No 1895 Tripartite Intervention

[Jackson Lennock]

In the Sino-Japanese War, Japan gained Southern Manchuria. Russia, joined by Germany and France, came in and forced Japan to give it back in exchange for a larger indemnity. Russia proceeded to take Port Arthur for itself.

What if there'd been no Tripartite Intervention? Russia could still secure the rest of Manchuria for itself, and have worthwhile ports at Huludao and Qinhuangdao.

It's possible that Japan would want more of Manchuria down the line, but that's hardly inevitable. Japan prior to the Russo-Japanese War was willing to accept a compromise of Korea for Japan and Manchuria for Russia. Without two stolen victories (1895 and not gaining North Sakhalin in 1905) Japan might not be as aggressive or revanchist.

 

[raharris1973]

In the Sino-Japanese War, Japan gained Southern Manchuria. Russia, joined by Germany and France, came in and forced Japan to give it back in exchange for a larger indemnity. Russia proceeded to take Port Arthur for itself.

What if there'd been no Tripartite Intervention? Russia could still secure the rest of Manchuria for itself, and have worthwhile ports at Huludao and Qinhuangdao.

It's possible that Japan would want more of Manchuria down the line, but that's hardly inevitable. Japan prior to the Russo-Japanese War was willing to accept a compromise of Korea for Japan and Manchuria for Russia. Without two stolen victories (1895 and not gaining North Sakhalin in 1905) Japan might not be as aggressive or revanchist.


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This is a wonderful question - here is a bare bones, minimal assumptions answer -

Japan is proud of its victory, and develops its dominance over Korea and the Liaodong peninsula faster

Japan gets less of an indemnity from China (and China loses a little less from its Treasury and takes out somewhat fewer loans), slightly curtailing Japanese fleet/army spending, giving China marginally more fiscal options

Japan has no particular reason to be angry with Russia, Germany or France.

Japan has no particular reason to tie itself to an exclusive alliance with one power, like Britain, so a a unilateral policy, but seeking positive relations with all powers wherever possible, seems a good way to go.

Japan is probably content with developing and integrating its new imperial sphere over the the next decade and a half, and does not sweat Russia's increased interest in a north Manchuria railroad (Chinese Eastern railway) spur line off the Trans-Siberian from Chita, Siberia leading to Vladivostock.

It is tempting to say that without the Triple Intervention, and the consecutive German, Russian, French, and British grabs for ports at Qingdao, Port Arthur, Guangzhouwan/Ft. Bayard, and Wei hai wei and Hong Kong new territories, there is not that latter OTL late 1890s feeding frenzy for new Chinese treaty ports and leased territories. However, the Triple Intervention may not have been a necessary precursor for it. The only necessary precursor might have been Japan proving China was a paper tiger, even weaker than everyone thought. So, all those ports and leases might be grabbed by those powers, on historical schedule, with the only difference being that Japan, not Russia gets the Port Arthur/Dairen port on the Liaotung peninsula area. Russia gets its compensation elsewhere, in northern Manchuria, through rail rights of way.

Theoretically Japan could try to encourage China to resist these subsequent European demands by Germany and others, but I doubt they would overpromise support to the Chinese or invest too much effort, or that the Chinese would want to become overdependent on the Japanese.

Japan does not sweat the Spanish-American war, American victory, and takeover of the Philippines.

Assuming all the above, anti-foreignism and the Boxer rebellion should still explode circa 1900, and Japan should probably participate with the Europeans in the 8 nation alliance.

Russian naval development in the Pacific, such as it is, concentrates in Vladivostock.

I assume the same factors restraining the Europeans, especially Russians, from Triple Intervention, also restrain the Russians from big moves in Korea.

Therefore, Korea may be ripe for Japanese annexation around 1902 or so, without an interlude of playing off the Russians as a counter-balance.

Japan doesn't have a reason to choose sides in European alliances.

