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No Vichy France?

MAC161

Well-known member
Published by SLP
Location
WI, USA
Currently mulling PODs for a story that might become an "Alternate Elections" anthology pitch, and one that (at present, anyway) seems to work best involves no Vichy collaborationist regime being set up. The key elements:

* Somewhat more prolonged Battle of France, ending in full German occupation a la Case Anton.

* Darlan killed in a naval battle during final flight/collapse of French forces, in which much of the French Navy is destroyed/scuttled.

* Much greater numbers of Pied-Noir & "Indigene" troops therefore needed in (initially token) Free French resistance from African colonies, up to the (somewhat later than OTL) Liberation of Paris and the end of WWII.

Leaving aside these elements and their plausibility for the moment, what would have had to change for Germany to end up occupying the whole of France by, say, mid-July 1940 rather than November 1942? How does this affect German strategy/policy for the rest of the year? The demands of occupation, plus concerns of continued resistance from French North Africa, suggest that Sealion might be shelved, certainly for a while, but would it be abandoned altogether? Presuming de Gaulle manages to escape/rise to prominence in exile as in OTL, how much worse (or better) are his prospects, and those of the Free French? How might the occupation of all France in 1940 take shape--like that post-Case Anton, or a different form altogether? Who would likely oversee the occupation, whether they be German administrators or French puppets?

Broadest question of all: What's the likeliest course/outcome of the war in general without Vichy, from September 1940 onward?
 
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Vichy's revocation of citizenship rights from the Jews of Algeria was the final straw for many Algerian moderates who'd hoped that assimilation would be a workable path to achieving liberty and prosperity. More Indigene (particularly Harki) troops leads to a peculiar sort of politics in post-war france. The demand for rights will be stronger. Greater familiarity between French and Algerian also will simply mean more sympathy.

Is the French Government fleeing to Algiers here? Why does Germany not simply establish a Vichy-style puppet regime?


Germany would require hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers to occupy France at a minimum. This may delay Barbarossa. And if Barbarossa is delayed, that means the USSR has more time to build up defenses and get its military together. Stalin OTL expected a German invasion, but figured it would be in late 1942 or in 1943. And Germany was pressed to engage in Barbarossa when it did because they were running low on loot to pay Stalin for resources with. Stalin's counteroffer was that if Germany couldn't pay for materials with money, he'd be willing to accept a German recognition of Bulgaria and Turkey as within the Soviet sphere instead. The later Barbarossa would thus potentially involve having to attack Soviet bases in Bulgaria and Turkey...
 
I couldn't see the French fleet getting destroying during the evacuation to North Africa, the Germans were never exceptional at aerial attacks on shipping, and the Italians probably wouldn't risk their fleet to attack the evacuation convoys, at best at that time they had two Battleships plus another pair working up and a decent number of cruisers vs most of the French fleet and some British ships.

I suspect the Germans would create a French Puppet government in order to devolve some of the responsibility for policing and such to the French.
 
I couldn't see the French fleet getting destroying during the evacuation to North Africa, the Germans were never exceptional at aerial attacks on shipping, and the Italians probably wouldn't risk their fleet to attack the evacuation convoys, at best at that time they had two Battleships plus another pair working up and a decent number of cruisers vs most of the French fleet and some British ships.

I suspect the Germans would create a French Puppet government in order to devolve some of the responsibility for policing and such to the French.
For the sake of argument, if the French fleet (or at least the bulk of its Mediterranean-based vessels) were still in or near port at Toulon, for whatever AH reason, how much better would the odds be of the Germans wreaking significant damage? I could also see an OTL form of the scuttling at that port happening, if there was a plunge in morale leading to a decision to deny the fleet to Hitler, and perhaps an OTL Mers-el-Kebir kind of incident if Churchill feared the fleet might not choose exile in British ports (maybe this is how Darlan dies, in the point mentioned above?)

Presuming a puppet government gets set up after full occupation, who's likeliest to be the main figurehead(s)? Petain and Laval as in OTL, or maybe Doriot, Darnand, or another notable far-right military/political choice?
 
Leaving aside these elements and their plausibility for the moment, what would have had to change for Germany to end up occupying the whole of France by, say, mid-July 1940 rather than November 1942?

