Without the Cuban Missile Crisis, how long does Khrushchev remain in power?

[Bomster]

So I’m developing a timeline of sorts, where the Soviet Union survives to the modern day. My idea for a POD is Nixon winning the 1960 election, butterflying the Cuban Missile Crisis and perhaps giving Khrushchev more time in power, hopefully butterflying Brezhnev. Does this seem plausible? Without the CMC, how long can Khrushchev last?

 

[Ricardolindo]

So I’m developing a timeline of sorts, where the Soviet Union survives to the modern day. My idea for a POD is Nixon winning the 1960 election, butterflying the Cuban Missile Crisis and perhaps giving Khrushchev more time in power, hopefully butterflying Brezhnev. Does this seem plausible? Without the CMC, how long can Khrushchev last?

I would say no longer than in our timeline. It's very doubtful that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the cause for Khruschev being ousted. His successors didn't even mention it when justifying his being ousted

 

[napoleon IV]

I would say no longer than in our timeline. It's very doubtful that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the cause for Khruschev being ousted. His successors didn't even mention it when justifying his being ousted

Actually, the Cuban Missile Crisis played a big role in the ouster of Khrushchev. It was basically the final straw for a lot of his underlings, who recognized that his recklessness and refusal to listen to others had nearly caused WW3 and had humiliated the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's humiliation during the crisis also seriously sapped his energy and left his listless and somewhat depressed, and as a result he was absent a lot from Moscow (giving the plotters ample time to plan) and didn't act with any real energy upon learning about the plot.

That said, even without the Cuban Missile Crisis Khrushchev's days are numbered. Khrushchev's underlings were sick of his erratic and arbitrary behavior and failures of his leadership in areas like agriculture and the economy. Eventually things are going to boil over, probably within a couple of years of OTL.

 

[Bomster]

Actually, the Cuban Missile Crisis played a big role in the ouster of Khrushchev. It was basically the final straw for a lot of his underlings, who recognized that his recklessness and refusal to listen to others had nearly caused WW3 and had humiliated the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's humiliation during the crisis also seriously sapped his energy and left his listless and somewhat depressed, and as a result he was absent a lot from Moscow (giving the plotters ample time to plan) and didn't act with any real energy upon learning about the plot.

That said, even without the Cuban Missile Crisis Khrushchev's days are numbered. Khrushchev's underlings were sick of his erratic and arbitrary behavior and failures of his leadership in areas like agriculture and the economy. Eventually things are going to boil over, probably within a couple of years of OTL.

Is Brezhnev atleast going to be butterflied?

 

[napoleon IV]

Is Brezhnev atleast going to be butterflied?

There's a good chance he would. By 1964 Khrushchev had become rather dismissive of Brezhnev, and was considering making Nikolai Podgorny his successor instead. Khrushchev had a tendency of removing his proteges after becoming disillusioned with them (see the fates of Frol Kozlov and Alexei Kirichenko) so he could do this to Brezhnev.

 

[Bomster]

There's a good chance he would. By 1964 Khrushchev had become rather dismissive of Brezhnev, and was considering making Nikolai Podgorny his successor instead. Khrushchev had a tendency of removing his proteges after becoming disillusioned with them (see the fates of Frol Kozlov and Alexei Kirichenko) so he could do this to Brezhnev.

Under Podgorny would the Soviet Union have a better chance at survival? Or would it be best to avoid Khrushchev altogether and go with someone like Melenkov or Mikoyan?

 

[Ricardolindo]

Actually, the Cuban Missile Crisis played a big role in the ouster of Khrushchev. It was basically the final straw for a lot of his underlings, who recognized that his recklessness and refusal to listen to others had nearly caused WW3 and had humiliated the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's humiliation during the crisis also seriously sapped his energy and left his listless and somewhat depressed, and as a result he was absent a lot from Moscow (giving the plotters ample time to plan) and didn't act with any real energy upon learning about the plot.

That said, even without the Cuban Missile Crisis Khrushchev's days are numbered. Khrushchev's underlings were sick of his erratic and arbitrary behavior and failures of his leadership in areas like agriculture and the economy. Eventually things are going to boil over, probably within a couple of years of OTL.

Ian Thatcher lists the reasons Khrushchev's successors gave for his bringing ousted. No where is the Cuban Missile Crisis mentioned.
"The anti-Khrushchev charges included policy failures, domestic and foreign. At home industry and agriculture were under-performing. Abroad relations had soured with China. Most importantly, these policy failings were linked to Khrushchev's misdemeanours as leader. Khrushchev, it was claimed, was bypassing the Presidium and the Central Committee. He had taken to issuing decrees in the name of the Central Committee that were in fact on his own initiative. Khrushchev had surrounded himself with sycophants and family members that formed his inner-staff. Presidium colleagues could not reach him directly but had to deal with this entourage. Khrushchev simply ignored the advice of the Politburo, assigning key duties to his private circle outside the control of the party elite. In this sense Khrushchev broke party norms and even engaged in corruption. The award of honours to his son and son-in-law was noted, as well as the use of state money to fund family excursions abroad on what was supposed to be official business.

"Such irregularities, it was said, occurred because Khrushchev had concentrated power in his own hands. Moreover, he did not know how to use this power sensibly. While having little or no expertise, he considered himself an expert in agriculture, diplomacy, science, and art, and his interfering had devastating consequences. Khrushchev defended the quack geneticist Lysenko, for example, despite warnings from eminent scientists. Khrushchev was unable to control his thoughts and most importantly his mouth. He had upset prominent friends within the socialist camp, causing trouble in relations with China, Albania, Romania, and Poland. Khrushchev would make promises to foreign heads of state for which he had not received the required authority from the Presidium or Central Committee. In the USSR Khrushchev had engaged in constant reorganisations of economic and party bodies that brought only additional confusion and threatened to split the party. Yet, paradoxically, this sad story of failure and illegality was accompanied by excessive praise of Khrushchev in the media. Ignored and often insulted by the man who had turned meetings of the Presidium into 'empty formality', Khrushchev's colleagues had to act. Khrushchev's 'petty tyranny' unlike Stalin's was not based on terror, but this did not excuse it. If anything, it was 'harder to struggle with a living cult than with a dead one. If Stalin destroyed people physically, Khrushchev destroyed them morally'.

"This indictment against Khrushchev was a clever use of his own denunciation of the 'cult of personality' against Stalin. (It also borrowed from the criticism, made by Stalin much earlier, that Khrushchev was guilty of 'hare-brained' schemes!) Khrushchev now found himself portrayed as a leader out of touch with reality, as making a mess of policy, and as flouting party rules, ignoring and belittling comrades, whilst surviving in an artificial bubble of excessive praise from official propaganda and an inner coterie of toadies..."

https://history-groby.weebly.com/uploads/2/9/5/6/29562653/khruschev_and_stalin_1.pdf