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The US and its allies overthrow Saddam Hussein back in 1991

CaliGuy

Active member
This should probably be the last new thread that I'm going to make for today since I don't want to overwhelm this forum. Anyway, though, here goes:

What if the US and its allies would have successfully pressed on all of the way up to Baghdad in 1991 and helped the Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish rebels whom Bush Sr. encouraged to rebel against Saddam Hussein to actually overthrow Saddam Hussein? Would there have been a subsequent Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgency similar to what occurred after 2003 in real life? Would there have eventually been the rise of anything comparable to ISIS? What effects would a new, likely Shiite-led regime in Iraq in 1991 (as opposed to 2003, as in real life) have had on both Iraq, on the rest of the Middle East, and on the rest of the world?

Any thoughts on this?
 
This should probably be the last new thread that I'm going to make for today since I don't want to overwhelm this forum. Anyway, though, here goes:

What if the US and its allies would have successfully pressed on all of the way up to Baghdad in 1991 and helped the Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish rebels whom Bush Sr. encouraged to rebel against Saddam Hussein to actually overthrow Saddam Hussein? Would there have been a subsequent Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgency similar to what occurred after 2003 in real life? Would there have eventually been the rise of anything comparable to ISIS? What effects would a new, likely Shiite-led regime in Iraq in 1991 (as opposed to 2003, as in real life) have had on both Iraq, on the rest of the Middle East, and on the rest of the world?

Any thoughts on this?

It would probably have gone much better than in 2003. The Sunnis were more secular, as they hadn't yet been radicalized by Saddam's Back to Faith campaign. The Shia were also more secular and had less ties to Iran, as they hadn't yet been betrayed by the US. In addition, Iraqis weren't suffering from years of sanctions. Overall, Iraq was much better in 1991 than in 2003.
 
It would probably have gone much better than in 2003. The Sunnis were more secular, as they hadn't yet been radicalized by Saddam's Back to Faith campaign. The Shia were also more secular and had less ties to Iran, as they hadn't yet been betrayed by the US. In addition, Iraqis weren't suffering from years of sanctions. Overall, Iraq was much better in 1991 than in 2003.
So, no massive Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq after 1991?

Also, does Bush Sr. aim to disband the existing Iraqi military? Doing that angered a lot of Iraqi Sunni Arabs in real life and caused a lot of them to join an insurgency against the US--something that was rather deadly considering that a lot of them had military training that could help this insurgency.
 
So, no massive Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq after 1991?

Also, does Bush Sr. aim to disband the existing Iraqi military? Doing that angered a lot of Iraqi Sunni Arabs in real life and caused a lot of them to join an insurgency against the US--something that was rather deadly considering that a lot of them had military training that could help this insurgency.

The Iraqi military was suffering from defections at this time. It would probably have been reorganized.
 
I mean reorganized as in they would probably have kicked out the high ranking Baathist officials and reassembled the remaining soldiers and the ones that had defected because they were tired of Saddam.
That makes sense. Of course, one might wonder if Iraq's new Shiite-led government might want a lot of Iraq's new top generals to likewise be Shiites.
 
Thing is, as I noted, Iraq was far less sectarian in 1991 than in 2003. Even many Sunni soldiers defected because they were tired of Saddam and his endless wars.
OK; that makes sense.

Also, you think that, with democracy being installed in Iraq in 1991, Iraq will successfully be able to keep a lid on sectarianism for the next three decades? If so, are we going to see politicians such as Ayad Allawi and/or Haider al-Abadi be more successful in this scenario due to their ability to appeal to a cross-sectarian coalition?
 
It would probably have gone much better than in 2003. The Sunnis were more secular, as they hadn't yet been radicalized by Saddam's Back to Faith campaign. The Shia were also more secular and had less ties to Iran, as they hadn't yet been betrayed by the US. In addition, Iraqis weren't suffering from years of sanctions. Overall, Iraq was much better in 1991 than in 2003.

Not to sound all neocon, but the Iranian role in the Iraqi insurgency is hard to overstate.

In 2001, the Iranians thought that they could form, if not an alliance, a mutual understanding with the U.S., which had similar goals and the same enemies. They cooperated very closely with the Americans in overthrowing the Taliban. The Axis of Evil speech was completely out of left field to the Iranians and hardened opposition to the U.S. The strong Iranian opposition to the U.S. agenda in the Middle East isn't because there's some kind of implacable irrational hatred, it's because the U.S. threatened the very existence of the Iranian regime for no particular reason.

