Ribbentrop Beck Pact

[lerk]

This was a post I did on AH.com a while back and was disappointed that people were more concerned about the plasubility of the premise rather than the premise itself. Here are the posts made showing what I had in mind:

I was reading about this Polish Alternate History novel Pact Ribbentrop Beck where a more submissive Poland decides to not oppose Hitler, leading to, among other things a German-Polish alliance against the USSR (Beck here being the Polish foreign minister). A lot of it does seem a bit off but it did make me wonder: What if Nazi Germany decided to ally with the other right wing states in Central Europe against the USSR? One can say that anti-Slavism was an inseparable part of Nazism and while that may be the case I think that realpolitik might influence a line of thought among Nazi ranks “Ok, let’s get rid of these internationalist communists first, and when Europe returns to its pre-1917 status of having mainly rightist states then we can have our nationalist wars”. After all, the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact was also an example of realpolitik. The POD here is that Stalinists or another hard left faction take control of Spain, leading to a European red scare that makes the Nazi Party decide that the Communists, and not other right leaning states whom they have a nationalistic dispute with, are the number one enemy, with the aforementioned disputes taking the back burner. Tbh I don’t really care about the “how” here as I am with this idea in total so we can just assume that the POD is “Hitler falls off the stairs and decides that he hates communists more than Slavs” and go from there.

So here’s how the war would look like:

Nazi Germany (same Germany that managed to blitzkrieg the supposed second most powerful country in less than two months, along with Austria and the Czech Republic) + Fascist Italy + Poland + Horthyist Hungary + puppet Slovakia + Romania + Yugoslavia + Metaxist Greece + Bulgaria + the Baltic States… all against the Soviet Union. Maybe the Finns help Germany as well.

Britain, France, and America are neutral, though I imagine that volunteers fight on both sides depending on ideology. Hard right businessmen like Henry Ford also probably try to help the anti-communist cause. I was sort of thinking of putting a second front here of Salazar’s Portugal against Red Spain but I thought that that would be too much of a diversion here. Also thought of having Japan join but that, too, would be a diversion and also fairly implausible, let’s just assume we’re talking about the set up mentioned above. In 1939, after a European red scare following a leftist victory in Spain, Germany and Italy decide to make these states part of the anti-Comintern pact, and after two to three years of preparation war breaks out around 1941/1942

So, who wins, and furthermore how does Europe look like in case of 1) German victory and 2) Soviet victory?

Who knows? Maybe the Pope, having witnessing a crackdown on the church in the aftermath of a formation of Red Spain (in response to their support of the Francoists) is radicalized to where he decides to declare such a war “Crusade against Communism”, bringing most of the Catholic World on Germany’s side, volunteers coming from as far away as Latin America and the Philippines, German-Vatican cooperation being an undeniable fact than a thing to be debated on, and could help with the whole Poland thing… ROCOR probably does same thing as well but their influence in lessened. Would have interesting impact on the church regardless of if Germany or the USSR wins

What would be interesting here is the Cold War if the Soviets win - here there is no meeting on the Elbe, no camaraderie between the Soviets and the West etc. I don’t have any proof but I’m willing to claim that, since most Cold War leaders were adults during WW2 that the fact that they remember the opposing side as once their friends and allies against an enemy force bent on the destruction of one side calmed things down a bit. Here no such thing exists and the Soviets would probably be a bit mad at UK, France, and US allowing pro-German activities to take place which they no doubt would despite the neutrality of those three governments. Furthermore, if the Germans and their allies decide to do an anti-Jewish Holocaust how many people in the West would believe it and how many would just think that it is all Soviet propaganda? No doubt if a new Cold War were to begin, with a West that never fought Nazis and Fascists but are now going against Communists, that Nazism, Fascism, and overall radical rightism would have a much better reputation. Certainly things worth thinking about here.

 

[ChrisNuttall]

Well, the first problem is that this is a very unlikely scenario. Germany would grow to dominate – or at least overshadow – Poland in almost any timeline, unless the Poles and French worked hard to keep them down. Even if we assume a Nazis Without Hitler or a Germany Military Regime, they’d still have problems dealing with Poland – the Poles had territory the Germans thought was theirs – and the Poles would be foolish to trust them. If nothing else, there would be strong political pressure to Do Something about that territory (even if Hitler is plotting to use the Poles to crush the Russians and then backstab the Poles.)

