Plausibility check - late Italian entry into WWI, Entente victory, lower price for Italy

[raharris1973]

To put my cards on the table, I will say I am a believer that the Italians were a net positive for any coalition they were a part of in both world wars, regardless of any complaints one may have about their military proficiency. More guys on your side, shooting at the guys on the side, is always better than the reverse - even if they are not that talented. Taking military tactical critique so far as to say the Italians were a detriment to the Entente in WWI (and then the Axis in WW2) is an argument that is too clever by half.

The argument that a neutral Italy would make things relatively worse for the Entente powers is pretty straightforward. It goes -- neutral Italy means less pressure on Austria-Hungary means more Austro-Hungarians pressure on Serbia and Russia so probably earlier collapses for each of those and an earlier collapse and no entry at all for Romania and Greece on the Entente side. Those factors can all lead to more resilience for Bulgaria and Turkey and Germany.

This argument would seem to scale down to an Italy that isn't always neutral, but even to an Italy that possibly gets into the war late, in 1916 or 1917 instead of 1915. And if Italy gets in the war on the Entente side earlier, in 1914, things should go better for the Entente. Indeed, if Italy does not get in the war by 1915 like OTL, anti-Entente events may have an opportunity to snowball so that it may become too late for Italy to join before the Entente loses, or joining the war becomes even *less* attractive for Italy each succeeding year of neutrality.

All those general calculations of trends aside. What if that champion of Italian neutrality, Giolitti, held on to national leadership, and kept Italy neutral through 1915 and 1916.

In those years, I anticipate Austria-Hungary will suffer less damage. Its final defeat of Serbia will be speedier, and far fewer retreating Serbian forces and South Slav defectors will make it out of the conquest of Serbia via Albania. Austria-Hungary should be performing better against Russia, and Russia should be taking more damage.

Italy will be an additional leak in the blockade of the CP, along with the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries.

None of these factors should change the outcomes of the offensives on the western front at Ypres and Champagne in 1915, nor on the Somme and Verdun in 1916 however. None of these factors should change the course of the Gallipoli campaign, or the occupation of Salonica, or Bulgarian entry into the war, or the Russo-Ottoman Caucasian front.

Theoretically, greater Austro-Hungarian "throw-weight" or "spare capacity" in 1915-1916 should attrite the Russians more, possibly moving forward a Russian revolutionary crisis by a significant number of months. It may also negate the visible success of the Brusilov offensive while leaving Austria-Hungary to appear more formidable, discouraging Romania from joining the Entente in 1916, which may keep Falkenhayn in his job longer and delay the decision for Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, the break in relations with the US, the Zimmerman Telegram, and US entry into the war.

But is it implausible for those events, the Russian Revolution(s), and USW and US entry, to unfold at basically the same pace as OTL, even in this changed, Italian neutrality scenario?
Perhaps Russia lucks through some additional months without its February revolution equivalent, with some officials making more lucky or competent food distribution or troop placement decisions. Maybe some Austrian troops, strong against the Italians in OTL, aren't as stellar on the Russian front. Maybe Falkenhayn gets fired and replaced by Hindy and Ludy at the end of 1916 anyway, Romanian entry or not, since Verdun was probably the real reason? USW unfolds in February, and relations worsen with the US. A Russian revolution happens in March, but no desertion of the war. By April, the US declares war on Germany.

Perhaps by this point, with the USA getting in, the pro-war factions in Italy re-group and resurge and feel they have new arguments for getting into a war on the Entente side they are now more certain will win, and Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary in May 1917, followed by Germany at some later point, maybe after some submarine attack on an Italian ship helps justify it.

Italy launches itself onto the Austrian Alpine front, having had two additional years to prepare. Who knows how it will perform? No guarantees it will be any better than historical, and the Austrians will be both more experienced and more weary. But even tactically unimpressive participation would be very, very burdensome on the Austro-Hungarians and strain CP reserves. In the best case, with good operational performance, the Italian attacks add to pressures along with the Kerensky offensive that knock Austria-Hungary out of the war while the British Flanders offensives tie down Germany. In the worst case, Austria-Hungary fends off the offensives, and it is Russia that has its second revolution and gets knocked out of the war. But Italy still stands.

