WI: Taiwan had nukes?

[Conster]

Starting from the mid-1960s when China successfully tested their first nuclear weapon, Taiwan had a covert nuclear weapons programme. This book goes into much more detail about this programme, but the gist is that by the mid-1970s Taiwan had successfully purchased uranium from Canada and South Africa and had developed "small-scale reprocessing capabilities" thanks to experts poached from various nations, despite United States opposition. In July 1976, an IAEA inspection discovered a laboratory that had reprocessed suspiciously large amounts of plutonium (more than what "civil use" would entail), which finally alerted the United States into taking decisive action: by 1977 the Taiwanese had begun to shut down parts of the nuclear programme under American pressure, although it still operated on a smaller scale (apparently unbeknownst to Lee Teng-hui himself) until the deputy director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Chang Hsien-yi, defected to the United States.

So what if Taiwan had managed to keep its programme under wraps, or the United States was more lax towards Taiwan's "civil nuclear programme", and they successfully tested a nuke in 1978/1979 (approximately the time frame American intelligence had expected)? How would China react? Would the United States use this opportunity to fully tilt towards China and cut military assistance to Taiwan?

 

[raharris1973]

Declaring open season on Taiwan, or any outcome that leads to a war involving Taiwan would be unpopular, but yes, Taiwan would *not* be making itself popular in the USA or the broader west developing nukes in that timeframe. The USSR might be chuckling silently given the geopolitics of the day, along with India and Vietnam.

 

[raharris1973]

Starting from the mid-1960s when China successfully tested their first nuclear weapon, Taiwan had a covert nuclear weapons programme. This book goes into much more detail about this programme, but the gist is that by the mid-1970s Taiwan had successfully purchased uranium from Canada and South Africa and had developed "small-scale reprocessing capabilities" thanks to experts poached from various nations, despite United States opposition. In July 1976, an IAEA inspection discovered a laboratory that had reprocessed suspiciously large amounts of plutonium (more than what "civil use" would entail), which finally alerted the United States into taking decisive action: by 1977 the Taiwanese had begun to shut down parts of the nuclear programme under American pressure, although it still operated on a smaller scale (apparently unbeknownst to Lee Teng-hui himself) until the deputy director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Chang Hsien-yi, defected to the United States.

So what if Taiwan had managed to keep its programme under wraps, or the United States was more lax towards Taiwan's "civil nuclear programme", and they successfully tested a nuke in 1978/1979 (approximately the time frame American intelligence had expected)? How would China react? Would the United States use this opportunity to fully tilt towards China and cut military assistance to Taiwan?

What do you think of the author's bleak prediction that any Taiwan nuclearization or substantially closer proximate progress to a weapon will mean the PRC going to war, presumably an unlimited one, to compel the project's end? That was the one and only endgame the author envisioned. The defectors and saboteurs of the program were the heroes in the authors telling, and certainly *not* villains or wrongdoers of any sort.

 

[Coiler]

In Nuclear War Simulator, I've actually run a bunch of hypothetical exchanges between Taiwan (with their various real conventional and proposed strategic platforms nuclearized) and the mainland.

Taiwan basically gets to tear a chunk out of Shanghai and the cross strait coast, kill a few million mainlanders, and then gets Exterminatused.

Delivery systems would be a huge bottleneck and getting international support to make them would be even harder.

 

[Conster]

What do you think of the author's bleak prediction that any Taiwan nuclearization or substantially closer proximate progress to a weapon will mean the PRC going to war, presumably an unlimited one, to compel the project's end? That was the one and only endgame the author envisioned. The defectors and saboteurs of the program were the heroes in the authors telling, and certainly *not* villains or wrongdoers of any sort.

I think this depends on who is in power in China/Taiwan/the US. Coiler is absolutely correct that the PRC has a massive advantage over Taiwan per se, and Taiwan knows this; unless they felt confident that the US would back them to the hilt even with the possibility of expanded nuclear war, they'd fold first under the threat of war.

Wouldn't be surprised if this played out like Cuban Missile Crisis, Pt. 2 to be honest.

