Germany Goes East first in 1914, British politics aspects only discussion

[raharris1973]

So I want to discuss once again an old standby.

Germany goes east first in 1914, not doing an offensive campaign in the west, and not violating Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality. Germany is hoping to avoid altogether, and at the very least significantly delay, any British participation in the war against Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary while these two Central Powers absolutely manhandle Serbia and settle the Balkans to their satisfaction and sharply defeat the Russians, at least throwing them out of Poland and Lithuania and buffering Austrian Galicia.

However what I would like to focus on in this thread, pretty much to this exclusion of other sub-topics, is British Cabinet and Parliamentary politics about handling the war in Europe, or entering it.

So I absolutely do not wish to debate or discuss the (im)plausibility of the Germans making the strategic decision written above, and will ignore posted commentary along those lines. I am mostly uninterested, at this moment and in this thread, in the probable course of military campaigns on mainland Europe on the German and Austrian borders with Russia, the Balkans, and the Franco-German border.

If you happen to have any posted commentary on French Presidential, Cabinet or Parliamentary politics, or Belgian, affected by this PoD, I may be interested.

The other postulate or ground rule I have is that the Liberal Cabinet, as consistuted in the early days of August 1914, will not declare war on Germany pursuing this east first course of action, and leaving Belgian territory inviolate, and that also does not send its fleet units into the English Channel for anti-French operations. [and Germany complies with that naval restriction] I postulate that any attempt by Asquith or Grey or any other Cabinet member to obtain a declaration of war, brings about a sufficient number of objecting Liberal Minister resignations to bring down the Cabinet and force a new election.

That said,

A) How long could a Liberal Asquith Cabinet refraining from declaring war in 1914 for many weeks while the CP attack east and south and the French attack east, remain in power without being forced to face an election?

A1) Would Grey resign over Britain remaining a non-belligerent?

A2) Who else would resign from the Cabinet over Britain remaining a non-belligerent, and would that number be sufficient to force a new election?

B) How soon (measured in days) could an election be held, and who would win the majority, Conservative, Liberal, or a forced Coalition?

C) In a spot election campaign, would the Conservative Party campaign, basically undivided, on a platform of 'Go to war with Germany, yesterday, for God, King, Country, the Empire, the Royal Navy, and the sacred Balance of Power'? [insert whatever slogan you may wish - poor little Serbia or our Gallant Gallic guypals would do as well]

D) How soon (measured in days) would the new Commons be filled and Cabinet selected?

E) If a Conservative majority Cabinet or Conservative-led coalition (presumably dominated by 'go to war with Germany' voices) would new Cabinet both inevitably, and promptly declare war on Germany? Or would there be time for the new Cabinet to deliberate, for Parliament to debate, or to form second thoughts, or to respond to second thoughts about entering the war if such emerged from public opinion, newspapers, or new backbenchers?

Since I'm not quite familiar with Parliamentary mechanics, procedure and tactics, and each individual in play, I can't be precise about timelines, but my honest ballpark estimate of the military situation that any British government, old or new, would be observing, anywhere from one week to the three months from the start of the conflict in August, would have the following features:

1. No belligerent's capital would be occupied or seriously menaced besides Belgrade
2. No belligerent would have surrendered, with the possible exception of Serbia
3. No belligerent's Army would have suffered a final, decisive, annihilating blow, except possibly Serbia
4. France would be attacking into German Alsace-Lorraine, but suffering heavy losses (and inflicting heavy ones too) while making ever more meagre returns; or this may have shift to the Germans counter-attacking, to the Germans at most successful having repelling the French back over their own frontier, but with the German counter-offensive now making ever more meagre returns
5. Russian losses would be no more than one or two armies of several
6. Russian territorial losses would be limited primarily to Congress Poland and perhaps some of Lithuania, with core Russia and Ukraine scarcely touched

To most neutral observers, in other words, the war map would not show an image of Teutonic arms sweeping all before them, but instead a grind of fairly evenly matched foes, in a tight grapple.

Interventionists, and Anti-Interventionists in the UK, I imagine, will interpret that, and its meaning, or lack of it, for the balance of power and other British interests, as they will. I'm inclined to seeing the even matching and tight grapple make British intervention seem *less* urgent while the battlefield losses make the war uglier and less glamorous and attractive. But that may be my 21st century detachment talking. It's not like domino theories, jumping to conclusions, panic, and manic policy improvisations haven't happened before, so interventionists could somehow use all the same circumstances to say why Britain must leap in to break the tie.

Thanks for reading, those of you still with me.