It depends what you're asking here, is France fighting on or are the Germans actively choosing to disregard any sort of armistice. If it's latter then it really would require a serious strategic misstep, Vichy was a massive win for the Germans in pretty much every way. It's difficult to find a rational reason as to why the Germans would pass on an armistice they can dictate the terms of if the French are offering one.

The demands of occupation, plus concerns of continued resistance from French North Africa, suggest that Sealion might be shelved, certainly for a while, but would it be abandoned altogether?

The Germans will still be looking for a way to knock the British out of the war so something like Sea Lion is likely to still be optioned even though it likely gets postponed and quietly cancelled as in OTL. The Med will likely be left to the Italians initially while the Germans fail to gain supremacy over the Channel.

Presuming de Gaulle manages to escape/rise to prominence in exile as in OTL, how much worse (or better) are his prospects, and those of the Free French?

Presuming there's an intact Third Republic evacuating to Algiers or elsewhere de Gaulle is likely to still be an important player but probably easier to sideline than in OTL. 'Free' France will have much larger teeth with the French Empire and the legimitacy of being the French government worldwide.

How might the occupation of all France in 1940 take shape--like that post-Case Anton, or a different form altogether? Who would likely oversee the occupation, whether they be German administrators or French puppets?

This is the aspect that's often glanced over in France Fights On scenarios and it's understandable why, the nature of the French occupation would be left much more to the whims of the Germans whose goals for France ranged from those like Otto Abetz who viewed France as playing a key role in Europe after German victory and those such as Himmler who wanted to dismember France entirely. It might seem as if the latter would hold greater sway here and that probably is the case but probably not to the extent their arguments will win out entirely. Instead you might see something akin to a mix and match of the way the Benelux countries were treated with existing civil servants being co-opted into a military administation with local fascists and separatists promoted but kept at arms length.

Broadest question of all: What's the likeliest course/outcome of the war in general without Vichy, from September 1940 onward?

Likely a quicker Allied victory; North Africa wrapped up sooner (the Allies may even hold Corsica although if the French fleet is destroyed that gets dicier), Churchill probably gets his Balkans front, Japan's initial successes are constrained without being able to use French Indochina as a staging ground. I'd wager Barbarossa probably still goes ahead in some form but may be more limited in scope initially and likely ends up being less successful with Britain and France sans metropole forcing Hitler to fight fires elsewhere.
 
This is the aspect that's often glanced over in France Fights On scenarios and it's understandable why, the nature of the French occupation would be left much more to the whims of the Germans whose goals for France ranged from those like Otto Abetz who viewed France as playing a key role in Europe after German victory and those such as Himmler who wanted to dismember France entirely. It might seem as if the latter would hold greater sway here and that probably is the case but probably not to the extent their arguments will win out entirely. Instead you might see something akin to a mix and match of the way the Benelux countries were treated with existing civil servants being co-opted into a military administation with local fascists and separatists promoted but kept at arms length.
SS Burgundy, during the war? Or the hig command decides the SS is way too busy during the war for such a project?

Germany would require [maybe one or two] hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers to occupy France at a minimum [maximum]. This may delay Barbarossa. And if Barbarossa is delayed, that means the USSR has more time to build up defenses and get its military together. Stalin OTL expected a German invasion, but figured it would be in late 1942 or in 1943. And Germany was pressed to engage in Barbarossa when it did because they were running low on loot to pay Stalin for resources with. Stalin's counteroffer was that if Germany couldn't pay for materials with money, he'd be willing to accept a German recognition of Bulgaria and Turkey as within the Soviet sphere instead. The later Barbarossa would thus potentially involve having to attack Soviet bases in Bulgaria and Turkey...

Mmmm. I am not hitting the 'I believe' button on delayed Barbarossa, and thus, everything after it, as interesting as it is. Also, on Nazi-Soviet trade, direct occupation means some more troops for occupation itself and for the operations to get them in place in the south in the first place, and some more local destruction, but it also likely means even more thorough looting of all France than Vichy would perform on its own sector.
 
Broadest question of all: What's the likeliest course/outcome of the war in general without Vichy, from September 1940 onward?