The Iranians captured a lot of senior Al-Qaeda leaders fleeing from Afghanistan in 2001 and held them there. When the U.S. invaded Iraq, they released them there, including guys like Zarqawi. A lot of people pooh-pooh the idea that Iran worked with or created Al Qaeda, but it's a real fact that it happened that way. Obviously there was never any Iranian control of AQI, but without Iran, the Sunni insurgency would have developed very differently. The Al Qaeda guys sent to Iraq by the Iranians created an organizational layer that welded various regime loyalist and Sunni insurgent groups into a signal organization that became AQI/Mujahedeen Shura (and eventually morphed into ISIS).

In addition, besides the overt Iranian government support of the Iraqi regime (which in many ways exacerbated sectarian tensions), the IRGC was subverting Shia groups like the nominally anti-Iranian Jaysh-al-Mahda into initially anti-regime but always anti-U.S. militias. If Iraq had actually been a Shia government versus a Sunni insurgency, the situation in 2006-2007 would have been much less out of control.

The situation in 1991 isn't likely to create U.S./Iran rapprochement in the same way you could have had in 2001, but the Iranian regime is likely to stand back and allow the coalition to succeed. That's in addition to the fact that 1991 Iraq is a lot more stable and a lot less a balancing act of tribal interests than Iraq after a devastating decade of sanctions. There may be some degree of insurgency, but it shouldn't be extremely difficult to suppress.
 
If Iraq had actually been a Shia government versus a Sunni insurgency, the situation in 2006-2007 would have been much less out of control.
The rest of your post here sounds very reasonable, but I'm confused about this part. Didn't Iraq, in fact, have a Shi'a government versus a Sunni insurgency in 2006-2007 in real life?
 
The rest of your post here sounds very reasonable, but I'm confused about this part. Didn't Iraq, in fact, have a Shi'a government versus a Sunni insurgency in 2006-2007 in real life?

Yes?

I just said it wasn't that simple, because you had groups like Jaysh-al-Mahda that were anti-coalition Shia militias that had a complicated relationship with the government.

This is one of many reasons why the iRaQ iS tHrEe SePaRaTe CoUnTrIeS, jUsT pArTiTiOn iT hot take from 2006 was utterly idiotic.
 
There would be no public or international support for an invasion of Iraq in 1991. Even committing to a defense of Kuwait was extremely controversial until the operation went so smoothly. The world was a very different place in 1991 than 2003. Vietnam was a recent memory. NATO hegemony wasn't absolute. Iraq pre-sanctions was a functioning state with a much more powerful military. Honestly it's much easier to imagine a scenario in which the US doesn't respond militarily to the occupation of Kuwait than one in which they decide to go all the way to Baghdad.
 
Yes?

I just said it wasn't that simple, because you had groups like Jaysh-al-Mahda that were anti-coalition Shia militias that had a complicated relationship with the government.

This is one of many reasons why the iRaQ iS tHrEe SePaRaTe CoUnTrIeS, jUsT pArTiTiOn iT hot take from 2006 was utterly idiotic.
That makes sense; thank you!

There would be no public or international support for an invasion of Iraq in 1991. Even committing to a defense of Kuwait was extremely controversial until the operation went so smoothly. The world was a very different place in 1991 than 2003. Vietnam was a recent memory. NATO hegemony wasn't absolute. Iraq pre-sanctions was a functioning state with a much more powerful military. Honestly it's much easier to imagine a scenario in which the US doesn't respond militarily to the occupation of Kuwait than one in which they decide to go all the way to Baghdad.
Interesting. Do you think that the US would have settled for sanctions on Iraq over Kuwait if Dukakis had been US President during this time?

Also, IMHO, Bush Sr.'s biggest mistake during the Gulf War was actually encouraging the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds to rebel. I mean, for goodness sake, if you're not actually going to help them, why encourage them to rebel against Saddam Hussein in the first place?
 
Interesting. Do you think that the US would have settled for sanctions on Iraq over Kuwait if Dukakis had been US President during this time?

Very possible. It's also worth noting that Saddam invading Kuwait was far from inevitable. Nationalistic cover aside, the main reason Saddam invaded Kuwait in the first place was because he owed them a ton of money he couldn't afford on loans acquired during the Iran-Iraq War. Without a belief that US power would back them militarily, Kuwait would probably be much more cautious and conciliatory in its dealings with Iraq (allow Iraq to negotiate a more favorable repayment plan, not slant drill into Iraq when they're unable to meet payments, etc.). It's entirely likely imo that under a President Dukakis the Gulf War never happens at all.
 
Not to sound all neocon, but the Iranian role in the Iraqi insurgency is hard to overstate.

In 2001, the Iranians thought that they could form, if not an alliance, a mutual understanding with the U.S., which had similar goals and the same enemies. They cooperated very closely with the Americans in overthrowing the Taliban. The Axis of Evil speech was completely out of left field to the Iranians and hardened opposition to the U.S. The strong Iranian opposition to the U.S. agenda in the Middle East isn't because there's some kind of implacable irrational hatred, it's because the U.S. threatened the very existence of the Iranian regime for no particular reason.

