LSCatilina
Never Forget Avaricon
- Location
- Teuta Albigas - Rutenoi - Keltika
- Pronouns
- ēs/xsi
IOTL, the occupation and peace terms for Italy was significantly more benign than Germany or Japan, or even comparatively to lesser partners of the Axis in Central and Eastern Europe. Territorial losses were particularly limited (including the restoration of a colonial mandate in Somalia), war reparations overall comparable to those of Finland or Hungary, limited military agency (which was shrugged off not two years later as Italy entered NATO), superficial de-facisation, etc. followed by a prompt re-integration of Italy in regional networks.
This was principally motivated by the quick initial collapse of Fascist Italy in 1943 giving the opportunity for Allies to quickly benefit from Italian resources and administration (at least, disregarding the Fascist remnant state surviving trough German support) additionally with Italy being seen both popularly and politically as a side-show, the strength of anti-fascist networks, unwillingness to rock the boat and to give both far-right and far-left in Italy far too much credibility or power in the post-war, and especially not giving both Yugoslavia (and indirectly the USSR) a strong contention point in the region while the costs for occupying a relatively minor strategically region (comparatively to Germany) would have been frowned upon.
Of course, it did not prevent some calls for occupations or harsher peace terms, especially from Yugoslavia with bigger war reparations and territorial gains in Istria and Friul, but as well with French attempts at annexing Ventimiglia and the Roya Valley (and somewhat half-assed attempts in the Aosta Valley) quickly stopped by Americans (basically pulling a "what is wrong with you"), and eventually calls for a retrocession of Sud-Tirol to Austria. So, even IOTL, there were some grounds we can use for an ATL development.
Now, what would be necessary to at least get the basic foundation of an harsher situation in Italy?
Giving it's intimately tied with the military situation, an obvious point might be found in Allies doing much worse in Sicily but I'm not sure how realistic it would be to expect British and American armies to just get stuck in Central Mediterranean threater at this point, giving that I feel like it would be unrealistic (maybe wrongly) to expect an Allies success in Sicily not to translate naturally towards a quick and victorious presence in southern mainland Italy.
Another initial issue would be how to reincofrce the fascist state apparatus in order to prevent its political collapse (or rather, dissolution within the italian state apparatus overall) which, barring significant political reforms and purges in the late 30's/early 40's I'm not to sure how to achieve : doing so, still, might be the best way to at least push forwards Yugoslavian and Italian communists elements while preventing the IOTL liberal/right-wing/post-fascist de facto integration in the immediate late/post-war situation in Italy.
Lasting warfare in the peninsula might be what both French and Yugoslavian ambitions might need to legitimize a-posteriori de facto takeovers (trough more or less phony plebiscites), altough probably not very far from the actual IOTL borders. That'd definitely, even if definitely more symbolic than German losses, put in jeopardy the relations with post-war Italy but again comparatively to West Germany IOTL, I don't think it would necessarily prevent anything similar to IOTL to happen especially with a stronger Soviet/Yugoslavian eastern pressure.
To be honest, i'm not too sure we'd have an occupation comparable to Germany or Japan (and barring an unlikely Soviet takeover, to say the least to Eastern Europe) but something more akin to stricter de-militarizaiton and control of strategic points and harbours.
This was principally motivated by the quick initial collapse of Fascist Italy in 1943 giving the opportunity for Allies to quickly benefit from Italian resources and administration (at least, disregarding the Fascist remnant state surviving trough German support) additionally with Italy being seen both popularly and politically as a side-show, the strength of anti-fascist networks, unwillingness to rock the boat and to give both far-right and far-left in Italy far too much credibility or power in the post-war, and especially not giving both Yugoslavia (and indirectly the USSR) a strong contention point in the region while the costs for occupying a relatively minor strategically region (comparatively to Germany) would have been frowned upon.
Of course, it did not prevent some calls for occupations or harsher peace terms, especially from Yugoslavia with bigger war reparations and territorial gains in Istria and Friul, but as well with French attempts at annexing Ventimiglia and the Roya Valley (and somewhat half-assed attempts in the Aosta Valley) quickly stopped by Americans (basically pulling a "what is wrong with you"), and eventually calls for a retrocession of Sud-Tirol to Austria. So, even IOTL, there were some grounds we can use for an ATL development.
Now, what would be necessary to at least get the basic foundation of an harsher situation in Italy?
Giving it's intimately tied with the military situation, an obvious point might be found in Allies doing much worse in Sicily but I'm not sure how realistic it would be to expect British and American armies to just get stuck in Central Mediterranean threater at this point, giving that I feel like it would be unrealistic (maybe wrongly) to expect an Allies success in Sicily not to translate naturally towards a quick and victorious presence in southern mainland Italy.
Another initial issue would be how to reincofrce the fascist state apparatus in order to prevent its political collapse (or rather, dissolution within the italian state apparatus overall) which, barring significant political reforms and purges in the late 30's/early 40's I'm not to sure how to achieve : doing so, still, might be the best way to at least push forwards Yugoslavian and Italian communists elements while preventing the IOTL liberal/right-wing/post-fascist de facto integration in the immediate late/post-war situation in Italy.
Lasting warfare in the peninsula might be what both French and Yugoslavian ambitions might need to legitimize a-posteriori de facto takeovers (trough more or less phony plebiscites), altough probably not very far from the actual IOTL borders. That'd definitely, even if definitely more symbolic than German losses, put in jeopardy the relations with post-war Italy but again comparatively to West Germany IOTL, I don't think it would necessarily prevent anything similar to IOTL to happen especially with a stronger Soviet/Yugoslavian eastern pressure.
To be honest, i'm not too sure we'd have an occupation comparable to Germany or Japan (and barring an unlikely Soviet takeover, to say the least to Eastern Europe) but something more akin to stricter de-militarizaiton and control of strategic points and harbours.