Definitely a net German benefit. For one, to cite from Chapter 3 of Peter Lieberman's Does Conquest Pay:

Germany immediately began recruiting West European labor, especially skilled workers. By the end of 1940, 220,000 civilians from the western occupied nations were working in Germany; a year later, the number had grown to almost 300,000. The flow of volunteers dwindled in 1942, after the unemployment that had been caused by the invasion dried up, despite policies intended to free up additional labor, such as withholding unemployment benefits, lengthening the work week, and closing down "unessential" enterprises.40 Germany then began deporting workers for forced labor in German factories. The German foreign labor czar, Fritz Sauckel, began combing through Dutch and Belgian factories, without indigenous cooperation, although the Dutch secretary-general for social affairs authorized the release of labor records. In France, Pétain's prime minister Pierre Laval managed to put off Sauckel until February 1943, when he instructed French labor agencies to provide employment data and personnel to the German recruiters and imposed sanctions against conscription evaders. The total foreign labor force in Germany increased from 1.2 million in 1940 to 7.1 million—or a fifth of the total labor force—in 1944. Only a third of these were West Europeans in 1943, but they represented a sizable proportion of their domestic labor forces (see table 3-4).​

In January to February of 1943, the Germans brought from France 125,000 specialist workers, for further context on a monthly basis. Further:

The indigenous administrations of every occupied country collaborated fully with German financial depredations. French negotiators fretted that the demanded "occupation costs" payments would enable the Germans "to buy the whole of France," but after a few protests they caved in. Vichy unilaterally lowered its payments from 400 to 300 million francs per day in May 1941. But German authorities countered by making greater use of the clearing mechanism and, in November 1942, they forced Vichy to increase its daily payments to 500 million francs. Belgium and the Netherlands failed to offer even this degree of resistance, although their obligations too were unilaterally increased to cover higher German expenditures. By agreeing to German demands for occupation costs and clearing arrangements, collaborating administrations effectively put their finance ministries, central banks, and taxation systems at Germany's service. Thus France and the other occupied economies were compelled to become Germany's economic allies.​

What could be possible effects of "utilizing" France sooner and earlier? To quote from Germany in the Second World War, Volume 4:

The consequences of that decision, needless to say, also affected the army's main programmes, even though they were included in the top priority class. Thus, tank production alone was short of over 6,000 skilled workers in January 1941 so that Todt—who was focusing increasingly on that sector because ammunition manufacture, his real responsibility, was running at only half speed—requested from Hitler the provision of additional labour. This was to be released from the rest of armaments production for the army, as well as from the army's personnel planning. Hitler approved Todt's request, and although Goring thereupon asked for additional manpower for the Luftwaffe, which Hitler granted, Halder nevertheless appeared to be proceeding from the assumption that munitions for the army would enjoy priority until the summer of 1941, with the Luftwaffe not being 'served' until after that date.​

So, more tanks, industrial labor and money. What else?

The Germans also preyed on West European industrial infrastructure, carting home industrial, transport, and agricultural equipment of all kinds. France, for example, was stripped of over half of its railway wagons, a fifth of its locomotives, and over a third of its buses and trucks. French wagons and locomotives increased the German supply by 45 percent and 15 percent, respectively, helping the German Railway to overcome a severe transportation crisis in the winter of 1941–42 as supply lines stretched deep into Russia. But while pillaging gained Germany badly needed goods, it hampered production in the occupied territories, much of which was going to Germany anyway. Whether from vindictiveness, overconfidence, internal German rivalries, or sheer greed, excessive pillaging stripped occupied Europe of equipment that would have been more useful there than in Germany.​

So, Germany would avoid the munitions shortfall and transport crisis of 1941-1942, and probably have several additional Panzer divisions on hand for Barbarossa. Given how close the Soviet state was to collapse in that timeframe, it's likely decisive.
 
It depends what you're asking here, is France fighting on or are the Germans actively choosing to disregard any sort of armistice. If it's latter then it really would require a serious strategic misstep, Vichy was a massive win for the Germans in pretty much every way. It's difficult to find a rational reason as to why the Germans would pass on an armistice they can dictate the terms of if the French are offering one.



The Germans will still be looking for a way to knock the British out of the war so something like Sea Lion is likely to still be optioned even though it likely gets postponed and quietly cancelled as in OTL. The Med will likely be left to the Italians initially while the Germans fail to gain supremacy over the Channel.



Presuming there's an intact Third Republic evacuating to Algiers or elsewhere de Gaulle is likely to still be an important player but probably easier to sideline than in OTL. 'Free' France will have much larger teeth with the French Empire and the legimitacy of being the French government worldwide.



