Short-term, "record-skip", ISOT: Provisional Government Russia ISOT forward 2 years from Mayday 1917 to Mayday 1919

[raharris1973]

What if all the lands under the control of the Army of the Provisional Government of Russia as of May Day, 1917, thus excluding the Central Powers occupied lands of Russian Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, but included the northern Baltics, Finland, Bessarabia, the Moldavian portion of Romania, and multiple northeastern, heavily Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, were ISOT forward in time, reappearing as they were on that date to an unsuspecting world that believes the current date is May 1, 1919?

The Premier of this Provisional Government, led by Duma politicians, is Prince Georgi Lvov, a lesser known name than the infamous Alexander Kerensky, who actually was premier for a shorter period of the PG's existence. But real power is exercised in Russia's cities and villages by the Soviets or Councils, which in Petrograd, and most are places, are dominated by multiple Socialist parties, but not necessarily the Bolshevik Party at this time.

Instantly, on their day of celebration, global believers in the Bolshevik/Communist strain of Socialist thought see their dreamt of worker's state undone, replaced by a Provisional Government and Soviets dual power situation, struggling its way to a constitution. Outside the lines of the 1917 PG regime's military control, it is the May 1919 world, and Europe is remaking its postwar borders in the months after the Nov 1918 armistice with several "successor states" from the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires taking shape. Most importantly, for Russia, are states of Poland, and Lithuania forming, and there is a small, intrepid patch of land controlled by Bolshevik Communists and Red Army troops in a territory covering Courland in Latvia and northeastern Lithuania. See map:

How does the world of 1919, and the peacemaking powers at Versailles, deal with the sudden reappearance of pre-Bolshevik, Provisional Government Russia?

How do the Provisional Government, and Soviets deal with their challenges, and their good fortune, of their Central Powers opponents being instantly defeated with no further effort required? And what about the special challenges of settling precise borders with Poland and even Lithuania, or dealing with the "could have been future" knowledge of what the Bolsheviks did, and then other factions did in the subsequent civil war? And as for the Red remnant in the Baltics, does it have the mass and proficiency, and bold, decisive leadership, to bid to try to take over Petrograd and Russia from a Provisional Government that hasn't seen a faction as ruthless as this in action yet firsthand? Or does that pocket of Reds defect and disintegrate?

Assuming the Bolshevik remnant is squashed rather than metastasizing, and Russia takes a noncommunist path, what does the future hold for Russia's peacetime consituent assembly, governance, national issues, and politics, and how is that reflected in the wider world. What is the impact of a world where a Bolshevik revolution happened, but disappeared like a mirage?

 

[raharris1973]

@Nyvis @BBadolato @lordroel - you responded to one of my earlier threads monkey'ing around with an ISOT to buff the Bolshevik revolution in world history, but this one does the opposite, but still leaving Russia is a precarious prerevolutionary situation, although eased by peacetime and in a world with external anti-Bolsheviks on the alert. Your thoughts?

And your thoughts @Ricardolindo @NotDavidSoslan @Jackson Lennock @ChrisNuttall

....and just to be perfectly clear about what things on the map represent, it represents the map of the ISOT'ed world as I descibed in text. The yellow-filled land on the map that has a label on the legend saying "White Army" is not really the White Forces of the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920, rather land with that color filled in represents land occupied by Russian forces as of May 1 (aka Mayday) 1917, when ruled by the Provisional Government. The relatively thick black line and dashed white line separates it from other territories in eastern Europe and Anatolia. That represents both the May 1917 front-line, and where the ISOT effect stopped. Everything else on the map is supposed to represent geographic-political reality as of May 1, 1919 - that is the day I paused the youtube animation. One can see the unsettled borders in the Balkans and Galicia. And that Bolshevik Red Guards/Red Army controls parts of Latvia and Lithuania. I do not know what senior most leaders were with them that day, but there were forces and commanders, and they would not be far from downtime Bolshevik comrades on the other side of the line in northwest Russia including Riga and St. Petersburg, including Lenin and Trotsky. They would have different personal experiences up to that moment, but could soon exchange information.

