Operation Eisenhammer in June 1943

[boomhauer]

What if Operation Eisenhammer was launched in June 1943 instead of the bombing campaign against Gorky?
For those who are unfamiliar:

Operation Eisenhammer - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Bombing of Gorky in World War II - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Historically the plan to bomb Soviet electrical stations was only fully developed by late July 1943, despite the author of the plan pushing for it since before the war started and again against Britain during the Blitz. He was only listened to after the Luftwaffe restarted strategic bombing in summer 1943 right before Kursk to damage Soviet production before the planned battle to destroy their armor reserves at Kursk. As a POD here the Luftwaffe listens to him in winter-spring 1943 and instead of going after the factories of Gorky, they instead use their resources to hit the 11 power stations identified in the Eisenhammer plan (technically still called Aktion Russland in 1943), some of which were in Gorky. All the elements of the plan were basically ready to go or could be made so in time if the plan was ready, such as the Fritz-X PGM, all they lacked was the plan to actually do it, though that existed conceptually already. The Mistel part only came in 1944, but was unnecessary to the plan, as that part would have only cut off civilian power to Moscow after factory power was already cut.

The impact, if successful, which given the success in bombing Gorky in June 1943 should be entirely doable with existing resources, would have been catastrophic for the Soviets and could not have been repaired in less than 18 months.
The impact:

The loss of only 50 per cent of the electricity supply is sufficient to paralyze the major consumers among the armaments industry.

The following depend on the electricity supply in the Moscow-Upper Volga region alone:

80 per cent of tank engine production

50 per cent of electronics production

60 per cent of light tanks and motor vehicles

50 per cent of howitzers, optical instruments, et cetera.

Coupled with the vast losses during Kursk and the Soviet counteroffensives, they would run out of tanks in 1943. Historically they produced about 20k and lost 20k in combat that year (same for 1944), but here they would have the power cut off in June, so at best they produce about 13k tanks for the entire year and no more than 5k in 1944 until they can replace the lost equipment. Since production of such things took at least 12 months and they'd have to ship and install it from the US, since the USSR did not manufacture it at home, 1945 would be the earliest they could restore production to 1943 pre-bombing levels.

Essentially their September offensives would be the end of the line for the year unless they wanted to keep attacking with just infantry in limited attacks with whatever equipment they could muster or the US was willing to ship them lots of manufactured AFVs instead of raw materials and other production related stuff. This effectively means that 3rd and 4th quarter 1943 would mean they are only able to launch very limited attacks which the Germans could counter with the resources at hand, while focusing more and more on the west. This very well may mean they could retain the Panther Line:

Panther–Wotan line - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Soviets also lose out on the liberated manpower in the occupied parts of Ukraine that were vital to maintaining their frontline strength, as their primary source of replacements from 1943-45 was manpower from liberated territories.

What would this mean for the rest of the war with the Soviets crippled so badly right before Kursk?

 

[GBW]

The USA started sending M4A2 Sherman tanks in late summer of 1944, which might be moved up if Eisenhammer is launched and succeeds to this extent. The Soviets upgunned about half of the 4,065 Shermans in OTL with the 76mm main guns from the T-34, supposedly because they were unsure about ammunition for the US-made 75mm gun, but relented when they were assured of the supply of shells through Lend-Lease. In this TL the Soviets will be pretty much dependent on American Shermans as they are, full stop. The US might be able to expand Sherman production a bit for the Soviets, but if the USSR is that desperate then additional Shermans may instead be sent to Moscow instead of other allies, like Brazil, Free France and, to an extent, the British and the dominions, which will have knock on effects elsewhere. Regardless, they aren't going to make up for the loss of that much production and the Eastern Front may end up stalled in late 1943 and into 1944. This relieves a lot of pressure on Germany to shore up their eastern defenses and focus on the Western Allies. That could mean more difficulty for the Allied invasion of Italy.

There's the possibility, with that much production lost, the Red Army withering, and German defenses strengthening, and no invasion of western Europe for over a year, that Stalin may threaten to pursue a seperate peace. That may force Churchill and FDR to push for an earlier invasion of France for diplomatic reasons that could go wrong. This could all end up with the first atomic bombs being used in Europe instead, either as part of a renewed invasion of France (as they had planned to use them to support troops in Operation Downfall in Japan), or on strategic targets in Germany itself.

 

[The Red]

The impact, if successful, which given the success in bombing Gorky in June 1943 should be entirely doable with existing resources, would have been catastrophic for the Soviets and could not have been repaired in less than 18 months.