Looking forward to your responses!

 

[AH Layard]

Deleted my earlier post on reflection as was too dismissive of the anti-war case. Thinking again, I think it’s quite likely that Grey would resign (as he had threatened to do if the Morley-Simon declaration of non-involvement was made) as his policy would have been decisively rejected. Likely that Churchill, Haldane, and Crewe resign with him too.

The Liberals and Unionists have ~270 MPs but the Liberals have the support of the IPP and Labour. There are probably at least 75 MPs (Asquith estimated 75% of the party was against intervention before Belgium) who are pro-intervention but I doubt that number rebels. An election is due in 1915: I guess what happens by then depends on the shape of the war in the west and whether the German navy are on manoeuvres. The Unionists will make the anti-German patriotic case as they did after the AH ultimatum OTL and there was very little internal dissent from this position. The result would be interesting and depend in the shape of the war: one year into the war and the horrors of modern warfare would be very clear to see, but if the Germans are winning then there could be panic about a German dominated Europe. Liberal divisions on whether or not to intervene could be exploited.

Another ? is over Ireland. Home Rule was suspended because of the July Crisis. If a decision is made to stay out then Redmond and IPP may push ahead with demanding implementation and the Asquith government may be even more reluctant to accede, which could lead to (a) IPP withdrawing support and an early election, (b) the UVF and Irish Volunteers engaged in civil conflict and a British army response which complicates the decision to intervene in Europe further.

 

[ChrisNuttall]

It’s been a while since I looked at this, but I had the impression that would be no major shifts in the balance of power in the UK (unless Grey resigns on the grounds European balance of power is about to shift against the UK, which may be unlikely if the Germans go East and France is not invaded in 1914). The French will presumably carry out their plan to attack Germany as early as possible, in order to fight the war on someone else’s territory, which will make it harder to convince the British public they need to join the war on France’s. Lacking a reasonable cause for war, such as the invasion of Belgium, the UK might try to stay out of the war completely.

If there are no major shifts in Europe by the end of 1914, the UK politics might settle down. Issues such as Irish home rule might resurface, as will concerns about the German Navy and Turkish involvement in the war (which might not happen here, as Britain will be neutral and the Germans won’t deal they need the Turks as much as OTL.) If we assume the war is fought out to a stalemate, the British may congratulate themselves on staying out of a bloody slaughter. If the Germans win decisively in the East, which is not impossible, there will be a strong faction in the UK demanding that UK backs France in order to prevent German domination of Europe for the foreseeable future. There would be a war party and properly a peace party, although I suspect the war party would have an edge.

Come to think of it, the UK would have had an economic boom through selling weapons and food to France. The UK probably wouldn’t have sold anything to Germany in this timeline, but the possibility would exist. (More adroit German diplomacy might keep the UK from getting too invested in a French victory, although I don’t think that was within their ability.) If this was true, the peace party might have an edge instead, as no one would want to be the politician who stopped the good times from rolling.

Lots of interesting possibilities here.

Chris

 

[David Flin]

(More adroit German diplomacy

Yeah. You see the problem here.

 

[ChrisNuttall]

Yeah. You see the problem here.

A better German diplomatic service would be a POD in and of itself.

Chris

 

[raharris1973]

If we assume the war is fought out to a stalemate, the British may congratulate themselves on staying out of a bloody slaughter. If the Germans win decisively in the East, which is not impossible, there will be a strong faction in the UK demanding that UK backs France in order to prevent German domination of Europe for the foreseeable future. There would be a war party and properly a peace party,

I imagine between the temperamentally and pragmatically inclined, peace party 'let's stay out of this mess',
and the temperamentally and pragmatically inclined war party, 'let's not lie sleeping and supine while our alliances are dismantled and Germany takes over Europe piece by piece,'

there will be a range of opinion in Britain that can live with seeing a defeat of some degree or another of Russia (a minor defeat costing Serbia and a border province or two doesn't change the balance of power much) - (a major defeat of Russia does alter the balance of power a bit much, but at least Russia would be in no position to take vengeance on the British Empire for being non-supportive) - but at the same time, Britain would have emphatic opinions about Germany not doing any counter-attacks in strategic depth into France, confiscating any of its metropolitan or significant colonial territories, or imposing crippling indemnities or military or naval limitations.

Britain would likely strongly communicate its objection to such endgames to the Germans all along, trying to end the war before that happens, regardless of what happens to Russia in the east, and some British interlocutors will include a dollop of threat that Britain would intervene to prevent the crushing of France.