If we do, somehow, end up with a German-Polish Alliance in 1939, the world will look very different right from the start. The Germans won’t have shown off their full power – no invasion of Poland – and they won’t have learnt from the errors of that campaign. On the other hand, the Russians won’t have learnt from Finland and they will be fighting a small war with the Japanese. If Hitler does head east in 1939, he would be starting closer to Moscow than OTL, but with a far smaller army that came alarmingly close to running out of ammunition in OTL. The Russians would be far less tactically capable, but they’d have practically limitless manpower to hurl at the Germans.

Of course, in this timeline, ‘Hitler’ is more political adroit, so he’s probably convinced the locals to side with him much more than OTL.

Britain and France would probably be pleased to have a long-drawn out conflict that weakens both sides. They’d also be an excellent chance to build up their economies by selling arms to the Germans, and building up their armies by learning the lessons of the war. Franco and Mussolini would sent volunteers, if not outright army formations; the French might just start offering to ship communists to the USSR to fight, on the understanding they wouldn’t be allowed to return home.

Just who’d win this war would be an open question. The Red Army of 1939 wasn’t the army of 1941. It was much smaller than the one the Germans faced historically. But the German logistics would be much worse than OTL (even if Finland joins them, which might not happen in this world) and getting to Moscow by winter probably isn’t going to happen unless the Russians REALLY mess up. The Germans may attempt to ‘liberate’ Ukraine and Byelorussia and use them as springboards for a resumed offensive in 1940, but it would still be incredibly difficult. The Germans would make themselves unwelcome very quickly even if they do maintain the pretence of ‘liberation.’ Their logistics would leave them little choice.

Assuming Stalin and his regime survives into 1941, I think the balance of power would rapidly tilt in their favour. The soviets can replenish their losses. The Germans cannot. It will get nastier if the locals still think the Germans are on their side, but even so the Germans and Poles will probably be slowly pushed back into their own lands and then counter-invaded. Unless the Germans come up with a miracle, the odds are good the Russians get all the way to the French border (probably even more heavily fortified in this world), with all the attendant atrocities of OTL. Then we have an alternate Cold War between Britain/France and the USSR …

 

[Max Sinister]

Poland has a common border with the SU, Germany doesn't. Poland may give in about the Corridor, but how are they going to dismember the SU? Will Germany gain Eastern Ukraine, as an exclave?

 

[History Learner]

Poland has a common border with the SU, Germany doesn't. Poland may give in about the Corridor, but how are they going to dismember the SU? Will Germany gain Eastern Ukraine, as an exclave?

As a reminder, there were power blocs in Germany that advocated breaking up the USSR into puppet states as opposed to direct annexations up to the Urals. If the Anti-Slavic elements have been contained, men like Rosenberg are going to be much more influential and this is what he proposed historically:

 

[frustrated progressive]

Calling Rosenberg a "power bloc" rather than "pet ideologue with very limited influence on actual events" seems very generous TBH.

 

[Charles EP M.]

Ignoring the plausibility issues, we have the USSR that struggled to handle Finland facing a mass of enemies on multiple fronts and no lend-lease (though you'll get foreign support from communist groups and unions). So on paper they should lose.

But thee other countries on the Eastern Front IIRC were not as committed or effective as the Germans OTL, the Germans aren't at their peak yet, and command & logistics here is a mess of states that don't all like each other or are actually good. So I figure the USSR wins in the end - at least force the Axis to change how victory is determined - because the Axis never achieve good enough cohesion while the Soviets do.

 

[History Learner]

Calling Rosenberg a "power bloc" rather than "pet ideologue with very limited influence on actual events" seems very generous TBH.

The characterization of Rosenberg's faction as a power bloc is directly from Alexander Dallin's German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945. Dallin asserts there were eight power blocs that shaped policy in the occupied USSR, with them all waxing and waning at times:

(1) Adolf Hitler;
(2) Martin Bormann and the Nazi Party machine;
(3) Alfred Rosenberg and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories; Hinrich Lohse, Reich Commissar for Ostland; and Erich Koch, Reich Commissar for the Ukraine;
(4) Joseph Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry;
(5) Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office;
(6) Hermann Goring and the Four-Year Plan, as well as other economic agencies;
(7) Heinrich Himmler and the SS empire;
(8) the Armed Forces, themselves divided by internal disputes.

Ignoring the plausibility issues, we have the USSR that struggled to handle Finland facing a mass of enemies on multiple fronts and no lend-lease (though you'll get foreign support from communist groups and unions). So on paper they should lose.

