the numbers to set up trenches and force the French to storm them one by one. Ironically, the war the French fight is the war they prepared for, slow offences rather than lightning strikes intended to shatter enemy lines and advance through the gap, sowing panic in the rear. They are slowed more by their own logistics failings than German resistance.

Hitler intends to keep fighting. He is encouraged by suggestions that Italy is going to put together a peace conference that will allow Germany to survive with honour. This is nothing more than self-delusion and the smarter German military leaders know it. The war is lost, and Germany is heading towards a defeat that will make 1918 look like a minor setback, rather than total disaster. They put together a coup, and launch it with what forces they have on hand. There is a brief period of confusion in Berlin, with fighting between the SS - such as it was in 1938 - and the German military, before the diehard Nazis are killed or forced to run for their lives. Hitler himself is evacuated by his bodyguard as troops storm the Reichstag, and flown to Switzerland. The Swiss aren’t too keen on giving him asylum, but he is safe for the moment. The new military government is quietly pleased with the outcome. A Hitler who fled is far less dangerous than a prisoner or a dead man who committed suicide by shooting himself in the back. Going into exile discredits Hitler more than anything they could do.

The new military government reaches out to the Allies and requests an armistice, all the while pulling back its troops into more defensible positions and doing what it can to prepare to continue the war if the allies refuse to come to reasonable terms. The military government does not expect to be treated gently, but it dares not risk another Versailles. There is a limit to how much they can blame on the exiled Hitler, and the longer it takes put together a peace treaty the more the new government will take the blame.

The allies themselves are also keen to end the war, although for different reasons. The British and French can afford a short victorious war, but a long drawn-out conflict will be utterly disastrous even if they win. The Czechs want to get the Germans out of their territory and the Poles want to secure their claim to East Prussia, while avoiding a conflict that might invite Stalin to intervene. There are some disputes between the allies, particularly over avoiding another Versailles that would encourage a revanchist German government a decade in the future, but eventually an agreement is hammered out and presented to the Germans.

The terms are surprisingly light. Germany will formally concede all claims to German territory and Germanic populations outside Germany itself. Germany will also concede East Prussia to Poland and demilitarise the Rhineland (again), as well as accepting more reasonable limits on her military power. The Czechs will receive a certain amount of reparations from the Germans, but otherwise the Germans will not have to pay anything to the victorious powers. While some people arguing that Germany should pay for the war, wiser heads point out that Germany is in no condition to pay much of anything - the collapse of the German economy is now all too clear - and demanding payment didn’t work out too well the last time. The German military government grits its teeth and accepts the terms. They are too much the realists to believe there’s anything to be gained by continuing the war.

The aftermath of the war, in Germany, is murky. The Nazi Regime has been effectively destroyed, and the economy has collapsed, which encourages more violence against Jews and others blamed for the crisis even though Hitler is now in comfortable exile. A sizeable number of Germans and Germanics have been evicted from East Prussia and Czechoslovakia, forcing the German state to house and resettle them. The government, desperate for cash, sells tanks and aircraft to other powers, including the Poles (ironically) and the Chinese. They also allow a number of German officers who were a little too close regime for comfort to go into exile themselves, taking their experience to the Chinese, Turks, Iranians, or other powers interested in building up their military power. Germany does not have a great reputation in this timeline, but it is generally agreed that German aircraft and tanks were very good even though they lost the war.

Outside Germany, the results are much better. Chamberlain’s government has staggered on, largely because there isn’t any real opposition. Churchill is now Minister of Defence and angling for the Prime Minister’s job, and he might just get it because Churchill saw through Hitler’s bluff a long time before anyone else. The new French government is much more bullish, now is fought and won a war with Germany and both France and Britain are enjoying a surge of confidence. The war did some economic damage, but nothing they can’t handle. Indeed, for both countries, the fighting helped bring the empires close together, although that will not last long.

The Poles and Czechs are still not very fond of each other, but they have formed a tight alliance out of fear of a rejuvenated Germany or abandonment by the Western allies. The polls work hard to turn East Prussia into another part of Poland, deporting many Germans who refuse to take Polish citizenship or were involved in the Nazi regime. They have become increasingly aware of the horrors of Nazi regime, and they’re determined to make sure there is no resurgence. They are also deeply concerned about the prospect of a war with the Soviet Union. They do not allow themselves any illusions about Stalin, or the manpower at his disposal.

