General Timeline from Russian victory in Russo-Japanese War

[raharris1973]

What if Russia won the Russo-Japanese War? What consequences might flow from that?

Part 1. - How Russia wins/"wins" the war: Like in the real world, the war opens up in February 1904 with the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur.

The differences start in that while the initial Japanese attack is effective at damaging, disabling and sinking multiple Russian ships, the sinking of the flagship Petropavlovsk is slower, and this allows Russian Admiral Makarov to escape the sinking ship rather than go down with it after assisting with the rescue of as many crew members as he can. He competently commands the remaining, surviving inferior Russian Pacific fleet vessels in the port, using a fleet-in-being strategy, significantly impeding Imperial Japanese Army maritime resupply to the area right around the port d drawing out the siege of Port Arthur while awaiting the arrival of help from outside.

The second difference is that during the siege of Port Arthur, Japanese siege operations on land are even slower and less optimal than in real life, and General Kodama never makes the key recommendation to field force commander General Nogi to focus on seizing 203 Metre Hill, leading to continued frittering away of the Japanese besieging force on indecisive operations around the port.

Fear of Makarov's 1st Pacific Squadron being able to sortie (to attack Japanese transports, bombard Japanese forces ashore, escape) forces the Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet to keep a constant guard around Port Arthur in the East China Sea/Yellow Sea, preventing the fleet from getting the four months of rest and refit it got historically between the surrender of Port Arthur in January 1905 and the battle of Tsushima in May 1905.

In this scenario, the Russian Baltic Fleet, renamed the "Second Pacific Squadron", under Admiral Rozhestvensky would be arriving to the China Seas by April-May after final refueling stops in Cam Ranh Bay, French Indochina.

The more exhausted and less nimble Japanese Combined Fleet under Admiral Togo is unable to catch the Rozhestvensky's fleet (or much of it) at the Tsushima Straits, force it to battle, "cross the T" and destroy it, allowing the clear majority of the force to proceed into the Yellow Sea/Gulf of Zhili, very close to Port Arthur and potential junction with Makarov's First Squadron.

About the same time, Russian General Stoessel's garrison is still holding out in the Port Arthur perimeter against General Nogi's besiegers, but Russian General Kuropatkin is riding down the South Manchuria railway via Shenyang/Mukden with a large army of reinforcements.

[Credit for these tactical/operational points of departure goes to users Captain Seafort and Sekhmet_D from AH.com]

The lack of dramatic defeats or military failures so far has prevented isolated strikes and urban and rural unrest from coalescing into anything that could be called a "revolution" so far in 1905, with no notable events called "Bloody Sunday" in January of that year (spawned by demonstrations effected by the impending/just accomplished fall of Port Arthur). Certainly, the Russian people found the boldness and audacity of the Japanese in their initial attack a bit shocking, and their tenacity thereafter troubling and worth a grudging respect, but the Russians remained confident of victory in the end, while remembering the rule that Russia wins, but seldom wins its victories *fast*, so this "Japanese war" is nothing outside the norm or cause for doubt.

While the Japanese Combined Fleet retains the advantage of an interior position of concentration and unified command, the nearby 1st and 2nd Russian Pacific Squadrons they are sandwiched between in the waters around Port Arthur now *outnumber* the Japanese Combined Fleet. Brutal naval melee fighting and gun duels commence as the Russian Squadrons seek a sortie/break-out and relief of Port Arthur while the Japanese Fleet fights to keep the harbor sealed and the enemy fleets divided.

Japanese maneuver and gunnery is generally better, with them getting better exchange ratios. But the ratios are not very uneven, Crews on many of the Russian ships in both squadrons are both professional and deadly, causing significant damages and irrecoverable losses to Japanese ships that the Japanese, already bleeding blood and treasure, can ill afford.

In the midst of this naval gunnery slugfest, the Japanese are unable to keep their blockade airtight, and some small batches of Russian-chartered blockade running vessels are able to run the blockade to get vitally needed supplies to the Russian garrison, a boost to their well-being, and above all, their morale, by May 15th.

Over the last two weeks of May, with massive casualties on both the Japanese and Russian sides, Kuropatkin's forces are able to break through portions of the IJA siege lines and establish a land corridor to Port Arthur, breaking the Japanese siege.

With the siege broken, unacceptable force attrition levels, increased popular questioning of the war effort and war related sacrifices and taxes, and foreign (British and American) creditors running out of willingness to generously extend yet more credit, the Japanese Cabinet reluctantly sues for peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.