This is the aspect that's often glanced over in France Fights On scenarios and it's understandable why, the nature of the French occupation would be left much more to the whims of the Germans whose goals for France ranged from those like Otto Abetz who viewed France as playing a key role in Europe after German victory and those such as Himmler who wanted to dismember France entirely. It might seem as if the latter would hold greater sway here and that probably is the case but probably not to the extent their arguments will win out entirely. Instead you might see something akin to a mix and match of the way the Benelux countries were treated with existing civil servants being co-opted into a military administation with local fascists and separatists promoted but kept at arms length.



Likely a quicker Allied victory; North Africa wrapped up sooner (the Allies may even hold Corsica although if the French fleet is destroyed that gets dicier), Churchill probably gets his Balkans front, Japan's initial successes are constrained without being able to use French Indochina as a staging ground. I'd wager Barbarossa probably still goes ahead in some form but may be more limited in scope initially and likely ends up being less successful with Britain and France sans metropole forcing Hitler to fight fires elsewhere.
For the POD, I'm leaning more towards the French fighting on a little longer, say to mid-July at the latest; maybe enough of Reynaud's gov't backs him, so he's encouraged to continue the war up to that point? This leads to official German occupation of the whole of France a la 1942; a puppet government is probably still established after Reynaud's finally collapses, but in Paris rather than Vichy, and is effectively limited to mainland France, Corsica and perhaps Indochina (officially, although I think the Japanese might be encouraged to "request bases" there earlier than OTL), with maybe post-Case Anton levels of real authority. Most of its 1940 military forces would be either disbanded or, in the case of conservatives/right-wingers, formed into "volunteer" divisions like the LVF or "internal security" units like the Milice, much-expanded compared to OTL.

There might not be a Third Republic gov't remnant in Algiers in the story, but yes, Free France would have much clearer legitimacy, esp. if de Gaulle manages to get set up there. A key story point, as noted in another post, would be that given the losses in a longer conflict, the Free French have to recruit much more heavily from the "Indigene" populations across the empire, giving them a far greater voice in postwar French politics, esp. with regards to the "French Union" idea.

If the Allies (still sans the U.S. at this point) are fighting from French North Africa, how would the campaigns there be "wrapped up sooner"? I have doubts even Mussolini would greenlight the OTL invasion of Egypt with the British sure to be building up for/launching assaults from Tunisia or Algeria, but standing on the defensive in Libya likely wouldn't turn out any better. I could see a form of Operation 25 still happening as a way for Hitler to shore up Axis dominance in the Balkans and maybe appease Italian claims in Yugoslavia, but would an invasion of Greece still be in the cards (esp. given German concerns about ATL British dominance in the Mediterranean)? What would a "more limited in scope" Barbarossa entail?
 
Definitely a net German benefit. For one, to cite from Chapter 3 of Peter Lieberman's Does Conquest Pay:

Germany immediately began recruiting West European labor, especially skilled workers. By the end of 1940, 220,000 civilians from the western occupied nations were working in Germany; a year later, the number had grown to almost 300,000. The flow of volunteers dwindled in 1942, after the unemployment that had been caused by the invasion dried up, despite policies intended to free up additional labor, such as withholding unemployment benefits, lengthening the work week, and closing down "unessential" enterprises.40 Germany then began deporting workers for forced labor in German factories. The German foreign labor czar, Fritz Sauckel, began combing through Dutch and Belgian factories, without indigenous cooperation, although the Dutch secretary-general for social affairs authorized the release of labor records. In France, Pétain's prime minister Pierre Laval managed to put off Sauckel until February 1943, when he instructed French labor agencies to provide employment data and personnel to the German recruiters and imposed sanctions against conscription evaders. The total foreign labor force in Germany increased from 1.2 million in 1940 to 7.1 million—or a fifth of the total labor force—in 1944. Only a third of these were West Europeans in 1943, but they represented a sizable proportion of their domestic labor forces (see table 3-4).​

In January to February of 1943, the Germans brought from France 125,000 specialist workers, for further context on a monthly basis. Further:

The indigenous administrations of every occupied country collaborated fully with German financial depredations. French negotiators fretted that the demanded "occupation costs" payments would enable the Germans "to buy the whole of France," but after a few protests they caved in. Vichy unilaterally lowered its payments from 400 to 300 million francs per day in May 1941. But German authorities countered by making greater use of the clearing mechanism and, in November 1942, they forced Vichy to increase its daily payments to 500 million francs. Belgium and the Netherlands failed to offer even this degree of resistance, although their obligations too were unilaterally increased to cover higher German expenditures. By agreeing to German demands for occupation costs and clearing arrangements, collaborating administrations effectively put their finance ministries, central banks, and taxation systems at Germany's service. Thus France and the other occupied economies were compelled to become Germany's economic allies.​

What could be possible effects of "utilizing" France sooner and earlier? To quote from Germany in the Second World War, Volume 4:

The consequences of that decision, needless to say, also affected the army's main programmes, even though they were included in the top priority class. Thus, tank production alone was short of over 6,000 skilled workers in January 1941 so that Todt—who was focusing increasingly on that sector because ammunition manufacture, his real responsibility, was running at only half speed—requested from Hitler the provision of additional labour. This was to be released from the rest of armaments production for the army, as well as from the army's personnel planning. Hitler approved Todt's request, and although Goring thereupon asked for additional manpower for the Luftwaffe, which Hitler granted, Halder nevertheless appeared to be proceeding from the assumption that munitions for the army would enjoy priority until the summer of 1941, with the Luftwaffe not being 'served' until after that date.​

So, more tanks, industrial labor and money. What else?

The Germans also preyed on West European industrial infrastructure, carting home industrial, transport, and agricultural equipment of all kinds. France, for example, was stripped of over half of its railway wagons, a fifth of its locomotives, and over a third of its buses and trucks. French wagons and locomotives increased the German supply by 45 percent and 15 percent, respectively, helping the German Railway to overcome a severe transportation crisis in the winter of 1941–42 as supply lines stretched deep into Russia. But while pillaging gained Germany badly needed goods, it hampered production in the occupied territories, much of which was going to Germany anyway. Whether from vindictiveness, overconfidence, internal German rivalries, or sheer greed, excessive pillaging stripped occupied Europe of equipment that would have been more useful there than in Germany.​

So, Germany would avoid the munitions shortfall and transport crisis of 1941-1942, and probably have several additional Panzer divisions on hand for Barbarossa. Given how close the Soviet state was to collapse in that timeframe, it's likely decisive.
Um, didja read the whole quote you added? It says that Germany already took so much from occupied Europe that they were worse off overall, if they take even more from France how is that going to help?
 
Um, didja read the whole quote you added? It says that Germany already took so much from occupied Europe that they were worse off overall, if they take even more from France how is that going to help?

I did, the Germans didn't begin to ransack France for those resources until after the Winter Crisis of 1941-1942, by which point the opportunity to take Moscow had passed. If they use those same resources in 1941, they will have greater logistics capacity and thus offensive power during Barbarossa itself. Basically, all you're doing is moving up the timeframe of the usage of these resources about six months to a year sooner. So, instead of being available for the Summer 1942 campaign, they're available in the Summer of 1941 when the Soviets are less prepared.

Outside of that, the use of French workers would enable much greater German munitions and armaments production in 1940-1941 window too, so probably a net of more logistics from that as well.
 
Definitely a net German benefit. For one, to cite from Chapter 3 of Peter Lieberman's Does Conquest Pay:

Germany immediately began recruiting West European labor, especially skilled workers. By the end of 1940, 220,000 civilians from the western occupied nations were working in Germany; a year later, the number had grown to almost 300,000. The flow of volunteers dwindled in 1942, after the unemployment that had been caused by the invasion dried up, despite policies intended to free up additional labor, such as withholding unemployment benefits, lengthening the work week, and closing down "unessential" enterprises.40 Germany then began deporting workers for forced labor in German factories. The German foreign labor czar, Fritz Sauckel, began combing through Dutch and Belgian factories, without indigenous cooperation, although the Dutch secretary-general for social affairs authorized the release of labor records. In France, Pétain's prime minister Pierre Laval managed to put off Sauckel until February 1943, when he instructed French labor agencies to provide employment data and personnel to the German recruiters and imposed sanctions against conscription evaders. The total foreign labor force in Germany increased from 1.2 million in 1940 to 7.1 million—or a fifth of the total labor force—in 1944. Only a third of these were West Europeans in 1943, but they represented a sizable proportion of their domestic labor forces (see table 3-4).​