Going by Gorky, the damage was repaired in the Autumn of 1943 rather than 1945 and that was with one large target rather than multiple smaller ones spread out across the USSR. Looking at the prospects of a strategic energy infrastructure campaign in 1943 and a large Luftwaffe strategic bombing offensive against multiple targets in a contemporary timescale, you have the joint triumphs of Steinbock and Tidal Wave.

 

[boomhauer]

Going by Gorky, the damage was repaired in the Autumn of 1943 rather than 1945 and that was with one large target rather than multiple smaller ones spread out across the USSR. Looking at the prospects of a strategic energy infrastructure campaign in 1943 and a large Luftwaffe strategic bombing offensive against multiple targets in a contemporary timescale, you have the joint triumphs of Steinbock and Tidal Wave.

First of all that is inaccurate. The Soviets claimed October 1943, but some of the damage was never repaired and the raids were against multiple targets in the region and very effective. Then there is the fact that the targets are completely different. Power stations are overall much smaller and much much easier to damage and keep damaged, due to how delicate and complex the machinery is and how hard it is to replace.
This book a much more details than are in the wikipedia article from Russian sources:

Hitler's Strategic Bombing Offensive on the Eastern Front

Germany was never able to match the power of the Allied air forces with their great four-engine bombers, the Lancasters, Liberators and Flying Fortresses. Indeed,…

www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

 

[The Red]

First of all that is inaccurate. The Soviets claimed October 1943, but some of the damage was never repaired and the raids were against multiple targets in the region and very effective.

On Yarsolavl and Saratov? Weren't they ineffective? If memory serves the former was an intelligence failure.

Power stations are overall much smaller

This works both ways when it comes to strategic bombing in WW2, easier to damage but much harder to hit.

This book a much more details than are in the wikipedia article from Russian sources:

Hitler's Strategic Bombing Offensive on the Eastern Front

Germany was never able to match the power of the Allied air forces with their great four-engine bombers, the Lancasters, Liberators and Flying Fortresses. Indeed,…

www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

Never read it but looking at reviews does the book really claim the Soviets had no prior knowledge of Citadel?

 

[boomhauer]

On Yarsolavl and Saratov? Weren't they ineffective? If memory serves the former was an intelligence failure.

Not according to the book I linked. They completely achieved their goals. That was the Carmen II bombing campaign.

This works both ways when it comes to strategic bombing in WW2, easier to damage but much harder to hit.

And yet the Germans had zero problem hitting all the targets they intended to with great effect per the Soviet reports cited in the book.

Never read it but looking at reviews does the book really claim the Soviets had no prior knowledge of Citadel?

I do not recall reading that, nor do I see that stated anywhere in the link, including the review section.

 

[boomhauer]

The USA started sending M4A2 Sherman tanks in late summer of 1944, which might be moved up if Eisenhammer is launched and succeeds to this extent. The Soviets upgunned about half of the 4,065 Shermans in OTL with the 76mm main guns from the T-34, supposedly because they were unsure about ammunition for the US-made 75mm gun, but relented when they were assured of the supply of shells through Lend-Lease. In this TL the Soviets will be pretty much dependent on American Shermans as they are, full stop. The US might be able to expand Sherman production a bit for the Soviets, but if the USSR is that desperate then additional Shermans may instead be sent to Moscow instead of other allies, like Brazil, Free France and, to an extent, the British and the dominions, which will have knock on effects elsewhere. Regardless, they aren't going to make up for the loss of that much production and the Eastern Front may end up stalled in late 1943 and into 1944. This relieves a lot of pressure on Germany to shore up their eastern defenses and focus on the Western Allies. That could mean more difficulty for the Allied invasion of Italy.

That all makes sense, but the constraint is not just shipping capacity, but also the ability to offload them in ports. That was a major constraint, as the US probably would have sent the Soviets even more if they could have actually done so. In fact that was even an issue for the US in 1944-45, as they had more Shermans to ship to Western Europe than Western Europe had the port capacity to offload. They could and would substitute production materials for finished weapons, probably as you say above by taking it away from the minor powers and Britain to ensure the Soviets had as much as could be shipped in. Still this is likely to only be at best a minor help, as at most we're talking only a few thousand extra per year. And that doesn't count all the missing radios/electronics, howitzers, Soviet produced trucks, etc., not to mention the subcomponents crisis which resulted from the OTL bombing of Gorky that disrupted production of many items outside of the region. Effectively best case scenario for the Soviets 'only' suffer a 50% combat effectiveness loss, though realistically probably closer overall to 60% given the loss of AFVs and huge role those played in their offensive power. Honestly though the losses of artillery are probably going to be extremely difficult to replace and be just as damaging.