Stalin himself is irked by the outcome. He had hoped that Western Europe would destroy itself, allowing the Russians a chance to walk in and simply take over. The prospect of a grand capitalistic alliance looms large in his paranoia, encouraging him to pull back from Spain and start preparing defences for a prospective attack from the West. The Soviets continue building up their military, but have fewer plans to risk an invasion of Poland and Germany.

The United States barely takes any notice of the war. The US has seen a slight economic upturn through military orders being placed in American factories by Britain and France, but otherwise is very little affected. United States is more concerned about Japan in the Far East than (the now defunct) Nazi Germany or the USSR.

The Japanese, at first, take little notice of the war too. The Japanese are trying desperately to drive the Chinese Nationalists out of the war, or at least force them to come to terms. The Japanese have the edge on the ground, and they have done immense damage to the Chinese army at the Battle of Shanghai, but the sheer size of China makes it impossible for them to bring the Chinese to a final decisive battle. They can beat the Chinese army in the field, yet they cannot keep Chinese insurgents from harassing their forces and targeting their supply lines. As the ramifications of the Munich War continue to spread, the Japanese discover the exiled Germans have been training the Chinese in use of modern weapons and tactics, making the Chinese War far more costly for Japan. The Japanese are not on the verge of losing - yet - but a long drawn out conflict is not in their interests. They are becoming increasingly aware that the British and French can afford to send more troops to the Far East, now the threat of a major European war has receded. The prospect of economic sanctions, as reports of Japanese atrocities continue to spread, cannot be dismissed. Japan is slowly becoming aware that is caught in a deadly trap. If the British and French - and perhaps the Americans - start tightening the economic noose, Japan will have no choice but to fight or effectively herself on the mercy of the western powers.

Military officers across the globe study the fighting in hopes of determining what lessons can be learnt from the brief war. Their conclusions are somewhat mixed. They believe that tanks have their value of the modern battlefield, but the idea of a lightning strike through the lines appears to have been discredited. The value of fixed defences appears to have been proven, although the Czechs have the advantage of terrain and the opponent who simply didn’t have the supplies for a long conflict. Airpower has proven its value, but bombing cities is no longer so feared and the dangers of aircraft harrying retreating troops is grossly underestimated. Most powers start improving their anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, including designs that can be used for both purposes.

The fighting in Spain splutters on, now that German troops and aircraft have been withdrawn. Mussolini continues to back Franco, but the Italian contribution is becoming increasingly expensive and showing no real return. The British and French are much more aggressive about enforcing the blockade now, making it harder for the Italians to openly support Franco and causing dissidents in Italy to question the wisdom of the Spanish involvement and, in fact, the wisdom of Mussolini himself. Franco still has a slight edge over his opponents, but with the prospect of the French supporting the Republicans in Spain looming on the horizon he can no longer sure of victory. The prospect of Italy frittering away what little military power it has, preventing them from causing trouble elsewhere, suits the British and French just fine.

In mid/late 1939, European statesmen have good reason to believe the world is going their way. Germany has been taught a salutary lesson. Italy is no real threat without Germany and Mussolini seems intent on making it much less a threat anyway. The Soviet Union is a long way away, and Japan is deeply enmeshed in China. There appear to be no threats on the horizon. And then, everything changes …
How would the French Social Party do in the 1940 elections?
 