End result - Japan is is utterly exhausted with nothing to show for it, while the Russians have a big pyschological boost, no revolution, a navy, and a much stronger position in the Far East. The big effect will be on the UK. The China Fleet's battleships probably stay there and the Anglo-Russian Entente doesn't happen, which is going to generate a bloody big flock of butterfflies.[credit goes to Captain Seafort for this description]

After hemming and hawing in negotiations for a few months and making demands, everybody keeps their original territory - Russia keeps all Sakhalin and the Port Arthur leased territory, it keeps its timber concession in Korea -- it *does not* get the demand it advanced for the Kurile islands. Japan keeps the Kuriles, *does not* get the exclusive rights over Korea it demands. Both sides exchange POWs unconditionally. Both sides reluctantly accept that the other side will not be paying the indemnity or damage claims they advanced.

 

[raharris1973]

Part 2. – The Aftermath of the War

Since readers are probably super-curious about what this means for Japan and its militarism, I will answer that first. Japan’s military and naval confidence is much dimmed, as is its confidence in the Emperor system. There is much more political discontent, questioning, and instability. Japan is certainly not going full “third world”, going “de-industrial” or getting colonized, but it’s international status is getting knocked down a couple pegs, not quite down to (just) independent Siam status, but along the lines of say definitely independent, but not a major power, like the interwar Turkish Republic, or Argentina, or Brazil, level.

Japan has its home islands, Ryukyus and Taiwan and continues to try to dominate Korea, and it maintains modern Army and Navy forces despite the costs. But it has a heavy debt burden to Britain and the USA at the same time it needs to modernize and replenish many of its ships and weapons. It exports silks, pearls, seafood, and cheap, labor-intensive manufactures, wherever there is a niche and an open market, plus many Japanese work abroad.

The defeat of Japan in the Russian war dims its luster in Asia as an example, but only slightly. No one really expected Japan to win. It is still admired for adopting industry and technology, for having the guts to attack Russia, and for surviving to tell the tale as an independent country.

Japan keeps its alliance with Britain. Japan still wants it, Britain doesn’t want it to sink into oblivion.

Despite the desires of radical militarist/navalist factions, there is *not* a broad/wide *popular* and elite consensus on preparing for a war revenge on Russia or anyone else in this generation. But there is support for strong national defense and for continuing to assert the national interest in Korea.

Korea remains the most vexing foreign policy problem. Really as much, or more because of Korean initiative rather than Russian, Russia remains heavily involved in Korea as a counter-vailing influence to Japan and this is a check on any ambitions to outright annex Korea or make Japanese influence exclusive of all others.

With Japan deflated by its loss in the war, Russia is responsive to Korean outreach and patronizes the Korean monarchy with aid and investment. Lacking the full suite of financial and technological tools, Russia permits and encourages countries considered pro-Russian/anti-Japanese, like France and Germany, to invest in Korean development, while Russia takes its profits and Japan seethes. Like in OTL, American Protestant missionaries have gradually building success among Koreans that, per capita, outstrips their success among the Chinese or Japanese peoples.

………..but Japan’s loss in the war really does relegate Northeast Asia to the geopolitical backdrop and shadows, and puts much more of the spotlight on other regions of the world soon…

For Russia, spared defeat and revolution, autocracy can happily proceed without “silly” innovations like a Constitution, Duma, or reforms to the communal landholding system. Some marginal improvements can be made to the Army, and the Navy, and Trans-Siberian railway communications, based on revealed shortfalls, but pressure for reforms is less than in the real world. Without OTL’s revolutionary disturbances continuing from 1905 through 1907 in Russia’s cities, towns, factories, mines, and rural areas (and Poland), numbers of men held in military service in European Russia should be a bit less.

Russia should be a bit more confident abroad on all fronts, while not having a specific, immediate, aggressive/expansive agenda, in the circa 1906-1907 timeframe. It may not be particularly embittered against Britain, but it doesn’t see much reason to sacrifice anything for her friendship, it is doing alright on its own and with France’s friendship.

--Western Europe – France and Britain –

During the Russo-Japanese War, France and Britain each cheer their respective ally, but neither want to get drawn into war on behalf of those allies. So they stay in close diplomatic communication. The French, with aspirations to expand in Morocco, and the British, who would like people (France) to stop questioning their role in Egypt, also have colonial matters to discuss, and since Britain is already concerned about imperial frontier conflict with Russia in Asia, it would really like to close the book on similar conflicts with France in Africa and elsewhere.

Like OTL, this all leads to the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale.

The fact that in this scenario, Russia rather than Japan wins their mutual war does not change the motives and outcome for each Anglo-French side.

With Japan weakened and Russia unchecked in the Pacific, Britain has just as much need of a pacified France as ever. While France can be confident in its Russian ally’s strength, removing British obstacles in Morocco is still handy, there’s nothing more to be gained by badgering Britain, and its aware potential hostility with both Britain and Germany is a poor fit with France’s aging/shrinking demographics.