On meeting, or even beforehand hearing from hostile sources, surely Lenin would be impressed with what he hears he ended up doing. But he will lose the peace now rationale/leverage and his foes will be alerted. He can try to inspire his Bolshevik followers with inevitable victory talk, spin things to somehow take credit for ending the war. But for his physical safety, he is probably safer running off to the camp of his armed followers in Latvia/Lithuania or going into exile rather than staying in Petrograd, even though that means stepping away was the platform of nationwide political activity and communication in Russia. Given disorder and mass movement to come home and reclaim land about to begin, Lenin and the uptime Bolsheviks, together or separately, could still try to force revolution and bank on chaos and populist appeals. But that really risks having the majority of the population and veteran troops (line soldiers *and* officers) and local and major metropolitan Soviets reacting against him / the Bolsheviks saying "what the hell kind of anti-democratic coup are you trying to do here? This is not the way". And that is before getting in to any foreign influence/intervention shenanigans.

 

[NotDavidSoslan]

What if all the lands under the control of the Army of the Provisional Government of Russia as of May Day, 1917, thus excluding the Central Powers occupied lands of Russian Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, but included the northern Baltics, Finland, Bessarabia, the Moldavian portion of Romania, and multiple northeastern, heavily Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, were ISOT forward in time, reappearing as they were on that date to an unsuspecting world that believes the current date is May 1, 1919?

The Premier of this Provisional Government, led by Duma politicians, is Prince Georgi Lvov, a lesser known name than the infamous Alexander Kerensky, who actually was premier for a shorter period of the PG's existence. But real power is exercised in Russia's cities and villages by the Soviets or Councils, which in Petrograd, and most are places, are dominated by multiple Socialist parties, but not necessarily the Bolshevik Party at this time.

Instantly, on their day of celebration, global believers in the Bolshevik/Communist strain of Socialist thought see their dreamt of worker's state undone, replaced by a Provisional Government and Soviets dual power situation, struggling its way to a constitution. Outside the lines of the 1917 PG regime's military control, it is the May 1919 world, and Europe is remaking its postwar borders in the months after the Nov 1918 armistice with several "successor states" from the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires taking shape. Most importantly, for Russia, are states of Poland, and Lithuania forming, and there is a small, intrepid patch of land controlled by Bolshevik Communists and Red Army troops in a territory covering Courland in Latvia and northeastern Lithuania. See map:View attachment 78696

How does the world of 1919, and the peacemaking powers at Versailles, deal with the sudden reappearance of pre-Bolshevik, Provisional Government Russia?

How do the Provisional Government, and Soviets deal with their challenges, and their good fortune, of their Central Powers opponents being instantly defeated with no further effort required? And what about the special challenges of settling precise borders with Poland and even Lithuania, or dealing with the "could have been future" knowledge of what the Bolsheviks did, and then other factions did in the subsequent civil war? And as for the Red remnant in the Baltics, does it have the mass and proficiency, and bold, decisive leadership, to bid to try to take over Petrograd and Russia from a Provisional Government that hasn't seen a faction as ruthless as this in action yet firsthand? Or does that pocket of Reds defect and disintegrate?

Assuming the Bolshevik remnant is squashed rather than metastasizing, and Russia takes a noncommunist path, what does the future hold for Russia's peacetime consituent assembly, governance, national issues, and politics, and how is that reflected in the wider world. What is the impact of a world where a Bolshevik revolution happened, but disappeared like a mirage?

Russia had no history of liberal democracy to speak of, and knowing how the post-Soviet transition went for the country, there would be the lingering threat of a reactionary monarchic restoration or Bolshevik revolution. Lvov would plan the restoration of the Russian Empire's pre-1914 borders, but not actually do it. The Constituent Assembly would focus on moderate reforms.

The Red Army remnant in the Baltics would be too weak to overthrow the Provisional Government, and the Soviets would be the actual threat to it, requiring the PG to put them under control. Lvov would try to deal with this supposed knowledge by trying to maintain civil rights and freedoms and avoid radical reforms, even those that Russia needed.

If the Russian Revolution disappeared instantly, the Communist movement would be much weakened, leading to stronger social democracy in Europe and authoritarian populism in Latin America and East Asia, as the working class would turn to these movements. Hitler and Mussolini do not come to power, and the Spanish Civil War, which you seem to be interested in, ends up with a faster Nationalist victory.