I would note that in the OTL Sino-Japanese War, Soviet aid flowed to *both* major parties of China's (not always very) United Front government, the Nationalists *and* the Communists. The Nationalists probably got more total tonnage of aid during the height of the wartime years, in the 1930s, when the USSR could afford to give aid [because it was not being attacked by Germany at the time], probably because the Nationalists larger, more conventionally formatted armies could absorb and integrate Soviet donations of larger artillery tubes, aircraft with volunteer pilots at times, armor, heavy machine-guns could fight set-piece urban battle where Soviet staff advice would be useful. The Communists were in radio contact with Moscow the whole war, and had their emergency expenses always paid for [and Moscow demanded Chungking pay a stipend to the Communists in return for the aid the Nationalists were getting], and its leaders had Soviet liaisons, doctors and medical care, shipments of light weapons, occasional donations of trucks and vehicles and small passenger aircraft. Of course at the *end* of the war, with Japanese surrender, the Soviets let the Chinese Communist raid Japanese arsenals in Manchuria right under their noses, and take possession of Japanese arms manufacturing equipment, but that was later on. I felt like mentioning this because of the half dozen references to the Soviets providing aid to Chinese Communists, but only mention of other, non-Soviet sources, for the Nationalists.
 
Part Three: The Battle of Singapore

As Japan nears the end of 1940, it becomes increasingly clear they are caught in a trap they need to escape now or face certain defeat. The problem is that they are dangerously low on everything they need to break free, and facing a growing number of enemies. The British, French and Chinese have been joined by the Italians and Siamese (Thailand), while both Russia and America might jump into the war at any moment. Unless the Japanese can win a stunning victory, inflicting enough damage to force their enemies to end hostilities and concede defeat, they are doomed.

The government and military factions spend months debating their options, but most proposals are fanciful. The Japanese do not have the logistics to invade Australia, nor do they have the fighting power to take and hold more ground in China. Their early victory in the Dutch East Indies has turned sour, as a combination of Allied commandos and Japanese contempt for the locals is making it increasingly difficult to keep control, let alone turn the DEI into a source of raw materials. The oil wells simply cannot be repaired in a hurry and even if they were brought back online impossibly quickly, the Japanese are uneasily aware of just how badly the Allied submarine campaign is hurting their shipping. They may have the materials, at least in theory, but getting them to the Home Islands is difficult and if America joins the war the shipping lanes will be cut completely. The Japanese think it is only a matter of time until they do.

The final plan is a combination of land and sea assaults aimed at Singapore, with secondary units heading west into Burma. On paper, the plan is workable. The Royal Navy (and its allies) will be forced to confront the Japanese in a naval battle, where the Japanese still have a rough superiority, or fall back to India and abandon Singapore to its fate. British land-based airpower might tip the balance in favour of the UK, but if Singapore is threatened from the land as well as the sea those airfields can be shut down, crippling the British ability to counterattack. The Japanese conclude they will either win the battle, and force the British (et al) to concede defeat, or force the British out of Malaya, a defeat that will do immense damage to British prestige. Even if Britain chooses to stay in the war, taking out Singapore will curtail the submarine offensive and give the Japanese a chance to make use of their new conquests.

The Churchill Government is struggling to come to terms with Britain’s significantly weakened position in the world. Britain has many advantages, not least the simple fact that British factories are well out of Japanese reach, but it is incredibly difficult to build and train an expanded military force, even with a lack of any real threats in Europe. British technology is better than Japanese in many places, but getting that technology deployed to the Far East is a whole other story. Churchill is uneasily aware that there is no way the war can be fought and won on the cheap, ensuring that even victory will do irreparable damage to the British Empire. So far, the British have avoided the disasters of OTL, but that could easily change if the Japanese win the upcoming battle. They can and they do seek loans from the United States, yet those loans come with heavy strings attached. Churchill has no intention of winning the war only to see the UK become a US dependency, but there appears to be no alternative. The minimum the Japanese will accept, if peace talks are held, is far more than the maximum Britain can grant.

The UK does have one immense advantage – it has been reading Japanese codes for quite some time. The British learn of the Japanese plans almost as soon as the Japanese finalise their concepts, then start planning to counter them. The Japanese plan does look good on paper, but the British consider it to be almost absurdly over-complicated (to the point that some British naval officers wonder if they’d being misled) with plenty of weak spots that can be used to turn the plan against its makers. The British finish laying their own plans and lay in wait for the Japanese.