--Western Europe – Germany and Austria-Hungary –

The Japanese attack seems to vindicate the Kaiser and German government’s policy going back to 1895 of encouraging Russia to focus on the Far East. The Russians stood guard against the “yellow peril” over the last decade. British ‘race traitors’ armed and encouraged the Japanese, and they sneaked attacked the Russians, but the Russians held them off and triumphed in the end. It was only a pity that the Dogger Bank incident did not bring Britain and Russia to blows, which only would have further increased German influence and opportunities. The global outlook remained generally positive. Investments in colonies were paying off, the fleet was growing, the economy and German science was growing. Russia’s status quo agreements with the Austro-Hungarians and Ottomans appeared to be holding, and Russia’s work in the Far and Middle East (Persia) appears undone. Japan was wounded but able and Russia needed to continuing armoring up its Far East and Manchuria, develop Korea, and work with Germany on the uplift of China.

In 1905 a dark spot was the French jostling themselves to an exclusive preferred position in Morocco, against international treaties, and most powers being indifferent to it. French Foreign Minister Delcasse seemed to be making side deals with everyone to get acquiescence to his dirty game. The Germans didn’t know whether to be insulted (for not being important enough?) or flattered (for being known to be too honorable for crooked deals?) for the French not approaching *them* about a side deal.

Germany voiced some diplomatic protests over France’s moves in Morocco, and held discussions with other powers. It found a remarkable lack of interest in Russia (no surprise), Britain (odd), Italy (odd), Spain, the USA in applying joint pressure on France to respect the Sultan’s sovereignty. Only the usual suspect (Austria-Hungary) lined up right behind Germany. Without a broad diplomatic coalition Germany mainly responded with complaints, protests, some forwarding of claims for compensation in other colonial spheres for any French unilateral advantage, and scarcely publicized commercial/financial/tariff counter-measures against the French. The Moroccan matters were resolved for the year with the French increasing their de facto control, while providing some rhetorical pledges to Germany, and all the other powers, about respecting the Sultan’s ultimate powers and commercial opportunity for all, and scarecely any real concrete compensation for anyone else. The Moroccan issues/discussions could scarcely be called a ‘crisis’ and did not involve German threats of war, menacing naval deployments or troop mobilizations on the French border. Delcasse happily remained the French Foreign Minister throughout.

The reason the Morocco affair was such a relatively low-tension ‘nothingburger’ compared to the crisis of real world 1905 is simple. Without Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War (notably first Port Arthur, then later Tsushima) and internal revolution and disorder, it simply never occurs to the German government that this diplomatic dispute is rendering Russia helpless in Europe and thus providing a golden opportunity to put unprecedented pressure on France to force concessions undermining her diplomatic position. On the contrary, Russia may be slightly distracted, but she is seen as standing strong and fully capable of helping France in Europe in this scenario. So, no temptation to play brinkmanship with France.

The lack of this Morocco Crisis of 1905 (in which France was frightened, but ultimately came out feeling supported and like a winner) is France is not so patriotically enthused confident with its anti-German sentiments given renewed fuel. Additionally, without the German threatening tone that year, France is a little more militarily complacent*, somewhat reducing draft intakes and modernization budgets over 1906, 1907, 1908. In OTL 1906 Germany had 24,353 more peacetime effectives than France, France was 4% inferior to Germany, in OTL 1908 Germany had 8,083 more effectives than France, France was 1.3% inferior to Germany. In this ATL, because of the differences, in 1906 Germany has 34,612 more effectives than France, making France 5.4% inferior to Germany, and in 1908 Germany has 42,712 more effectives than France, making France 7% inferior to Germany

*An equal or larger reason for relative French military complacency is the apparent greater Russian strength overall.

Austria-Hungary –

To whatever degree Austro-Hungarian military spending was responsive, up or down, to perceived fluctuations in Russian military/threat or strength here, there is a lack of complacency and greater seriousness and potentially more funding of Austro-Hungarian forces in 1906-1910 because of it.

But it is not that clear how responsive the dual monarchy’s defense budget *was* to external threat, it remained pretty low, and Hungarian unwillingness to pay tax was a major limiting factor that was fairly constant.

Southern Europe – Italy and the Ottoman Empire –

For the moment, this is similar to OTL from 1905-06 on. Italy is formally a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, but it made an Entente with France in 1902, promising to support France over Morocco in return for French support for eventual acquisition of Libya. Italy does not make immediate haste to seize Libya however, and in either 1908 or 1909 it will face the devastating Messina earthquake in Sicily.

For the moment the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdulhamid II has decent relations with the Russians, Germans, Austro-Hungarians and the French who loan him a great deal of money. His relations with the British are not exactly terrible most of the time as in the 1905-1908 timeframe the Armenian issue is relatively quiet. The Akaba/Straits of Tiran Crisis/Affair is a relatively small dispute with Britain where the two sides posture over the border between Ottoman Palestine and Egyptian Palestine, but it is settled by compromise without fighting.

The Great Game – Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia – 1905-1908

Russia is too powerful and assertive in East Asia and South Asia and on the seas for Britain’s comfort, and its victory in the Russo-Japanese War only confirms this. The Dogger Bank incident of accidental Russian firing on British fishing trawlers during the Russo-Japanese War didn’t help matters. The Russians didn’t appreciate all the tech help and loans from Britain to Japan.