 

[raharris1973]

Russia had no history of liberal democracy to speak of, and knowing how the post-Soviet transition went for the country

Absolutely true. And the post-Soviet transition isn't confidence inspiring.

there would be the lingering threat of a reactionary monarchic restoration or Bolshevik revolution.

The Bolshevik threat is there, though lacking the motive power of war-weariness. Monarchism seemed quite dead by this point. Judging by Constituent Assembly voting totals, reactionary political preferences were quite weak, as were even liberal ones, with different flavors of socialism and populism predominating, though reactionary tendencies reared their heads among the White Movement in White areas during the Civil War. Reactionary restoration would seem to need to take significant time to regain popular strength.

The Red Army remnant in the Baltics would be too weak to overthrow the Provisional Government,

OK

and the Soviets would be the actual threat to it, requiring the PG to put them under control.

The Soviets and Provisional Government are indeed the separate and dual powers at this time. But it is important not to conflate the Soviets of May 1, 1917, in Petrograd or elsewhere in Russia, with the Bolshevik controlled Petrograd Soviet at the time of the October Revolution and afterward. While the latter Soviets, under the "Democratic Centralist" control of Bolshevik Party discipline functioned as an instrument of democracy, the Soviets of the spring and summer were bodies of representative pluralistic democracy. And tensions between the two, or new direction for the Provisional Government was supposed to be provided by the election and convening of the Constituent Assembly, which could now happen under conditions of international peace.

Lvov would try to deal with this supposed knowledge by trying to maintain civil rights and freedoms and avoid radical reforms, even those that Russia needed.

I suppose he would hesitate to authorize any permanent radical reforms in advance of the Constituent Assembly, just like the real Provisional Government, but might, with the instant outbreak of peace, be able to push for the holding of Constituent Assembly elections pretty damn fast.

The Constituent Assembly would focus on moderate reforms.

The Constituent Assembly, if actually convened, would likely have a Socialist but not Bolshevik majority, a Social Revolutionary plurality, with the SR's being a wide-ranging agrarian big tent Party. If the elections are quick, liberals and conservatives are likely to get more representation than they did in the assembly elected in Jan 1918. The Constituent Assembly should have the affect of replacing the Provisional Government with just, "the Government" and may cause the Soviets to disband themselves or become absorbed as different levels of local and regional government.

 

[Nyvis]

The Bolsheviks will have a very hard time getting anything going without the anti war cause.

On the other hand, if the constituent assembly remain dominated by the right wing of the SR, it's probably going to half ass land reform too. The SR coalition was already breaking at the seams OTL but wasn't reflected on constituent assembly electoral lists. A more equal Bolshevik-Left SR coalition has a lot more reach. It also doesn't have the question of the peace treaty to divide itself.

 

[raharris1973]

The Bolsheviks will have a very hard time getting anything going without the anti war cause.

On the other hand, if the constituent assembly remain dominated by the right wing of the SR, it's probably going to half ass land reform too. The SR coalition was already breaking at the seams OTL but wasn't reflected on constituent assembly electoral lists. A more equal Bolshevik-Left SR coalition has a lot more reach. It also doesn't have the question of the peace treaty to divide itself.

Do you think a Constituent Assembly would be elected maybe in early July 1917(old calendar)/1919(new calendar) and seated in August 1917oc/1919nc?

And would Right SRs dominate it with Kadets, liberals, conservatives all marginal, Mensheviks more substantial, nationality parties more substantial, and Bolsheviks and Left SRs as the most serious/profound opposition? IE, similar to the OTL historic vote distribution?

How long would the the Assembly take to perform its Constitution-writing work, and when would that replace the Provisional Government, with the new "Government" under the new Constitution? In the meantime, if the Constitution, reflecting Left SR caution, only half-asses land reform and is substantially *behind* what the peasants and former soldiers returning to the land are doing throughout the countryside, will the composition of the Soviets in the cities and rural areas remain matched with the composition of the Constituent Assembly, or move to its left, with more Left SR and Bolshevik electeds and fewer Right SRs and Mensheviks? Would the Soviets wither and disband with a new Constitutional government or insist on holding a parallel separate power to government or be drawn into the Constitutional design of government? I don't know if Right SRs, or major SR figures like Viktor Chernov had a view on this.