The battle of Singapore begins with a major Japanese thrust through Malaya towards Singapore. The Japanese are surprised, at first, by just how quickly they advance. The road network is not great, and the British and French have gotten over pre-war racist belief the Japanese didn’t make good soldiers. There are hints, through intercepted radio broadcasts, that Singapore is being abandoned – in reality, dependents and certain irreplaceable pieces of kit being evacuated (just in case) – and that fuels their desire to keep pushing south. The IJN sails, as planned, and homes in on the Royal Navy. Unknown to the Japanese, the ships they spot are actually fakes, freighters and makeshift carriers (and older battleships) posing as the main British fleet. The IJN turns into the wind and launches a major strike.

The British spring their surprise as soon as the Japanese aircraft are too far away to intervene quickly. The land-based aircraft deploy and attack the Japanese fleet, backed up by modified carrier-capable Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Japanese are caught without anything like enough air power to protect their carriers, giving the British a clear shot at their hulls and wiping out the majority of Japan’s remaining naval striking power. Their aircraft attempt to make it to Japanese-held territory in Malaya, but most run out of fuel before reaching safe harbour. The remnants of the Japanese fleet attempts to escape, only to find itself running a gauntlet of land-based aircraft and submarines. Only a handful of ships escape the trap and make it back to safe waters.

Desperate to salvage something from the disaster, the Japanese army attacks Singapore – and runs straight into immense fixed defences. The British have nowhere to retreat as the Japanese try to get across the water and into the island city, nor can they be outflanked. The Japanese have to charge straight into the British defences and rapidly find themselves being slaughtered by superior firepower, their positions bombarded by British, French and Italian battleships that were held in reserve near Singapore. They rapidly discover just why they were allowed to advance so quickly – British stay-behind units appear in their rear and cut their logistics chain, while Anglo-French forces move into Malaya and threaten Japanese-held Indochina. Their logistics are not much better than the Japanese, but the mere prospect of a French return to Indochina galvanises nationalists who start preparing to rise against the Japanese in hopes of liberating their country before the French can retake their lost colony.

The Japanese humiliation is not yet over. The Chinese Nationalists launch a series of offensives of their own, each relatively small-scale – the Chinese are not yet capable of sweeping blitzkrieg operations – but immensely costly to a Japanese army that is no longer able to replace its losses. The Japanese break in places, forcing them to mount a series of desperate counterattacks that are – on paper – successful, yet grind their army down still further. The Communists, smoked out, launch their own series of attacks in Northern China.

As soon as they are sure of the scale of their victory, the British redeploy their submarines further into Japanese waters, putting even more pressure on the Japanese shipping lanes. The Japanese have no easy counter and are forced to order their garrisons to prepare to live off the land, which does not endear them to the locals.

The British victory shifts public opinion in America towards the UK, providing political cover for FDR being neutral in the UK’s favour. British ships passing near the Philippines are quietly ignored even when they violate American waters, while Japanese vessels are harassed or interned by American forces. American ships and aircraft monitor Japanese movements and broadcast reports in the clear, a transparent trick that fools absolutely no one.

Stalin is quietly gleeful at the sudden decline in Japanese forces and hastily reinforces his military units near the border, alternatively threatening the Japanese with a full-scale invasion and offering economic trade on very favourable terms in exchange for the border being redrawn in Russia’s favour. The Japanese are not keen on working with the Russians, and they suspect it is just a matter of time until the Russians invade anyway, but they don’t need more enemies.

The shock of the defeat forces the Japanese to re-evaluate their strategy. Their navy has effectively been shattered. The few remaining surface vessels are unlikely to be able to defeat the Allied fleet, as it makes its way up the coastline. There isn’t anything like enough time to rebuild the lost ships, let alone replace the destroyed carrier air wings, nor is there time to raise new troops for China and Indochina. The arguments lead to a near-civil war in Japan, between factions that think it is time to open talks before the entire empire is lost and others who want to fight to the end, and result in an effective split between the Home Islands and the Kwantung Army.

The Japanese haven’t quite given up. They don’t believe they can win outright any longer, apart from the fanatics, but they are fairly certain the British and French won’t want to risk an invasion of the Home Islands. The Japanese are already preparing their civilians for invasion, encouraging them to fight to the last. A bloody defeat might just let the Japanese salvage something from the disaster. Might. They also start talking to nationalists in both Indochina and the DEI. They don’t want to make any concessions to them, but if they soak up allied bullets it’ll be worthwhile.