In January to February of 1943, the Germans brought from France 125,000 specialist workers, for further context on a monthly basis. Further:

The indigenous administrations of every occupied country collaborated fully with German financial depredations. French negotiators fretted that the demanded "occupation costs" payments would enable the Germans "to buy the whole of France," but after a few protests they caved in. Vichy unilaterally lowered its payments from 400 to 300 million francs per day in May 1941. But German authorities countered by making greater use of the clearing mechanism and, in November 1942, they forced Vichy to increase its daily payments to 500 million francs. Belgium and the Netherlands failed to offer even this degree of resistance, although their obligations too were unilaterally increased to cover higher German expenditures. By agreeing to German demands for occupation costs and clearing arrangements, collaborating administrations effectively put their finance ministries, central banks, and taxation systems at Germany's service. Thus France and the other occupied economies were compelled to become Germany's economic allies.​

What could be possible effects of "utilizing" France sooner and earlier? To quote from Germany in the Second World War, Volume 4:

The consequences of that decision, needless to say, also affected the army's main programmes, even though they were included in the top priority class. Thus, tank production alone was short of over 6,000 skilled workers in January 1941 so that Todt—who was focusing increasingly on that sector because ammunition manufacture, his real responsibility, was running at only half speed—requested from Hitler the provision of additional labour. This was to be released from the rest of armaments production for the army, as well as from the army's personnel planning. Hitler approved Todt's request, and although Goring thereupon asked for additional manpower for the Luftwaffe, which Hitler granted, Halder nevertheless appeared to be proceeding from the assumption that munitions for the army would enjoy priority until the summer of 1941, with the Luftwaffe not being 'served' until after that date.​

So, more tanks, industrial labor and money. What else?

The Germans also preyed on West European industrial infrastructure, carting home industrial, transport, and agricultural equipment of all kinds. France, for example, was stripped of over half of its railway wagons, a fifth of its locomotives, and over a third of its buses and trucks. French wagons and locomotives increased the German supply by 45 percent and 15 percent, respectively, helping the German Railway to overcome a severe transportation crisis in the winter of 1941–42 as supply lines stretched deep into Russia. But while pillaging gained Germany badly needed goods, it hampered production in the occupied territories, much of which was going to Germany anyway. Whether from vindictiveness, overconfidence, internal German rivalries, or sheer greed, excessive pillaging stripped occupied Europe of equipment that would have been more useful there than in Germany.​

So, Germany would avoid the munitions shortfall and transport crisis of 1941-1942, and probably have several additional Panzer divisions on hand for Barbarossa. Given how close the Soviet state was to collapse in that timeframe, it's likely decisive.
Yeah, but the Heer has had to fight the French all the way to Marseille, on increasingly stretched supply lines, whilst the figleaf of legitmacy that the Vichy Regime offered isn't there so more German forces (which would have otherwise been sent to Russia OTL) will be required to garrison France.
 
Yeah, but the Heer has had to fight the French all the way to Marseille, on increasingly stretched supply lines, whilst the figleaf of legitmacy that the Vichy Regime offered isn't there so more German forces (which would have otherwise been sent to Russia OTL) will be required to garrison France.

The entire German garrison in France was just 40,000 men in the Spring of 1942. In January to February of 1943, the Germans brought from France 125,000 specialist workers on a monthly basis. Thus, this is still a net manpower gain for the Germans.
 
It's not absolutely clear who sank the French Navy, because it certainly won't be the Kriegsmarine.
I'm thinking of changing Darlan's death to an accident amidst the chaos (plane crash on the way to Algiers, say) or a lucky airstrike on whichever ship he's aboard. The French Navy in the Mediterranean, meanwhile, gets hit harder by the Luftwaffe and Regio Aeronautica in a longer Battle of France; some of the smaller/faster ships escape to North Africa or British ports, but continuous air attacks mean the heavier vessels not already damaged/destroyed by these are deliberately scuttled to deny them to the Axis. I suspect the Atlantic section of the Navy, in this scenario, would end up joining the ATL Free French and being a significant boost to the Allies in the Channel and North Sea, maybe further dampening enthusiasm/planning for Sealion. It'd be interesting, too (if maybe not quite as plausible), if this leads to the Bearn being used in actual combat on the Free French side, if only briefly and in limited ways.
 