In 1918 the Germans have to shoot their last bolt in a western offensive, and the Americans and Entente will have a counterattack they can't resist after that. The Italians will take the initiative and never give it up on their front.

In the end, the Italians will win the irredenta. Doing so over over 18 months should axiomatically be less expensive in blood and treasure than doing it over the course of OTL's 40 months, right?

Is it plausible for things to work out this way, for Italy to join only after America declares war? Or would such delay (not that it would be deliberately chosen for this reason) in almost all cases mean that the CP position would be too strong and it would be *too late* for the Entente to win and for Italy to join to make its gains?

Could Italy beat the spread by even more and join only in May 1918, for the last 6 months of the war?

 

[raharris1973]

I will sketch out a possible timeline in general terms based on the above:

Italy remains under Giolitti and neutral through 1915 and 1916. Perhaps his hold over national politics will slip by the end of 1916.

The western front campaigns of 1915-1916 and the extra-European (African, Pacific, Mideast, submarine) campaigns of those years are nearly identical in their course or net results as OTL. The crushing of Serbia in late 1915 is a bit more thorough. Russia is a bit more on the back foot in the campaigns of 1915 and 1916, and Austria-Hungary is a bit stronger and less beat up, although just like OTL, it still had a terrible 1914. Gallipolli and Bulgaria joining the war go similar. The Ottoman-Russian Caucasus campaigns go about as OTL, disastrous for Ottomans at first, and then Russian-dominated. Perhaps by 1916 the Russians aren't quite as advanced in east Anatolia as OTL because Russia holds more troops in Russia opposite Austria.

Romania is not inspired to join the war in late 1916, because Austria-Hungary doesn't look as weak and the Brusilov offensive doesn't look as strong. That is convenient and helpful for the CPs, at least in the short term. But it helps Russia in a way too, since the Russians do not need to extend their front lines to cover Romania or southwest Ukraine.

Falkenhayn still gets fired in late 1916 (because of Verdun) and is replaced by Hindy & Ludy. They decide to launch USW in early 1917, & put in their munitions-centric economic plan that harms the economy. Russia has its historical Feb/Mar revolution over bread riots in Petrograd. USW leads the US to declare war by April.

USW provides the excuse, and opportunism provides the motive, for Italy to declare war on the CP in May 1917, attacking headlong into the Austrian front. It is a bloody mess for the Italians, but a bloody shock for the Austrians too. Meanwhile, the French have to be passive after the Nivelle Offensive and mutinies of April 1917. Romania, inspired by the Italian example and opportunism, and possibly also using USW as an excuse, declares war on the CP and attacks Austria in June 1917. From July, the British start continuous attacks on the Flanders front.

Combined Italian, Romanian, and Russian pushes in late June overwhelm Austria-Hungary's ability to resist and force the Austrians to steadily cede ground. The Germans can only send limited and tardy support, because the British are at their peak strength to date on the western front and attacking hard.

Local successes in their sectors and an increased prisoner take, especially of Austro-Hungarians, encourage the Entente powers to press on. In the meantime, the Salonica-based, multinational, French commanded Army of the Orient senses vulnerability as Austrian and German reinforcements and supplies for the Bulgarians are pulled back. They launch a breakout in October, with Greece finally declaring war, and all forces pushing north to liberate Serbia.

This sense of progress inspires French troops to resume attacks on the western front, and the still very limited #s of American troops on the line to seek action, by the end of October. By 1 November - the Russians are at Warsaw, Krakow, and Breslau, the Romanians are at the Tisza river, and the Italians have conquered Austria proper, including Vienna, while German troops are being pushed back in France and Belgium.

The Austrians and Bulgarians capitulate by 2 November, with the Ottomans following suit on 22 November, and the Germans on Dec 11.

The sudden entrance of Italy and Romania into the war in the spring/summer was the decisive turn overthrowing the Austrian and CP position in 1917.

Postwar effects:

Russia: Have Democratic Socialist (non-Bolshevik) governments, catering to peasant interests above all, land reform is the biggest issue post-war. Russia holds together with the exception of Poland, west of the Curzon line, being permitted independence, and Finland being granted near total self-government.