Churchill convenes an Allied Strategy Council in early 1941. The Japanese are on the back foot and, as he puts it, it is time to put the boot in before the Japanese can regenerate their military power. The French agree, as do the Chinese. This opens up a whole new can of worms, as far as the British (and to a lesser extent the French) Empire is concerned. If China liberates Hong Kong and the other British possessions in China, currently in Japanese hands, the British might not be permitted to reclaim them.

It isn’t the only problem facing Britain. The Indian Nationalists are demanding a greater share of power, even though the UK has avoided any major defeats, and there are clear limits to just how long Britain can hold on to India. Churchill would prefer to avoid making concessions to the Indians either, but it is growing clear that India will claim its independence shortly, forcing the British to either concede defeat or fight to keep India in the empire. Churchill argues that such decisions should wait until after the war, leaving the Indians to suspect they’re being stalled. They’re probably right.

The Anglo-French offensive into Indochina starts out relatively well, pushing back the Japanese whenever they encounter them. The Japanese try to encourage the Indochinese Nationalists to fight the Allies, but the Indochinese are increasingly convinced Japan is going to lose and see no reason to fight for a lost cause. The Japanese have also made themselves extremely unwelcome in Indochina, ensuring the proto-Vietcong and others have no interest in fighting for them. The Japanese are still doughty fighters, but as their position starts to collapse the locals turn on them with ever-increasing fury. Many Japanese fight to the last; others, more practical, fall back to China. The French re-establish colonial government in Indochina, but discover – to their fury – that the Indochinese have recovered and concealed enough Japanese weapons to fight a later war of independence.

The Chinese Nationalists go on the offensive again, this time for keeps. They are a far more mobile force now than they ever were in OTL, thanks to German weapons and advisors, and they are capable of isolating and sealing off Japanese garrisons, cutting their supply lines and leaving them to starve rather than risk trying to crush them through mass attacks. The Japanese position in South China crumbles rapidly, allowing the Chinese to punch through to the sea and start liberating coastal cities. The Chinese are very vague about their plans for the former western enclaves, but hardly anyone expects them to be returned to their colonial masters. It would be the kiss of death for the nationalist regime.

As the Japanese hastily shift troops south, the Russians up the pressure on Manchuria and eventually attack. The offensive starts out well – the Russians have more and better tanks – but grinds to a halt when the Russian spearheads outrun their logistics. The Japanese aircraft are better and their pilots better trained, giving them a little hope before the Russians rush more supplies forward and resume the offensive. The Chinese Communists move ahead of the Russians, trying to prepare for the expected Nationalist-Communist Civil War. Mao isn’t keen on working too closely with the Russians – the risk of being seen as a cat’s-paw is high, even before the Russians start looting and raping their way across Occupied China – but there isn’t any choice. The Nationalists are a far more effective force in this timeline, as proven by their successful liberation of Hong Kong.

That sparks off a political crisis. Churchill has no intention of allowing the Chinese to recover Hong Kong. His generals and admirals on the ground argue that it is too late – the Chinese have already liberated Hong Kong and the UK cannot force them to return the island to Britain, not without a major war the UK would almost certainly lose. The conflict would also seriously impede the real war against Japan. The British need access to Chinese ports to tighten the submarine blockage of Japan. After much arguing, a pair of compromises are reached. China will maintain political control of the colony, but Britain will have its economic position respected (a very vague promise) and will also be allowed to claim Taiwan after liberating it from the Japanese. The invasion is carried out in late 1941 and, although victorious, is immensely bloody.

The Japanese Government, perversely, benefits from the effective destruction of the Kwantung Army, even if the Japanese position in China and Korea is on the edge of complete collapse. Large parts of Korea are in open revolt, with Japanese civilians struggling to flee back to the Home Islands before the rebels can slaughter them; their handful of remaining positions in China are little more than isolated garrisons, cut off and surrounded by the Chinese. Some garrisons try to break out and head to the coastline, on the assumption the IJN would rescue them (false), while others fight to the last. The Chinese are not gentle.