The Germans doubtless would find it unfair and annoying to be told Britain disapproves of the Germans doing anything less than retaliating against France in full measure and winning satisfaction (territory or indemnity wise) from France if and when the opportunity emerges. But while playing for decisive advantage in Poland and the Balkans it would probably be wise to keep such resentments contained under their pickelhaub.

And supposing Germany maintains a primary offensive focus eastward while Austria-Hungary helps there and also finishes Serbia, while Germany does mainly defensive and local counter-offensive on the west, while Britain remains neutral, the Russians should be prone to get tired eventually. Not immediately, but not taking as long as OTL. However, by the time the Russians are settling out, of their effort is gravely weakening, France will have paid a big butcher's bill to be sure, but France will also be very well armed, mobilized, and fortified, so even though German sentiment wants to crush France next, the costs involved in doing it, even without the prospect of direct British involvement, could be prohibitive, and the Germans could pragmatically content themselves with a 'Half-Victory' that at least breaks their 'encirclement' while leaving France unpunished except for its wounds sustained against German trenches.

 

[Redolegna]

France will have kept its entire industrial might, instead of losing I can't even remember how much access to coal, steel and the factories for using them, I think it was more than half.

It would have made demands about the RN, because the French Marine was mostly focused on the Mediterranean on the understanding the RN would have taken care of the Atlantic, the Channel and the North Sea. It would be interesting to see how the Admiralty would square that circle. Speaking of them, not going to war means Churchill's illegal decision re the Ottoman dreadnoughts probably gets quashed, he might be thrown out for having dared to go there, and the Ottomans, if properly mollified, might decide not going to war (but then again...) meaning the Russians aren't so choked out if there is still trade going into the Black Sea.

While Britain might wish to keep a neutral stance, it does not make sense to do so while not preparing at least for the possibility that the country and its empire might not manage to stay out. But without a BEF bled white, there is a core around which to build up an army and avoid some of Kitchener's mistakes. So if the Cabinet changes tacks, it will have a number of corps to send, better equipped and prepared.

 

[raharris1973]

France will have kept its entire industrial might, instead of losing I can't even remember how much access to coal, steel and the factories for using them, I think it was more than half.

It would have made demands about the RN, because the French Marine was mostly focused on the Mediterranean on the understanding the RN would have taken care of the Atlantic, the Channel and the North Sea. It would be interesting to see how the Admiralty would square that circle. Speaking of them, not going to war means Churchill's illegal decision re the Ottoman dreadnoughts probably gets quashed, he might be thrown out for having dared to go there, and the Ottomans, if properly mollified, might decide not going to war (but then again...) meaning the Russians aren't so choked out if there is still trade going into the Black Sea.

While Britain might wish to keep a neutral stance, it does not make sense to do so while not preparing at least for the possibility that the country and its empire might not manage to stay out. But without a BEF bled white, there is a core around which to build up an army and avoid some of Kitchener's mistakes. So if the Cabinet changes tacks, it will have a number of corps to send, better equipped and prepared.

Agree for the most part - Despite probable bleeding and frustration of having the burden of being the attacker, France is left stronger on balance over time, where it was partially conquered and occupied AND had the burdern of being the attacker/counter-attacker for most of the war.

A neutral Britain, in a Germany goes east-not-west scenario, has cards that are still valuable later, even if not played at the outset.

[That is in contrast to a neutral or late arriving Britain in a Germany strikes west scenario with OTL's Schleffen-Moltke plan. Britain entering the war any degree later makes Britain's cards relatively less valuable and allows more damage to the French, more breathing room to the Germans, and make the Entente irrecoverably less effective.

speaking of them, not going to war means Churchill's illegal decision re the Ottoman dreadnoughts probably gets quashed, he might be thrown out for having dared to go there, and the Ottomans, if properly mollified, might decide not going to war (but then again...)

I wouldn't treat these conclusions as definite. If I were in Churchill's shoes, and my country was neutral, but I had told the Germans to limit some naval activities (like in the Channel) and knew there was still a chance (50/50) of getting into war, I would have a good national security argument to requisition ships for sale in the non-war (for us) international emergency.

Additionally, I don't think we should read the Ottoman entry into the war as entirely reactive, or entirely emotional. They had been desperately trying to ally with either bloc for a couple years to gain protection. The German one was always more logical for them, since the Germans had stolen the least from them. Germany once the war started began to reciprocate and try to bring the Ottomans on board. The Ottomans potential usefulness to the Central Powers against Russia would be just as obvious to Berlin and Vienna even if Britain were not involved in the war (...for now).