For the POD, I'm leaning more towards the French fighting on a little longer, say to mid-July at the latest; maybe enough of Reynaud's gov't backs him, so he's encouraged to continue the war up to that point?

I could see Reynaud marginalising the defeatists and successfullly pressing for the war to continue but I'm not sure he would be able to get backing for a doomed last stand on the metropole and leaving the Germans to pick up the pieces when they can safely continue the struggle overseas. That would be too close to the sort of caricature of the Third Republic that was spun at Riom.

There might not be a Third Republic gov't remnant in Algiers in the story, but yes, Free France would have much clearer legitimacy, esp. if de Gaulle manages to get set up there. A key story point, as noted in another post, would be that given the losses in a longer conflict, the Free French have to recruit much more heavily from the "Indigene" populations across the empire, giving them a far greater voice in postwar French politics, esp. with regards to the "French Union" idea.

The Free French forces were majority composed of "Indigene" IOTL, by the time of the liberation of Paris this caused enough alarm between de Gaulle and the WAllies (who feared the implications of the French capital being liberated by Africans) to instead opt for the city to be liberated by those most patriotic of Frenchmen, Spanish Republicans. If Free France has much clearer legitimacy their forces are likely to be more white not less even with attrition taking its toll, the difficulty is in avoiding the whitewashing of the African contribution that is still very likely to happen.

If the Allies (still sans the U.S. at this point) are fighting from French North Africa, how would the campaigns there be "wrapped up sooner"? I have doubts even Mussolini would greenlight the OTL invasion of Egypt with the British sure to be building up for/launching assaults from Tunisia or Algeria, but standing on the defensive in Libya likely wouldn't turn out any better.

Yes, wrapped up sooner as in the Italians are kicked out of North Africa sooner.

What would a "more limited in scope" Barbarossa entail?

It depends but if the Heer is having to occupy southern France and cover the French Med, protect Italy and potentially maintain a front in the Balkans then the original Barbarossa plan (overambitious as it already was) might be reduced in its objectives. The strategic aim will likely remain overly optimistic, the USSR being a rotten edifice and all that but what is required to bring about its destruction might get moved west of the OTL A-A Line.
 
The French Navy in the Mediterranean, meanwhile, gets hit harder by the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica in a longer Battle of France; some of the smaller/faster ships escape to North Africa or British ports, but continuous air attacks mean the heavier vessels not already damaged/destroyed by these are deliberately scuttled to deny them to the Axis.
The Treaty of Versailles & inter-service rivalry meant that neither the Kriegsmarine or the Luftwaffe invested seriously in torpedo-bombers or their ordnance. This meant that in 1939 Germany had only small numbers of torpedo-bombers, half of which were obsolescent biplanes, armed with unreliable and outdated torpedos.

In 1940 the Germans began buying the excellent Fiume torpedo from Italy, but the Italians could only supply a limited number (since they needed them for their own aircraft).

Also, the He-115 torpedo bomber was slow and vulnerable, so it was not until early 1942, when He-111 and Ju-88 bombers were modified to carry torpedos and crews trained to use them, that the Luftwaffe was able to inflict serious losses on Allied shipping.

So I'm not sure how the Luftwaffe would do this, except by getting lucky time and time again. The number of Royal Navy ships sunk by the Luftwaffe between Sept 1939-June 1941 was zero.

Benito's fleet-in-being would soon become a fleet-in-not-existing if it left port to attack the Royal Navy and Marine Nationale, and neither the French nor the British navies would want to scuttle ships that had done this. They'd just return to Mers-el-Kebir for repairs.
 
The Treaty of Versailles & inter-service rivalry meant that neither the Kriegsmarine or the Luftwaffe invested seriously in torpedo-bombers or their ordnance. This meant that in 1939 Germany had only small numbers of torpedo-bombers, half of which were obsolescent biplanes, armed with unreliable and outdated torpedos.

In 1940 the Germans began buying the excellent Fiume torpedo from Italy, but the Italians could only supply a limited number (since they needed them for their own aircraft).

Also, the He-115 torpedo bomber was slow and vulnerable, so it was not until early 1942, when He-111 and Ju-88 bombers were modified to carry torpedos and crews trained to use them, that the Luftwaffe was able to inflict serious losses on Allied shipping.