In Tokyo, the debate rages back and forth. On one hand, Japan has effectively lost the empire. The Allies and the Russians have both bombed Japanese cities – the Russians had bombers that were supposed to be able to reach Tokyo from Russian territory – and Japanese morale is starting to break. On the other hand, the British are reluctant to risk a second major invasion after Taiwan and the Russians simply don’t have the shipping to get an invasion force to Japan itself. Both sides will build up their bomber forces, the Japanese assume, but even using Taiwan as a base it won’t be easy to burn japan to the ground. Insanely, some Japanese see hope even in the darkest days. There is a better than even chance that the Westerners, Chinese and Russians will start fighting amongst themselves, now they have effectively beaten Japan. The war has opened a great many issues that need to be settled quickly, such as whoever inherits Korea, and some will be solved through violence.

The Emperor insists on being heard, after the debate goes on and on with no clear winner, and argues that it is time for Japan to seek terms. The Russians are pressing into Korea and will soon try to seize islands that have been disputed for years, giving them a shot at Japan itself. Even if the Japanese win the coming battle, their existence as a society is at risk. The British and their allies might resort to poison gas or biological weapons, after uncovering evidence the Japanese used such horrors themselves in China. The war is over, he says, providing cover for the government to open talks.

Discussions begin fairly quickly, and nearly fail at once because of disputes between the various anti-Japanese powers and objections to the US’s very strong suggestion it serve as mediator. Most participants find common ground in objecting to the latter, not least because the US has benefited hugely from the war while neither fighting to beat the Japanese nor having anything at risk. Even after that is settled, the arguments go back and forth for quite some time. Japan is unwilling to concede anything she hasn’t already lost and her enemies are reluctant to risk a resurgent Japan, although they take heart from Hitler’s failure in 1938.

The Treaty of Tokyo formally ends the war in 1942. The Japanese concede all claims to China, Korea, Taiwan and other territories outside the Japanese Home Islands. The Japanese agree to pay a certain amount of reparations, as well as accepting limits on their military power, and also to punish Japanese officers responsible for atrocities. The Allies agree not to demand an occupation of Japan, although inspection parties are free to roam where they will, and to make no attempt to unseat the Emperor or his government. It isn’t a perfect victory, and not everyone is happy with it, but the Japanese refuse to concede anything else without an invasion of their homeland. It isn’t going to happen and everyone knows it.

The war is over. Now, can they win the peace?
 
Churchill or someone in his government should make it clear to India that Dominion status will be theirs at the end of the war in a Federal India system- it’s the only way to prevent a revolt and keep India inside the British Commonwealth and supplying the Home Country with cash.

Churchill will not like it, but he is also a pragmatist- put the numbers regarding how much the UK economy needs India ‘in’ rather than out of Britain's sphere and he will have to give way.
 
Probably the last section. Comments?

The Munich War Aftermath (Part IV)

The Japanese Government might have come to terms with the allies, but not all Japanese are interested in peace. Some military units in the Dutch East Indies go rogue and resist Allied troops as they seek to recover the islands, others hand their weapons over to independence-minded factions before they are repatriated back to Japan. A handful of units in China try to hold out, only to be crushed by superior Chinese forces. The Japanese Government is quietly relieved to see the back of the fanatics, no matter how badly their deaths hurt Japan. The public mood is ugly, and the government is growing increasingly aware that someone is going to take the blame for the lost war and that someone is probably going to be them.

The British and French secure control of the remnants of Malaya and Indochina, but – again – the Japanese have provided weapons to nationalists and the risk of outright insurgency is too high to be borne. A handful of isolated incidents make it clear the locals will no longer accept colonial authority, certainly not on the same terms as before. The Dutch are already at risk of losing the DEI permanently, even though Japan has only just surrendered. They plead for British and French help, but neither power has much to send.