Britain sees Russia as a threat to the China market and India, nervously watching Afghanistan and Persia. Britain dislikes Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II for two reasons, he’s a bloody tyrant and he gets along too well with the Russians. In a more ideal situation for Britain, both Turkey and Russia would be more internally liberal, friendly with Britain, but antagonistic with each other.

Russia lacks any urgency to make a compromise with Britain, it would like to increase its influence in Korea and China, including locations on the margin of China like Tibet – it at least doesn’t want to leave it a British monopoly. Likewise Russia is loath to leave Afghanistan a British monopoly, and Russia would like to extend its economic, military, naval influence over its Persian neighbor and its commercial and diplomatic influence somewhat into the Persian Gulf to emirates like Kuwait.

These clashing aspirations forestall any Anglo-Russian Entente like the one in OTL.

They also re-color Britain’s whole global perspective on European security and naval threats.

While the German fleet is technologically more sophisticated, and growing, the Russian fleet is still large, combat experienced, basically professional, and at least in combination with the French almost as menacing as any German threat.

In terms of risk of continental hegemony, Europe seems far more at risk of Russo-French hegemony than Austro-German, with the Russians having the largest, and thus far, demonstrably unchecked, Army.

While not throwing away its colonial compromise Entente with France, Britain will be inclined to view the Triple Alliance powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Germany as a vital balance to excessive (Franco)-Russian power.

[all this postwar stuff is my own ideas]

 

[raharris1973]

Part 3 - Balkan Powder Keg, 1908

July 1908 – The Young Turk revolution breaks out, removing Sultan Abdulhamid II from effective power.

Aug-Sep 1908 – The Young Turks (CUP) calls for a parliamentary assembly from all parts of the empire, including those, like Bosnia, Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Crete, Cyprus, Egypt, Bulgaria, no longer under de facto Ottoman administrative control but only formal Ottoman suzerainty/sovereignty.

Most of the effective ruling powers, Greece, Britain, ignore this “threat” with equanimity, but two, the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Prince of Bulgaria regard this as an unacceptable threat making the current modus vivendi untenable and requiring a change to the status quo consolidating their authority.

The Bulgarians make plans to declare independence and their Prince a Tsar. The Austro-Hungarians plan to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina.

September 15-16, 1908 – Aehrenthal-Izvolsky meeting at Buchlau Castle. The respective Austrian and Russian Foreign Minister agree to a deal to mutually recognize Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia, Bulgarian independence, and a revision of the straits regime in Russia’s favor. Aehrenthal concocted and Izvolsky accepted a grand diplomatic deal that proposed major benefits for both sides. Austria would gain full ownership of Bosnia with Russian approval. Turkey would get full control of the territory known as the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, plus cash. Russia would get the right of passage for its warships through the Straits. Serbia would get nothing. [wiki]

On October 6, 1908, a press release in Vienna announced that Bosnia was fully annexed. Bulgaria also had declared independence on October 5th.[wiki]

Aehrenthal had expected wide European approval and instead he faced a hostile volcanic eruption from every direction. Izvolsky vehemently denounced the action and demanded an international conference on Bosnia. After decades of low-level activity, pan-Slavic forces inside Russia mobilized in opposition. Mass demonstrations broke out across the continent. Rome took advantage of the situation by reversing its friendship with Vienna. Berlin officials were surprised and appalled. The British were especially angry, denouncing the violation of an international agreement signed by both Austria and Britain. France denounced the scheme. Turkey was surprised by the unexpected development, but was quieted by the cash payment. By far the angriest reaction came from Serbia, which called for revenge, and began setting up secret guerrilla bands, plotting insurrection in Bosnia.[wiki]

Britain harbored no ill-will towards Austria-Hungary, but it disliked this deal vehemently, as soon as they heard on background the part about agreement on changing the rules on the straits. They hated the idea of giving the Russians more freedom through the straits, and resolutely opposed it, and they hated the idea of an Austro-Russian deal in general, with its implication of a German-Russian deal and thus a broad continental bloc excluding Britain.

In a way, lucky for the British worriers, loud-mouthed Russian Pan-Slavs and Serbians, not previously briefed on the deal, and not approving of the deal, bitched and moaned so loud that Izvolsky disowned and denied ever having agreed to it.

Serbia mobilized its army and on 7 October the Serbian Crown Council demanded that the annexation be reversed or, failing that, Serbia should receive compensation. [wiki]

Germany and Austria-Hungary are shocked and horrified at the audacity of Serbia mobilizing against Austria and demanding a reversal of its policy, fear that Serbia (and perhaps all Slavs in general) are emboldened by lately demonstrated Russian strength and Berlin sends a friendly appeal to Russia’s better nature to get Serbia to back down.