The Iranians captured a lot of senior Al-Qaeda leaders fleeing from Afghanistan in 2001 and held them there. When the U.S. invaded Iraq, they released them there, including guys like Zarqawi. A lot of people pooh-pooh the idea that Iran worked with or created Al Qaeda, but it's a real fact that it happened that way. Obviously there was never any Iranian control of AQI, but without Iran, the Sunni insurgency would have developed very differently. The Al Qaeda guys sent to Iraq by the Iranians created an organizational layer that welded various regime loyalist and Sunni insurgent groups into a signal organization that became AQI/Mujahedeen Shura (and eventually morphed into ISIS).

In addition, besides the overt Iranian government support of the Iraqi regime (which in many ways exacerbated sectarian tensions), the IRGC was subverting Shia groups like the nominally anti-Iranian Jaysh-al-Mahda into initially anti-regime but always anti-U.S. militias. If Iraq had actually been a Shia government versus a Sunni insurgency, the situation in 2006-2007 would have been much less out of control.

The situation in 1991 isn't likely to create U.S./Iran rapprochement in the same way you could have had in 2001, but the Iranian regime is likely to stand back and allow the coalition to succeed. That's in addition to the fact that 1991 Iraq is a lot more stable and a lot less a balancing act of tribal interests than Iraq after a devastating decade of sanctions. There may be some degree of insurgency, but it shouldn't be extremely difficult to suppress.

The reason why Iran supported the Iraqi insurgency was that it was afraid that the existence of a Shia majority democracy, especially a neighboring one, would lead to a revolution in Iran. If a Shia majority Iraqi democracy succeeded in this thread's scenario, do you think a revolution would eventually happen in Iran?
 
The reason why Iran supported the Iraqi insurgency was that it was afraid that the existence of a Shia majority democracy, especially a neighboring one, would lead to a revolution in Iran. If a Shia majority Iraqi democracy succeeded in this thread's scenario, do you think a revolution would eventually happen in Iran?

That's not at all why the Iranians supported the Iraqi insurgency. The U.S. had explicitly said that the Iranian regime was next on the chopping block, so it made perfect sense for the IRGC to do everything they could to make the U.S. occupation fail while the Iranian government was propping up the Iraqi regime.

A Shia majority democracy has succeeded in Iraq (with Iranian support), and the Iranian regime hasn't magically fallen. There's been demonstrations and protests (and continue to be demonstrations), but the Iranian regime is pretty stable, not to mention democratic.

Are you posting from a parallel universe? No element of your question makes any sense at all.
 
That's not at all why the Iranians supported the Iraqi insurgency. The U.S. had explicitly said that the Iranian regime was next on the chopping block, so it made perfect sense for the IRGC to do everything they could to make the U.S. occupation fail while the Iranian government was propping up the Iraqi regime.

A Shia majority democracy has succeeded in Iraq (with Iranian support), and the Iranian regime hasn't magically fallen. There's been demonstrations and protests (and continue to be demonstrations), but the Iranian regime is pretty stable, not to mention democratic.

Are you posting from a parallel universe? No element of your question makes any sense at all.

No offense, but I don't consider Iran, that has a clerical as Supreme Leader and where no anti-Ayatollah politicians are allowed, a democracy.
Regardless, no doubt, one of the reasons Iran supported the Iraqi insurgency was the American threat. However, I have no doubts that the Ayatollah also was afraid that a successful Shia majority Iraqi democracy would lead to Iranians demanding to have something like that. That doesn't mean his fear was justifed, though.
 
No offense, but I don't consider Iran, that has a clerical as Supreme Leader and where no anti-Ayatollah politicians are allowed, a democracy.
Regardless, no doubt, one of the reasons Iran supported the Iraqi insurgency was the American threat. However, I have no doubts that the Ayatollah also was afraid that a successful Shia majority Iraqi democracy would lead to Iranians demanding to have something like that. That doesn't mean his fear was justifed, though.

I mean, if we're just making things up rather than talking about things that actually happened, yes. But if we're confining ourselves to facts rather than wild supposition, no.
 
I mean, if we're just making things up rather than talking about things that actually happened, yes. But if we're confining ourselves to facts rather than wild supposition, no.

Here is a news article from the time: https://washingtontimes.com/news/2004/apr/7/20040407-124311-9361r/. It includes those quotes from a military source: "Iran does not want a success in Iraq" "A democratic Iraq is a death knell to the mullahs." What do you think of this? I think the wording is ambiguous enough to support both of our views.
 
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