So I'm not sure how the Luftwaffe would do this, except by getting lucky time and time again. The number of Royal Navy ships sunk by the Luftwaffe between Sept 1939-June 1941 was zero.

Benito's fleet-in-being would soon become a fleet-in-not-existing if it left port to attack the Royal Navy and Marine Nationale, and neither the French nor the British navies would want to scuttle ships that had done this. They'd just return to Mers-el-Kebir for repairs.
I could see Reynaud marginalising the defeatists and successfullly pressing for the war to continue but I'm not sure he would be able to get backing for a doomed last stand on the metropole and leaving the Germans to pick up the pieces when they can safely continue the struggle overseas. That would be too close to the sort of caricature of the Third Republic that was spun at Riom.



The Free French forces were majority composed of "Indigene" IOTL, by the time of the liberation of Paris this caused enough alarm between de Gaulle and the WAllies (who feared the implications of the French capital being liberated by Africans) to instead opt for the city to be liberated by those most patriotic of Frenchmen, Spanish Republicans. If Free France has much clearer legitimacy their forces are likely to be more white not less even with attrition taking its toll, the difficulty is in avoiding the whitewashing of the African contribution that is still very likely to happen.



Yes, wrapped up sooner as in the Italians are kicked out of North Africa sooner.



It depends but if the Heer is having to occupy southern France and cover the French Med, protect Italy and potentially maintain a front in the Balkans then the original Barbarossa plan (overambitious as it already was) might be reduced in its objectives. The strategic aim will likely remain overly optimistic, the USSR being a rotten edifice and all that but what is required to bring about its destruction might get moved west of the OTL A-A Line.
Yeah, seems the PODs in mind at the start of the thread need a lot of sixes being rolled, making them unworkable even for soft AH. Ah, well.

The whitewashing of the Liberation would definitely be a bigger, sorer issue in the "Alternate Elections" story I have in mind. To go on a tangent: Basically, the AH war goes so badly for France (hence the "prolonged German invasion/no Vichy" idea) that the "Indigene" forces can't be denied a central, prominent role in this event and the war in general. Because of this, a real French Union, or at best federalized empire, is seen as the only way to maintain the French empire postwar while appeasing (or trying to) the much-empowered colonies--an effort that's showing serious cracks by the 1960s period of the story. Suggestions welcome on other PODs that might plausibly lead to this scenario!
 
Yeah, seems the PODs in mind at the start of the thread need a lot of sixes being rolled, making them unworkable even for soft AH. Ah, well.

The whitewashing of the Liberation would definitely be a bigger, sorer issue in the "Alternate Elections" story I have in mind. To go on a tangent: Basically, the AH war goes so badly for France (hence the "prolonged German invasion/no Vichy" idea) that the "Indigene" forces can't be denied a central, prominent role in this event and the war in general. Because of this, a real French Union, or at best federalized empire, is seen as the only way to maintain the French empire postwar while appeasing (or trying to) the much-empowered colonies--an effort that's showing serious cracks by the 1960s period of the story. Suggestions welcome on other PODs that might plausibly lead to this scenario!

I wouldn't be disheartened. Soft AH is more about painting a picture than creating a scientific formula, the POD is important but it's more about getting a setting you're comfortable in writing about. The POD for Fatherland gets all of three sentences devoted to it, SS-GB doesn't even bother with that.

One thing I would say is that if you're looking at a French Empire facing an existential crisis, @Arthur_Phuxache's mention of a Franco-British Union might be an idea. It offers a similar POD, avoids Vichy, and you could have it ending once the war's over with a newly independent and liberated metropolitan France looking to find it's place in the world once more. You could see an enduring Tripartisme in such a scenario, where a French Union might become a bit more of a viable political aim, at least in the metropole.
 
I wouldn't be disheartened. Soft AH is more about painting a picture than creating a scientific formula, the POD is important but it's more about getting a setting you're comfortable in writing about. The POD for Fatherland gets all of three sentences devoted to it, SS-GB doesn't even bother with that.

Some* Nazi victory books do, and you wish they hadn't, tbf.

@Arthur_Phuxache's mention of a Franco-British Union might be an idea. It offers a similar POD, avoids Vichy, and you could have it ending once the war's over with a newly independent and liberated metropolitan France looking to find it's place in the world once more.

...or maybe it's just a ruse to steal France's colonies and re-establish the Angevin empire...




* George Galloway's Queensway
 
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