Without Russian defeat and revolution in 1904-1905 Russia is a more confident power and seen as more powerful. This likely leads its tensions with Austria-Hungary to escalate to a Europe-wide war by 1908, after the Young Turk revolution (unless that is butterflied away) calls Bosnia's permanent sovereignty (de jure Ottoman, de facto Austian) into question.

There is a decent chance that in this war, Russia backs Serbia, Germany backs Austria, and France backs Russia. However, because of Britain perceiving Russia as a greater threat, Britain intervenes on the side of Germany & Austria, or is a neutral, leaning in their direction.

If that is the case, the result should be a Franco-Russian defeat within about two years.

Japan would not have a stake in the war at first, but after Russia faces defeat and revolution, it would probably find the opportunity to expand in a power vacuum left in northern Manchuria and the Russian Far East an irresistible opportunity. Less likely, but possible, it could do the same in French Indochina. But in French Indochina, the British may get to move first.

On the other hand, there is a chance that German planning by this point forces Germany to attack west first, through Belgium, and this genuinely overrides and drives and determines British policy, and Britain sides with France and Russia against Germany. In that case the Entente has the advantage, and Japan again has no stake in the war and starts it off neutral.

The Entente could win early, with no bad consequences for Russia, if the tech balance in artillery at this moment is such that the French have a great advantage on the western front, and this is compunded by blockade limiting German access to nitrates over time.

However, during the whole war, the untested paper armies of Russia are at danger of collapse and the country in danger of revolution.

*If* Germany survives long enough, and *if* Germany has working U-Boat technology to deploy against the blockading British, Germany will use it, eventually in an unlimited fashion. This could well prompt the USA under the Taft Administration to go to war. Once it sets that precedent, other countries with a lot of merchant shipping that may be victimized may declare war on Germany (much like several Latin American states in OTL), and if "everybody's doing it" this may include Japan. Micronesia and Tsingtao probably would be already occupied by the Allies at this point, so no loot. But under the decent assumption of Russian Revolution and civil war, even in Allied victory, Japan will likely expand its sphere of influence on mainland northeast Asia.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Russia will still seek to dominate Northern Manchuria for purposes of building a shorter track of railroad, and will still have some interest in interfering in Outer Mongolia and Northern Xinjiang at least. That alone might trigger a scramble for China. Germany also would have a strong desire for an Asian port like Qingdao, although it is possible that Germany just tries harder for the Philippines.

Japan had an interest in supporting an independent Philippines OTL (albeit one that it assumed would be in the Japanese orbit). But I doubt they'd be so interested as to pick a fight with the US over it. I'm not sure why the Japanese would feel any less threatened by a US acquisition of the archipelago. Perhaps they'd be less offended to see the United States acquire the territory given that they themselves would not have been recently robbed of a gain for themselves (unjustly, in their minds, and because of racial reasons) but the prospect of an American military threat would be no less. Maybe (if this is what you are suggesting) that absent the tripartite intervention, Japan would not feel that the established powers (never mind that the US was not quite an established power yet) were out to get Japan; and so Japan would not feel threatened by the US moving in close to it.

I suspect Russia would be uncomfortable with Vladivostok being so close to Japanese Korea. Maybe they negotiate an exchange of northeast Korea for something else (southern Sakhalin or a bigger slice of Southern Manchuria?).

Russia without the humbling of 1904-1905 and the associated opportunity to get its act together after realizing it needs to fix up its military would likely be prone to a walloping in 1908. My guess is any war that kicks off that year would be a comparably short one. The Ottomans might side with the anti-Russian forces in order to regain Kars and Batumi. If a war breaks out, Italy might be better able to insist on recompense from Austria for tolerating the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, as the Triple Alliance required.

Japan may get opportunistic in such a conflict, but on whose side? I suppose Germany's territories would be the more easily acquired.

 

[raharris1973]

Russia will still seek to dominate Northern Manchuria for purposes of building a shorter track of railroad, and will still have some interest in interfering in Outer Mongolia and Northern Xinjiang at least. That alone might trigger a scramble for China. Germany also would have a strong desire for an Asian port like Qingdao, although it is possible that Germany just tries harder for the Philippines.