 

[raharris1973]

In Nuclear War Simulator, I've actually run a bunch of hypothetical exchanges between Taiwan (with their various real conventional and proposed strategic platforms nuclearized) and the mainland.

Taiwan basically gets to tear a chunk out of Shanghai and the cross strait coast, kill a few million mainlanders, and then gets Exterminatused.

Delivery systems would be a huge bottleneck and getting international support to make them would be even harder.

Have you simulated based on 1970s PRC capabilities, 1980s PRC capabilities, 2020s, or decades in between?

 

[raharris1973]

Getting back to your proposed scenario, successful Taiwan nuke testing in 1978/1979.

PRC has a massive advantage over Taiwan per se

This is true, in terms of crude TNT equivalent throw-weight, at least if nuclear munitions, mounted on SRBMS (SCUDs, No Dongs), MRBMs, IRBMs are included. Chemical munitions stockpile tactically deliverable from PRC to Taiwan at that time is less certain. Deliverable conventional firepower from PRC to Taiwan, by conventional warhead missile, bomber aircraft with conventional payloads, and naval ships, in 1978/1979 may be *considerably* less than would meet the eye or that would be grossly suspected of two land-adjacent neighbors of such different geographic and population sizes.

So, although China would *want* to present the following type of threat:

Wouldn't be surprised if this played out like Cuban Missile Crisis, Pt. 2 to be honest.

China in 1978/1979 I think lacks the naval and coast guard capabilities to mount a Kennedy-esque "quarantine" operation/de facto naval blockade against Taiwan. The Taiwan ROC could fairly contest the near-shores waters and maritime approaches to Taiwan and its ports, and, within the range of Taiwan's land-based air cover, it's qualitatively and tactically superior Air Force and pilots could help tip the naval blockade/counter-blockade balance further to Taiwan's advantage.

Now China's naval platforms, by dint of some quantity, including some minelayers, destroyers, and loud diesel subs could make some third party international shippers and insurers "skittish" and cause them to not operate in or insure trade/travel to Taiwan just by making danger of mines or cross-fire elevated. China also wasn't as far from its 'crazy-man' reputation yet. But the Taiwanese could probably pull off protected trading convoys for vital imports with indigenous shipping and naval escort. And the Taiwanese were tougher and more martial then than now. They were under Martial Law also.

The Chinese could also volley some SCUDs in the general direction of Taiwan's shipping lanes, ports and airports, but the accuracy would be piss-poor. China lacked ISR assets and had little or no space-based intel to help with accurate targeting. The max amount of damage and fright they could impose would be on the order of what the Houthis are getting done in the Red Sea now.

The lack of space-based intel and ISR assets means specific preemptive targeting, with any precision, of wherever Taiwan's bombs or limited delivery systems are unlikely to be on target. Unlikely to catch everything on the island. Less so than US targeting for Cuba in 1962, which could have well missed armed tacnukes or some armed MRBMs or IRBMs.

So Chinese tactics, campaigns, operations in a Taiwan Bomb Crisis could not quite have matched those of the USA in the 1962 CMC.

But, for similar strategic ends, disarming the island, China could substitute mass nuclear atomic throw-weight (and the threat of using it) for precision. The threat is disarm, and open for inspection on our terms, by ultimatum deadline, or we use nuclear fire power against all suspected areas housing weapons and beyond. Which is essentially a hostage terror tactic, promising to use at least two dozen of China's high-yield warheads, mounted on SRBM, MRBM, IRBM range rockets mainly over Taiwan's populated industrial areas to ensure pretty thorough coverage of any arsenal/delivery system, general military capability and state capacity. 'Destroy the province to save reunification'.

This requires a revision or explanation of exceptional circumstances making it a non-violation of no-first use policy, but Beijing could do it.

Then it is a matter of the Taiwanese believing it or not and third parties, none more important than the USA believing it and deciding if they want to support Beijing's ultimatum via alternate pressures on Taiwan.

If things proceed a bit further along the game of chicken, and China starts to arm and fuel up their nuclear missiles, other powers, the USA, and do not forget the very non-trivial USSR, both need to decide how they feel about China unholstering and brandishing its nuclear deterring with systems, that in the Russian case, can reach Russian territory. Then Soviets need to consider whether they should follow some doctrinal lines of thought suggesting they should strike first.