Romania: Achieves all territorial aims:

Serbia: Restored and merged with Croatia and Slovenia

Austria-Hungary: dismantled into national states , much like OTL

Poland: is created, west of the Curzon line, with a corridor to the sea

Italy: gains all territorial irredenta, and wins all territorial disputes against Yugoslavia because of its more advantageous starting position (Fresh power in 1917, as opposed to a totally occupied power (Serbia), with a smaller army in exile. Italy wins a 'Vittoria Soddisfacente' a 'satisfactory victory' instead of 'Vittoria Mutilata'. As a result, it never becomes a Fascist dictatorship. Although, Italian governments may pursue repression against left-wing strikes and other Socialist and Communist non-parliamentary activities. Italy can also be prouder of its part in the war, it is linked more decisively in time and space to the final victory. Therefore, it is less likely to feel a compulsion to trifle with Ethiopia and conquer it in the coming decades. "We won the Great War, Ethiopia is so small time". Of course Italy will also be confident, so if Ethiopia offends or threatens Italy's colonies, Italy won't hesitate to defend them, counterattack, and punish Ethiopia to the point of wiping it off the map.

France: regains Alsace-Lorraine, gets to temporarily occupy the Saar, and Rhineland, with other western Allies. Other Allies like Britain, Italy, and the USA however oppose French ambitions for setting up separatist Rhineland state or annexing the Rhineland.

Ottomans dismantled - but never forced to sign something as harsh as Sevres.

Britain - gets a year shaved off their war.

America - Because of slowness to mobilize and speed with which the war ends, is only able to get about 875 of its men killed by desperately rushing them into random battles where they aren't really needed.

America ends the war with a case of wartime "blue balls" all dressed up for the main event, with nowhere to go. There will have been time for some wartime measures that were unpopular to have emerged, but not all of them. Millions would have been conscripted, but many fewer sent abroad, Only a tiny minority of those sent abroad have seen combat. And, as noted before, by WWI standards, hardly any of them died.

This leaves America with little anti-war and isolationist backlash, and almost a desire to go around proving itself. The USA willingly signs a postwar treaty committing itself, along with Britain, to the defense of France and Belgium for 25 years.

Germany - It gets hit with a settlement about as territorially harsh as OTL's Versailles, but owing reparations to more countries, now including Russia. It also never gets the experience of feeling that it did beat the Russian Empire into submission and that this is a manageable achievement. [OTL's German victory over Russia in WWI, and success imposing Brest-Litovsk, and ability to run wild beyond the B-L treaty's limits, though short-lived, was, in my view, foundational to later Nazi German underestimation of Soviet strength and the belief that merely "kicking the door in" could send the Soviets crashing down.]

A key point of tension at the Versailles Conference is the future of the Japanese occupied former German colony in China at Qingdao. The Chinese delegation, led by Wellington Koo, angrily walks out of the peace conference when the Conference awards the territory to Japan based on treaties concluded early in the war.

However, American opinion is uncomfortable with Japanese expansion during the war, both in China and the Pacific, and demagogues the China issue, with politicians championing the Chinese cause and vilifying the Japanese.

The Wilson-House-Lansing Administration offers major loans, financial support, and arms supplies to the Chinese Beiyang Republic to support its standing up to Japan, indeed breaking away from Japan from summer 1919, and the US starts to reconcentrate its fleet in the Pacific.

The Japanese, in response to American-sponsored Chinese Japanophobia, react to their sudden loss of influence by using their agents of influence more aggressively, supporting a coup by Qing dynasty royalists in Manchuria, and sending the Kwangtung Army to back it up, in August 1919.

In September 1919, the US sanctions Japan, boycotting imports (like silks) from Japan and embargoing exports (like cotton, oil, and iron) and demanding Japanese evacuation from Manchuria. The US continues to reinforce its Pacific and Asiatic fleets, and begins to convoy troops to the US Pacific possessions in the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and Hawaii, slowing down the post-war demobilization. Beiyang Republic forces put up resistance against the Japanese around Manchuria and a skirmish line at the Great Wall, although it is pathetically doomed. Beiyang troops also begin assaults on the Japanese at Tsingtao, although they are also repelled with disproportionately heavy losses to the attackers.