Agreed absolutely on Russia. Germany can stick its nose in anywhere on the China coast, it had been surveying multiple sites, Qingdao, Zhoushan island, Amoy, for a decade - to the Philippines. OTL's choice is conceivable and I ran with it for simplicity.

Japan had an interest in supporting an independent Philippines OTL (albeit one that it assumed would be in the Japanese orbit). But I doubt they'd be so interested as to pick a fight with the US over it. I'm not sure why the Japanese would feel any less threatened by a US acquisition of the archipelago. Perhaps they'd be less offended to see the United States acquire the territory given that they themselves would not have been recently robbed of a gain for themselves (unjustly, in their minds, and because of racial reasons) but the prospect of an American military threat would be no less. Maybe (if this is what you are suggesting) that absent the tripartite intervention, Japan would not feel that the established powers (never mind that the US was not quite an established power yet) were out to get Japan; and so Japan would not feel threatened by the US moving in close to it.

I agree 100% - I just did not articulate the nuances so well as you did!

I suspect Russia would be uncomfortable with Vladivostok being so close to Japanese Korea. Maybe they negotiate an exchange of northeast Korea for something else (southern Sakhalin or a bigger slice of Southern Manchuria?).

Possibly, but it might take more diplomatic creativity and flexibility than the two sides can muster. If anybody postures too hard publicly, - well then we could find our way back to a Russo-Japanese war.

Russia without the humbling of 1904-1905 and the associated opportunity to get its act together after realizing it needs to fix up its military would likely be prone to a walloping in 1908. My guess is any war that kicks off that year would be a comparably short one. The Ottomans might side with the anti-Russian forces in order to regain Kars and Batumi.

I could see that - Russia is ripe for a surprisingly one-sided and definitive beating. But, it is not the only factor in a Europe-wide struggle. I know I went overboard speculating the different directions it could go, but the specific technical, numerical, doctrinal, and tactical balance or imbalance between France and Germany also matters a lot, as does any role Britain plays.

If a war breaks out, Italy might be better able to insist on recompense from Austria for tolerating the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, as the Triple Alliance required.

Possibly, either in advance of fighting or at its beginning, because Austria doesn't know how weak Russia will be, or during it, because there is a hot war on, and Italy could be in a position to threaten to intervene in a hostile manner, perhaps with more credibility, not having gotten tired out in the sands of Libya.

Japan may get opportunistic in such a conflict, but on whose side? I suppose Germany's territories would be the more easily acquired.

Yes, it could happen I suppose. Germany's possessions are smaller, and closer, especially on the Asian mainland. But the Japanese are going to start of with a perception of the Germans as a healthy world power in general. Plus, if things in Europe shake out so that Britain ends up allied *with* Germany instead of against her, Japan may judge anti-German action far too risky.

 

[raharris1973]

Without two stolen victories (1895 and not gaining North Sakhalin in 1905) Japan might not be as aggressive or revanchist.

Maybe Japan is not revanchist, and I outlined above in posts #2 and #4 how Japan could proceed as a not particularly revanchist, and nor particularly reckless, but still decidedly imperial expansionist state.

But another possible effect of the absence of a Triple Intervention is a Japan that careens into further conflicts rather quickly, not having been been taught a harsh lesson in its own limitations.

For example, Japan is all proud and happy about its gains in Korea, southern Manchuria and Taiwan, and begins empire-building there, and collects its indemnity from China. None of the powers, whatever minor verbal criticism may weapon, make any kind oof serious fuss, and Japan assumes they are all impressed with Japan's skill, determination and strength.

Japan's probably content with its China spoils for the moment but may think more about expanding later on, but it may more aggressively support Filipino insurgents in 1896 or 1897 or 1898, ending up either helping the insurgents win a victory, or ending up in a war with Spain.

