Parliamentary Egypt: Naguib and Mohiedden prevail over Nasser

[Jackson Lennock]

The Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led by Nasser was increasingly splitting from Egyptian President Muhammad Naguib starting in 1954. Naguib was critical of the RCC's repressive internal policies and wanted to restore political parties. In February 1954, Naguib said he would not allow the RCC to use him as a figurehead, hoping to force the RCC to legalize opposition parties. The RCC responded by putting Naguib under house arrest and vacating the office of president temporarily. The arrest led to big protests in support of Naguib - mainly by remaining supports of the Wafd (National-Liberals), Muslim Brotherhood, and Leftist groups (Communists, Socialists, etc.). The big goal on the part of protestors in the streets (middle class wafdists, along with students and workers who supported islamists or leftists) was to get opposition parties legalized again, a free press, and parliament restored. The protestors also had some army support, including one other member of the RCC.

The one member was Khaled Mohiedden, the youngest and leftmost RCC member and a person in ideological alignment with the RCC. There was a meeting he put together - which Nasser showed up to - and it was possible an arrest could have occurred there. Mohiedden later said some folks at the meeting wanted the impression of an arrest being possible, but did not want to do it themselves. They just sought Nasser accepting their demands. Initially the idea seemed to be that Naguib would be restored as President and Nasser would be premier, but in Nasser's ten days as premier he purged the RCC of anti-Nasser elements while Naguib was down in Sudan and Mohiedden was sent to Europe. Also, Nasser put loyalists in charge of the ministry which had power over the trade unions.

What of Mohiedden had been made premier, as initially proposed, and Naguib President? The RCC would still mostly be anti-Naguib and anti-Parliamentary, but the RCC isn't the entirety of the army. A lot would depend on Mohiedden using the opportunity as premier to shore up an alternative center of power in the military and keeping the trade unions on his side, but I don't know enough about Mohiedden to conclude if he had the Machiavellian nature to take such political steps. It's also possible that by giving civil society (the left, the liberals, and the islamists) the breathing space to develop on its own, you could protect a more pluralistic (and thus parliamentary) Egypt.


If Naguib and Mohiedden had won out, what next? In part it would depend on the composition of the parliament, which I imagine would be much less liberal-dominated than prior to the Egyptian Revolution. Land and social reform might be stalled without Nasser having complete control of the system, but the the Muslim Brotherhood and Leftist groups probably would be able to force some sort of reforms through if it is a truly democratic system. Democracy would probably be corrupt at first, but that's the case for all democracies.

The British probably keep their base around the Suez Canal, going off of the quoted passage below. While this would be a recurrent thorn in the side of Egyptian politics (likely as much as the OTL US canal in panama was over Panamanian politics) it might be a net positive for the region insofar as you would avoid the Suez Crisis of 1956-1957. There'd also be no (or fewer) Fedayeen raids out of Gaza into Israel, I assume, since those really started kicking off in late 1954 when Nasser took firm control.
Another big knock-on is that without the failed Suez Crisis escapade, you don't have the 1957 Defence White Paper - Britain could be a more potent military operator in the late 20th century. The effect of that, presumably, would be the US mucking around less in the middle east and letting the UK do the really dirty antisoviet business.

Without Nasser's grandiosity, the proposed partition of Sudan (with Egypt getting the north) might occur instead of Sudan's becoming independent as a single entity OTL. Nasser pushed for a united independent Sudan OTL because he thought the Arab world was going to unite very quickly anyway, so any separation would only be temporary. Somebody other than Nasser might settle for an Egyptian North Sudan. What to do with a potential breadbasket would be an interesting political issue. It could be a pressure release valve in a country where a lot of the land is controlled by relatively few people ... or the southern lands could themselves end up owned and consolidated by just a few people.