There's the possibility, with that much production lost, the Red Army withering, and German defenses strengthening, and no invasion of western Europe for over a year, that Stalin may threaten to pursue a seperate peace. That may force Churchill and FDR to push for an earlier invasion of France for diplomatic reasons that could go wrong. This could all end up with the first atomic bombs being used in Europe instead, either as part of a renewed invasion of France (as they had planned to use them to support troops in Operation Downfall in Japan), or on strategic targets in Germany itself.

I think you're very right about Stalin seeking a deal in 1943-44. Especially if the power stations of the dams are hit in follow up raids in July and Moscow civilians are cut off of power. War should be over before the A bomb is ready

 

[Incognitia]

If bombing power plants is that effective, and the Germans have done it, guess what the Western allies are going to do to the German network?

 

[boomhauer]

If bombing power plants is that effective, and the Germans have done it, guess what the Western allies are going to do to the German network?

Nothing, since they explored that option IOTL, but thought the German system was too well defended and diffuse to bother with; they already knew how huge of an impact it would have had, but simply thought they couldn't actually knock out the system. After the war they realized their mistake and there is included a specific section in the USSBS about how they messed up.

The Soviet system was uniquely centralized and overburdened during the war due to their rapid industrialization, concentration of industry (in large part due to how spread out everything is in that vast nation), and the disruptions/damage caused by the invasion. For that reason it wouldn't be thought to be comparable to the German one, which indeed it was not. The German system required 56 stations be knocked out just to impact less than half the grid; in contrast the Germans could knock out 11 and take down an entire region, the region with the most important concentration of industry. Follow up on two more major targets and they'd eliminate all civilian power too and plunge the remaining heartland of Soviet industry into the stone age.

 

[History Learner]

Nothing, since they explored that option IOTL, but thought the German system was too well defended and diffuse to bother with; they already knew how huge of an impact it would have had, but simply thought they couldn't actually knock out the system. After the war they realized their mistake and there is included a specific section in the USSBS about how they messed up.

Didn't they attempt to attack the electrical system indirectly via the Ruhr Campaign in early 1943?

The Soviet system was uniquely centralized and overburdened during the war due to their rapid industrialization, concentration of industry (in large part due to how spread out everything is in that vast nation), and the disruptions/damage caused by the invasion. For that reason it wouldn't be thought to be comparable to the German one, which indeed it was not. The German system required 56 stations be knocked out just to impact less than half the grid; in contrast the Germans could knock out 11 and take down an entire region, the region with the most important concentration of industry. Follow up on two more major targets and they'd eliminate all civilian power too and plunge the remaining heartland of Soviet industry into the stone age.

Were the 11 stations specified in the planning? I know a lot of the basis of the German planning was because in the 1930s they had, themselves, ironically built much of the Soviet electrical grid right.

 

[boomhauer]

Didn't they attempt to attack the electrical system indirectly via the Ruhr Campaign in early 1943?

Not intentionally. If it got hit it was part of the dehousing program.

Were the 11 stations specified in the planning? I know a lot of the basis of the German planning was because in the 1930s they had, themselves, ironically built much of the Soviet electrical grid right.

Yes. That is exactly where the intelligence came from and motivation of Steinmann's proposal. Siemens FTW. That's also why the Luftwaffe had a complete plan presented to them within about a month after they put out a request for target ideas. And why it came from Speer's ministry, since they had all the economic data.

 

[The Red]

Not according to the book I linked. They completely achieved their goals. That was the Carmen II bombing campaign.

Looking at Oleg Hoeffding's German Air Attacks Against Industry and Railroads in Russia, 1941-1945, it seems even the Luftwaffe didn't believe they had completely achieved their goals at the time and the reasons for the secondary targets appear dubious.

​

And yet the Germans had zero problem hitting all the targets they intended to with great effect per the Soviet reports cited in the book.

That seems charitable for 1943 levels of accuracy. The USAAF which had spent much more effort to get strategic bombing down to a science reported a peak accuracy of 70% in 1945 according to the USSBS. The Luftwaffe on the other hand had Speer advocating kamikaze raids against Soviet power plants "in view of the low bombing accuracy of Corps Meister." You cite Soviet sources about German target accuracy but claim they're lying about their recovery from the bombings, which is it?

I do not recall reading that, nor do I see that stated anywhere in the link, including the review section.

