IOTL, During the French campaign in Egypt and Syria in late 1798, Napoleon employed a cadre of archaeologists, scientists, cartographers and engineers to mount an expedition to the remains of the ancient Canal of the Pharaohs, built by Necho II between the River Nile and Suez Gulf and improved upon by Ptolemy II. Napoleon considered rebuilding and modernizing the un-navigable canal, but ultimately cancelled this project, and instead commissioned the surveyor who'd discovered the remains of the canal, Jacques-Marie Le Père, to conduct a feasibility study on the construction of a new north–south canal to connect the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. However, the three fragmentary survey measurements carried out by Jacques-Marie Le Père to measure the levels of the isthmus in 1799, working in difficult conditions due to Bedouin attacks, the ongoing war, and periods of intense drought and flooding, led his study to incorrectly conclude that the Red Sea was 8.5m (28ft) higher than the Mediterranean; meaning that the waterway would require locks to operate, the construction of which would be costly and time-consuming.
Ultimately, this led to the canal's construction to be placed on hold indefinitely, before ultimately being cancelled altogether by Napoleon. In 1830, General Francis Chesney submitted a report to the British government that stated that there was no difference in elevation and that the Suez Canal was feasible, but his report received no further attention; with Chesney himself subsequently undertaking a campaign in order to persuade the British government to focus upon the Euphrates, with the goals of not only to opening up a new trade route between Britain and India which avoided the lengthy voyage around the South African Cape of Good Hope, but also preventing Russian expansion in the Near East from posing an existential threat to Britain's control of India, as part of the 'Great Game'. And it took until 1846, a full 47yrs afterwards, for Paul-Adrien Bourdaloue's survey of the isthmus (after Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin's Société d'Études du Canal de Suez had invited him and a number of other experts to study the feasibility of the Suez Canal) to be generally accepted as evidence that there was no practical difference in altitude between the two seas. And on the basis of this revelation, concessions were obtained from Sa'id Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt and Sudan, to create a company to construct a canal open to ships of all nations.
However, the British, who controlled both the Cape route and the Overland route to India and the Far East, and heavily favored the status quo, greatly feared that the canal would interfere with its India trade, and disrupt their commercial and maritime supremacy. And they did everything in their power to obstruct and oppose its construction, with Lord Palmerston, the project's most unwavering foe, confessing in the mid-1850s the real motive behind his opposition- that Britain's commercial and maritime relations would be overthrown by the opening of a new route, open to all nations, and thus deprive his country of its present exclusive advantages. And as one of the last-gasp diplomatic moves against the project when it nevertheless went ahead in early 1859, the British disapproved of the use of "forced labour" for construction of the canal; involuntary labour on the project ceased, and the viceroy condemned the corvée, halting the project for two years (1859-1861) before Napoleon III's public backing of the canal project gave it sufficient diplomatic clout to recommence its construction.
Sa'id died in mid-January 1863, and his successor Ismail abolished corvée labor, motivated by his own personal projects (cotton farms, whose export from Egypt had been increasing since the beginning of the American Civil War, along with other cash crops and public works) within Egypt, and looking to limit the company's power. Ismail would soon issue a clarification that corvée labor could still be used for public works essential for the common good (though not on the Suez Canal project)- demanding the return of land from the company to Egypt. The problem was referred during 1864 to the arbitration of Napoleon III, and it took until July for Napoleon III to issue a decree which restricted the use of corvée labour on the project once more, placing the land grants back into the hands of the Egyptian government, but calling for remuneration of 84 million francs to the Suez Canal Company for violation of the labor and land agreements. And with the corvée having already finished the access canal from Lake Timsah to the Red Sea by February 1864, the main canal's construction continued, ultimately being completed via the use of large mechanical dredging machines, and finally opened under French control in November 1869.
So, then- what if the survey measurements carried out by Jacques-Marie Le Père, his brother and the team of accompanying engineers, hadn't made that great mistake back in 1799, and had correctly identified that there was no difference in elevation between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea? How much earlier would the Suez Canal be likely to get completed ITTL, compared to OTL- early enough to be completed in the first decade or two of Muhammad Ali Pasha's reign? And if the Suez Canal's already open to traffic before the Greek War of Independence takes place, how massively could its entry into the equation have shaken things up?
Ultimately, this led to the canal's construction to be placed on hold indefinitely, before ultimately being cancelled altogether by Napoleon. In 1830, General Francis Chesney submitted a report to the British government that stated that there was no difference in elevation and that the Suez Canal was feasible, but his report received no further attention; with Chesney himself subsequently undertaking a campaign in order to persuade the British government to focus upon the Euphrates, with the goals of not only to opening up a new trade route between Britain and India which avoided the lengthy voyage around the South African Cape of Good Hope, but also preventing Russian expansion in the Near East from posing an existential threat to Britain's control of India, as part of the 'Great Game'. And it took until 1846, a full 47yrs afterwards, for Paul-Adrien Bourdaloue's survey of the isthmus (after Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin's Société d'Études du Canal de Suez had invited him and a number of other experts to study the feasibility of the Suez Canal) to be generally accepted as evidence that there was no practical difference in altitude between the two seas. And on the basis of this revelation, concessions were obtained from Sa'id Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt and Sudan, to create a company to construct a canal open to ships of all nations.
However, the British, who controlled both the Cape route and the Overland route to India and the Far East, and heavily favored the status quo, greatly feared that the canal would interfere with its India trade, and disrupt their commercial and maritime supremacy. And they did everything in their power to obstruct and oppose its construction, with Lord Palmerston, the project's most unwavering foe, confessing in the mid-1850s the real motive behind his opposition- that Britain's commercial and maritime relations would be overthrown by the opening of a new route, open to all nations, and thus deprive his country of its present exclusive advantages. And as one of the last-gasp diplomatic moves against the project when it nevertheless went ahead in early 1859, the British disapproved of the use of "forced labour" for construction of the canal; involuntary labour on the project ceased, and the viceroy condemned the corvée, halting the project for two years (1859-1861) before Napoleon III's public backing of the canal project gave it sufficient diplomatic clout to recommence its construction.
Sa'id died in mid-January 1863, and his successor Ismail abolished corvée labor, motivated by his own personal projects (cotton farms, whose export from Egypt had been increasing since the beginning of the American Civil War, along with other cash crops and public works) within Egypt, and looking to limit the company's power. Ismail would soon issue a clarification that corvée labor could still be used for public works essential for the common good (though not on the Suez Canal project)- demanding the return of land from the company to Egypt. The problem was referred during 1864 to the arbitration of Napoleon III, and it took until July for Napoleon III to issue a decree which restricted the use of corvée labour on the project once more, placing the land grants back into the hands of the Egyptian government, but calling for remuneration of 84 million francs to the Suez Canal Company for violation of the labor and land agreements. And with the corvée having already finished the access canal from Lake Timsah to the Red Sea by February 1864, the main canal's construction continued, ultimately being completed via the use of large mechanical dredging machines, and finally opened under French control in November 1869.
So, then- what if the survey measurements carried out by Jacques-Marie Le Père, his brother and the team of accompanying engineers, hadn't made that great mistake back in 1799, and had correctly identified that there was no difference in elevation between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea? How much earlier would the Suez Canal be likely to get completed ITTL, compared to OTL- early enough to be completed in the first decade or two of Muhammad Ali Pasha's reign? And if the Suez Canal's already open to traffic before the Greek War of Independence takes place, how massively could its entry into the equation have shaken things up?