The prospect of Egypt lacking the Aswan Dam and having a slower industrialization (as observed below) is questionable to me. A more democratic (and potentially less anti-western) Egypt could still get the foreign financing to build a dam. Plus, the source below seems to overlook how Nasser's nationalistic policies gutted the Egyptian middle class. Jews likely still leave because of the Israel issue, but there were many groups other than Jews that Nasser went after. By expelling the Italians, Maltese, Armenians, Greeks, Syro-Lebanese and targeting the businesses often owned by the Coptic community, Nasser gutted much of the country's middle class (as much as a quarter of the country?) which itself could have been a source of revenues for investments and reforms - as well as a crucial driver of economic opportunity in the country. Plus, the Nasserist regime's centralized and illiberal nature meant that many modest but incredibly important institutional measures such as a sound judiciary or an effective system of land titling and recording didn't develop. Business dealings and protection of what little property the poor have is impossible without those sorts of basic things, even if they don't capture the imagination as much as a big dam does.

It's possible that forces such as the muslim brotherhood or the communists would be waiting in the wings to take power if the Egyptian system fails to deliver tangible benefits (social and land reform, getting rid of the British) quickly though. But there's also the prospect that no single group would be strong enough to take power outright. The military might just take power later on though, if political tumult evolves into violence in the streets. But if Nasser is defeated (and potentially locked up?) early on, and the military after a decade of parliamentary governance is less ideological, would the military be able to do much? Or, maybe, Egypt in the 20th century would have a model akin to Turkey - a hybrid system of democracy at times with the military routinely stepping in to restructure things when it thinks the system is getting out of whack.


Does a parliamentary Egypt get as involved in pan-arabism? I'm not sure. Maybe that movement would remain centered in Damascus, rather than Cairo.

From David T in an AH.Com Post

The conflict in 1954 between President Muhammad Naguib on the one hand and Gamal Abdel Nasser and his supporters in the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council) on the other was crucial for the future of Egypt. For a while it seemed that the popular Naguib, a critic of the RCC's increasingly repressive policies and an advocate of restoring political parties, was going to be triumphant. Some background:

The conflict came out in the open in February 1954, when Naguib decided that he would no longer allow the RCC to use him as a figurehead. On February 23, Naguib submitted his resignation to the RCC in an attempt to force the junta's hand. The junta replied by placing Naguib under house arrest and declaring the office of the President temporarily vacant. The news of Naguib's removal led to big popular demonstrations in Naguib's favor. According to Robert Stephens (*Nasser: A Political Biography*, p. 125) they "were organized by the remaining cadres of Wafdists and the left-wing groups who, with the Muslim Brothers, could still bring masses of students and workers into the streets. This united front of the Brotherhood, the left and the Wafd aimed to use Naguib's popularity in the hope of forcing the junta to restore the political parties, parliament and a freer press." What worried Nasser, however, was not so much the demonstrations themselves but the support they drew in the army. There was a stormy meeting of cavalry corps officers loyal to Khaled Mohieddin, the youngest and most left-wing member of the RCC, and the only RCC member other than Naguib who had opposed the repressive measures of the Council. Nasser himself went to the meeting, where he faced demands for Naguib's restoration. There were rumors that Nasser was in danger of arrest at this meeting. Khaled Muhieddin later denied that the corps was planning a coup or that Nasser faced arrest, but did acknowledge that some of the officers present tried to make Nasser think that their tanks had the barracks surrounded.

Anyway, the next day, Nasser beat a temporary retreat. He informed the RCC that to avoid a split that would destroy the army, it was necessary to bring back Naguib as President and make Khaled Muhieddin Premier. The RCC reluctantly agreed. However, the triumph of Khaled was sort-lived; Free Officers loyal to Nasser began to organize counter-action against the cavalry corps. So a new compromise was reached, with Naguib to become President again and Nasser Premier. Naguib accepted it. Naguib became President, and announced the abolition of press censorship and plans to create a constituent assembly and provisional parliament within a few months. On March 9, Nasser handed over the premiership to Naguib until free elections would be held. It looked as though Naguib had won all along the line.