But thee other countries on the Eastern Front IIRC were not as committed or effective as the Germans OTL, the Germans aren't at their peak yet, and command & logistics here is a mess of states that don't all like each other or are actually good. So I figure the USSR wins in the end - at least force the Axis to change how victory is determined - because the Axis never achieve good enough cohesion while the Soviets do.

To quote from Denis Havlat (2017) Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies -

With Britain’s refusal to make peace with Germany, the Luftwaffe was forced to commit substantial forces into the bombing of Britain, and later into the Mediterranean, resulting in costly losses. From 1 July 1940 to 22 June 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 4,313 aircraft, including 1,688 bombers and 1,100 fighters.108 Additionally, not all available aircraft could be used against the USSR. By 22 June 1941 a total of 1,561 German aircraft were stationed at other fronts in Europe and in the Mediterranean fighting against Britain, as compared to 3,104 stationed at the Eastern Front.109 German historian Rolf Dietrich-Müller concludes that if Britain had arranged itself with Hitler in the summer of 1940, the Luftwaffe could have used up to 9,640 aircraft at the start of Barbarossa, which would have resulted in a quick victory over the USSR.110 In the second half of 1941, Luftwaffe losses against the Royal Air Force (RAF) remained far lower than the losses sustained against the Soviet air force; however, they were still substantial. By 27 December 1941 the Germans had lost 2,505 aircraft in the East, while losses on all other fronts since June 1941 amounted to 779 aircraft.111​

​

The allocation of the majority of the Luftwaffe to the Eastern Front gave Britain the opportunity to build up its bomber force; this meant that with each passing month the RAF grew stronger and more capable of launching largescale bomber attacks against German industry. After British forces had been kicked out of Europe in France and Greece, this form of warfare had remained the only possible way in which Britain could strike against Germany. Another reason for this approach was the hope to aid the Soviet Union by keeping away large German forces, as well as the desire to end the war without the necessity of costly land warfare. The bomb load dropped by the RAF on Germany and German-occupied territories rose from 13,037 tons in 1940 to 31,704 tons in 1941.112 At this stage of the war bombing was still too imprecise and the bomb load too small to cause any substantial damage to German industry; however, fighting over the skies of Western Europe and the Mediterranean resulted in costly losses for the Luftwaffe. During the second half of 1941 the Royal Air Force was responsible for roughly one-quarter of all German aircraft losses; additionally, large numbers of German aircraft were sent to these fronts to replenish and reinforce the Luftwaffe formations fighting the RAF. By October 1941 there were 642 German aircraft stationed in the Mediterranean theater of war alone.113 ​

​

Continued British resistance after the summer of 1940 denied the Germans the ability to reorganize and replenish their air forces; instead it forced them into a costly campaign that greatly decimated the Luftwaffe. Without British resistance in the year leading up to Barbarossa and the necessity to keep substantial amounts of aircraft in Western Europe and the Mediterranean, the Luftwaffe could have attacked the USSR with a force up to three times as strong as it actually did. On top of that, German stocks of aviation fuel would have been substantially higher because in case of a British withdrawal or surrender, fuel consumption would have stood at a fraction of the historical level. Even in the second half of 1941, at a time when the majority of the Luftwaffe fought in the East, Britain contributed greatly to Soviet survival by engaging and destroying hundreds of German aircraft, thus preventing the Luftwaffe from creating reserves that could have been used to keep up the strength of German air forces in the East.​

Further:

In order to counter possible British landings in Northern France and Norway, the Germans had to keep substantial mechanized forces in these areas. In April 1940 the total German tank stock numbered 3,387 units, of which 2,580, or 76 percent, were used in the invasion of Western Europe.120 By the beginning of June 1941, the German tank stock had increased to 5,639 machines, but only 3,580, or 63.5 percent, were used against the USSR.121 Without British resistance, Germany should have been able to use against the USSR the same percentage of tanks as used against Western Europe, or an additional 700 machines. A thousand German tanks, supported by the hundreds of French, British, and Polish tanks captured during 1939–1940, would have been enough to perform effective occupation duties throughout Europe, had the British been knocked out of the war in 1940.​

With a much stronger Operation Barbarossa, it exceedingly likely the Soviets lose Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donets Basin/Rostov in 1941, which would be a fatal blow and enable the Germans to conduct a successful "mopping up" operation to the A-A Line against the weakened Red Army in 1942. By 1943, I personally have no doubts the Wehrmacht will have succeeded in establishing the envisioned Urals border, with the remnants of the Soviet state east of that line far too weak to ever contest such a development from then on.