First review on Amazon

​

 

[boomhauer]

Looking at Oleg Hoeffding's German Air Attacks Against Industry and Railroads in Russia, 1941-1945, it seems even the Luftwaffe didn't believe they had completely achieved their goals at the time and the reasons for the secondary targets appear dubious.

View attachment 72960​

Ok? They were incorrect. Though they also targeted a different facility than intended, as they thought the factory was for T-34s, not light tanks. As a result of the strike light tank production was mostly discontinued and a major production increase was stopped in its tracks. In terms of policy estimates like the above led to the Eisenhammer plan IOTL. Though for this POD none of the above really matters.

That seems charitable for 1943 levels of accuracy. The USAAF which had spent much more effort to get strategic bombing down to a science reported a peak accuracy of 70% in 1945 according to the USSBS. The Luftwaffe on the other hand had Speer advocating kamikaze raids against Soviet power plants "in view of the low bombing accuracy of Corps Meister." You cite Soviet sources about German target accuracy but claim they're lying about their recovery from the bombings, which is it?

What are you talking about? The USAAF did entirely different types of bombing from what we're talking about here, and their methods sucked very hard in 1943. For instance in 1943 only the master bombardier even aimed, the rest of the bomber group just dropped as soon as they saw him drop; that had changed by 1945 and results unsurprisingly improved. Remember by 1943 the USAAF was just starting strategic bombing of Germany for the first time and dealing with the best air defense system in the world at that time, so were still battle-babies. Germany had been conducting strategic bombing missions since 1939 and had experience on the ground of seeing what their results were and altering methods accordingly (France for one example, but hardly the only one by 1943). So their accuracy was considerably better than the USAAF (also had much lower threat levels from air defense in the USSR) and better than the above claim you make was.

In terms of Corps Meister, that was in reference to attempts to bomb London in 1944, which was against an insanely effective air defense system, completely the opposite of what existed in the USSR in 1943, which lacked even gun-laying radar for their AAA, which basically fired randomly at night. So I see you're engaging in strawmanning already.

The 'kamikaze' raids you talk about were in 1945 when the Luftwaffe was basically destroyed and irrelevant to the discussion.

Plus again the Fritz-X was available and accurate to within 100 feet, plenty for hitting small facilities.

First review on Amazon

View attachment 72961​

One review on Amazon that very well may not be accurate, not the website I linked. Also that has nothing to do with the subject of the book, so even if hypothetically that claim is true that means nothing about the quality of the book in terms of the topic addressed. You're getting pathetically desperate by throwing shit against the wall to see what sticks.

 

[boomhauer]

Hopefully this will help clear things up for some posters, screenshots from the book itself

 

[Japhy]

Hopefully this will help clear things up for some posters, screenshots from the book itselfView attachment 72981View attachment 72985View attachment 72986View attachment 72987

Citations are more important before I would weigh in on the value of one book standing against other studies.

 

[boomhauer]

Citations are more important before I would weigh in on the value of one book standing against other studies.

Are you asking for the citations from these pages?



For those wondering what TsANO means:
Central Archives of the Nizhny Novgorod Region

Chapter 11: Freedom In The Understanding Of Workers Of Russia (1918)

Read this article

www.europeanproceedings.com

 

[iainbhx]

One review on Amazon that very well may not be accurate, not the website I linked. Also that has nothing to do with the subject of the book, so even if hypothetically that claim is true that means nothing about the quality of the book in terms of the topic addressed. You're getting pathetically desperate by throwing shit against the wall to see what sticks.

MODERATOR POST: The mods note that you are fairly new here and therefore may not have taken note of the rules fully. Rule 1 is about civility, your last sentence quoted above is a breach of Rule 1 because of the lack of civility. Please take note for future posts.

 

[boomhauer]

Came across this in the conclusion section:

 

[boomhauer]

MODERATOR POST: The mods note that you are fairly new here and therefore may not have taken note of the rules fully. Rule 1 is about civility, your last sentence quoted above is a breach of Rule 1 because of the lack of civility. Please take note for future posts.

Noted and will be more careful with my phrasing in the future.

 

[Charles EP M.]

By the sound of it, I'd have to go with GWB and Incognitia: the Soviets are now dramatically more dependent on lend-lease and are making ever-desperate noises for a second front asap, the Allies are going to have a much harder time of it in Italy (and bombing Germany) but are still going to need to keep hitting western Europe regardless so the USSR has time to recover, and the RAF/USAAF will go bomb German power stations where they didn't IOTL. Even if they think it's going to be horrifically bloody, look what pulling it off has done to the Reds!

What's the likely outcome if the Allies bomb Germany's power network after all and find it worked better than thought?