Appearances were deceptive, though; Nasser had already begun preparing what virtually amounted to a second coup. First, he had used his ten days as premier to purge pro-Naguib elements in the army. (It helped that Naguib was in Khartoum at the time to inaugurate the Sudanese Parliament.) Khalid Mohiedden was sent on a "special mission" to Europe. Nasser also tightened his hold on the trade unions by appointing a loyal Free Officer, Kamal al-din Hussein, as Minister of Social Affairs.

Nasser's strategy was to make it plain to the army that--contrary to what Naguib and much of the public might think--there was no middle ground, that they could not have both the fruits of the revolution and a return to the political parties, that a return to parliamentary life "would mean the end of the army movement and probably of most of what it had set out to achieve." (Stephens, p. 127) Accordingly, on March 25 the RCC announced that it would "surrender its powers to a constituent assembly on 24 July 1954 at which time it will proclaim the end of the Egyptian Revolution."

This declaration had the desired shock effect on all those in the army and the public who feared a return to the old regime, even if without a king. The Liberation Rally (the political arm of the RCC) and the trade unions staged huge demonstrations demanding the retention of the Council and calling for Nasser instead of Naguib. The demonstrations were backed up by a general transport strike. Most important, Nasser was given a free hand by an assembly of the Free Officers to settle the crisis.

"Nasser thus demonstrated conclusively that, whoever might hold the titles, he held the keys to power--in the army, among the workers and in the streets. It was only a matter of time before he took the titles too. On 17 April, Naguib, suffering from a nervous breakdown, still popular but shorn of organized support from any source, was forced to resign again as prime minister. He was also dropped from the Council of the Revolution." (Stephens, p. 128). Nasser took over the premiership again; political parties were once more banned and elections postponed. Nasser kept Naguib as President, but this became increasingly a figurehead role until in October the attempted assassination of Nasser by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood provided an excuse for ousting Naguib once and for all.

So, could Naguib have won? The odds seem to me to have been against it because the real power was with the RCC, which except for Khaled Muhieddin never seems to have had much sympathy for Naguib, though it might temporarily make concessions to him. Still, the RCC was not the entire military, and if Naguib had refused the compromise which gave Nasser a crucial ten days as Premier to purge pro-Naguib elements, it is conceivable that Naguib's opponents would have backed down. Anyway, if Naguib had prevailed and political parties restored, would it have been a good thing for Egypt? Stephens--who is sympathetic to Nasser but not uncritical--is skeptical on this point (pp. 128-9):

"So the parliamentary constitutional system which Egyptian liberals had struggled so long to establish and which had suffered so many abuses was finally destroyed. Did Egypt's parliament deserve to die? What would have happened if Naguib had won? It might be argued that with all its faults the parliamentary system in Egypt at least held out some prospects of a political evolution which might gradually reduce its corrupt basis and enable an increasing educated public to learn from political discussion. British parliamentary life until the last century was also corrupt and dominated by land-owners. Against this has to be weighed three probabilities. First, a parliament dominated once again by the Wafd would probably have undone the land reform and held up other economic and social reforms. There would probably also have been no High Dam and a slower industrialization. Second, there would have been no negotiated agreement with the British over the Canal Zone base, because no political group, even if it wanted to, would have been strong enough to make such an agreement. Third, even if Naguib had won and the parliament had been re-created, it is probable that it before long would have broken down again in the throes of a revolution more violent and bloody than the 1952 coup. For the combination of social and economic pressures and of a possible resumption of the struggle against the British in the Canal Zone would almost certainly have been more than the old parties could cope with. Disillusion would have been widespread and the way would have been open for action by the Muslim Brothers and the Communists waiting in the wings..."

 

[Nyvis]

The main issue I see is the divided nature of the opposition. I think that's always going to make reforms difficult, which in turn make Nasser and the like more attractive when he's promising enough authority to make them happen. The land question is going to loom very large.

I'm also not sure how much the middle class (is it really a middle class in the way we understand it today or small business owners actually) is worth as an economic engine either when Egypt is going to be struggling with a hostile neocolonial economic order abroad. Liberalism's economic plan doesn't seem that attractive when you're not one of the countries winning at the liberal international trade game.