The Germans are shocked and horrified when the Russians simply reply with excuses for not doing so, citing domestic opinions and historic religious ties. The Russians seem deaf to German arguments about Serb defiance being a distraction from Russia’s strategic destiny in Asia, and a disruptor of the last 10-15 years of international quiet in the Balkans and Central European great power calm.

Russian deafness to German concerns and Austria’s interests signals an insufferable, and dangerous, Russian arrogance, and disregard for German strength and worth. It sends German civil and military authorities, and Austrian and British ones when told, into a tailspin of worst case thinking, with all agreeing that the Russian and Slavic arrogance problem would only worsen with concessions and with time as Russia naturally grew in strength.

The Austrians coalesce around thinking it is ‘now or never’ for a showdown with Serbia. The Germans coalesce around thinking it is ‘now or never’ for a showdown with Russia, and thus their French allies.

Despite Britain’s initial complaint about the Bosnia annexation as a modification of the Berlin treaty, and rejection of any Austro-Russian deal, when it learns of Russia’s refusal to restrain Serbia, London comes to see Serbia as a mere proxy pawn of Russia and advises Austria not to back down in the face of Serbia and Germany not to back down in the face of Russia (or France, should it play into Russia’s hands).

Germany and Austria-Hungary conclude that Austria-Hungary must mobilize immediately and obtain a rescinding of Serbia’s demands and demobilization. Austria-Hungary is able to start this rather soon because as of October 10th the harvest is already being collected and collection will soon be complete allowing reservists to be called in without harm to the food supply.

In the atmosphere of diplomatic notes and rising tension, one thing the Russians do ask of the Serbs is for them to clarify what “compensation” they seek if Austria were not to reverse its Bosnia annexation. Serbia clarifies on October 11th that they would require, at a minimum, the northern portion of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, to permit them a land corridor with Montenegro. The Russians share this response with the Austrians and Germans and French, who all pass it onto the British. It only amplifies British anti-Serbianism and anti-Russianism, because they see a Serbo-Montenegrin land corridor as a potential strategic asset allowing Russian naval basing to bypass the straits using Montenegro, and using Montenegro-Serbia-Romania for land connectivity back to Russia. Britain reassures Vienna and Berlin once more it completely understands its position and need to resist foreign demands.

Coupled with the announced Austro-Hungarian mobilization on October 12th, the Germans raise alert levels and cancel leaves. In reaction, most of the Tsar’s advisors urge him to not allow Serbia to be crushed and mobilize in response to Austria. The Tsar consults with France to confirm its support and now, belatedly, starts discussing wide-ranging colonial bargains with the British.

The French President reassures the Tsar and his Ministers of unconditional support, despite some silent, and some quietly discussed doubts among his advisors and Cabinet members. Ultimately, although this springs not from French interests, not even from Russian survival, but from Russia’s Balkan interests/preferences, the French President feels that France has been riding the Russian bear since 1892 and there is no looking back. The bear is strong, it is getting stronger compared to France, if ever fighting the German eagle alongside the Russian bear, better to do it now while the bear thinks it needs France as a valuable contributor.

The British for their part are skeptical of all late-blooming Russian proposals.

The occasional Serbian in the street sees reason and wonders why his country is courting destruction by challenging Austria head-on. But in governing political and military circles, all are crazily confident of ultimate victory, and fearful of assassination or blackballing or exile if they get held responsible for backing down or any other such cowardly decision.

The Russians declare mobilization on October 15th. The Germans use this mobilization to argue internally and externally that Russia and Serbia are forcing war upon all Europe, a war of necessity, not choice.

 

[raharris1973]

Part 4: The Great War of 1908

Within days, the Austrians declare war on Serbia (but conspicuously only start actual infantry advances days after that), the Russians declare war on Austria, the Germans declare war on Russia, and the Germans issue an ultimatum to France to stay neutral and demilitarize the frontier.

Austrian shells are the first hostile object to cross borders, followed by Russian cavalry reconnaissance groups checking out Galicia, but Russian infantry units and Austrian are not able to move yet.

This is followed by the German occupation of Luxemburg on October 20th and the investment of Liege on the 21st and mutual raids across the Franco-German border the next day.

The British Cabinet and press is favorable the German-Austrian side and antipathetic to the Russo-Serbian side, and critical of France for its ‘folly’ of supporting and strengthening Russia.

Militarily, the fall 1908 campaign makes some headway capturing most of Belgium and some French territory on the fringe of German Lorraine, while inflicting disproportionate losses in the maneuver parts of the campaign on the French force. But the disproportion is only small. The Germans never approach Paris, nor France’s channel ports during the fall 1908 campaign for two reasons, it is a relatively short campaign (shorter than OTL 1914), and the French are intelligently fighting it as a defensive delaying action, not an offense a l’outrance.