The developing situation in China worries both powers. The Nationalists rule much of the country, and riding high after their victory over Japan, are currently crushing warlords (as well as the Japanese remnants) and preparing for a push into Manchuria. The Communists are in a weaker position than they know, their alliance with the Russians called into question as the Russians loot Manchuria while making themselves very unwelcome. The Russians might not be quite as bad as the Japanese, but they’re still preying on the local population – looting, raping, burning – and Mao is unable to do anything about it. In the Sino-Japanese War, Mao could mock Chiang for not attacking the Japanese, secure in the knowledge that the Communists were in no position to attack the Japanese themselves, but now it is Mao who must defend his people or face their scorn. The Nationalists don’t hesitate to make political hay out of the affair, gleefully recounting stories of Russian atrocities and pointing out that the Chinese Communists are doing nothing about it. Public support starts to slip away from the Communists, leaving them caught between the Russians and the Nationalists.

Stalin is unbothered by the atrocities in China, but he is uneasily aware that the offensive showcased the limitations of the Red Army. The Russians have powerful tanks, deployed in vast numbers, but they have a nasty habit of outrunning their logistics and being surrounded and picked off. The Japanese won a handful of tactical victories that would have turned into complete disasters, if they’d had the firepower to capitalise on their brief successes. They also had better aircraft, with better pilots. Stalin has no intention of abandoning Manchuria to the Chinese Communists – at least until they become Moscow’s puppets – and he even has ideas about advancing into Korea. The Red Army starts a series of new training programs designed to learn from the war, and avoid making the same mistakes in a second war. Stalin is too cynical to expect that the defeat of Japan will lead to a new era of endless peace.

The British Government is torn between delight at the victory – which has done wonders for national morale – and horror at the cost. The country is effectively bankrupt. The United States is demanding payment for the orders placed in American factories and the UK simply can’t pay. A handful of weapons and supplies are sold to various other governments, including Mexico and China, but no matter what Britain does it is unlikely the country can recover in a hurry. Japan, the British reflect sourly, might have the last laugh after all.

There is a major ongoing debate about the status of the British Empire. Churchill is determined to keep everything, which is economically impossible. The Indians are demanding dominion status, if not complete independence, while other British possessions are agitating themselves. Other nations are also becoming more dangerous; the Shah of Iran took advantage of the Japanese War to rebuild his army with German advisors and weapons, meaning it won’t be so easy to push Iran around any longer (the Iranians insist they’re preparing for a Russian offensive, but no one in Britain is fooled). The British have too many fires and not enough firemen.

The French rapidly run into trouble in Indochina. Their poor performance against the Japanese, at least in the early months of fighting, galvanised nationalist opinion and convinced many Indochinese that they could resist, then liberate themselves. The French make matters worse by appointing a governor who sees the Indochinese as less than human, destroying all hope of a negotiated compromise. Fighting starts rapidly – the French discover they are unbeatable as long as they stay in large groups, but smaller forces and garrisons are quickly overcome and destroyed. French weapons and supplies are captured, giving the Indochinese more fighting power; French atrocities, carried out against helpless villagers who had little or nothing to do with the insurgency, only fuel hatred of the French. The fighting rapidly gets worse, and the French start losing control of vast parts of the country.

The Indochinese War tips the balance in Britain. The prospect of a major war for India, one the British can only lose, is unthinkable. Churchill is overridden – he resigns in protest – and India gets dominion status, with plans for full independence – if it wishes to be independent – once a proper government is established. It isn’t easy. The uneasy peace between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs had been breaking down for years, but the prospect of India ruling itself brings all the fault lines out into the open. The debate over just what form the new government is to take grows acrimonious, with threats of open civil war between the various factions. It looks as if the post-independence India will be split into three parts, perhaps four.

There are other problems facing the UK. Germany is growing stronger – again – and Hitler is still broadcasting from Switzerland, raising the spectre of a Nazi revival. The UK and France have an understanding that they will invade, without warning, if Hitler returns to power (Poland and Czechoslovakia have a simile agreement), but both powers are aware that the German military is dangerously advanced and it would be simple for the Germans to take the weapons they are producing for other powers and turn them against their enemies on the continent. Poland is also growing stronger, and preparing for war with Russia as well as Germany, but it isn’t clear if Germany can be constrained. The Germans have a rocket program as well as a quiet atomic program, the potential of which is not – yet – fully understood. Or feared.

