raharris1973
Well-known member
To put my cards on the table, I will say I am a believer that the Italians were a net positive for any coalition they were a part of in both world wars, regardless of any complaints one may have about their military proficiency. More guys on your side, shooting at the guys on the side, is always better than the reverse - even if they are not that talented. Taking military tactical critique so far as to say the Italians were a detriment to the Entente in WWI (and then the Axis in WW2) is an argument that is too clever by half.
The argument that a neutral Italy would make things relatively worse for the Entente powers is pretty straightforward. It goes -- neutral Italy means less pressure on Austria-Hungary means more Austro-Hungarians pressure on Serbia and Russia so probably earlier collapses for each of those and an earlier collapse and no entry at all for Romania and Greece on the Entente side. Those factors can all lead to more resilience for Bulgaria and Turkey and Germany.
This argument would seem to scale down to an Italy that isn't always neutral, but even to an Italy that possibly gets into the war late, in 1916 or 1917 instead of 1915. And if Italy gets in the war on the Entente side earlier, in 1914, things should go better for the Entente. Indeed, if Italy does not get in the war by 1915 like OTL, anti-Entente events may have an opportunity to snowball so that it may become too late for Italy to join before the Entente loses, or joining the war becomes even *less* attractive for Italy each succeeding year of neutrality.
All those general calculations of trends aside. What if that champion of Italian neutrality, Giolitti, held on to national leadership, and kept Italy neutral through 1915 and 1916.
In those years, I anticipate Austria-Hungary will suffer less damage. Its final defeat of Serbia will be speedier, and far fewer retreating Serbian forces and South Slav defectors will make it out of the conquest of Serbia via Albania. Austria-Hungary should be performing better against Russia, and Russia should be taking more damage.
Italy will be an additional leak in the blockade of the CP, along with the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries.
None of these factors should change the outcomes of the offensives on the western front at Ypres and Champagne in 1915, nor on the Somme and Verdun in 1916 however. None of these factors should change the course of the Gallipoli campaign, or the occupation of Salonica, or Bulgarian entry into the war, or the Russo-Ottoman Caucasian front.
Theoretically, greater Austro-Hungarian "throw-weight" or "spare capacity" in 1915-1916 should attrite the Russians more, possibly moving forward a Russian revolutionary crisis by a significant number of months. It may also negate the visible success of the Brusilov offensive while leaving Austria-Hungary to appear more formidable, discouraging Romania from joining the Entente in 1916, which may keep Falkenhayn in his job longer and delay the decision for Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, the break in relations with the US, the Zimmerman Telegram, and US entry into the war.
But is it implausible for those events, the Russian Revolution(s), and USW and US entry, to unfold at basically the same pace as OTL, even in this changed, Italian neutrality scenario?
Perhaps Russia lucks through some additional months without its February revolution equivalent, with some officials making more lucky or competent food distribution or troop placement decisions. Maybe some Austrian troops, strong against the Italians in OTL, aren't as stellar on the Russian front. Maybe Falkenhayn gets fired and replaced by Hindy and Ludy at the end of 1916 anyway, Romanian entry or not, since Verdun was probably the real reason? USW unfolds in February, and relations worsen with the US. A Russian revolution happens in March, but no desertion of the war. By April, the US declares war on Germany.
Perhaps by this point, with the USA getting in, the pro-war factions in Italy re-group and resurge and feel they have new arguments for getting into a war on the Entente side they are now more certain will win, and Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary in May 1917, followed by Germany at some later point, maybe after some submarine attack on an Italian ship helps justify it.
Italy launches itself onto the Austrian Alpine front, having had two additional years to prepare. Who knows how it will perform? No guarantees it will be any better than historical, and the Austrians will be both more experienced and more weary. But even tactically unimpressive participation would be very, very burdensome on the Austro-Hungarians and strain CP reserves. In the best case, with good operational performance, the Italian attacks add to pressures along with the Kerensky offensive that knock Austria-Hungary out of the war while the British Flanders offensives tie down Germany. In the worst case, Austria-Hungary fends off the offensives, and it is Russia that has its second revolution and gets knocked out of the war. But Italy still stands.
In 1918 the Germans have to shoot their last bolt in a western offensive, and the Americans and Entente will have a counterattack they can't resist after that. The Italians will take the initiative and never give it up on their front.
In the end, the Italians will win the irredenta. Doing so over over 18 months should axiomatically be less expensive in blood and treasure than doing it over the course of OTL's 40 months, right?