Or Japan may intervene in support of Hawaiian monarchists and/or Japanese/Asian suffrage during the internal instability in the White-ruled Republic of Hawaii in 1897, when Japan did send even in OTL its protected cruiser, the Ninawa to Hawaii. Without the smackdown of 1895, Japan could intervene on the ground and end up at war with the United States.

The most likely outcome of any such war would be a loss, either a local loss in a short war, over just Hawaii and Midway island, leading to US takeover of those islands and a Japanese exclusion act. Or, even worse for Japan, it could result in a longer war lasting multiple years leading to all those results plus eventual US occupation of the Bonin islands and possibly either Okinawa or Taiwan or both, and possibly China or Russia or both entering the war as allies of the USA and Japan being driven from the Asian mainland.

If conflict with Spain is dodged up until 1898, and conflict over Hawaii is dodged in 1897, the Japanese may still stick their nose in the Philippines when the Spanish American War starts or when it becomes imminent, to preempt either the American takeover of the Philippines or the German purchase of the Carolines, Marianas, and Palaus. Without the Triple Intervention experience, the Japanese might miscalculate and think by deploying first in some spots they can dictate or negotiate a settlement for these islands from a superior or equal position. They could get away with it theory, but offended American or German pride likely mean not.

If they dodge all that, they might get too greedy during the Boxer Suppression, or the appetite for more of Manchuria or Sakhalin might grow naturally by the 1905-1910 era.

A Japan rolling sixes avoids confrontation with anyone too powerful, while the powerful are too busy with other stuff. I don't think its likely at all, but to illustrate, that would be something like grabbing the Philippines and Spanish East Indies and getting away with it, presumably before the Americans or Germans get too committed to those goals, and then after a decent interval, a decade or so, Japan descends on the Dutch East Indies from the Philippines, preferably while Britain is busy fighting someone.

 

[raharris1973]

Thoughts on this more aggressive variant in post #5 Jackson?

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Not getting their nose bloodied could make Japan more aggressive, but there's also a world of difference in ego between beating a decrepit China and Tsarist Russia.

There was an 1896 incident between Spain and Japan that could have escalated to open war, potentially. Spanish authorities requisitioned a Japanese ship in Manila because they thought the Japanese were arming the Katipunan. On the one hand, Japan's nationalists were worked up over the Triple Intervention robbing them of their spoils. On the other hand, Japan's government wasn't eager to tangle with any European power after the Triple Intervention. A Japan which is riding high after defeating China, not vindictive, but also not humbled by outside intervention might take a harder line against Spain.

Japan's military in 1895 wasn't as impressive as it was later. Their victory over China wasn't a crushing one. But Japan is closer to the Philippines and it would take Spain weeks to get to Asia. Japan taking over the Philippines with local support could be a fait accompli by the time the Spanish fleet gets to Asia.

Russia wanted Port Arthur and might not care about Japan getting involved in the Philippines. But Russia might get involved to pressure Japan into ceding Port Arthur. Germany would be interested in the Philippines and Micronesia though. The Americans also were interested in Manilla.

I don't see how Japan could get involved in Hawaii. It's too far away for Japan in the 1890s.

A lot could still come down to how bellicose Russia is. Russia had an ego OTL about refusing Japan's proposed compromise (Russian Manchuria and Japanese Korea) and Japan would in theory be in a stronger position here (more resources, more Chinese conscripts, etc.).


I don't see the incentive for Japan to go after the Dutch East Indies. Managing Liaodong, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines would already be a handful and provide most of the resources Japan is scarce in.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Assuming the Russo-Japanese War still happens, Japan from the get-go is in a better position in Manchuria. The Li-Lobanov Treaty of TTL (which granted Russia Port Arthur and extraterritoriality in the South Manchuria Railway zone) either doesn't happen (since the Russians aren't getting Port Arthur), Russia getting a different port on the Bohai Sea (Qinhuangdao?) or simply doesn't involve the creation of a South Manchuria railway concession. My guess is that option two (Russian Qinhuangdao) is what happens, because Russia still wants a warm water port.