The United States has benefited from the war, even though it was not a formal combatant. The British and French arms purchases gave the American economy a boost, overcoming the last of the depression, although the economy hits a downturn as the final orders are cancelled or left unpaid. The Americans are strongly positioned in the Philippines and, now the war is over, making preparations to grant the locals independence (after signing a bunch of military basing agreements). That said, internal problems threaten US stability. The rising tide of insurgency in the Middle and Far East is inspiring black activists, who want the rights and freedoms they should have had years ago. It also threatens to spread to Mexico, which has ties to Hispanics in the United States, and Panama.

In the longer term, where is this world likely to go?

I see a Chinese Civil War as pretty much inevitable. Chiang was not the kind of person to tolerate an opposing army, not if he could do something about it, and the Chinese Communists are weak compared to the Nationalists and discredited because of their collaboration with the Russians. Quite who would win is an interesting question. On one hand, the Nationalists are much stronger; on the other, the Russians could keep funnelling weapons and supplies to the Nationalists indefinitely, ensuring the war continues for quite some time.

The British and French are likely to lose power very quickly, no matter what happens in the Middle and Far East. Their empires are no longer sustainable, which means they need to cut their commitments quickly before the price of keeping them gets too high. India may well collapse into civil war, if the British move out too quickly, or split apart (or come to some kind of power-sharing agreement). Iran, being much stronger (and avoiding the UK/Russia invasion of OTL), might dominate the Middle East.

Germany is an interesting question. On one hand, a return to continental power is very likely – economic if not military. On the other, Hitler taught the rest of the continent some hard lessons and no one wants to risk a German superpower again. Can they build rockets and nukes before they are stopped? Are they even going to try?

Stalin and Russia are a wild card. The Soviets might get dragged into a Chinese Civil War. They might also look at the countries on the border – Finland, Poland, Iran – and note that they’re getting stronger. Stalin is too careful to risk a strike that might drag the rest of the world into a war against the USSR, but he fears what’ll happen if Russia’s enemies get too powerful. The NKVD is doing its best, but it can’t keep word of Poland’s independent farms spreading into the Western USSR. There’s a very real risk of an uprising, no matter how hard he cracks down. What will he do?

What do you think?
 
I could see a federal India happening here with the Princey States, 'Pakistan', Punjab, etc as compoent parts under a Govenor/PM situation with a National Parliament, but heavy amounts of self-rule for the various Regions. Civil War can be avoided I think, esp since without the continental war Britain should not be as destroyed or as skint as OTL even if they are strapped ittl which means they are not going to 'run away' and make sure their is an orderly formation of the Dominion.

Ditto the Levant. Also E. Africa and the Caribean.

With Churchill forced out and not losing an election he is not coming back for a 2nd go in the 50's. With the changed circumstancies Atlee and Labour are not getitng the landslide of OTL so while Britain socialises I can see them wanting to maintain the Imperial trade as much as possible to balence the books, thus India being sorted carefully and the Commonwealth being a stronger organisation.

With the US not the powerhouse it was OTL, Britain could carefully manouvour to make sure she stays a major player. Iran needs careful handling for example so BP does not get nationalised, which should be possible with the politicans of the time esp given the Soviet risks.

Actually I don't see a Cold War ITTL in the same way we got one, sure Stalin is the boogyman, but without the Iron Curtain in Europe, and Red China (I cannot see the Nationalists losing here) plus the need to keep Germany bottled up then the USSR will still be 'open' in a way. Poland will be the big change, depends on if the Poles start something or USSR does.

The Independence movements of the Far East are still going to happen, France and the Dutch are done in the area I think, depends on how long before they see it and how much they try to hold on. If France extracts itself 'with honour' perhaps they can keep the N. African holdings together better?

Did S. Africa do aparthid here? A South Africa that avoid that evil and remains part of the Empire/Commonwealth would be interesting for the whole of Africa, esp with Rodesia next door - a non-aparthid South Africa will mean the racists have less to play with in Rhodsia.

Be interesting if Malta joins the UK and what might come of that ITTL.

I suspect Hitler gets assassinated either by the Brits or Swiss within a year or so of the end of the war, he is too dangerous to let live.

Interesting world. Thanks for the ideas.
 
Back
Top