Britain’s press, public, and political reaction of the German violation of Belgian neutrality is an interesting one. It is shaped by its preconceptions of the belligerents, positive to the Germans, negative to the Russians and French. Essentially, “treaty shmeaty”. The British have little respect for the Belgian, French, and Russian propaganda playing up the German violation of Belgian neutrality. Few indeed argue it incurs any duty or interest of Britain to fight against Germany or *for* Belgium. The defense of Belgian neutrality per the Treaty of 1839 is called a collective obligation of the powers, not Britain’s solo duty to bear alone. The powers succeed or fail in doing it together. The failure is everybody’s fault, so it’s nobody’s fault. The British reassure themselves, and everyone else who talks to them about the Belgium issue, that “of course, the Germans acted on military necessity for survival; but these are not barbarians, Vandals are Huns, they will make the Belgians whole at the end of the war and compensate them for all damages you can be sure.”

The invasion of Belgium, and some horror stories (though less played up here) might be part of the overall formula, along with generalized pacifism among many Radical Liberals and Labourites, a desire for maximum comfort and business as usual, and a sense of Austro-German adequacy, that causes Britain’s PM and Cabinet to *not* seek a declaration of war on Russia or Serbia or France, nor make an alliance with Austria or Germany with the start of the war. Instead HMG declares a neutrality, which is in fact, pro-Central Powers tilted, but still permits commerce with both sides.

Even a pro-CP tilted neutrality by Britain is welcome to Germany in fall 1908, especially because Italy, upset about the original Balkan/Bosnian casus belli of the war, craps out on the Triple Alliance and announces its neutrality. Britain, with its relatively small professional army, is not considered of decisive use in the expected short war.

By the time the fall 1908 campaign is over, the Russian forces have captured significant portions of central and eastern Galicia and inflicted damage on Austro-Hungarian units, but their belated invasion of East Prussia has been repulsed. The Serbs are still fighting for their tiny country, to the surprise of many, but they’ve incurred unsustainable losses to their armies.

The British government is wooing the new, perceived as liberal, Young Turk regime, and it funds an Austrian ‘compensation’ scheme, essentially hush money, to get Turkey to forgive and forget the Bosnia annexation. The Young Turk regime is also suspicious of the Serbs and Russians because of the Serb claim to Novi Pazar, which the Austrians retroceded to Turkey in October 1908 while annexing Bosnia.

The Austrian and German staffs meeting over the winter decide that in the spring of 1909, they will do no more than straighten the line of defensive trenches a bit and put their main focus on throwing back the Russians and recovering Galicia.

That is exactly what happens in 1909.

Russian difficulties in Galicia, and defeats in the East Prussia campaign of 1908 provided a foretaste of how outclassed the Russians are in a match-up with an all-around modern western army like the Germans, and the disasters to come in 1909.

The 1909 campaign sees a combined German-Austrian campaign that thrashes the Russian armies in Poland and Galicia, forcing them on a “great retreat” from Poland and Lithuania, that is made worse by Russian scorched earth in areas thought vulnerable to capture and encouragement of population evacuations.

A secondary Austrian campaign with some German assistance sees the Serbs get crushed and alternately mowed down or captured when pushed up against the Ottoman and Bulgarian and Romanian borders.

Central Powers victories and diplomacy encourages the Ottoman Empire and Romania to join the Central Powers and declare war on both Russia and Bulgaria by fall 1908. In the Bulgarian side campaign, with Austro-German assistance, the Romanians compel Bulgaria to cede southern Dobruja and the Ottomans compel Bulgaria to cede eastern Rumelia, while the Bulgarian remainder is compelled to pay an indemnity, and submit to occupation and demilitarization.

On the Russian front, Romanian. forces with Austro-German assistance begin an advance into Bessarabia, while Ottoman forces begin an assault into Kars.

On the western front, the French find their assaults aimed at recovering their lost territory in Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium frustratingly futile, and the Germans expert at fixed and flexible defenses.

In the naval sphere, neither Germany nor France can effectively blockade each other, although they fight many ship to ship duels at sea and raid each other’s commerce. They have to mind cruiser rules no matter if attacking with surface or submarine platforms especially when dealing with ships that may belong to powerful or commercially important neutrals like the British, Americans, Norwegians, Dutch, Italians.

In the colonial sphere, the German colony of Togo is overwhelmed by its larger and more populous neighboring French West Africa colony by late 1909, but Germany’s Kamerun colony fights a persistent see-saw battle with the neighboring French Equatorial Africa colony as the war proceeds in Europe. Indochina, Port Arthur and Qingdao based ships raid each other without decisive result. France pull in colonial troops from Algeria and Senegal in ever increasing numbers. The Germans initially do little of this, but when the Ottomans join the war effort in 1909, they begin to ship in an increased number of Muslim Askari troops from Ost Afrika to augment to the Ottoman and Balkan fronts. Ost Afrika troops are also employed in running seesaw battles with the Belgian Congo’s Force Publique. Given recently revealed but long-running pervasive atrocities in the lately abolished Congo Free State, the defenses of Belgian Congo are likely unstable and require French reinforcement against German Ost Afrika colonial force invasions and supported uprisings. However, Ost Afrika is not 100% internally stable, with its own Maji-Maji revolt a recent memory.