If scenario two happens: The Japanese probably start the war by attacking Qinhuangdao (the main Russian Port in the east here) and not Port Arthur (which is Japanese at the start of the Conflict). Assuming the Japanese still win, the Peace Treaty is similar to OTL: Japan gets the South Manchuria Railway Zone and half of Sakhalin. But a big difference would be in 1909 with the Gando Convention. OTL, China accepted Japanese conquest of the South Manchuria Zone and Port Arthur in exchange for Japan dropping Korean claims to southeast Manchuria (the historic Gando region). With the South Manchuria Zone so much closer to Beijing here, the inverse probably happens. Japan surrenders portions of the South China railway west of the Liao River and China accepts a cession of portions of Manchuria to Japan as part of the historic Gando.





Under the Vladivostok-only option, I suppose Russia would still desire an annexation of a portion of South Korea in order to get a warm water port. A division of Manchuria along the following lines could be a possibility, since it would give Russia the warm water port at Chongjin and a border otherwise secure along the Changbai and Hamgyong Mountains. Japan in exchange gets more of Liaodong Province and/or perhaps South Sakhalin as I mentioned above.



But if Russia is too stubborn to offer or accept such a division, Japan probably still wins as in OTL. Japan probably gains North Sakhalin. But there's no South Manchuria Railway Zone for Japan to seize here. The Gando Convention thus would probably mean Japan gets more of Gando/Manchuria, so long as it does not encroach on the portions of Manchuria which are still in the Russian sphere.

 

[raharris1973]

In the Sino-Japanese War, Japan gained Southern Manchuria. Russia, joined by Germany and France, came in and forced Japan to give it back in exchange for a larger indemnity. Russia proceeded to take Port Arthur for itself.

What if there'd been no Tripartite Intervention? Russia could still secure the rest of Manchuria for itself, and have worthwhile ports at Huludao and Qinhuangdao.

It's possible that Japan would want more of Manchuria down the line, but that's hardly inevitable. Japan prior to the Russo-Japanese War was willing to accept a compromise of Korea for Japan and Manchuria for Russia. Without two stolen victories (1895 and not gaining North Sakhalin in 1905) Japan might not be as aggressive or revanchist.


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Taking the PoD as a given - a question for you, and anyone else who cares to comment:

Would the Anglo-Japanese alliance still be likely in this alternate timeline? I can see a couple different sides to the argument.

From both the British and Japanese point of view, they are both breathing a little easier with one fewer examples of three continental/naval powers - Russia, Germany and France, jointly flexing their muscle, so an Anglo-Japanese alliance might seem less necessary to both. The Japanese are breathing a lot easier, the British a little easier.

On the other hand, the British over the course of the 1890s had other examples of their isolation and the difficulties of naval competition-
The pushback they received in trying to rally the powers against Abdulhamid over the Armenian issue
The continued 'Great Game' against Russia
The Tirpitz-championed German Naval Laws
The Fashoda incident
The continental anti-British reaction during the Boer War

So the British still may be ally-shopping in the 1901-1902 timeframe and seeking to lighten their global naval burden to allow fleet concentration in home waters. And Japan, with its demonstrated skills in the Sino-Japanese War and probable Boxer Rebellion/Intervention, may seem like a regionally strong but relatively uncomplicated ally.

From the Japanese point of view, allying with Britain might be seen as inviting unnecessary complications with other European powers or the US should they come into dispute with the UK. It may not seem necessary to a self-confident Japan that hasn't been humiliated by the Tripartite Intervention. On the other hand, an alliance offer from the UK *is* pretty flattering for any up and coming nation. The UK is the #1 world power and *the* exemplary western country par excellence, so an opportunity to ally with it isn't to be dismissed lightly if it arises.

Also, even without performing the Triple Intervention or stealing Japan's Shimonoseki prizes, if there is a Boxer Rebellion like OTL, a Russian overland intervention like OTL through Manchuria to Beijing (and slowness about withdrawing afterwards) may seem to Japan (as it did to Britain) too heavy-handed and menacing for comfort.