 

[Nyvis]

Ignoring the plausibility issues, we have the USSR that struggled to handle Finland facing a mass of enemies on multiple fronts and no lend-lease (though you'll get foreign support from communist groups and unions). So on paper they should lose.

But thee other countries on the Eastern Front IIRC were not as committed or effective as the Germans OTL, the Germans aren't at their peak yet, and command & logistics here is a mess of states that don't all like each other or are actually good. So I figure the USSR wins in the end - at least force the Axis to change how victory is determined - because the Axis never achieve good enough cohesion while the Soviets do.

The thing to remember here is that unlike the winter war, this is an existential war for the soviet union. They're not going to surrender when the terms are annihilation anyway. They're also unlikely to fall to counter revolution because by then Stalin had thoroughly cleaned house already.

What's more likely to happen is Germany declarin annexations and puppet states as they advance and solidify control without that being a clear peace treaty settlement.

Then Germany is going to go back for Poland and annex it anyway, because why the hell not, they did the same to the Czech even after they gave them all the German minority areas. And everyone will make a surprised pikachu face.

The world probably also starts getting worried and considering something like lend lease as it becomes apparent the Germans aren't stopping, they aren't really making new states as much as vaguely country shaped reservations and the truth about the holocaust start filtering out. I doubt anyone declares war but pragmatic support for the soviet union probably rises. That could be enough to have Moscow be the turning point after a Stalingrad style siege, while Leningrad falls but isn't held for very long?

Meanwhile in western Europe, I expect French politics have gotten very messy over the failure to contain the resurgent Germany and that breaks at some point. I could see a lot of ways for it to go but a pro German generals coup to stop the French left (which was never far from government at the time) from declaring war on Germany or over covert support to the soviets is likely, at which point an opposing general strike and even revolution are on the table. The Germans are far too busy to turn around and support their allies so it might even succeed, especially if the UK or US see a German controlled France as a bit too much of a threat to the balance of power and weight in. Once that's concluded, that leaves us with western allies willing to declare war on Germany, which is starting to feel the strain of its eastern occupation anyway.

The conclusion is probably fairly similar to OTL, but the biggest differences are an even greater soviet trauma which means there's no way they even try bouncing back into the cold war. France is also probably more left wing as a result of having to fight its own pro German right itself rather than blame it on occupation and the various exhausted powers are more likely to find a settlement for Europe everyone can live with long term.

Maybe a joint mandate for a neutral and demilitarized Germany with the need to keep it under thorough watch keeping the powers cooperating? I could see the SPD emerging as the natural party of neutrality and cooperation with the mandate.

Poland also looks very stupid and party to the Nazi's eastern campaign so it's unlikely to get much sympathy when the soviets get to it and they probably don't even bother with the pretense of an independent state. Might end up a small SSR, with the same loss of territory east as OTL and no compensation with German land.

Spitballing and probably some soviet bias because I don't really like nazi victory TLs but that's my take. I also really like no cold war alt histories, and I think a weaker soviet union following an even more traumatic war is one way to get there. They'd be in no shape to cause trouble abroad, and occupying the warsaw pact states is going to look less criminal when they're clear fascist co belligerents.

 

[ChrisNuttall]

With a much stronger Operation Barbarossa, it exceedingly likely the Soviets lose Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donets Basin/Rostov in 1941, which would be a fatal blow and enable the Germans to conduct a successful "mopping up" operation to the A-A Line against the weakened Red Army in 1942. By 1943, I personally have no doubts the Wehrmacht will have succeeded in establishing the envisioned Urals border, with the remnants of the Soviet state east of that line far too weak to ever contest such a development from then on.

It isn't going to be stronger.

The Germany of 1939 was not the Germany of 1941. Even if we assume the Germans throw everything they have at the USSR, without worrying the French will put a knife in their back, they are still going to be a lot weaker than they were in OTL. The Poles can't make up the difference and nor can the Japanese (again, assuming the Poles don't worry about being backstabbed themselves). Bottom line is, a weaker German (and allied) force will confront a weaker Russian force with far more reserves and room to learn than themselves. If the Germans don't win quickly, they're screwed.

Chris

 

[History Learner]

It isn't going to be stronger.