The French and Germans occasionally exchange captures of islands in the south and central Pacific between Micronesia and the Society islands around Tahiti. Out of deference to American opinion, the Germans leave the French Caribbean and St. Pierre et Miquelon alone.

Meanwhile in neutral Italy, the Messina earthquake of 1908-09 and recovery from it is keeping Italy hors de combat and uncommitted.

In February 1910, Petrograd (renamed to something non-‘Germanic’ during the war is wracked by food riots and ultimately revolution leading to the abdication of the Tsar and declaration of a Republican, parliamentary regime for Russia.

In parallel with former would-be politicians’ organization in would-be parties for a would-be parliament never actually approved and ratified during the Russian Empire’s lifetime, who make up a provisional parliament and Duma, and pledge to hold a Constituent Assembly to make a new permanent constitution for the land, from the grassroots, among workers, soldiers, and soon peasants, and on occasion other occupational groups additional form governing councils or ‘Soviets’ form. Self-identified Socialist influence is even stronger in these bodies than in the new Duma and reformed Ministries in directs.

The French are worried about a decline in order, stability, and the security of property in Russia. But many Frenchmen hope for the best and try to look on the bright side. At last, the Russian ally is a Republic, the kind of ally France should have. Optimists hope a reformed Russia can persist and fight the war with renewed vigor, perhaps sort of like the Gambetta government after the capture of Napoleon III. Skeptics quickly point out that is a poor example because the French Provisional Government ultimately lost. Peace advocates and volunteer mediators in neutral countries cling to the revolutionary change in Russia as an opportunity to advocate negotiations and peace.

Even the small minority of socialists and peace advocates in the CP occasionally make similar comments. The German Kaiser, Cabinet, and military cabinet is not having any of it. Enemy encirclement needs to be broken once and for all.

In neutral Britain, the Asquith government is getting generally high marks having avoided British participation in war and damage from war, with dignity, in a time of war. There’s some real satisfaction in seeing Russian imperial power blunted, some happiness with seeing reactionary Tsarist autocracy overthrown. Shanghai, India, Persia, and the straits all seem safer now. Small satisfaction at comeuppance for the French failing in their plot to use Russia to crush Germany and Austria and as a lever globally they could use on Britain. But not much, nobody wants to see France eliminated. ‘Good on ‘em’ Britons think when the Japanese mount an invasion in March 1910 of the fairly weakly garrisoned Russian island of Sakhalin.

But there is a growing unease that Germany and its growing web of wartime allies, at land and sea is getting stronger than is good for Britain or the world.

Yet at the same time, among Asquith and his close confidantes there is a feeling there is nothing much to be done about. The fleet and the economy and colonial forces should be kept strong, but good relations with rising Germany are essential. Maneuvering to a policy seen as hostile or as directly thwarting of Germany at this stage although crudely in line with old-time ‘balance of power’ concepts, seems just like a way of antagonizing rising Germany while it ascends without materially constraining Germany.

No, the best way forward is good set of relationships with the likely winner of this war, Germany, and the most powerful of neutrals, the United States, while avoiding too ‘Carthaginian’ a peace against anyone, at least anyone who isn’t Russia.

Germany, for its own reasons, is optimistic for what the Russian Republican revolution means for itself. It expects a decline in military order and discipline. It seeks to encourage this by facilitating the return of Russian radicals and agitators back home from places of exile.

Germany’s early spring effort is a land grab in western Ukraine to grab additional grain lands to worsen Russia’s food problems, and further damage Russian forces.

Its summer focus is an offensive to bleed out the French forces holding Verdun. Also over the summer the Germans and Austrians defend against the Russian Republican regime’s attempt at an offensive and fend it off with effective defense in depth and punishing counter-attacks that leave the Russian Army in ruins.

Russian Bolsheviks, campaigning on the slogans of peace, land, and bread seize power in September 1910 and come to an armistice with the Central Powers by October 1910.

In response, and seeing the writing on the wall, France and Belgium sue for peace, France seeking whatever terms it can get and loss avoidance, and Belgium hoping for whatever merciful restoration it might receive from appealing to the better nature of the Germans and neutral opinion.

Since the Germans, sitting pretty, are in no hurry to reply and allow the western allies to twist in the wind for several days, the Italians, in a true example of bad form, belatedly reiterate their allegiance to the Triple Alliance and declare war on France and all other enemies of Germany and Austria-Hungary, including pointlessly, the already defeated like Serbia, Bulgaria, and Russia. The Italians hasten to mount attacks on French Tunis, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Djibouti. In the initial days of fighting, they are thrown back on all these fronts.