Is it plausible for things to work out this way, for Italy to join only after America declares war? Or would such delay (not that it would be deliberately chosen for this reason) in almost all cases mean that the CP position would be too strong and it would be *too late* for the Entente to win and for Italy to join to make its gains?
Could Italy beat the spread by even more and join only in May 1918, for the last 6 months of the war?
The argument that a neutral Italy would make things relatively worse for the Entente powers is pretty straightforward. It goes -- neutral Italy means less pressure on Austria-Hungary means more Austro-Hungarians pressure on Serbia and Russia so probably earlier collapses for each of those and an earlier collapse and no entry at all for Romania and Greece on the Entente side. Those factors can all lead to more resilience for Bulgaria and Turkey and Germany.
This argument would seem to scale down to an Italy that isn't always neutral, but even to an Italy that possibly gets into the war late, in 1916 or 1917 instead of 1915. And if Italy gets in the war on the Entente side earlier, in 1914, things should go better for the Entente. Indeed, if Italy does not get in the war by 1915 like OTL, anti-Entente events may have an opportunity to snowball so that it may become too late for Italy to join before the Entente loses, or joining the war becomes even *less* attractive for Italy each succeeding year of neutrality.
All those general calculations of trends aside. What if that champion of Italian neutrality, Giolitti, held on to national leadership, and kept Italy neutral through 1915 and 1916.
In those years, I anticipate Austria-Hungary will suffer less damage. Its final defeat of Serbia will be speedier, and far fewer retreating Serbian forces and South Slav defectors will make it out of the conquest of Serbia via Albania. Austria-Hungary should be performing better against Russia, and Russia should be taking more damage.
Italy will be an additional leak in the blockade of the CP, along with the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries.
None of these factors should change the outcomes of the offensives on the western front at Ypres and Champagne in 1915, nor on the Somme and Verdun in 1916 however. None of these factors should change the course of the Gallipoli campaign, or the occupation of Salonica, or Bulgarian entry into the war, or the Russo-Ottoman Caucasian front.
Theoretically, greater Austro-Hungarian "throw-weight" or "spare capacity" in 1915-1916 should attrite the Russians more, possibly moving forward a Russian revolutionary crisis by a significant number of months. It may also negate the visible success of the Brusilov offensive while leaving Austria-Hungary to appear more formidable, discouraging Romania from joining the Entente in 1916, which may keep Falkenhayn in his job longer and delay the decision for Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, the break in relations with the US, the Zimmerman Telegram, and US entry into the war.
But is it implausible for those events, the Russian Revolution(s), and USW and US entry, to unfold at basically the same pace as OTL, even in this changed, Italian neutrality scenario?
Perhaps Russia lucks through some additional months without its February revolution equivalent, with some officials making more lucky or competent food distribution or troop placement decisions. Maybe some Austrian troops, strong against the Italians in OTL, aren't as stellar on the Russian front. Maybe Falkenhayn gets fired and replaced by Hindy and Ludy at the end of 1916 anyway, Romanian entry or not, since Verdun was probably the real reason? USW unfolds in February, and relations worsen with the US. A Russian revolution happens in March, but no desertion of the war. By April, the US declares war on Germany.
Perhaps by this point, with the USA getting in, the pro-war factions in Italy re-group and resurge and feel they have new arguments for getting into a war on the Entente side they are now more certain will win, and Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary in May 1917, followed by Germany at some later point, maybe after some submarine attack on an Italian ship helps justify it.
Italy launches itself onto the Austrian Alpine front, having had two additional years to prepare. Who knows how it will perform? No guarantees it will be any better than historical, and the Austrians will be both more experienced and more weary. But even tactically unimpressive participation would be very, very burdensome on the Austro-Hungarians and strain CP reserves. In the best case, with good operational performance, the Italian attacks add to pressures along with the Kerensky offensive that knock Austria-Hungary out of the war while the British Flanders offensives tie down Germany. In the worst case, Austria-Hungary fends off the offensives, and it is Russia that has its second revolution and gets knocked out of the war. But Italy still stands.
In 1918 the Germans have to shoot their last bolt in a western offensive, and the Americans and Entente will have a counterattack they can't resist after that. The Italians will take the initiative and never give it up on their front.
In the end, the Italians will win the irredenta. Doing so over over 18 months should axiomatically be less expensive in blood and treasure than doing it over the course of OTL's 40 months, right?
Is it plausible for things to work out this way, for Italy to join only after America declares war? Or would such delay (not that it would be deliberately chosen for this reason) in almost all cases mean that the CP position would be too strong and it would be *too late* for the Entente to win and for Italy to join to make its gains?
Could Italy beat the spread by even more and join only in May 1918, for the last 6 months of the war?