Maybe the army and left together force enough reforms to make it seem like the system is delivering on its promises but that's a coalition that will by its nature marginalize the liberals and islamists.

This feels like a Russian provisional government situation. An untenable stage of the revolution. Can we get something that isn't Nasser hegemonic out of it? Yeah probably. Can we get everyone to agree to cooperate despite their very different aims and the mounting pressure? I doubt it.

 

[heraclius]

I would feel there's still a danger of a coup by frustrated ultra-nationalist and/or pan-Arabist officers in the RCC at some point, even if there's a moderate who doesn't go after the 'alien' business community and stoke up a confrontation with the UK - and any sort of reforms that don't bring quick results in terms of better economic conditions for the masses are going to provide fodder for RCC members or allied malcontents who want to discredit the new govt by creating urban riots. Any riots or financially targeting big business for extra taxes or public-friendly nationalisation are going to scare off foreign investment, and be seen as signs of 'Communist influence' by the US hard-liners - meaning probably no US financial support and the new Egyptian govt having to turn to the USSR (or threatening to do this to get better terms out of the US, which would then scare the latter).

Similarly any crowd-pleasing move against British control of the Suez Canal , as a way of distracting the public from feeling that the govt is too pro-Western and no better than the pre-1952 monarchy, scares the British and risks a retaliatory plan for a 1953 Iran-style coup to put 'sensible' senior officers with conservative social views and links to the US/ UK military back in charge - though not an equivalent of the OTL 1956 War plan if Eden is not in charge of the UK from Apr 1955. Would passing over Eden be possible if Eden's health was too uncertain after his 1953 problems so Churchill sidelines him on 'doctors' advice' in favour of the more stable Butler (a former ally of appeasers from his role under Halifax in 1940 so possibly not trusted by the Churchill inner circle as 'tough and reliable enough') , though at this point in 1954-5 the capable and ambitious Macmillan, Churchill's trusted subordinate from the War and with North African experience and military links from being minister in the region in the War, was probably too junior to leapfrog over both Eden and Butler.

No adventurist Nasser in charge probably means no economic disaster and nationalist expulsion of foreign business and residents (a forerunner of the populist nationalism of later Middle Eastern and S Asian rulers, eg the Assads, Saddam Hussein, and in a different manner Modi's Hindu vision of India)so a more prosperous and outward-looking Egypt and possibly no obsession with avenging the 1948 defeat by Israel and Radio Cairo rhetoric about the Israelis for year after year, which duly plays into retaliatory aggression by Israel -and no pan-Arab linking up with Syrian nationalist radical military leaders in 1958 so possibly the (shaky) Syrian civilian govts of 1954-8 last longer. We might even get butterflies as far as Yemen -no military coup by Nasser-admiring young officers against the new Imam in 1962 or at any rate no Egyptian milit intervention to save the new regime there from a tribal conservative backlash and so no civil war (and a Gulf-style monarchy carrying on in Yemen though with less wealth to buy off the public). But given the popularity of Nasser's stands and anti-Israeli/ Arab unity campaigns among the Egyptian public at large, a strong enough govt with enough money to bring prosperity, a good reputation with the restive officers to stop a coup, and a supportive not interventionist US is going to be a big ask. With a skilful leader who can rally or control the military as a united body without trying to overthrow his neighbours or take on Israel, we could get a tough but reformist centralised govt (plus secret police to deal with plots and intimidate the civilian Left), an Egyptian equivalent of the Shah's Iran in the 1960s - a sort of Nasser without the dangerous foreign policy. The Moslem Brotherhood could then be used as a bogeyman to rally the army to unity. But this probably needs to be a younger and verbally belligerent person to appeal to enough of the newly dominant officer cliques not an 'old generation' general who is seen as too pro-US or not interested in the people, as the latter would probably go the way of Nuri Said's govt in Iraq in the 1958 coup in due course .

 

[raharris1973]

Interesting speculations here folks- along with a healthy realism about the limitations and boundaries to divergence that would be imposed by popular passions and elite political fashions.