The Germans go for a peacemaking strategy of going harder in the African colonial and eastern sphere in Europe than the western sphere in Europe or Indo-Pacific colonial sphere.

For the Bolshevik Russians, they impose a complete ‘Brest-Litovsk’ like granting of independence to all western fringe ethnic groups, plus the nations of the Trans-Caucasus, leaving the Bolsheviks/now Communists with rule over Belarus, Russia, and Turkestan. In Africa, the Germans establish a Mittelafrika connection between Ost Afrika and Kamerun by absorption of the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa and get Togo restored. For all its late war trouble, Italy walks away only with Djibouti and nothing else.. Berlin and especially Vienna do not mind basically snubbing this Gianni-come-lately that did nothing to prove its military worth. France holds all its possessions in Madagascar, North Africa, and West Africa.

The pre-war status quo in the Pacific colonies is reestablished wherever it was violated.
In the west, Germany retains all Alsace-Lorraine, gains the addition of the Briey-Longwy iron district (already occupied) to its Lorraine/Moselle district, wins the demolitions of all French border fortresses, and the annexation of Luxemburg. Belgium is returned to neutral status, and compensated for its invasion and occupation overwhelming at French expense, with the French forced to cede their traditional Flanders and Picardy north of the Somme regions including Calais to Belgium, which also increases British security from France.

The three leading world powers at the conclusion of this war and the signing of its treaties in 1911 are Germany, the British Empire, and the United States. The leaders of all three are not insincere when they hold summit meeting and speak of maintaining cooperation and peace for all nations, and of the need to avoid a repetition of anything like the late war.

But the idea of hierarchy of nations or of the rights of some nations to guide others, is certainly not dead, although being challenged to one degree or another by the Communist revolutionary state in Russia, Democratic Socialists in Europe, Japan and America, and Anglo-American legalistic proponents of world organization and arbitration.

The Japanese extract a vengeance on Russia in its time of weakness with the occupation of Sakhalin island, and attempt to enhance their influence in China, and totally dominate Korea at the same time.

These latter efforts are less successfully than the Japanese hoped for. In Korea, it is true the countervailing influence projected by the Russian state and state-sponsored trainers and garrisons disappear. However, in the years 1906-1910, Russian trained and Russia/German/French funded/supplied Korean armed forces made some real gains in size, equipment and professionalism and ability to operate independently of Japanese. Additionally, some Russian personnel, fearing for their lives and livelihoods in revolutionary Russia, opt to stay in the service of the Korean Empire. For the Korean populace and elites, seeing the defeat of the Japanese in 1905 also introduced the idea the Japanese could be successfully defied and reduced their all-pervasive ability to intimidate.

By 1911, the American Taft Administration, a champion of the Open Door for China, was also open to the entreaties of American businessmen and Protestant missionaries and secular educators achieving successes in Korea and came to back an open door for Korea as well. Without Japan’s victory over Russia, or the follow-on immigration controversy and need for the ‘Great White Fleet’, the US feared little for a Japanese threat to the Philippines and the Taft-Katsura spheres of influence deal over the Philippines and Korea hardly seemed necessary.

Germany was another staunch opponent of outright Japanese annexation of Korea, and thus, a supporter of the Open Door in Korea.

Thus, Japan found MFN status and natural market advantage based on low-transport costs, low labor costs, and extensive interpersonal, intercultural, and educational contacts were going to be about the limits of its special advantage and position in Korea.

…And this turned out to be all to the good of the people of both countries, and their mutual relationship. Empress Myeongsong, the Imjin War, Admiral Yi and Wako pirates all got mentioned from time to time in this world’s 20th and 21st century Japan and Korea, but *very* infrequently compared to our world, with much less mythology and only by a narrower, nerdier circle.

In China, especially Manchuria, the Russians abandoned their garrison at Port Arthur, with peasant origin troops largely wandering home to try to take part in the division of noble estates. Watching this development, and Russian decay in general, the Japanese planned to invade and occupy Port Arthur, but so did the officials of Qing Dynasty China. Yuan Shikai, commander of the growing Chinese Beiyang Army, made the decisive moves to formally declare war on the dispirited Russians first, move forces into places, and after desultory skirmishing to negotiate their voluntary departure.

 

[Arachnid]

Very nice short tl. Obviously history won't stop in 1911, Germany has secured a dominant position for herself in Central Europe and a large African Empire, in the short term she will be occupied restoring stability to their new colonies and puppets, demobilising, arguing about post war reforms (will the 3 class system be sustainable, I doubt it). Austria-Hungary might have won but a victory won't have solved the deep structural problems of the Dual Monarchy and with Franz Ferdinand alive the heir to the throne is someone who explicitly wants to cut Hungary down to size. That is going to generate massive political fallout in the medium term. As for Britain I can see a renewed push for Imperial Federation to efforts to build up Italy and France against this new German colossus.