As a result of these threatening Chinese, US economic, naval, and military measures and demands, the Japanese declare war on both countries, and launch a rapid campaign to secure the Chinese capital of Beijing and China's principal coastal ports like Shanghai, and attack US forces in China whenever this can be done without attacking non-belligerent third-country (British, French) or multinational concession cessions. Other Japanese Army forces are sent to invade the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island with fleet transports while the battle fleet is sent to come to grips with the US Asiatic Fleet.

The US declares war on Japan and denounces its attacks and the Philippines, Guam, and Wake are all lost by spring 1920.

The US is finally in the epic war it prepared for, but did not get, in Europe. Meanwhile, all of the European belligerents, including Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, have declared strict neutrality.

China is the Americans only ally. Japanese Army forces generally win the field wherever and whenever they come into contact with Chinese forces. The size and roughness of China's terrain, and the multiplicity of new willing leaders and armies who show up for the popular cause of challenging the Japanese, are much more of a problem for the Japanese than any combat capability or cohesion of any particular Chinese combat force. Fairly quickly into 1920 and 1921, all coastal routes for the Americans in particular to deliver any practical arms aid to the Chinese are cut off by Japanese port occupations.

1920 after the conquest of US Pacific territories is largely a stalemated year, so is 1921, although the US fleet is built to gargantuan size, far outpacing the British. Early 1922 sees the US fleet and US fleet supply train take key parts of the Marshall Islands, and then the Marianas islands while heavily damaging the Japanese fleet this is followed by mid-year battles in the Philippine sea and some landings in the outlying Philippine islands. Australia and Canada, breaking ranks with Britain, declare war on Japan and permit the US to use their territory for logistic purposes, and send in forces on a small scale. France, after having reinforced Indochina with colonial troops, a hard core of metropolitan troops, and fleet units, and being nagged by the US, declares war on Japan a few months into 1922, and their participation and opening of Danang and Haiphong harbor to advance US fleet units also logistically eases US operations for the comprehensive counter-invasion of the Philippines, the costliest ground operations to date for the US army since 1917, indeed since the American Civil War.

War-weariness and war-related anxiety grows in the US as battlefield reports from the Philippines flow in.

Fortunately for the French, by the time they've declared war, the Japanese fleet is so weak, and the Japanese have so many land points to defend from potential landings by the Americans, that the Japanese never are able to send a large enough invasion force to overwhelm Indochina's defenses. There is however, some war-related unrest in the colony.

The Philippines are near completely liberated in 1922, and this effectively establishes a blockade of Japan. US troops are able to enter the Chinese mainland via beaches unoccupied by Japanese and to bypass Japanese held points by landing in French-held Tonkin, and marching up in to China, and use Haiphong as a main supply route to support Chinese forces as well as American, especially as Japanese naval ability to interdict has been nearly ground down to dust.

Japan has made attempts to negotiate its way out of the war since 1921, but the US alternately refused to entertain the idea at all, or found the Japanese terms, usually based on battlefield status quo, unacceptable. In late 1922 and early 1923, the Japanese started offering some terms yielding some of the status quo, as their military and naval position became less sustainable, but the US was still rejecting terms.

However, war weariness, mother's protests, and strikes at home were reaching worrisome proportions by 1923.

Russian-mediation, obtained by Japan at the price of retroceding southern Sakhalin island to Russia, succeeds in helping the USA, Japan, and China reach the peace of Petrograd by June 1st, 1923.

By its terms, Japan yields all its Micronesian islands conquered from Germany to the United States, evacuates any remaining troops from the Philippines, evacuates all troops from China, including Taiwan (included at the insistence of China, but also the US, desiring a buffer for the Philippines against attack), and the Kwangtung peninsula, and yields Southern Sakhalin to Russia. Japan retains its home islands, the Kuriles, the Bonins, the Ryukyus, and Korea. Japan accepts the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which British neutrality declarations had rendered a dead letter anyway.

 

[Doctor Sulemain]

I think Italy remaining neutral as the horror of industrial warfare are fully unveiled is another interesting POD.

 

[Gary Oswald]

I think Italy remaining neutral as the horror of industrial warfare are fully unveiled is another interesting POD.

Be interesting for Libya, that. I hadn't grasped before looking into it, how much the Italian position in Libya collapsed after the start of WWI but before Italian entry. Cos it was the movement of Italian troops away from fighting in the desert to protect the borders in case they entered that was critical.