The Germany of 1939 was not the Germany of 1941. Even if we assume the Germans throw everything they have at the USSR, without worrying the French will put a knife in their back, they are still going to be a lot weaker than they were in OTL. The Poles can't make up the difference and nor can the Japanese (again, assuming the Poles don't worry about being backstabbed themselves). Bottom line is, a weaker German (and allied) force will confront a weaker Russian force with far more reserves and room to learn than themselves. If the Germans don't win quickly, they're screwed.

Chris

Germany in 1939 is fairly strong, especially in this set up; by 1936, before any annexations, it was already larger than the Soviet economy. Annexations that followed and the allies it has here increases that relative power, same for maintaining trade links with the West. The Soviets, meanwhile, have not learned the lessons of 1939-1941 and the Germans are starting far closer to their main cities than OTL.

 

[Nyvis]

Germany in 1939 is fairly strong, especially in this set up; by 1936, before any annexations, it was already larger than the Soviet economy. Annexations that followed and the allies it has here increases that relative power, same for maintaining trade links with the West. The Soviets, meanwhile, have not learned the lessons of 1939-1941 and the Germans are starting far closer to their main cities than OTL.

Not getting to neutralize France and turn it to collaborators probably doesn't help though, depending on how politics go there. If France is swayed to be pro German that's helpful but short of a coup, I don't see it happening.

The soviets not learning the lessons of 1939-41 also applies to the Germans. More so, really. A lot of the tactics the soviets later used were pioneered against Poland, where a lot of needed improvements were revealed in usage. And of course the campaign in France also had its share of lessons.

Instead, the Germans are nearly as green as the soviets. There's also no illusion in the soviet union about them coming like OTL. I don't think it's all upsides for them.

 

[ChrisNuttall]

Germany in 1939 is fairly strong, especially in this set up; by 1936, before any annexations, it was already larger than the Soviet economy. Annexations that followed and the allies it has here increases that relative power, same for maintaining trade links with the West. The Soviets, meanwhile, have not learned the lessons of 1939-1941 and the Germans are starting far closer to their main cities than OTL.

Historically, the Germans built as much as they could in the way of armed forces for 1939 and they came VERY close to running out of ammo. There's a reasonable chance their offensive into Poland could have bogged down if the USSR hadn't invaded from the east, maybe not enough to for them to lose but certainly enough to slow them down a lot and make them look less impressive. Even if Not-Hitler rationalises ruthlessly - no navy, for example - they're still going to be very short on a lot of things they need desperately.

Chris

 

[Charles EP M.]

@Nyvis that's a really good point that ITTL, the Soviets know what's coming and have time to prepare like the Nazis do (I missed the first post proposed a 1940 attack). So it's an attack on a fortified, fired-up enemy. Possibly, ala Israel in the Six Day War, the USSR hits someone preemptively too.

How many people in this Axis get put off by their soldiers going into a meatgrinder early on and try to downgrade their involvement? Greece, for example, might decide Germany can do the offensives while they guard the rear.

 

[Nyvis]

@Nyvis that's a really good point that ITTL, the Soviets know what's coming and have time to prepare like the Nazis do (I missed the first post proposed a 1940 attack). So it's an attack on a fortified, fired-up enemy. Possibly, ala Israel in the Six Day War, the USSR hits someone preemptively too.

How many people in this Axis get put off by their soldiers going into a meatgrinder early on and try to downgrade their involvement? Greece, for example, might decide Germany can do the offensives while they guard the rear.

To be fair, I expect Stalin's directives still won't take full advantage of Russia's situation due to hangups about surrendering land (defense in depth is really how to make the best of it) but it's probably not going to be as critically unprepared.

 

[Japhy]

Alexander Dallin's German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945.

You do know that historical research on the third Reich has moved on drastically since 1953? Some of those are absolutely Power Blocs. Others are really nothing more then discussion circles.

 

[lerk]

As a reminder, there were power blocs in Germany that advocated breaking up the USSR into puppet states as opposed to direct annexations up to the Urals. If the Anti-Slavic elements have been contained, men like Rosenberg are going to be much more influential and this is what he proposed historically:

Interesting map but “Greater Caucasia” is probably one of the most unworkable ideas ever. It’d have to be a client state as left on its own it’ll just be Yugoslavia but with two coastlines. Also a lot of Russians live there as well. Tajikistan being a part of Turkestan though Tajiks are an Iranic people (and thus not Turks) is also odd.