There could be an off-chance that even if the US is furious with Taiwan and seeking its disarmament, in this period at the height of the militarized Sino-Soviet dispute, the USSR ends up shielding Taiwan, saying it could not abide (and thus retaliate against) any Beijing nuclear attack on Taiwan, and would stop any imminent attack by "all available means.

Fun times!

Not all the prizes behind the multiple doors here are Armageddon or disaster for Taiwan, just some. Quite the contrary.

 

[raharris1973]

Great book that @Conster is citing by the way. Learned a lot of stuff I never knew before.

Also, even though in the post above I pointed to limitations in the PRC's potential stand-off strike capabilities in the late 1970s, or amphibious or blockade capabilities at a major scale, the PRC always had a serious military, even in national hard times like famine. Still beat India on the frontier during the famine of 61-62 while there were Tibet, Xinjiang insurgencies, a Henan mutiny, and losing air battles with the ROC over the straits. Took the Yijingshan islands amphibiously in '55. And in 1975, pulled off an amphibious seizure of the Paracels from the South Vietnamese, over an unprecedented distance.

 

[ChrisNuttall]

It’s been a long time since I looked at any of this, but IIRC there was a US study in which much of the Chinese population could be wiped out with relatively few nuclear bombs – this does assume, of course, that one had the ability to get them to their targets and while the US did and does there’s no reason to assume Taiwan had the ability to get them far into the Chinese mainland. That said, the Taiwanese could easily put bombs on ships sailing into the Chinese harbours or hide them on the seabed in hopes of causing tidal waves – a tactic that worked in books and comics, but I don’t know how it would work in real life.

The Taiwanese justification for nukes would be obvious – they have no reason to believe China is interested in peaceful reunification and, even before Hong Kong was returned to China and saw its democracy brutally crushed, they’d suspect the worst. They’d also be unsure if the US would back them, if the Chinese invaded; they’d certainly fear the US might look the other way, if the Chinese offered or threatened the US enough to keep them out.

They might also assume the Chinese threats were bluffs. If they had enough nukes to do real damage to China, or the Chinese believe they do, they might call the Chinese bluff. Demands they open all their facilities to Chinese inspection would be disastrous in the long run – they certainly couldn’t trust the Chinese to do it fairly, nor could they keep the Chinese from stealing nuclear secrets or exploting the inspections in other ways. They might also assume the US would back them anyway, either to keep China from taking Taiwan or to make sure the Chinese go down hard in a nuclear exchange. Probably not true, but people have made all sorts of absurd assumptions before …

Thoughts?

Chris

 

[Charles EP M.]

As I understand it, the  rhetoric is that China sees a fully independent & admitting it Taiwan as an existential threat and will cone down hard. So it depends if they really do mean that and are willing to lose Shanghai (at least) and piss off the other nuclear powers by going to war, or if they'll consider the price too high now they might have to pay it

 

[Simon]

So what if Taiwan had managed to keep its programme under wraps, or the United States was more lax towards Taiwan's "civil nuclear programme", and they successfully tested a nuke in 1978/1979?

Seems like carrying out an actual test would be kicking over a hornets nest for little real advantage, the Israeli path of nuclear ambiguity potentially being the better option.

 

[Coiler]

It’s been a long time since I looked at any of this, but IIRC there was a US study in which much of the Chinese population could be wiped out with relatively few nuclear bombs

China is comparably (even more) vulnerable to nuclear attack because its gigantic population is packed into the east. "Relatively Few" bombs in an American case means relatively few monster 1950s-60s bombs where the smallest are in the triple digit kilotons. It doesn't mean those from an emerging nuclear state.

Seems like carrying out an actual test would be kicking over a hornets nest for little real advantage, the Israeli path of nuclear ambiguity potentially being the better option.

Plus they literally have no room to safely test it beyond an obvious and still iffy drilling really, really deep into a mountain.

 

[Simon]

Plus they literally have no room to safely test it beyond an obvious and still iffy drilling really, really deep into a mountain.

Well there's always the (probable) Israeli-South African method of loading it onto a ship and then conducting the test somewhere out of the way.