To be honest, I have never been sure how serious the proposal for Franco-British unity really was. Even in the darkest days of 1940, there were strong historical reasons mandating against such a union, as well as the coldly practical problem of France needing to seek an armistice as it became clear the Germans had beaten them and the prospect of Britain trying to seek a separate peace of its own. Historically, of course, that didn’t happen, but any French politician worth of the title would at least consider the possibility.
There was also a considerable degree of antagonism between France and Britain as both sides sought to blame the other for the disaster. It would not be easy to overcome such a problem, not least because the prospects for long-term victory would have seemed very remote to the French government in 1940. There was a certain feeling, I suspect, that France had lost and it was time to take their chips, go home, and prepare for another war (as in 1871). With Hitler involved, that was foolish, but not unreasonable based on what they knew in 1940.
What sort of change would it have taken to make a semi-permanent union acceptable?
That’s a tricky question to answer. If France believes Britain will fight on until victory, the French will have a certain incentive to remain in the war - but that incentive would be balanced against the cold fact the Germans could do an awful lot of damage to France (perhaps in this timeline there would be no Vichy, although Vichy’s claim to be standing between France and total German occupation was more self-serving than anything else) and relatively few possibilities for actual victory over Nazi Germany.
Perhaps the Italians entered the war earlier than OTL. That will be foolish, but Mussolini was known for making stupid decisions. Perhaps he thinks France is going to exit the war quicker than OTL and he decides he needs to take his booty before it’s too late. In that case, the combined French and British Navies would have no trouble thrashing the Italian Navy and Anglo-French troops could invade Italian Libya from both East and West, collapsing much of Mussolini’s Empire within a month or two. This would in turn provoke Hitler to be harsher to France, not least because it would also provide excuse for moving additional French troops to Algeria, and instead of Vichy the war in France might end with a near complete German occupation and/or a French government that is even more blatantly a German collaborator.
If France could not get acceptable surrender terms, the French might move to Algeria and accept a union with Britain, at least the duration of the conflict. Might.
In this timeline, the remainder of the Italian Empire would be mopped up before Hitler could come to Mussolini’s rescue. Mussolini might not lose power, but Italian enthusiasm for adventures in Greece and Yugoslavia would be non-existent. Italy would be a very low level player in the war, even if she remained a formal combatant. This would allow the exiled French to ship additional troops to Indochina, making easier for them to stand up to the Japanese; it would also open the prospect of additional support to the French resistance without any of the inter-France political disputes that made it so hard for the Free French to establish themselves as the one true French government. (In this timeline, Charles de Gaulle would probably be a senior French military officer rather than the French political leader.)
Hitler would still go east in 1941, perhaps earlier than OTL. The real question is what would happen with Japan. If the French look stronger in Indochina, the Japanese will find it harder to bring troops to bear against European possessions or win so quickly when/if war breaks out. The absence of a major war in Libya/Egypt would make it easier for Britain to move troops to the Far East too, along with better commanders and war material.
We therefore have two possibilities:
One - Japan attacks Pearl Harbour, as in OTL, and we get a very different war in Europe (probably an invasion of France in 1943).
Two - Japan decides to avoid war with the United States, as well as everyone else, and the war between Hitler and Stalin ends with either a stalemate or one dictator triumphant over the other.
In the long run, greater Franco-British amity would probably lead to a very different NATO and European Union. Historically, there was a great deal of mistrust between Britain and France and that played a major role and how the EU took shape and form.
Thoughts?
Chris