 

[Nyvis]

Interesting map but “Greater Caucasia” is probably one of the most unworkable ideas ever. It’d have to be a client state as left on its own it’ll just be Yugoslavia but with two coastlines. Also a lot of Russians probably live there as well. Tajikistan being a part of Turkestan though Tajiks are an Iranic people (and thus not Turks) is also odd.

Nothing in this is likely to be anything more than forcibly puppets anyway. Even those that historically had collaborators have wildly divergent borders from their support. For example, Ukrainian identity is strongest in the west of the country but that's the part that gets the lebensraum treatment while Ukraine gets saddled with a lot of Russians as far east as Stalingrad. It's absolutely insane and even if the Nazi find enough Ukrainians to form a pro German government, they'll need perpetual support from German troops to maintain those borders.

 

[History Learner]

Not getting to neutralize France and turn it to collaborators probably doesn't help though, depending on how politics go there. If France is swayed to be pro German that's helpful but short of a coup, I don't see it happening.

OP seems to suggest France is a Pro-German neutral, and this fits with Horne's analysis in To Lose a Battle.

The soviets not learning the lessons of 1939-41 also applies to the Germans. More so, really. A lot of the tactics the soviets later used were pioneered against Poland, where a lot of needed improvements were revealed in usage. And of course the campaign in France also had its share of lessons.

As a general point, yes, which is why it becomes relevant that the Germans are the far larger economy here; if they don't succeed in knocking the Soviets out quickly, the conflict becomes a war of attrition. Having more industrial might to wield thus becomes the critical element of the conflict, and to which the advantage remains with the Germans.

Instead, the Germans are nearly as green as the soviets. There's also no illusion in the soviet union about them coming like OTL. I don't think it's all upsides for them.

The USSR was already transitioning to a full war economy by 1940 and the issues of 1941 would be even worse here; they simply lack the officer cadres, institutional experience or material base to take advantage of obviously being the next target. David Glantz argues in his works that Stalin dispersing the Soviet air force or attempting to move more reserves to the front would've collapsed the logistical network entirely.

Also, as an aside, it seems increasingly accepted among historians Barbarossa wasn't that much of a strategic surprise. Stalin had already ordered a partial mobilization in April of 1941 and accelerated air base construction in the Western regions in advance of the attack. The claims of his mental breakdown have also been misrepresented; it only came after the Germans had achieved their successes in the border regions, several weeks into the campaign.

You do know that historical research on the third Reich has moved on drastically since 1953? Some of those are absolutely Power Blocs. Others are really nothing more then discussion circles.

Which probably makes it a good thing it came out originally in 1957 and then was updated in following additions; the one I'm quoting from is from the 1980s. Specifically, perhaps you can suggest some sources that argue contrary to Dallin?

 

[History Learner]

Historically, the Germans built as much as they could in the way of armed forces for 1939 and they came VERY close to running out of ammo. There's a reasonable chance their offensive into Poland could have bogged down if the USSR hadn't invaded from the east, maybe not enough to for them to lose but certainly enough to slow them down a lot and make them look less impressive. Even if Not-Hitler rationalises ruthlessly - no navy, for example - they're still going to be very short on a lot of things they need desperately.

Chris

The former is increasingly under attack; it comes from Tooze, who now publicly admits at least parts of his thesis from WoD needs revision. From Robert J. Gordon in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Mar., 2009), pp. 312-316:

As for the latter, it is not true or, at least, is misrepresented. The Germans came close to exceeding the ammunition budgeted for the campaign, but total stocks were never in danger of being depleted; basically, they ended up using close to 1/6th of their total.

Spoiler: From the GSWW Series

Interesting map but “Greater Caucasia” is probably one of the most unworkable ideas ever. It’d have to be a client state as left on its own it’ll just be Yugoslavia but with two coastlines. Also a lot of Russians probably live there as well. Tajikistan being a part of Turkestan though Tajiks are an Iranic people (and thus not Turks) is also odd.

This is Nazi Germany we're talking about, "unworkable ideas" was their forte. I have no doubt there would be a disaster from this, but it does give an idea of what a non total annexations scenario would look like, I would argue.

 

[Ricardolindo]

This was a post I did on AH.com a while back and was disappointed that people were more concerned about the plasubility of the premise rather than the premise itself. Here are the posts made showing what I had in mind:

No offense, but there is a problem with this kind of scenarios. How something happens will obviously impact the aftermath. That's the problem with handwaving unlikely scenarios.